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[COMMITTEE PRINT]

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY
IN BERBERA, SOMALIA

REPORT

OF

SENATOR BARTLETT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY

IN BERBERA, SOMALIA



JULY —, 1975

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., July 15, 1975.

HON. JOHN C. STENNIS,
*Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At your request, I headed a team that went to Somalia at the invitation of the Somali Government to examine alleged Soviet facilities at Berbera, Somalia, and to evaluate these facilities in light of Department of Defense claims that they represented a "significant Soviet capability." Mr. Jim Smith, of the Committee staff, accompanied me and assisted in the analysis of the information and the preparation of this report.

The trip was intriguing, extremely fast-paced, and full of surprises. The Somalis maintained their contention that there were no Soviet facilities in Berbera right up to the point where we stopped at the communications receiver site. The opportunity to see the inside of a Soviet missile facility was the high point of the trip.

I think there are two significant findings from the trip. First, the Department of Defense was remarkably accurate in their assessment of Soviet facilities at Berbera. What we saw absolutely confirms that the Soviet Union is expanding Berbera into a major, military-capable, air and naval port. Second, the Somali Government has opened the door to better United States-Somali relations and thereby it may be possible to defuse or at least minimize the developing Soviet potential at Berbera.

I compliment the team members for their time, expertise, and their contributions. Most of the conclusions in my report are based on collective observations and findings of the entire team.

In addition to this report, I am planning a second report on the refugee situation which will be available soon.

Sincerely,

DEWEY F. BARTLETT.

BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense has sought Congressional approval to establish a naval logistical facility on the island of Diego Garcia since 1970. The Congress has proceeded cautiously in its actions fearing that if the United States were to unilaterally expand its presence in the Indian Ocean, a dangerous, expensive arms race with the Soviet Union could result.

In the Fiscal Year 1975 Military Construction Authorization Act, \$18.1 million dollars was authorized as the first increment of a three-year, \$37.8 million expansion effort for Diego Garcia. However, the authorization was contingent on a thorough review of the situation by the Administration and certification by the President as to the necessity. After the Presidential certification, either House of Congress could block the expansion by agreeing to a disapproving resolution. On May 12, 1975, President Ford signed and sent to Congress the certification that the construction at Diego Garcia should proceed. Senator Mansfield on May 19, 1975, introduced a disapproving resolution (S. Res. 160) in the Senate which was referred to the Armed Services Committee.

On June 10, 1975, the Armed Services Committee held hearings on the Diego Garcia issue and received testimony from Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown. The highlight of that testimony was the presentation by the Secretary of Defense of aerial photographs allegedly showing major Soviet facilities under construction at Berbera, Somalia. Secretary Schlesinger contended, "It is evident that the U.S.S.R. is in the process of establishing a significant new facility, capable of supporting their naval and air activities in the northwest Indian Ocean."

On June 17, 1975, the Armed Services Committee in executive session voted 10-to-6 to disagree with the Mansfield Resolution and filed their report on June 18, 1975.

The Secretary of Defense's allegations brought vigorous denials from both the Soviet Union and the Government of Somalia. Red Star, the organ of the Soviet Defense Ministry, labeled the allegations "a mirage" and said the Soviets were building "a meatpacking factory." Tass was quoted, "The American Defense Secretary James Schlesinger must have fallen victim to a mirage when he saw a Soviet war base near Port Berbera on the sun-parched sandy coastline of Samolia."

The Government of Somalia sent invitations (Exhibit A) to both House and Senate Members inviting them to "come and see for themselves." Senator Stennis accepted the invitation (Exhibit B) on behalf of the Armed Services Committee and Senator Bartlett agreed to make the visit as the Committee representative. Senator Bartlett invited the Somali Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Addou, to

accompany the team; he declined, however, he did request and Senator Bartlett agreed that his first deputy, Mr. Mussa, be permitted to accompany the team.

TRIP PREPARATION

The trip was scheduled for the period of 2 through 6 July 1975. A general itinerary is at Exhibit C.


To assist Senator Bartlett in his assessment of the Berbera facilities a team of specialists was assembled. The team make-up and a short biographical sketch on each member is contained in Exhibit D. In addition to these specialists, Mr. Mike Rexroad, professional staff member for the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Mr. Jim Smith, professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee participated.

The Defense Intelligence Agency conducted extensive prebriefings of the entire team to include a detailed "what-to-look for" briefing just prior to departure for Somalia. In addition, the State Department presented a background briefing on the evolution of the present Somali Government.

THE TRIP

Purpose

It was made clear to the entire team that this visit was at the request of the Somali Government; and the Somali Government had guaranteed the invited Members free access to see anything and everything, and every reasonable effort should be made to examine facilities in detail.



The team was advised that the purpose of the trip was to validate or refute the Department of Defense's contention as it was stated by Secretary Schlesinger on June 10, 1975, that, "It is evident that the U.S.S.R. is in the process of establishing a significant new facility, capable of supporting their naval and air activities in the northwest Indian Ocean." Each of the facilities identified by the Secretary of Defense was to be examined with a view toward determining (1) who constructed the facility, (2) what was the capability of the facility, (3) what was the intended use of the facility, (4) who controlled the facility, and (5) who had access to the facility.

