



Somaliland: Dynamics of internal legitimacy and (lack of) external sovereignty



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ABSTRACT

Despite its strong legal and historical claims to sovereignty, the Republic of Somaliland remains entirely unrecognized by the international community more than 20 years after it proclaimed independence from Somalia in 1991. Paradoxically, Somaliland's lack of external legitimacy has, in some ways, facilitated the growth and development of its internal legitimacy. In contrast, Somalia enjoys widespread external recognition from the international community but has very little domestic legitimacy and largely fails to govern effectively the territory it claims. Somaliland's high degree of domestic legitimacy and its strong desire for external recognition increasingly come into conflict with one another both in the eastern parts of Somaliland and in the continued democratic development of its hybrid domestic political institutions. The safest prediction for Somaliland is continued *de facto* statehood where its strong internal legitimacy enables it to survive in a hostile external environment but fails to translate into widespread sovereign recognition of its significant domestic accomplishments. Ultimately, though, Somaliland's ability to deliver the "goods" on economic development and poverty reduction for its citizens will be significantly hampered without external recognition of its domestic achievements.

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Introduction

There is growing recognition that sovereign states share the stage with a wide range of other entities, including governments-in-exile, stateless enclaves, internationalized territories, and *de facto* states (Berg and Kuusk, 2010; McConnell, 2009). However, McConnell's (2009: 344–345) observation still rings true: framing these sovereign anomalies "in consistently negative terms (as illegal, pathological and clandestine) and with regard to what they fail to achieve (sovereign territorial statehood) ultimately restricts analysis of these polities and denigrates their achievements." This article investigates a specific type of sovereign anomaly, a *de facto* state that controls territory and provides governance over an extended period, yet remains unrecognized by the international community (see Pegg, 1998 for a detailed definition). We employ the term "*de facto* state" both because it is "the most appropriate and most neutral" term (O'Loughlin et al., 2011: 2) and because it is widely used (see, for example, Pegg, 1998; Lynch, 2002; Popescu, 2007; Berg and Kuusk, 2010; Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2012).

Among today's *de facto* states, Somaliland occupies a special place. The only extant such case in Africa, it does not – in contrast to virtually all other unrecognized states – enjoy the support of an external patron. It achieved its independence and has maintained its precarious existence at the margins of international society entirely by its own efforts. Even after the formation of its latest government in 2012, the formal parent state from which it has seceded, Somalia, remains a paradigmatic failed state and does not – at least for the time being – represent any military threat to Somaliland. In contrast to the situation of many widely recognized African states, most observers agree that Somaliland enjoys a high degree of legitimacy among its citizens (Huliaras, 2002; Kaplan, 2008: 144; Ibrahim and Terlinden, 2010: 76).

Thus, a unique situation has arisen in the Horn of Africa: a failed state (Somalia) enjoys full international recognition, with all the rights that go with it, such as a seat in the UN and access to other intergovernmental institutions. To the degree that this state exists at all, it does not enjoy much legitimacy among its own citizens. As Lewis (2010: xv) observes, there is "a striking contrast between the legitimacy bestowed outside Somalia on this ramshackle enterprise by the EU, UN, African Union and latterly the United States and the contemptuous disregard displayed toward it by the majority of the Somali population" (see also Anonymous, 2002; Geldenhuys, 2009: 146; Menkhaus, 2012). As discussed below, this

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situation has not changed greatly since the inauguration of the latest Somali government in 2012. Yet, next door we find Somaliland, which exists under the opposite conditions: denied external recognition, the majority of its citizens recognize it as a legitimate state, and with its limited means it tries to fulfill the basic tasks expected of a state such as providing security, infrastructure and basic health and educational services. The paradox, then, can be described as the contrast between a legal state with limited internal legitimacy and an internationally “illegal” state which enjoys widespread domestic legitimacy (Anonamous, 2002: 247–248; Poore, 2009; Walls and Kibble, 2010: 52).

Most studies of Somaliland have focused either on the external aspect – why it is denied recognition and/or the prospects for achieving it – or the internal aspect, why Somaliland ended up with the political system it has, and how it functions. We combine these two perspectives and ask: how are these two aspects of legitimacy – internal and external – interconnected? Has the lack of international recognition hampered (or promoted) the development towards good governance that can be observed in Somaliland?

Aspects of internal legitimacy in *de facto* states

State legitimacy has been variously defined. Lipset maintained that legitimacy involves the capacity of a system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society (Lipset, 1960: 77). Gilley (2006: 48) similarly notes that “legitimacy is a distinct form of political support that concerns evaluations of the state from a public or ‘common good’ perspective. . . a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power.” Here, legitimacy derives from the citizens’ beliefs and attitudes rather than from actual state performance.

The understanding of legitimacy in the Failed State Index (FSI) is more substantive. It includes pressures and measures related to such things as corruption, government effectiveness, political participation, level of democracy, illicit economy, protests and power struggle (Fund for Peace, 2013). On the FSI list, Somalia ends up with the dubious distinction of being “the world’s most failed state,” with 9.5 points out of 10 possible for legitimacy failure (Somaliland is not listed). Another ranking of state performance, however, Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” index, which ranks countries in terms of their civil liberties and political rights on a scale from 7 (lowest) to 1 (highest), gives Somaliland a combined score of 4.5. Unsurprisingly, this is far better than Somalia (7), but also better than most of the other neighboring countries: Uganda scores 5, while Djibouti gets 5.5; Ethiopia, 6; and Sudan, 7. Only Kenya (4) scores marginally better than Somaliland (Freedom House, 2014). Although Freedom House’s methodology has come in for sharp criticism, Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2012: 142) find that it typically devalues democratic achievements in *de facto* states which means that this comparison might actually understate Somaliland’s comparatively better performance than its recognized neighbors.

Democracy is only one possible source of legitimacy. Max Weber famously identified three types of legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal (Weber, 1984). These he called “ideal” types that do not necessarily correspond directly to any actually existing states. Expressed in Weberian terms, Somaliland is a mixed type where state authority rests on a peculiar combination of traditional and rational-legal values discussed below.

Holsti (1996) has introduced two important distinctions with regard to state legitimacy which are useful for our discussion. The first one runs between domestic and international legitimacy (internal and external legitimacy in our terminology). Holsti points

out that a state whose frontiers are contested or which receives no international recognition is inherently weak. “The lack of international legitimacy may help undermine domestic legitimacy (and vice versa)” (Holsti, 1996: 95). Next, within domestic legitimacy Holsti distinguishes between a “vertical” and a “horizontal” dimension. The former in his terminology establishes the connection between the society and political institutions and regimes (the “right to rule”). In most modern states, Holsti maintains, vertical legitimacy is based on performance. “The state has to earn and maintain its right to rule through the provision of services, including security, law and order” (Holsti, 1996: 91).

The horizontal dimension of domestic legitimacy, according to Holsti, defines the limits and criteria for membership in the political community. If the various groups and communities within the polity accept and tolerate each other, horizontal legitimacy is high. Conversely, to the extent that groups oppress or exploit each other within the state, there is low horizontal legitimacy (Holsti, 1996: 97). Dubious vertical legitimacy may exacerbate problems with horizontal legitimacy. States that are based on a fundamentally exclusionist vertical principle such as religion or ethnicity by definition divide plural communities (Holsti, 1996, 88 and 106).

Several authors have argued that domestic or internal legitimacy is particularly important for *de facto* states (Caspersen, 2012; Berg, 2013, 470–1). Bakke et al. (2014: 2) maintain that “while internal legitimacy [. . .] is important for any state, it is particularly important for unrecognized states, whose lack of external legitimacy has made claims to internal legitimacy integral to their quest for recognition.” In their study of internal legitimacy in *de facto* states Bakke et al. combine elements of a perception-based and a performance-based understanding. They define internal legitimacy as “people’s confidence and belief in the entity itself, the ruling regime, and the state institutions” (Bakke et al., 2014: 2). State legitimacy, they maintain, is about “believing in the state and its right to exist, it is about the population’s adherence to the foundational myth of a political entity as a state” (Bakke et al., 2014: 3). At the same time, these authors seek the sources of this internal legitimacy at the level of performance, in the ability of *de facto* state leaders to act as “state-builders”. Among the public goods they believe *de facto* state leaders must deliver in order to inspire trust in the population are schools and health care, economic goods and democratic participation, but most important is the provision of security and physical protection. “An important source for internal legitimacy is security. . . . Indeed, if a *de facto* state is characterized by violence and insecurity, internal legitimacy is likely to suffer both directly and indirectly” (Bakke et al., 2014: 3).

Discussing political legitimacy in three *de facto* states and their parent states, Berg (2013: 471) distinguishes between “input-oriented” and “output-oriented” legitimacy. While the former refers to a sense of identity and community, the latter is based on the capacity to solve problems. Within output-oriented legitimacy Berg makes further distinctions between democracy, general performance, and security. Among these, security is the most fundamental because it “makes the production of other sources of legitimacy possible, including basic health and education services” (Berg, 2013: 472).

The internal legitimacy of Somaliland: a hybrid political system with popular support

Somalia and Somaliland are almost unique in Africa in their high degree of ethnic homogeneity. Most Somalis speak the same language and profess the same religion, Sunni Islam. However, Somalis are divided into an elaborate system of clans and sub-clans that in many ways plays the same role as ethnic groups in other

African societies. Northern Somalia is dominated by the Isaaq clan (itself divided into several sub-clans), one of the five or six large clan families in Somalia, but there are also substantial groups of other clans in Somaliland, such as the Gadabuursi in the West and the Warsengheli and Dhulbahante in the East.

Before colonization, authority among the Somalis was exercised by clan elders. Lewis (1961) described the political system among the northern Somalis as a “pastoral democracy.” When the British established the protectorate of Somaliland in 1884, they interfered relatively little in the way society was run. Their main interest in the region was to secure a steady delivery of livestock to their much more important colony of Aden, which controlled approaches to the Suez Canal. This led to “benign neglect” (Spears, 2003: 93).

Bradbury maintains that when the military dictatorship of Siad Barre (1961–1991) ended, “one legacy of indirect rule in Somalia was to reinforce indigenous political institutions in a way that proved vital to the ability of people in Somaliland to reconstitute a polity in the aftermath of the civil war” (Bradbury, 2008: 29). Of course, the British did not leave traditional Somali society untouched; their system of indirect rule drew upon the authority of the clan leaders and in the process altered it (Renders, 2012: 25). Yet, precisely because the colonial authorities needed the traditional leaders as intermediaries, “they were careful not to push their demands on them too far, or undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the population” (Renders, 2012: 26). Thus, after 1991, the traditional leaders represented an important source of authority that could be tapped (Ibrahim and Terlinden, 2010: 76).

This was seen clearly in the first years after the civil war ended. The Somali National Movement (SNM) which had led the armed resistance against Siad Barre’s dictatorship in the northwest, controlled Somaliland militarily but was not inclined to rule permanently. Rather than simply establishing a one-party state, it got a mandate to govern for two years with SNM leader Abdirahman Ahmed Ali “Tuur” as interim president. This mandate was given to the SNM at a conference, or *Guurti*, of elders in Burco in 1991, the first in a series of such conferences that were destined to play crucial roles in the formative years of the *de facto* state.

In 1993, an even more important *Guurti* was held in Boroma. This lasted for four months and involved more than 2000 persons (Adam, 1994: 33; Bradbury, 2008: 97–100). In addition, a series of sub-national *Guurti* were organized to sort out local disputes among neighboring clans. These meetings were materially supported by the communities, and resolutions were adopted by consensus after broad consultations. According to Ibrahim and Terlinden (2010: 76), this provided the Somaliland state with “a remarkable degree of local and national ownership, legitimacy, and inclusion.”

The *Guurti* served two main purposes. On the one hand, they settled disputes among the clans and sub-clans. State- and nation-building in Somaliland was not plain sailing. Armed conflicts over the control of important resources such as harbors and airports erupted among the clans and sub-clans. Somaliland went through two main fits of civil war. Clan and factional fighting started in January 1992 in Burco and escalated sharply in Berbera in March. The contest to control the port of Berbera was ultimately resolved by two clan conferences, held in Sheikh (October 1992) and in Boroma (January–May 1993) (Bradbury, 2008: 87–100; Omaar, 1994: 234–235). Subsequently, in November 1994, new fighting broke out near Hargeisa. Opposition forces controlled Burco and the outskirts of Hargeisa. This fighting was again resolved by a conference, in 1997. Except for sporadic fighting in the eastern regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC), the rest of Somaliland has remained peaceful since 1997.