First visit with President Siad

The team arrived in Mogadiscio, the capitol of Somalia, at about 2 p.m. on July 3. The team was met by Col. Ahmed Suleiman, the head of the Somali Secret Service, a member of the Somali Supreme Revolutionary Council, a son-in-law of the President, and according to our embassy, the number three man in the country. Colonel Suleiman accompanied the team throughout their visit of July 3 and 4. He appeared to have complete authority and on several occasions he overruled other Somali officials who sought to impose restraints on the team.



Senator Bartlett confers with Colonel Suleiman who was the senior Somali representative during the trip to Berbera

After visiting a teachers' college, a boys' orphanage school, and a girls' orphanage school, a call was paid on President Mohammed Siad Barre at 10:30 p.m. The visit was made by Senator Bartlett, Messrs. Rexroad, Smith, Hamrick of the U.S. Embassy, Noyes, and Hughes, the photographer. President Siad was accompanied by approximately seventeen persons identified as members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. President Siad is articulate, polished and convincing. He spoke uninterrupted for an hour concerning the history of Somalia, the Somali-Soviet relationship, the Somali-United States relationship, and the Somali form of government. He stated that Somalia was ruled by "scientific socialism," which permits the free practice of the Islam religion; ignorance, poverty, and disease were the forces against which the government was struggling. He closed his colloquy by saying that his reason for inviting U.S. Congressmen to Somalia was, not to see Berbera, but to witness their struggle and thereby to improve relations between the two countries. He said that the team could go to Berbera to see anything they wanted, and that he would open all doors to prove that there were no Soviet facilities in his country. He asked that the team extend their visit for at least one day to see the refugee camps and how the government was handling the refugee problem.



President Siad welcomes Senator Bartlett to Somalia

At this point Senator Bartlett thanked President Siad for his invitation and showed the President the book of unclassified photographs prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency that depicted the Berbera facilities as revealed by Secretary Schlesinger on June 10. A second copy of the photographs was shown at the same time to Colonel Suleiman and other Somali officials. Senator Bartlett told the President exactly which facilities the team wanted to see and received assurances from the President that the team would have unrestricted access and could spend as much time as necessary.

Senator Bartlett also requested that a U.S. Air Force C-130 be permitted to take the party to Berbera. President Siad objected stating that the team members were guests in his country and he preferred to handle the accommodations. Senator Bartlett agreed to utilize Somali transportation emphasizing that he did want ample time to see everything that the team desired to see.

Senator Bartlett requested and the President agreed that the United States and foreign press could accompany the party to Berbera.

The exchange between the President and Senator Bartlett grew sharp on one or two occasions after the President had been shown the photographs and he attempted to temper his offer of complete and unrestricted access. President Siad directed Colonel Suleiman, who was to be the Senior official for the visit, to "open all doors" for the visit.

The meeting with President Siad broke up cordially about 12:30 a.m., July 4.

Enroute to Berbera


The team was scheduled to depart Mogadiscio at 5 a.m., July 4. The team arrived at Mogadiscio airport shortly before 5 a.m., to discover that the Somalias had not yet begun to crew the Viscount aircraft that was to take us to Hargesia. At this point the team was joined by six members of the press corps, American and foreign, who stayed with the group for the remainder of the day.

Shortly after 6 a.m. the Somali Air Lines Viscount left for Hargesia, landing at approximately 8 a.m. Senator Bartlett, and Messrs. Rexroad, Smith, Noyes, Casani, Adams and Hughes along with several Somali escorts transferred to a Soviet-built, Somali-piloted helicopter for the trip to Berbera. The remainder of the group traveled concurrently in a Somali DC-3 and arrived just ahead of the helicopter. The helicopter orbited Berbera several times prior to landing and the facilities depicted in the Defense Department photographs were easily discernable. During a pass over the barracks ship, Caucasians were seen on the deck and it was noted the bow numbers on the ship had been obscured. Prior to taking off from Hargesia the team was told that no pictures were allowed. Enroute the prohibition on picture taking was objected to and Colonel Suleiman overruled the Somali naval commander and permitted the team to photograph all the facilities from the air as the helicopter orbited Berbera. The party landed at Berbera at about 9 a.m.

Berbera

General.—Berbera is extremely hot. The temperature was estimated to be about 110° F with the winds gusting to 30 mph. The city consists of an indigenous population of about 10,000 with another esti-



mated 7,500 refugees being resettled at Berbera to learn the fishing trade. Transportation throughout the visit was by foot or by lorry. Except where otherwise mentioned, the team was accompanied by the press and permitted to take photographs without restrictions. Each team member had one or more Somali "escorts" who made it a point to stay with their "charge" wherever he went. The day of the visit was Friday, a normal Moslem religious holiday, which may have accounted for some of the inactivity that was conspicuous.




The fuel facility.—The party moved from the airstrip to the north side of the fuel tank farm by lorry. At this point the team disembarked and was permitted to roam through the facility at will. At the time of the visit the nine new tanks and associated pipelines were being pressure tested. (There were several obvious leaks.) The new fuel tanks are connected to the old tank farm by piping and there are underground pipelines apparently leading to the missile handling facility and to the new airfield. The new tank farm is surrounded by a masonry wall approximately three feet high and each tank rests on a concrete foundation with spill gutters surrounding the base of each tank. There are metal steps leading to the top of each tank. The welded horizontal joints on the tanks are coated with some corrosion-resistant substance which makes them stand out against the rusting tank sides. There is a ten-point, truck hydrant fill stand on the south side of the facility that is nearing completion. Much of the material and equipment bore Soviet markings.

In response to questions, Colonel Suleiman and other Somali officials said that this facility would not contain bunkering fuel, but would be used for the fuel needs of the northern part of Somalia.