Importantly, the fighting in the 1990s pitted various sub-clans of the Isaaq against each other, rather than against the smaller clans. At the various *Guurtis*, elders from minority clans contributed actively to finding peace formulae that could settle the

disputes among the Isaaq (Walls, 2009a: 388). These civil wars illustrated that the numerically dominant Isaaq did not represent a united front against the minorities and therefore served to reassure at least some of the minorities that the Isaaq would not dominate Somaliland politically. As Bryden (2004: 177) notes, the engagement of the western Gadabuursi clan in Somaliland’s national administration “since the early 1990s has long helped Somaliland to claim an identity broader than the Isaaq clan.”

The second important objective of the clan conferences besides reconciliation was to lay the groundwork for the structure of Somaliland’s state institutions. The 1993 Boroma conference developed a Transitional National Charter which became the basis for Somaliland’s Constitution. It also decided to replace interim president “Tuur” with Mohammed Ibrahim Egal. The system designed at the conference has been described as a traditional–modern “hybrid,” as it included elements of premodern “pastoral democracy” such as a reliance on traditional clan elders for mediation or negotiation and modern representative democracy with a division of powers between the different branches of government. A permanent *Guurti* was established as the upper house of the parliament to which the clans appoint elders from among their own group. Initially, the lower house in the parliament as well as the government were also composed on a clan basis, with each clan getting a fixed quota of MPs and ministers. Under this system the smaller clans were overrepresented as a deliberate measure to assuage fears of Isaaq dominance (Bradbury, 2008: 97–100; Eubank, 2012: 471–473).

When a constitution was adopted through a national referendum in 2001, however, a competitive party system was adopted for elections to the lower house instead of the clan quotas. The party system in Somaliland is somewhat idiosyncratic, as only three parties which demonstrate support in each of Somaliland’s six regions are allowed to register for national elections in accordance with Article 9 of Somaliland’s Constitution. This three party limitation is meant to forestall party fragmentation along clan lines (Bradbury et al., 2003: 464; Huliaras, 2002: 166). Somaliland’s 2001 “Presidential and Local Elections Law” (subsequently modified by the 2011 “Regulation of Political Associations and Parties Law”) established a system whereby multiple political parties and associations could compete in local elections whose results would determine the three parties allowed to compete for the next ten years (personal interviews, Abdu Rahman Hussein and Mohamed Farah Hersi). Seven parties and associations ultimately contested the local elections in 2012.

Although the various clan conferences were watershed moments in Somaliland’s political development, it is important to note that “the self-styled republic was not solely established on ‘bottom-up’ processes and ‘grassroots’ democracy. Rather... it has at least as much been shaped by ‘top-down’ policies and elitist power politics” (Balthasar, 2013: 231). In the critical assessment of Balthasar (2013), the civil wars of the early-mid 1990s were as constitutive of Somaliland’s state-making process as were its various clan conferences because they debilitated rivals, brought important assets like Berbera’s port and Hargeisa’s airport under national control and solidified the government’s revenue base.

Since the adoption of the 2001 Constitution Somaliland has faced numerous political crises. These include the unexpected death of President Egal in 2002, an incredibly close and hotly contested presidential election in 2003, the government’s loss of a parliamentary majority in 2005, and repeated delays to the presidential elections originally scheduled for 2008. It has arguably emerged stronger from all of them. After the death of President Egal, power was transferred peacefully and in accordance with the Constitution to Vice-President Dahir Riyale Kahin, even though he was from a minority clan. In Somaliland’s first direct presidential elections in 2003, Riyale Kahin was initially declared the

winner over opposition candidate Ahmed Mohammed Mohamoud “Silanyo” by only 80 votes. Subsequently, the Supreme Court upheld Riyale Kahin’s victory by a 214 vote margin, a decision that Silanyo’s party ultimately accepted (Bradbury, 2008: 194–195).

Riyale Kahin repeatedly postponed the presidential elections originally scheduled for 2008 and had his term in office unilaterally extended by the *Guurti* (Walls, 2009b). Critics correctly noted the president’s “authoritarian tendencies” and the “formalistic” nature of his commitment to democracy (Walls and Kibble, 2010: 44, 46). Even so, the fact that Somaliland ultimately held presidential elections in June 2010 at which time Riyale Kahin quickly recognized Silanyo’s victory demonstrated the limits of his authoritarianism.

Somaliland’s people have matured politically through these processes. At this point, there is no turning back on Somaliland’s institutions – the constitution, parliament, etc. cannot be dismantled (personal interview, Mohamad Fadah). A former foreign minister proclaims that the constitution is “the single biggest asset we have created” (personal interview, Abdillahi Duale).

The Somaliland political hybrid has generally been received favorably by international observers (Kaplan, 2008; Moe, 2011; Ibrahim and Terlinden, 2010; Walls and Kibble, 2010). Walls and Kibble (2010: 39–40), for example, maintain that “Somaliland’s remarkable achievement in establishing a durable stability is due in large part to the ad hoc, organic and unplanned adoption of a hybrid political system that fuses elements of kinship affiliation and ‘modern’ constitutional design.” Moe (2011: 154–55) emphasizes that the

legitimacy gains of the Somaliland political order lie with the processes through which this order emerged from – and became socially validated by – a plurality of existing social forces..., rather than from the merging of “tradition” and “modern” institutions as such.

Some researchers, however, while acknowledging that the use of clan elders may have contributed to Somaliland’s initial political development now question the continued viability of this system. Renders and Terlinden (2010: 735) point out that “many members of the House have become urbanized and somewhat disconnected from their largely rural constituencies, eroding the traditional principle of collective and consultative decision making”. According to Hoehne (2013: 200) “The outcome of these developments is a ‘crippled hybrid’ in which neither state nor traditional institutions function really well.” As the clan leaders became co-opted by the executive, “their claim to legitimate traditional authority became hollow” (Hoehne, 2013: 212).

Women have voted in large numbers in all of Somaliland’s elections “but women candidates had little chance of being elected” (Bradbury, 2008: 215). Somaliland’s constitution does not discriminate against women’s participation in the political process but it does not facilitate it either. The lower house of parliament passed a minimal quota or reservation system for women but this was vetoed by the *Guurti*. In 2010, there were three women in parliament out of 164 total members. At one point, President Riyale’s government featured one woman minister out of 47 in total (personal interview, Kinzie Qawdhal). President Silanyo’s first cabinet featured two women ministers out of 20 in total.

Concerns have also been expressed about the dominant role played by the diaspora in Somaliland politics. Caspersen (2012: 112–113) notes that in *de facto* state politics diaspora support “comes with a price tag” and contributes to “internal divisions as some groups benefit more than others.” Bradbury (2008: 175–176) goes so far as to characterize Somaliland as a “transnational state” because “the participation of the diaspora in Somaliland is sufficiently influential to challenge traditional definitions of a state as a sovereign system of government within a delimited territory.”

There is also a real clash between trying to ensure the representation of different groups, and the democratic ideal of one-person-one-vote which favors larger clans (personal interview, Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim). The upper house of the parliament, the *Guurti*, has remained unelected (Walls and Kibble, 2010: 41). It is meant to be apolitical but is increasingly seen as having been co-opted by the executive branch (Hoehne, 2013; personal interview, Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim). More generally, the dominance of the executive branch over all other institutions became evident after opposition parties won control of the parliament in the 2005 elections. In Somaliland’s presidentially-dominant system, “When the opposition won parliament, they realized they had nothing” (personal interview, Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim). The constitutional stipulation that the country should have only three political parties at the national level is another recurrent source of dissatisfaction for those who believe it should be easier to establish new political parties.

Another aspect of Somaliland democracy that has come in for criticism is the treatment of the media. Former Minister of Information, Abdi Yusuf Du’ale, claims with a smile that “[the newspapers] write as they like, and insult me every morning” (personal interview). Each year, however, dozens of journalists have been arrested and detained. As detained journalists have typically been released after a few days, these arrests function more as shake-ups and warning signals than as punishments. They are generally initiated by lower-level officials or police officers, rather than reflecting government policy, claimed Yusuf Abdi Gabobe, editor-in-chief of *The Somaliland Times* (personal interview) in 2012. He may have changed his views here since being sentenced to three years in prison on defamation charges in June 2014 (although he received a presidential pardon and was released from prison one month later).

However, the issues of independence and clan relations are highly sensitive. Although an African Union fact-finding mission in 2005 noted “a visibly emotional attachment to the reclaimed independence and a firm determination among the people of Somaliland not to return to the failed union with Somalia” (AU, 2005: 4), the fact remains that within Somaliland there is “a substantial minority, mainly among the non-Isaaq clans, who remain attached to the notion of a united Somalia” (Bryden, 2004: 185). Somaliland’s desire for international recognition generates so much pressure to be seen as successful that it stifles rigorous debate over the respective merits of independence vs. reunification with Somalia.

In spite of these question marks surrounding its democracy, Somaliland has an impressive track record of crisis management. In its two decades of *de facto* statehood, Somaliland has faced repeated existential economic, political, and security threats and it has managed to overcome all of them. Economically, Somaliland has been subjected to two separate Saudi Arabian bans on its livestock exports starting in 1998 and again in 2000, with the latter ban only fully lifted in November 2009. One estimate is that the livestock export ban led to a 60% decline in exports and the loss of US\$100 million a year in revenues (Bryden, 2004: 180). Despite these sharp economic blows against Somaliland’s dominant export commodity, “government finances, on the whole, appear to have been managed prudently, with only small fiscal deficits accumulated in 1998 and 2000, the years in which Gulf states banned the import of Somali livestock” (Bradbury, 2008: 237).

Somaliland’s conflict management system consists of several core elements. Perhaps the most important is its decentralized nature, with responsibilities devolved to each clan for the maintenance of security in their own areas (Moe, 2011; Walls, 2009a: 386). Somaliland’s clan-based conferences have been locally instigated, funded primarily by locals and the diaspora. They have maintained a strong commitment to engaging in dialogue even

when disagreements are sharp. They have also repeatedly engaged the services of groups external to the conflict as mediators, and emphasized the importance of reaching consensus rather than putting matters to a formal vote (Walls, 2009a).

The biggest question mark with regard to the internal legitimacy of the Somaliland state concerns the disputed regions of Sanaag, Sool and Cayn (SSC) in eastern Somaliland. These are claimed also by the ostensibly non-secessionist Puntland, which declared sovereignty within Somalia in 1998. Most inhabitants of Puntland belong to the Harti clan, and Puntland's claim to SSC is based on ethnic irredentism: the Warsengheli and Dhulbahante clans in Sanaag, Sool and Cayn also belong to the Harti clan family. Somaliland and Puntland are also both challenged by the nascent and questionably viable Khaatumo State which was proclaimed in the SSC region in 2012. Khaatumo State is predominantly populated by Dhulbahante and it positions itself within Somalia and in opposition to rule by either Somaliland or Puntland.

Although Somaliland is sometimes derided as an exclusively Isaaq project, most observers agree that the western Gadabuursi clan has been effectively incorporated into the political system (Bryden, 2004: 177; Hoehne, 2009: 261). Indeed, Somaliland's second longest-serving president to date, Dahir Riyale Kahin, is Gadabuursi. The eastern Warsengheli and Dhulbahante clans, however, are not integrated to the same degree. Throughout Somaliland's democratization process, polls have been postponed and voter turnout has consistently been low in the disputed regions of Sanaag and Sool. Government attempts to remedy this problem by appointing designated Warsengheli and Dhulbahante individuals as Members of Parliament and cabinet ministers have not generated local legitimacy (Bradbury, 2008: 216; Hoehne, 2013: 212). According to Menkhaus (2006/2007: 92), "the majority of the population of Sool and Sanaag regions express support for a united Somalia rather than Somaliland." Hoehne (2009: 271) is somewhat more cautious: "In much of Sool and Sanaag, which are on the periphery of both Somaliland and Puntland, economic development and political participation are very limited, and the sense of belonging to one of the two regional states is weak."