They indicated that the expansion was part of a general plan to upgrade the logistical capability of Berbera now that the Suez Canal had been reopened.



Three POL tanks nearing completion




The truck hydrant refueling point adjacent to the fuel tank farm

The pier area.—From the fuel facility the party moved on foot to the west access road to the mole area. At the head of this access road there are cattle pens apparently used as holding pens for stock being exported. The west access road is about 12 feet wide and contained on both sides by cattle fencing that has been in place for sometime.

At the entrance to the mole area there was a solid masonry wall and a gate that was locked. The Somalis were unable to locate the key to the gate and eventually accommodated the team by breaking the lock. The structure at the head of the west access road is a large warehouse. The team was permitted in the warehouse which contained large quantities of cement and other construction materials. The area surrounding the warehouse was also cluttered with what appeared to be construction materials, pumps, generators and other crated equipment, most of which bore Soviet markings and indicated Soviet port of origins. The pier area was equipped with two large, track-mounted cranes and large towers supporting lighting fixtures that appeared to be adequate to permit round-the-clock operations.


There were several ships tied to the mole area. The *Lord Byron* was there with what appeared to be Somalis on deck. Two Soviet-built, Somali patrol boats, crewed apparently by Somali sailors were moored adjacent to the *Lord Byron*. The Somali coastal freighter, the *Boolimooq*, was tied to the east side of the pier and the Soviet barracks ship tied to the west side of the pier.

The Soviet barracks ship flew the Soviet flag from its stern and the Somali flag from its bridge mast. As the party moved down the pier between the *Boolimooq* and the barracks ship, a Soviet military man was seen at the head of the gangway to the barracks ship. The captain of the freighter, apparently a Somali, disembarked and shook hands with Senator Bartlett. The party then moved to the base of the gang-



The mole area. Note the large rail crane in the right background and the two large lighting towers. Large quantities of construction materials were in evidence on the pier

way to the barracks ship. The Soviet sentry was dressed in a blue garrison cap, a blue, short-sleeved shirt and blue shorts. He was asked if the party could come aboard by the team's Russian linguist. His response was a clearly discernible "Nyet!". He was asked several other questions by the Russian linguist and each time before he responded, the sentry conferred with someone unseen in the doorway behind him, and each of his responses was non-committal.



The Soviet VYN Class Barracks ship. Note the Soviet flag at the stern and the Somali flag from the main mast

From this point the team moved past the "port immigration building" and another warehouse to the head of the east access road. Here the team boarded lorries and was driven to the Somali port area. The lorry caravan drove down on to the Somali pier and turned around without anyone getting out. Unfortunately, a high wall shielded the team's view of two other warehouses in this area and the team did not get into this area. However, a photograph taken by a team member during the approach to Berbera by air revealed the area and a Styx missile crate is plainly in evidence adjacent to one of the warehouses. From this point the party proceeded to a club-like building for a short rest period.

The barracks area.—From the club building, the party moved by lorry to the barracks and trailer area. In the trailer area the team disembarked and was permitted to roam through the trailer and barracks area at will. The Somali escorts said that the trailer area was Soviet and that the barracks area was Soviet and Somali.

The trailer area consisted of about 18 trailers each with an air conditioning unit. The area was well policed and the trailers were closed up with window curtains drawn. There was much evidence of



The Soviet sentry aboard the barracks ship who denied the party entry

Soviet presence in the form of Soviet litter and markings. One team member, the Russian linguist, who temporarily "lost" his Somali escort entered one of the trailers. He encountered a Soviet emerging from the shower and spoke to him briefly before his Somali escort found him and took him outside. There was one Soviet van truck noted in this compound that had the international radiation hazard symbol on its side.


The barracks area contains 16 two-story barracks buildings. Each room appeared to have a window-type air conditioner. The units were attractive apartment-like structures, painted in bright colors with enclosed porches or balconies. At the entrance to the compound was a large bulletin board with Soviet lettering on it and pictures concerning Soviet-Somali relations. For example, there was a picture of President Siad and the Soviet ambassador executing an agreement between the countries. The compound contains its own powerplant with Soviet machinery and signs and an outdoor theater with a marquee in Russian. The team was shown two rooms which were said to be occupied by Somalis. Several times during the visit, glimpses of Caucasians were seen throughout the area. The fencing around both areas was flimsy and could serve no real security purpose.



The communications receiver site.—From the barracks area the party headed south by lorry caravan toward the communications receiver site. Enroute a communication site was passed which the Somalis identified as their ship-to-shore port communications facility. The party did not stop at this location. Farther down the road the caravan stopped and a Somali official went to each lorry advising that the taking of photographs was prohibited until further notice. The caravan proceeded south past the receiver site toward a cement plant according to Colonel Suleiman who was escorting Senator Bartlett in the lead lorry.




The trailer housing area showing a rocking swing and the gazebo



One of the six new, air-conditioned barracks buildings

At Senator Bartlett's insistence the caravan turned off the main road and headed toward the gate at the southwest corner of the fenced receiver site. The caravan pulled parallel to the western fence about 100 feet from the gate and as the lead lorry passed the gate, a sentry, apparently a Somali guard in white uniform, leveled a rifle on the lead vehicle and remained trained on the lead vehicle as it drove by the gate. As the center of the approximately six vehicle caravan came opposite the gate, the caravan stopped and the party began to disembark. As one team member moved toward the gate, the sentry leveled his rifle at him and shouted a warning. At this point Colonel Suleiman said that the team could not enter the facility because it was a Soviet facility. He said that he had made two separate requests that the team be permitted entry, but the Soviet commander had refused. At this point there was a lengthy discussion with the press who seemed greatly surprised that the Somalis admitted the Soviet presence, that the Soviets were in command, and that the American team had been refused entry even though it had been requested by the Somalis.