Somaliland as an unrecognized state

The Republic of Somaliland has been independent for more than 23 years. A former British colony, Somaliland enjoyed five days of recognized sovereign statehood, from June 26 to July 1, 1960, before joining with the former Italian Somaliland to form Somalia (Bryden, 2004: 170; Geldenhuys, 2009: 129). For various reasons including the failure to pass a single or unified Act of Union bill in both Somalia and Somaliland and Somaliland's rejection of Somalia's new constitution in a 1961 referendum, many question whether the union with Somalia was ever properly consummated (Adam, 1994: 23–26; Bradbury, 2008: 33–34; Bryden, 2004: 170–171). Even so, no UN member state has to this day recognized Somaliland.

Somaliland argues its case for independence along several different lines. First, it maintains that it fulfills the criteria for empirical statehood as laid down in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 (Somaliland government, n.d.). Although this is true, empirical statehood is no longer the decisive criterion for acceptance into the international community. In Jackson's (1990: 23–24) phrasing, "the juridical cart is now before the empirical horse." Under the current recognition regime, states are recognized not on the basis of their ability, but on their (perceived) moral right to exist by virtue of their previous colonial status (Fabry, 2010; Jackson, 1990; Ker-Lindsay, 2012). Even if this system today is regarded by some scholars as no longer tenable (Fabry, 2010: 14), it still dominates

world politics and seems to be "a settled feature of the international landscape" (Jackson, 1990: 201).

Another strong argument in support of recognition of Somaliland is the "just theory of secession" (Poore, 2009: 122). According to this principle, a population which has been oppressed or exposed to gross human rights violations has the right to secession as a means to protect itself (Musgrave, 2002: xv; Ker-Lindsay, 2012: 37). If this principle had been enshrined in international law, Somaliland would certainly have qualified. There is little doubt that its people suffered massive human rights violations at the hands of the Siad Barre regime (Adam, 1994: 29; Omaar, 1994: 233; Lewis, 2010: 262–268; Poore, 2009: 139). During the civil war in the late 1980s Siad Barre indiscriminately bombed the civilian population in Hargeisa and Burco. As Hussein Ismail Omer (personal interview) explains, "Six people in my own family were killed by aerial bombing. Everyone in Somaliland is like me." However, the just theory of secession still has "absolutely no legal footing" in international law (Ker-Lindsay, 2012: 37).

The combination of its separate colonial existence, its five days of sovereign independence, and its respect for former colonial borders gives Somaliland a unique degree of legitimacy in terms of the contemporary interpretation of self-determination. Recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state is thus seen as perfectly consistent with the Constitutive Act of the African Union's (AU) insistence on respect for the territorial integrity of borders as they stood at the moment of independence from colonial rule (Anonymous, 2002: 263; Bryden, 2004: 170, 175). Indeed, a 2005 AU fact-finding mission (AU, 2005: 4) noted that these various factors made "Somaliland's search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history."

Somaliland's ability to present its case in terms of the dissolution of a failed union also allows it to embed itself in a wider tradition of acceptance of such dissolutions, including those of Egypt/Syria, Cape Verde/Guinea Bissau, and Senegal/Gambia (Kaplan, 2008: 152) as well as the more recent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia whose constituent republics were recognized only after other countries decided to treat this case as the dissolution of a union legally equivalent to what happened in the former Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, albeit without the consent of the parent state (Fabry, 2008: 62).

Finally, although not without problems or qualifications, Somaliland has an impressive record of both maintaining peace and democratizing its political system over the past two decades. It is hard to imagine any other would-be sovereign state putting together a better case than the one Somaliland has both been blessed with and earned for itself.

Yet, the odds remain stacked against Somaliland because the demonstrated empirical success of *de facto* states remains unlikely to result in widespread juridical recognition of their sovereignty claims in the contemporary international system (Pegg, 1998: 223; Caspersen, 2008: 127). Whereas Somaliland's high degree of internal stability and democratic legitimacy remains entirely unrecognized, the international community has now sponsored more than 15 different peace conferences for Somalia, all of which have ended in failure (Walls, 2009a: 372). Somalia's Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in 2000. Although the TNG "was unable to exercise authority over more than a few neighborhoods in the capital" (Menkhaus, 2006/2007: 92), it was soon accorded international recognition by the UN, the Arab League and the Organization for African Unity. In contrast to Somaliland's two decades of unrecognized yet effective *de facto* statehood, the TNG "obtained a remarkable degree of international recognition even before it had gained effective control over the capital city, let alone other parts of southern Somalia" (Anonymous, 2002: 247–248). The story was much the same with its successor, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established in 2004.

Although the TFG was “a reed-thin affair” which “had never controlled more than a small area around one city near the Ethiopian border before Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion” (Kaplan, 2008: 146–147), it too quickly earned widespread acceptance by various international organizations. The most recent Somali government, formed in 2012, has arguably attained even greater international acceptance, including formal recognition from the US government (a first since 1991) even though its “new president is taking the reins of a failed government that exercised only nominal control over the capital, Mogadishu...” (Menkhaus, 2012) and which still fails to exercise effective control over large swathes of the country’s territory.

That Somalia is a “failed state” has not in any way detracted from its ability to frustrate Somaliland. As Geldenhuys (2009, 146) explains, “Although devoid of empirical statehood, Somalia has retained its juridical statehood – a feature that has allowed it to effectively veto Somaliland’s progress to confirmed statehood.” The only two cases of widely recognized sovereign independence in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War – Eritrea (in 1993) and South Sudan (in 2011) – both reinforce this point: neither won recognition until their parent states had relinquished their veto.

Western countries have repeatedly indicated that the question of recognizing Somaliland should first be addressed by the AU. While it is assumed that Western countries would quickly follow an African lead in recognizing Somaliland, they have shown no willingness to step out in front of this issue. Although Addis Ababa maintains cooperative relations with Hargeisa in several areas, Ethiopia is conscious of its role as the home of the African Union and does not want to push an issue that might divide AU members. Ethiopia is also widely perceived to favor a weak and divided Somalia, which makes it comfortable with the current status quo (Hoehe, 2009: 273–274; Kaplan, 2008: 154; Walls and Kibble, 2010: 51). Djibouti, which provides Somaliland with important air links and trade relations, also prefers the current situation: the port of Berbera and its enormous airstrip could provide dramatically stiffer competition for military bases and trade flows to Ethiopia, were Somaliland to receive formal recognition.

Eradication or reunification unlikely

Besides widespread recognition of its sovereignty, the two other most plausible routes out of *de facto* statehood for Somaliland would be forcible military eradication or peaceful reunification with Somalia. The World Bank (2014a) estimates that Somaliland spent on average 51.1% of its entire budget on security services from 2002 to 2011. This has left the state with very little to put into education, health, infrastructure or other developmental expenditures, so these efforts have largely been outsourced to aid organizations and the diaspora. In 2011, for example, Somaliland spent US\$42.2 million on security, as against \$5.9 million on education and \$2.9 million on health (World Bank, 2014a). Caspersen (2012: 90) points out that for unrecognized states the need to prioritize national defense over welfare “risk(s) undermining the internal legitimacy of the entity.” In Somaliland, however, the government has not suffered such a loss of legitimacy, because the prime demand from its citizens is for *peace* as theoretically stipulated by both Bakke et al. (2014: 3) and Berg (2013: 472). As Mohamad Fadah (personal interview) puts it, people “do not care about much else from the government. The government handles security; otherwise it faces few demands or expectations from the people.”

Even so, Somaliland is by no means a particularly militarized state. Using a population estimate of 3,000,000 people and a standing army size of 15,000 with no reservists, Caspersen (2012: 149)

calculates that only 0.5% of Somaliland’s population is in the army. By contrast, her figures for soldiers and reservists in other *de facto* states are 4% for Transnistria, 12% for Northern Cyprus, 22% for Abkhazia, and 32% for Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Abdi Bobo Yusuf Duale (personal interview), Al Shabaab failed to disrupt the 2010 presidential elections, but *not* because Somaliland’s police and military are efficient – they are not. Rather, in his words, “the people are our police,” and several terrorist plots have been broken up because people saw something suspicious and called the police to inform them.

Most politicians in Mogadishu remain distinctly hostile to Somaliland’s separatist aspirations. The biggest argument against military defeat and forcible reincorporation into the parent state is the manifest weakness of Somalia. Military strength is always relative. As Kolstø (2006, 732–733) argues, “As long as the parent state is mired in political chaos and economic misery, it is not only prevented from launching a new war to recapture the lost territory but also fails to attract the population of the breakaway region.” A reconstituted Somalia could one day pose an existential threat to Somaliland’s continued survival. That day has not come for the past 23 years, and it is unlikely to come anytime soon. Even allowing for some genuine optimism about the surprise election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as Somalia’s new president in September 2012, his government faces a daunting list of challenges. As Menkhaus (2012) observes, “Even in the best case outcome, it will take years for the government to extend and deepen its authority.”

The starting point for any discussion of peacefully reintegrating Somaliland into Somalia via a negotiated settlement has to be “the abject failure of repeated external efforts to revive a conventional central government in the country via a top-down process of power sharing among Somalia’s quarreling political elites” (Menkhaus, 2006/2007: 101). Arguably, one major obstacle has now been removed: Somaliland finally has a partner to negotiate with. Somaliland officials, including President Silanyo, attended the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012, the first time that Somaliland had ever participated in one of the many international conferences on Somalia. The presidents of Somaliland and Somalia met in Dubai in June 2012 and again in Ankara in April 2013. Turkey has now assumed a leading mediation role in the Somaliland–Somalia talks. A joint secretariat has been established in Istanbul, with recent delegation talks held there in July 2013 and January 2014.

To date, the only substantive achievement of these various talks has been that the parties in Istanbul (July 2013) reached an agreement on air traffic management “and decided to establish a joint control body that is based in Hargeisa to lead the air traffic control of both sides.” Yet, Somaliland has scored some significant victories in other areas. Point 3 of the Ankara Communiqué (April 2013) “Stated that the Dialogue is between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Somaliland.” Subsequently, the Istanbul II Communiqué (January 2014) made four separate references to the “Government of Somaliland” and noted in two places that the dialogue was between the Government of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia – language which will certainly be interpreted in Somaliland as implying the equal status of the two parties to the talks, and which also apparently negates Puntland’s status as a separate or distinct entity at these talks. The Istanbul II Communiqué also committed the two parties “to resolving all problems and disputes in an exclusively peaceful manner,” thus seemingly removing the option of forcible military eradication which Caspersen (2012: 126) finds is “statistically the most likely outcome for unrecognized states.” Finally, for the first time ever, one of Somaliland’s fundamental concerns about war crimes was addressed, with the Istanbul II Communiqué condemning “all atrocities” committed “by the military regime in Somalia before the year 1991” and making special reference in this regard to “the people in Somaliland.”

Despite the tentative signs of optimism emerging from the negotiations, the fact remains that it will be extremely difficult, economically and politically, for any Somali leadership to countenance recognition of Somaliland as an independent state (Bryden, 2004: 185–186). Menkhaus' observation that "little if any consensus exists inside Somalia about the merits and meaning of federalism, and none of the key details of federalism has been resolved" (2006/2007: 98) remains valid today.

Somaliland also has little incentive to negotiate an agreement short of independence. King's argument about the parent states of the Eurasian *de facto* states applies with even greater force to Somalia: "As the military losers in the conflicts, they have little to offer the separatist regimes. That basic dynamic is compounded by the parlous state of their own economies, which makes reintegration of little interest either to separatist elites or to their constituent populations" (King, 2001: 548).

Somaliland is poor, but Somalia is probably poorer. South-Central Somalia has both a higher proportion of people suffering from multidimensional poverty (89%) than Somaliland (72%) and a higher average intensity of deprivation (60.2) than Somaliland (54.1) (UNDP Somalia, 2012: 30–31, 184). Somaliland has a high degree of internal peace and stability; Somalia does not. The percent of youth experiencing five different kinds of violence in the past year was lower in all categories in Somaliland than in South-Central Somalia (UNDP Somalia, 2012: 209). People in Somaliland have been accustomed to electing their leaders democratically; people in Somalia have typically had warlords or leaders chosen for them at international conferences. Given the ongoing democratization process and the recent example of South Sudan, it is difficult to envision Somaliland's leaders or its people agreeing to accept anything less than Somalia committing itself to respect the results of an internationally-supervised referendum on independence.