From what could be seen the facility was essentially as shown in the photographs presented by the Department of Defense. There was a double fence of barbed wire with warning signs in Somali on the outside fence. The buildings on the inside were quonset type structures and at one point a Caucasian in short pants was seen running inside the compound.



The communications transmitter site.—Colonel Suleiman advised at the receiver site that the transmitter site was also a Soviet site and that the team could not enter. Colonel Suleiman attempted to discourage the team from visiting the transmitter site, but Senator Bartlett insisted that the team be taken to the transmitter site and the caravan moved from the receiver site back into the town and then in an easterly direction.

The events at the transmitter site were similar to the events at the receiver site. The caravan stopped several hundred feet from the gate, the party disembarked and a lengthy discussion ensued. The gate was again guarded by Somalis in white naval uniforms and this time a five or six man Somali force deployed in a line in the prone position with their weapons trained on the party. The site was again enclosed in a double, barbed-wire fence. Vans, probably generators, could be seen inside under a shed-like protective structure. Again no photographs were allowed.

Other points of interest.—During the course of the trip to the transmitter site, several things of interest were noted. At one point, 10 Soviet fuel trucks with Soviet military drivers were seen. At another location in the southern edge of the town approximately four Soviet artillery pieces and four tracked cargo carriers were seen. Outside the town on the left side of the road enroute to the transmitter site were some sophisticated, reinforced concrete structures under construction which the Somali escorts identified as a refugee hospital. Also south of the road some two-story, apartment like structures were being constructed which were identified as refugee housing. The Somali escorts also spoke of a new water supply system that would take water by pipeline from the mountains 20 miles away and bring it into Berbera. (This would greatly enhance the port capability, since a fresh water source is critical in this area.)

The missile handling and storage facility.—Following the visit to the communications transmitter site, the party returned to the "club" for a break. At this point Colonel Suleiman advised Senator Bartlett that he could take four others with him into the missile facility and that no photographs would be allowed. Messrs. Smith, Adams, Graham, and Casani accompanied Senator Bartlett.

The party approached the facility in two lorries and stopped about 100 feet from the gate. The facility was guarded by Somalis in white uniform and after some negotiation the party moved inside the enclosure. About a fifty foot section of the front gate appears to be of stucco construction and was painted blue with the symbolic, white, five-pointed Somali star painted over the blue background.

Once inside the vehicles drove straight ahead to the component storage area. The small building to the right of the gate is a drive-through structure with a small (estimated 5-ton) overhead crane. In the component storage area the team went into two bunkers. On the top of each bunker is a large flag pole size lighting arrestor. These bunkers contained Soviet ammunition. Inside the center bunker, the team was shown ammunition crates stacked at random about four crates high. Each crate contained what appeared to be two rounds of 122 millimeter artillery ammunition. In the second bunker similarly stacked crates contained 37 millimeter ammunition. We did not go into the western-most bunker or the center bunker.



From this area the team moved by lorry to the vicinity of the high bay building. Outside the building was a Styx missile crate surrounded by other crates with Soviet markings. The team entered the high bay building through a door near the center of the west side and moved past the single story shops into the high bay area. This was an impressive facility. The open bay was about 45 by 120 feet with 30 feet of vertical clearance to the bottom of a large bridge crane. This crane rode on 12-14 inch I-beams, had both longitudinal and traverse travel, and an estimated capacity of at least 25 tons. The facility was just nearing completion. Leaning against one wall, partially obscured by some equipment was a red sign with Soviet lettering. The lettering was facing the wall and the message could not be discerned. There were four missile dollies in the area. This facility appeared adequate to handle any surface to surface, surface to air, or submarine launched missiles in the Soviet naval inventory.

The team then went outside the building and asked to enter one of the two large storage bunkers adjacent to the high bay building. At first the team was refused permission, but eventually Colonel Suleiman agreed and the team moved to the first bunker which was unlocked. When the doors were opened the bunker, a huge structure approximately 30 by 250 feet and with sophisticated temperature and humidity controls, was empty. Senator Bartlett requested, but was refused, entry into the second bunker.


Behind the high bay building another shop type building and a grease rack-type structure were noted. A generator plant in front of the high bay building appeared to be nearing completion. Although the team was not permitted to enter the fueling area, open-sided structures containing fuel tanks and fuel trucks were observed.

Inside the facility only Somalis were seen. The high-ranking Somali escorts acknowledged that this was a Styx missile facility and said that they would soon receive ships from the Soviets that can fire the Styx missile. The design, construction, materials and equipment were obviously Soviet. Inside the gate was a bulletin board that had been stripped of its contents but retained its Soviet lettering.

The party then left the missile facility without entering the fueling area and returned to the "club" to pick up the remainder of the party for the trip to the airfield.

The new airfield.—During the visit to the airfield the entire party including the press stayed in the lorries and were not permitted to take photographs. The team drove to the west end of the runway over what appeared to be a new two lane highway that was taking shape. The runway is long, estimated to be about 4,000 meters. At the western end sub base rock has been placed. This sub base rock appeared to be three inch minus rock, poorly graded, about 10 inches in depth. There was a crawler mounted device resembling an asphalt paving machine that had apparently been used to place the sub base rock. The elevation of the top of the sub base rock was several inches below the level of the desert surface implying that there would be more base rock (probably uniformly graded, 1 and ½ inch minus) before the surface was paved. A hot mix asphaltic concrete plant was seen near the eastern end of the runway. When questioned, the Somalis said that the airfield would be a commercial facility for the exporting of cattle.

Leaving the runway the caravan drove through an area of several new buildings which were just being erected. The buildings were the pre-engineered, pre-fabricated type and their utility was difficult to discern. There was one low, concrete structure that was of heavy reinforced concrete construction, funnel-shaped that is presumed to



be a jet engine sound suppression or jet engine blast absorption device.

The party returned from the new airfield to the departure area about 3 p.m.

En route from Berbera

Senator Bartlett agreed to make a stop at a refugee camp enroute from Berbera to Mogadiscio. For this trip those team members who had flown into Berbera on the helicopter boarded the DC-3 and vice versa. During the flight to Berbera, Somalia (the site of the refugee camp), the DC-3 lost an engine and had to make an unscheduled stop. The team was then ferried to Berbera by helicopter and after the visit to the refugee collection camp returned to Mogadiscio by a Soviet-built AN-24 aircraft which carried Somalia airlines markings.

Final visit with President Siad

After visiting two refugee resettlement camps on the morning of July 5, a final call was paid on President Siad by Senator Bartlett and Messrs. Rexroad, Smith, Noyes, Hamrick (of the U.S. Embassy), Rodriguez, and Hughes. This meeting was much different from the initial meeting with President Siad saying very little, while Senator Bartlett thanked him for his courtesies and told him exactly where we had been and what we had seen. President Siad reiterated that his reason for inviting U.S. Congressmen was primarily to see his nation's struggle, and to see Berbera was incidental. He stressed his desire that Somalia wants the same relation with the United States that it enjoys with the Soviets. The meeting lasted about 30 minutes and closed on a cordial note.



Senator Bartlett at his final meeting with President Siad

AFTER THE TRIP

Preliminary observations

The preliminary observations of Senator Bartlett were set forth in a press release made shortly after he returned (Exhibit E). In essence, the position taken by the Department of Defense that the Soviet Union was developing a significant capability was validated.

Debriefings

The team members were kept together to compile a comprehensive report of what they had seen and their analysis. This detailed report is available in the Armed Services Committee files.

SPECULATION: WHY THE INVITATION?

Since the trip undoubtedly confirmed a significant Soviet presence at Berbera, it is difficult to understand why the Somali Government was so insistent that "It would never allow its soil to be used by a foreign power for the storage or deployment of means of destruction that would cause tension in the region or disturb international tranquility.". Equally as puzzling was the Somali Government's "opening of all doors" to the team which most assuredly will strain Soviet-Somali relations at a time when the Soviet Government is providing humanitarian as well as military aid to Somalia. In reviewing the trip there are several possible reasons for the Somali invitation:

1. As President Siad stated, he invited Members of the United States Congress, not to see Berbera, but to witness his nation's struggle against poverty, disease, and ignorance. He referred to the Americans as "humanitarians" and implied that he would like to have increased U.S. foreign aid.

2. The Somali Government issued the denials and subsequent invitations in the full expectation that the invitations would not be accepted.

3. The Somali Government did not know the full extent and meaning of the Soviet activity in Berbera.

4. The Somali Government did not realize that the United States intelligence regarding Soviet activities in Berbera was as good as it was, and that they felt they could obscure the facilities while showing a visiting delegation through Berbera.

5. The Somali Government has issued a formal invitation for a United States naval vessel to call on the port of Mogadiscio. The invitation to visit Berbera may have been made to pave the way for this naval visit.

6. As a general rule the Somali citizenry do not like the Russians. There were numerous reports of Somalis throwing rocks at the Russians and other similar events. There may be enough pressure from the general public to persuade President Siad to harden his position toward the Soviets.

7. There may be pressure on President Siad from within the Supreme Revolutionary Committee to take a more balanced position regarding the Somali relations with the United States and the U.S.S.R.

8. The invitation may have been a direct overture to improve Somali-United States relations and possibility to place them on a parity with Somali-U.S.S.R. relations.

9. The Somali Government may have been seeking a method to expose the Soviet facility in Berbera to the world. The Soviet Union may be imposing the Berbera facilities on the Somalis against their will and against any agreements between the two countries, and the Somalis may desire to reduce Soviet military presence as occurred in Egypt.

In attempting to decide just why the invitation was extended, none of the above reasons exactly solves the puzzle. It is believed that all of the first eight reasons listed above may have played a part in the decision, while the ninth is highly speculative and therefore less likely to have been a consideration.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Berbera, with the facilities that are under construction, has significant military potential.

2. The Soviets control or at least have access to all facilities at Berbera.

3. The facilities at Berbera are still undergoing expansion and the total scope of the effort planned cannot be accurately determined. However, the capabilities of the observed and analyzed facilities are listed below:

(a) *The port facility.*—The harbor has depths of 50 to 60 feet and is large enough to accommodate a sizable naval task force. There is adequate berthing space, material handling equipment, storage space, and access roads to enable the port facility to service a naval task force quite readily.

(b) *The communications facility.*—Both the transmitter and receiver sites are obviously under Soviet control. The nature of the installations implies a long-haul capability rather than local ship-to-shore communications.