De facto statehood and internal legitimacy: benefits and burdens of non-recognition

It may sound incongruous to claim that the lack of international recognition can in any way be positive for Somaliland, but comparing the situation in Somaliland with the results of the international engagement in Somalia suggests that it can. As Leonard and Samantar (2011: 575) note, the accumulated evidence from two major foreign troop interventions and the various regional and international conferences leading to the creation of Somalia's TNG and its TFG is that "None of these efforts has ever resulted in effective control of more than a portion of Somali territory or anything that meets the Weberian definition of empirical statehood." Arguably, the best explanation for these repeated failures of international state-building efforts is that the responsibility for achieving peace in Somalia has been taken from Somalis, who have lost ownership over their own reconciliation and state-building processes. As Hammond (2013: 184) notes, "Trust between Somalis and international actors has never been particularly strong, but in recent years has weakened to the point where international political engagement has come to be seen by many Somalis as a liability..." Similarly, Menkhaus (2012) observes that Somalis "want an end to warlordism and jihadism, but they also want an end to foreign domination."

By contrast, the peace-building and national consolidation in the north has largely if not entirely been a bottom-up process. If the Somalilanders did not achieve peace among themselves, nobody would do it for them (Moe, 2011: 168). They fell back on the time-honored consensus-based reconciliation mechanisms of the *beele*, in which the clan elders deliberate extensively among themselves until mutually acceptable solutions are found.

Within Somaliland, the lack of external intervention is often seen as a strength. Former foreign minister Abdillahi Duale (personal interview) believes that any major international engagement would have undermined self-reliance and the slow growth of local institutions for maintaining peace. Bottom-up in Somaliland, in his view, is far better than top-down in Iraq or Afghanistan. Explains former minister of finance Muhamad Hashi Elmi (personal interview): "When they started nation- and state-building they had no foreign interference. We had no five-star hotels, but had our meeting in the shade of a tree. The lack of attention from the international community has been a blessing. We did not realize that at the time, but now we realize it." While limited international assistance certainly comes at some cost, it did allow local political processes considerable latitude to develop in their own way and at their own pace (Bradbury, 2008: 93; Walls and Kibble, 2010: 40). The decision to include the clans directly into the political system went against the conventional wisdom, in Africa as well as in most of the expert community, which saw sub-state communal loyalties and identities as backward, divisive, and conflict-prone. Thus, the transitional hybrid model of government which served Somaliland well in its early years would probably not have been adopted if international facilitators had been more involved.

Also the comparatively limited relief assistance Somaliland has received can, paradoxically, be seen as a blessing in disguise. According to Lewis (2010: 146) "the cessation of aid removed a major source of clan contention, leading to a reduction in conflict." Other observers also argue that Somaliland has actively benefitted from its comparative lack of foreign aid. Eubank (2012) goes so far as to argue that the lack of foreign aid contributed to a desperate search for revenues which made the Somaliland government more open to compromise and democratic reforms. Eubank (2012, 477) observes that, in contrast to southern Somalia, "revenue bargaining forced Somaliland's central government to accept institutional arrangements that provided safeguards against the possible rise of a predatory state... In addition to forcing the development of these institutions, revenue bargaining also provided Somaliland citizens with an ongoing mechanism for enforcing these arrangements." Thus, unlike many other sub-Saharan African countries, "in Somaliland the persistent dependency of the central government on local tax revenues helps keep occasional attempts to exceed constitutional limits by the executive in check" (Eubank, 2012: 477). A South African research report speculates that in the (unlikely) event that Somaliland should gain international recognition the consequences might not be altogether wholesome. While on the one hand it might give a boost to the economy by bringing in more aid and foreign investment, it could also "diminish the link of accountability between Somaliland's democratic government and its people as the government may be tempted to be more responsive to international partners, with their potentially significant aid packages, than to the people" (Brenthurst Foundation, 2011: 22, 25).

However, all this should certainly not be taken as evidence that Somalilanders want their country to *remain* poor and unrecognized. On the contrary, the desire for recognition is significantly driven by economic concerns. Even though all statistics on Somalia and Somaliland need to be treated with caution given the various constraints on data collection, by any standard, Somaliland is indeed very poor. The World Bank (2014b) recently estimated Somaliland's 2012 GDP per capita at US\$ 348, which makes Somaliland the world's fourth poorest country; the sub-Saharan average per capita GDP is more than four times greater, at \$1,435. Somaliland has a very fragile economy that is highly dependent upon livestock exports and diaspora remittances. The World Bank (2014b) estimates that livestock accounts for 29.5% of Somaliland's GDP and that it generated US\$12.8 million of export revenues in 2012. Diaspora remittances, estimated between US\$200 and 500 million

annually, “may account for between 22.5 and 25 per cent of total household income” (Bradbury, 2008: 148). Other indicators of poverty also paint a grim picture for Somaliland. The World Bank (2014a) estimates that 1040 mothers die per every 100,000 child-births, a figure approximately three times higher than neighboring Ethiopia and five times higher than neighboring Djibouti. One out of 14 children in Somaliland dies before the age of one, as against one out of 21 in neighboring Ethiopia. One out of two children in Somaliland aged six to 13 do not attend primary school – more than double the average for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2014a).

While revenues collected by the state were minuscule for many years, according to former minister of finance Muhamad Hashi Elmi this was not so much a result of deliberate tax evasion as because of the state’s lack of revenue collection mechanisms. “People will pay when they realize that the country is doing something for them with the money they collect.” And things are improving: during his two years in office from 2010 to 2012, Elmi claims, the state budget increased from \$45 million to \$83 million, and is still growing (personal interview). The World Bank (2014a) estimates that from 2009 to 2012 Somaliland’s budget increased threefold to about \$130 million.

Some of Somaliland’s economic woes may be regarded as self-inflicted. In particular, the fact that perhaps up to 90% of the adult male population chews *qat*, which has to be imported from Ethiopia daily and drains hard currency and remittance income, adds to the economy’s fragility, as does *qat*’s negative impact on work force productivity – the workday typically ends around 1:30 pm so *qat* chewing can begin. But Somaliland’s economy also suffers considerably from what Pegg (1998: 43) has called “the economic cost of non-recognition.” Among other things, the country has difficulties getting its export certificates accepted internationally; foreign vessels using Berbera port pay higher insurance premiums; its citizens have difficulties traveling on Somaliland passports; the country cannot issue letters of credit; and the lack of insurance and concerns over the banking system limit foreign direct investment (Bradbury, 2008: 154; Bryden, 2004: 180–181; Walls and Kibble, 2010: 40–42). In a personal interview, Somaliland’s former foreign minister Mohammed Omar laments that, while the wire system for remittances works well, the country lacks an internationally recognized financial system. There has been talk of banks regulated by Ethiopia or Ethiopian banks opening branches in Somaliland, but nothing has yet happened. In a World Bank (2014b) survey of businessmen, “access to finance” was cited as the number one obstacle. Somaliland elites also believe that non-recognition has restricted foreign aid. In their view, Somaliland has received limited humanitarian assistance but not larger developmental assistance; moreover, aid priorities are set in Nairobi or Geneva, not in Hargeisa (personal interviews with Abdillahi Duale, Mohammed Omar, and Hussein Ismail Omer).