(c) *The missile handling and storage facility.*—Although every effort was made to make it appear that this was a Somali facility, it is undoubtedly a Soviet facility. The ammunition the team saw was improperly stored, the Somali officer who claimed to be commander couldn't answer the most routine questions about the facility, and, most important, the facility has far more size and sophistication than is necessary to service the Styx missile which the Somalis acknowledged they would receive.

(d) *The airport facility.*—The runway is of substantial structural quality and will be long enough when completed to accommodate any known aircraft. Although claimed to be a Somali airport, the runway is much longer than Somali military or civilian needs and the military capabilities of the runway will be limited only by the extent of supporting facilities that may be constructed.

(e) *The fuel storage facility.*—Considering the relatively short distance to the refineries of the Persian Gulf, the storage capacity at Berbera is quite large. There is adequate capacity to handle both naval and air refueling requirements.

(f) *Other facilities.*—The team learned of other expansion that had not been identified prior to the arrival in Berbera. Construction, labelled as a "hospital" and housing for refugees, appeared quite substantial and in excess of what the Somalis normally construct or what

they require. A 20-mile water line and a water treatment plant (identified from aerial photographs after the team returned) likewise appears incongruent unless the military naval resupply function is considered.

4. The Soviets are currently in Berbera in substantial numbers. It is impossible to make an accurate estimate, but a range of 500 to 1,500 represents a consensus of team opinion based on observations and the capability of the available housing.

5. The Berbera location is very advantageous from a strategic point of view. The Berbera facilities, combined with the Aden facilities, could control the confluence of the sea lanes from the Suez Canal and the Red Sea into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

6. The Government of Somalia would like to improve relations with the United States. The refugee situation in that country requires massive assistance and President Siad is desirous of U.S. help—even to the detriment of current Somali-Soviet relationships. Though these overtures have far-reaching implications, the Soviet influence in Somalia is not expected to be reduced significantly.

7. The position of the Department of Defense with regard to the significance of Berbera is valid. The team's conclusions do support the Berbera argument which favors the expansion planned for Diego Garcia. In order for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of relative parity regarding mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean, the Diego Garcia expansion is essential and should be approved prior to initiating any negotiations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should proceed with the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. While I believe that the expansion of Diego Garcia is justified notwithstanding the existence of a significant Soviet military capability at Berbera, the results of this trip greatly reinforce the arguments in favor of the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia.

2. The President acting through the State Department should explore every opportunity to exploit the overtures made by the Somali Government to improve United States-Somali relations.

3. The invitation by President Siad for a U.S. naval ship to call at Mogadiscio should be accepted and an effort made to expand this visit to include a call at Berbera.

4. The United States should reevaluate its ongoing humanitarian aid program in view of Somalia's current refugee resettlement efforts. (A separate report covering Senator Bartlett's findings in this area will be published.)

EXHIBIT A

SOMALI EMBASSY,
Washington D.C., June 18, 1975.

Hon. JOHN. C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know, the Defense Department is sustaining that there is a Soviet Military Base in Berbera, Somali. A week ago, precisely on the 10th of this month, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, in seeking appropriation funds for the construction of Diego Garcia facilities, has displayed before the August Senate Armed Services Committee the so called "Aerial photographs" showing supposedly Soviet base including missile installations in the Berbera area.

The Somali Government categorically denies the existence of a Soviet base in Berbera or elsewhere in Somalia. Everytime the Defense Department spokesman makes allegations of Russian base in Somalia, the Somali Government has promptly rejected such allegations.

When last October President Siyad Barre of Somalia paid a courtesy visit to President Ford here in Washington, the Somali Leader made very clear assurances to the American Chief Executive that there is no Soviet base in Somalia.

The Somali Democratic Republic is a non-aligned country committed to world peace and prosperity for the mankind. It would never allow in its soil to be used by foreign power for the storage or deployment of means of destruction that would cause tension in the region or disturb international tranquility. Somalia is a developing nation and therefore would like to be free of Big Powers rivalry involvements, to devote its total attention to its declared enemies which are those of the humanity namely: a) hunger, b) disease, c) ignorance and is determined to win its war against these evils for the well-being of the Somali people.

On the light of the affirmations made by the Defense Secretary Dr. Schlesinger and consequent seriousness of the issue, President Siyad Barre has instructed me to extend, on his behalf and that of the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic, a cordial invitation to members of your honorable Committee to visit Somalia as soon as possible, in order to witness that Soviet base does not exist in Berbera or other parts of the country. This invitation is extended in the interest of U.S.-Somali friendly relations, which the Somali Government highly values and for the purpose of clearing up once for all this controversy.

It is my earnest hope, Mr. Chairman, that your distinguished Committee will honour the Somali Government's cordial invitation and will be able to send a team of its members to Somalia soon. By soon I mean within this month or, at the latest, early next month, because around the end of July President Siyad Barre will be leaving for Kampala (Uganda) where as current Chairman, he will be opening the O.A.U. (Organization of African Unity) Summit.

I shall be anxiously awaiting to hear from you at your earliest convenience, so that I be able to promptly inform the President. I would be accompanying or precede the group, as you desire.

Respectfully yours,

Dr. ABDULLAHI A. ADDOU,
Ambassador.

EXHIBIT B

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., June 26, 1975.