Legitimacy vs. legitimacy

As noted above, Holsti assumes that in most cases there is a positive relationship between international and domestic legitimacy, with the two reinforcing each other. While this intuitively makes sense, Somaliland interestingly shows that in certain respects and under some circumstances there may also be a negative relationship, in which policies in pursuit of international legitimacy may weaken the bases for a state’s domestic legitimacy, and vice versa.

Two of Somaliland’s strongest arguments for independence are its high degree of internal legitimacy and its status as a separate former British colony prior to unification with Somalia. In certain respects, however, these two strong points come into conflict with

each other, such that Somalilanders cannot push the one argument without weakening the other. According to the principle of *uti possidetis*, when the colonial empires were broken up, the boundaries between the various colonies should be kept intact. Thus, Somaliland insists on the continued territorial integrity of the former British protectorate. Primarily for that reason it cannot contemplate giving up the eastern districts of SSC, even if its rule here is tenuous and its local support is questionable at best. Conversely, the main reason why Puntland claims these same regions, Renders believes (2012: 195), is not a desire to let all members of all Harti sub-clans live together in the same state, but “to kill the legitimacy of Somaliland independence” and prevent Hargeisa from securing international recognition of its sovereignty claim. For Somalilanders, this leads to a Catch 22-situation: they cannot let go of SSC without undermining the *uti possidetis* principle – their crowning argument for independence – but they cannot hold on to these regions without weakening their own internal legitimacy.

Viewed from another angle, the need to preserve a high degree of internal legitimacy and the desire to achieve international recognition also clash with each other. The clan element in the hybrid system of government has secured strong support for the regime, particularly in rural, conservative areas, but from the perspective of liberal democracy it is defective. Not only is the principle of one person–one vote violated, but under this system women and minorities from outside the traditional clans have no political influence whatsoever (Renders, 2012: 157). Moreover, the application of customary law sometimes violates civil liberties and individual rights (Moe, 2011: 160).

Therefore, the political elite in Somaliland regard the introduction of a democratic, Western-type political system as a prerequisite for winning international recognition (Ibrahim and Terlinden, 2010: 77; Renders, 2012: 197–98). While this may secure a higher degree of legitimacy for Somaliland statehood abroad (as well as among urban women and Western-educated Somalis returning from the diaspora), it will inevitably weaken support for the Somaliland state from among the traditional layers of society on which it has leaned so heavily for preserving/re-establishing social peace.

Conclusions

It seems safe to conclude – even if this cannot yet be backed up by extensive survey data of the kind collected for other *de facto* states (Bakke et al., 2014; Berg, 2013; O’Loughlin et al., 2011) – that Somaliland enjoys a high degree of internal legitimacy among its citizens, although it still remains unrecognized 23 years after its proclamation of independence. The general assumption advanced by Holsti (1996) that unrecognized states are inherently deficient in horizontal (societal) legitimacy does not seem to apply. Not least in an effort to gain international recognition, the Somaliland regime has gone out of its way – albeit with mixed success – to create an inclusive society in which the minority clans also feel welcomed in the polity.

The sources of Somaliland state legitimacy are diverse. There are two sources of “negative legitimacy,” in the sense that for most Somalilanders both the former united Somali state and the current rival Somali state hold no attraction. People do not want to be united with the current chaotic Somali state ostensibly under Mogadishu rule, and they also abhor the thought of a resurrected strong and centralized Somali state such as they experienced under Siad Barre, where they at the best of times endured discrimination and at the worst of times suffered from harsh military repression.

Somaliland also has a number of diverse positive sources of internal legitimacy. They include the ability to maintain law and order and to establish a state in which not only the largest clan

group, the Isaaq, but also the smaller clans may feel included. This enhances horizontal legitimacy in Holsti's terminology. The Somaliland state combines elements of traditional "pastoral democracy" and modern representative, liberal democracy, or, expressed in Weberian terms: traditional and rational-legal legitimate authority. To be sure, this hybrid model does not always operate smoothly, and there is a certain inherent imbalance between its constituent parts (Hoehne, 2013). Moreover, political actors, including several presidents, have occasionally exploited their powers for their own benefit rather than for the common good. Nevertheless, the Somaliland political model has functioned so well that it has survived numerous crises, even accomplishing the relatively rare African achievement of solidifying its democracy with a peaceful transfer of power from the government to the opposition in 2010.

The "goods" that Somalilanders expect from their government can be summed up as peace, good governance, economic development, and international recognition. The government has been able to deliver on the first, does reasonably well on the second, has made limited progress on the third, and has failed entirely on the final count. However, what Somalilanders crave more than anything else, is security. As Caspersen (2012), Berg (2013) and Bakke et al. (2014) all suggest, this does not seem to be unique for Somaliland, but rather is a common feature among *de facto* states, due to these states' precarious international status and the violent history of their genesis. And security is precisely what the Somaliland state has been able to deliver, against high odds. Therefore, even if the standard of living among the Somaliland population remains depressingly low, Holsti's dictum that vertical legitimacy in modern states is based on performance seems to hold true for this country, albeit on a very narrowly defined basis. When we try to assess the performance of a state, we have to measure it against the goods that its citizens most value which, in this case, is peace.

The lack of external legitimacy has not hindered and may even have helped the growth of internal legitimacy in Somaliland. The high levels of internal legitimacy have not yet translated into external legitimacy. Somaliland will probably continue like this for some time to come. Ultimately, though, its ability to deliver the "goods" on economic development and poverty reduction for the population will be significantly hampered without external recognition of its domestic accomplishments.

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