HIS EXCELLENCY,
DR. ABDULLAHI A. ADDOU,
*Ambassador of the Somali Democratic Republic,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR. In response to your letter of June 18, 1975 I want to express the appreciation of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services for your cordial invitation extended on behalf of President Siyad Barre and the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic to visit Berbera and any other part of Somalia.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services accepts your invitation and will furnish you in the near future with the names of the Committee members and the Committee staff who will represent the Committee on this visit. The persons representing the Committee will travel as part of a delegation from the United States Congress which has suggested the tentative dates of July 2, 1975 through July 7, 1975 for the visit.

Your kind offer to be present during the visit to Somalia is appreciated.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. STENNIS, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT C

SOMALIA ITINERARY

Depart	Andrews Air Force Base.....	1:30 p.m., July 2.
Arrive	Mogadiscio, Somalia.....	2:30 p.m., July 3.
Depart	Mogadiscio, Somalia.....	6:00 a.m., July 4.
Arrive	Berbera, Somalia.....	9:00 a.m., July 4.
Depart	Berbera, Somalia.....	3:00 p.m., July 4.
Arrive	Mogadiscio, Somalia.....	7:00 p.m., July 4.
Depart	Mogadiscio, Somalia.....	1:00 p.m., July 5.
Arrive	Andrews Air Force Base.....	12:00 noon, July 6.

(25)

EXHIBIT D

TRIP TO SOMALIA—SENATOR BARTLETT'S TEAM MEMBERS

<i>Name and Organization</i>	<i>Specialty</i>
Angelo J. Collura, Professor of Foreign Languages, Prince Georges College	Ports.
Albert E. Graham, Jr., Slavic Division, Library of Congress	Russian language. Communications.
Clayton B. Adams, Headquarters U.S. Air Force	Greek/Arabic language.
Capt. George Michaelidis, Kirtland Air Force Base, N. Mex.	Missiles.
Maj. Andrew B. Casani, Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Tex.	Photographer.
Gwilym D. Hughes, U.S. Air Force	Doctor.
Lt. Col. Ensor Rodriguez-Lopez, U.S. Air Force	Escort.
Maj. Fred M. Sims, U.S. Air Force	Escort.
M. Sgt. Raymond N. Pritchett, U.S. Air Force	

BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF ALBERT E. GRAHAM, JR.

Position: Senior Slavic Reference Librarian, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1970 to present.

Education: BA (history), 1957, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.; MA (Soviet area studies), 1970, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; and MLS, due 1975, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.

Languages: Russian, French, Spanish, Dutch, Flemish, Italian, Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, and Afrikaans.

Career highlights: July 1957–November 1957—OCS, Newport, R.I.; January 1958–October 1958—Russian Language School; October 1958–August 1960—Research Analyst, NSA; August 1960–August 1962—Russian Language Instructor, U.S. Naval Academy; and June 1964–June 1970—Research Analyst, Defense Research Division, Library of Congress.

Personal data: Date of birth, October 1, 1934; place of birth, Jersey City, N.J.; married, wife's name, Fernande Maris; children, five; lieutenant commander in U.S. Naval Reserves.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF ANGELO J. COLLURA

Position: Instructor, Prince Georges Community College since 1967.

Education: BA, 1955, Modern Languages, Penn State University; MS, 1956, Modern Languages, Georgetown University; and Ph. D., 1967, Modern Languages, Catholic University.

Languages: German, Italian.

Career highlights: August 1956–December 1956—OCS; January 1958–March 1960—Courier, Naval Support Activity, Naples, Italy; 1961–1964—Instructor (German and Italian), U.S. Naval Academy; and 1964–1967—instructor (Italian), Georgetown University.

Personal data: Date of birth, January 31, 1934; place of birth, Pittsburgh, Pa.; married, wife's name, Mary Rose; children, one; commander in U.S. Naval Reserves.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF CLAYTON B. ADAMS

Position: GS-14, Directorate of Command, Control and Communication, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, since 1969. Works on wideband communication, air, ground, command and control, basically European communications.

Career highlights: 1946-1948—served in the Navy as an electronics technician; 1948-1951—employed with the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.; 1951-1962—employed with Philco Corp.; 1963-1968—entered Civil Service with Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Directorate of Command, Control and Communications. Duties involve basically European communications.

Personal data: Date of birth, 1928; place of birth, Medford, Oreg.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF MAJ. ANDREW B. CASANI, U.S. ARMY, 162-32-8766

Position: Director, Combat Development, Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Tex.

Education: U.S. Military Academy.

Career highlights: Air Defense Analyst, Staff and Faculty, U.S. Army Missile School, Fort Bliss, Tex.; Foreign Space and Missile Threat, Guided Missile Systems Officer, Research and Development Analysis, Target Acquisition, Electronic Warfare Battlefield Surveillance USAMC, USAEUR; and NORAD, Division Warning Officer; Manager of Watch Team concerned with briefing of the current foreign space and missile technology.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF CAPT. GEORGE M. MICHAELIDIS, U.S. AIR FORCE

Position: Electrical engineer, Air Force Special Weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, N. Mex.

Education: Schooled in the Sudan, Egypt, Germany, and France.

Languages: Fluent in Arabic (Egyptian); Also speaks French and Greek.

Career highlights: Has no intelligence background or experience.

Personal data: Date of birth, 1943; place of birth, Wad Medani, Sudan; emigrated to the United States in 1961 and became a naturalized citizen.

EXHIBIT E

NEWS RELEASE JULY 6, 1975

Senator Dewey Bartlett has just returned from a 3-day factfinding mission to Berbera, Somalia. At the invitation of the Somali Government, Senator Bartlett headed a 10-man team composed of staff members of the Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees and technical experts from several sources that went to investigate allegations made by the Department of Defense that Berbera was the location of "major Soviet support facilities". The Secretary of Defense had released aerial photographs of Berbera at a June 10, 1975, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning proposed United States expansion of the naval facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. These photographs allegedly showed Soviet ships, a new major Soviet communications facility, an expanding oil storage area, a missile storage and repair facility, and a large runway under construction. Both the Somali and Soviet Governments have denied that there are any Soviet facilities at Berbera. Senator Bartlett's statement follows:

"The purpose of our trip, which was made in response to an invitation by the Somali Government, was to visit the location of the alleged Soviet facilities at Berbera, Somalia, and determine, to the best of our ability, the validity of the Department of Defense claims that the Soviet Union was developing a significant military capability at Berbera.

"Let me say at the outset that we received every courtesy and consideration from the Somali Government. Some members of the team and I met on two occasions with President Siad and our conversations were cordial and frank. Before departing for Berbera, he guaranteed our party free access to see anything we wanted at Berbera.

"Our official team consisted of 10 members including a professional staff member from the Senate Appropriations Committee and one from the Armed Services Committee. Technical assistance to evaluate our observations came from several sources. I had linguists from the Library of Congress, from a civilian university, and from the Department of Defense. There were experts on communications, missiles, and port facilities from the Department of Defense. I also had a photographer who was permitted to photograph nearly everything we saw. In addition we were permitted to have six members of the American and foreign press accompany us.

"We departed for Berbera from Mogadiscio early on the morning of July 4, 1975. We traveled to Hargeisa by Somali aircraft and from Hargeisa to Berbera by a Somali-piloted, Soviet-built helicopter, circling the Berbera area before we landed. We arrived in Berbera about 9 a.m. and our visit lasted for about 6 hours.

"Our first stop was at the fuel facility. We were permitted unrestricted access and allowed to photograph anything we wanted. The nine fuel tanks under construction were obviously of Soviet design and Soviet construction material.

From the fuel tank farm we walked to the pier area and were given complete access to all pier facilities until we came to the Soviet barracks ship. This ship, which flew the Soviet flag, was tied to the pier. It had a Russian sailor in uniform at the top of the gangway. I made a request through my Russian linguist to come aboard and was denied permission. Although Caucasians were seen on the deck of the barracks ship as we flew in and some were seen through portholes, there was an obvious effort to keep any Russians out of sight.

"We left the pier area and went to the barracks and trailer housing area. Here again, we had complete access to the facilities and could photograph anything. Our Somali escorts described the trailers as "Russian" housing and the barracks as "Russian and Somali family" housing. We saw Soviets in the trailers and Somalis and Soviets apparently living in the barracks.

"Following this stop we went by vehicle to the area identified by the Department of Defense as a communications receiver site. Before we approached the facility the Somalis directed that no photographs be taken. We stopped near a gate guarded by Somalis in white naval uniforms. At that time we were advised

by a Somali escort official that this was a Soviet facility and that we could not enter. The Somalian guard confirmed this. He said that the Somalis shared the facility and that, on two occasions, he had requested of the Soviets that we be permitted to enter, but his request had been denied.

"From this point we drove to the communications transmitter site and were again refused permission to enter with the same explanation that this was a Soviet facility. Both the transmitter and receiver sites were observed from a distance and they appear to be powerful, long-range, Soviet communications facilities.

"As we left this facility, a Somali official advised me that only four others of the team and I could visit what was described by the Department of Defense as a missile handling and storage facility and that there would be no photographs permitted. We did visit this nearly completed facility under these restraints. Again this facility was guarded by Somalis in white naval uniforms and only Somalis were observed. Inside the facility we were shown bunker areas and a large building nearing completion. We confirmed that the facility was designed for missile storage, checkout, and assembly. The facility was obviously built by the Soviets.

"Our final visit was to the new airfield and the entire party was permitted to go. We confirmed the construction to be a large airport facility capable of handling any known aircraft with prefabricated buildings under construction. The airport appeared to be several months away from operational status with the nature and amount of support facilities not fully determinable.

"We departed Berbera about 3 p.m. and returned to Mogadiscio by Somali aircraft. The following morning I met again with President Siad, to tell him what we had seen, and to thank him for his many courtesies.

"In summary, I believe our visit was extremely successful. Of course, we have not had the opportunity to analyze completely what we have seen, and to make final conclusions, but I do have some preliminary observations.

"First, during his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 10, 1975, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger said, "It is evident that the U.S.S.R. is in the process of establishing a significant new facility, capable of supporting their naval and air activities in the northwest Indian Ocean." Our trip absolutely confirms this contention. The facilities we saw were of Soviet design; Soviet construction techniques, materiel, and equipment were used; there were a substantial number of Russians in the area despite attempts to remain hidden for the most part. Second, the Soviets control the long range communication receiver and transmitter sites as well as the barracks ship. In addition, common sense, coupled with our observations, indicates that the Soviets have access to a significant missile handling facility and will soon have access to a major airport. Collectively these and other facilities, not previously known to exist, represent a significant capability.

"Finally, the Somali Government is obviously interested in improving its relations with the United States. Under trying circumstances they appeared quite candid with all members of the team. In fact, I am going to prepare a separate report on the refugee situation in Somalia that addresses part of this observation. I believe that our country should explore this opportunity to improve the relations between the United States and Somalia, which, if successful, could be mutually advantageous.

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