The article “Cheap Talk: No Signs of National Unity” analyzes the dire situation in Somalia under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), focusing on his government’s lack of serious engagement with national dialogue despite a collapsing security situation. It outlines three possible scenarios for Somalia’s future, ranging from a highly unlikely “Hail Mary” to a worst-case scenario involving Al-Shabaab taking control of Mogadishu.
Somalia is facing a major security crisis due to Al-Shabaab’s growing strength. President HSM announced a national dialogue to address this, but his actions suggest he’s not taking it seriously. He seems to rely on external help rather than making meaningful internal reforms.
The article accuses HSM of being complacent, believing that foreign intervention will always bail him out. This complacency prevents him from taking the necessary steps to unite the country and effectively combat Al-Shabaab.
Three Scenarios:
Best Case (Unlikely): HSM realizes the severity of the situation and drastically changes course. He revitalizes national unity talks, builds consensus, and launches a coordinated military offensive against Al-Shabaab with support from neighboring countries and international partners. This involves political concessions, constitutional reforms, and the promise not to run for re-election.
Most Likely (Muddling Through): HSM makes only minimal, superficial efforts at national dialogue. He prioritizes appearances over substance, offering gestures without real concessions. This leads to continued security deterioration, with Al-Shabaab strengthening its hold. Political tensions worsen, and Mogadishu becomes divided among the government, opposition, and Al-Shabaab. An OPOV plan will most likely move forward in very limited areas.
Worst Case: HSM makes no reforms whatsoever. Al-Shabaab intensifies its siege of Mogadishu, forcing international organizations and embassies to evacuate. Al-Shabaab effectively seizes control, leaving the international community with a difficult choice: recognize them or support an opposition coalition.
The article paints a pessimistic picture of Somalia’s future, emphasizing that simply “muddling through” is not a viable option. It calls for two immediate priorities: HSM must withdraw his candidacy for the 2026 election, and a credible, impartial entity must guarantee the outcome of the national dialogue. These are presented as difficult but necessary steps to prevent further deterioration.
In essence, the article accuses HSM of lacking the leadership and willingness to make the necessary compromises to save Somalia from its current crisis. It warns that his inaction could lead to dire consequences, potentially even Al-Shabaab taking control of the capital. The article suggests these concessions must be made to revive trust in and progress towards a comprehensive political settlement.
The complete piece is as follows:
Cheap Talk: No Signs of National Unity
By The Somali Wire Team
A distinct lack of urgency surrounds Somalia’s supposed ’emergency national dialogue.’ On the eve of Eid, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) reluctantly announced a national dialogue process in the face of collapsing security across the Shabelles and the growing threat to Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab.
The Hawiye national opposition, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe, and others have cautiously welcomed the offer, though they have sought greater clarity on a number of points, not least the scope of discussions. In the week since the announcement, however, Villa Somalia seems to have reverted to ‘business as usual’, exhibiting the same myopic and unilateral behavior that precipitated the country’s current crisis.
HSM’s distinctly unserious attitude towards national dialogue seems to reflect his government’s longstanding belief that, no matter how crassly they governed, someone else would come to bail them out. This week, apparently, it is Türkiye’s pledge to deploy thousands of troops from the SADAT private military company that has induced Villa Somalia to lapse back into lazy, magical thinking. Or perhaps it is also the prodigious sense of relief that Al-Shabaab did not press its offensive into the core of Mogadishu when it seemingly had the chance. Whatever the reason, Hassan Sheikh seems poised to miss what is arguably his last chance to salvage his administration and his legacy.
Looking ahead, there are three principal scenarios that can be sketched out for Somalia in the coming weeks and months. The best of these – which might be described by sports aficionados as a ‘Hail Mary’ – is sadly also the least likely: Hassan Sheikh belatedly grasps the scale of the threat and, under pressure from domestic opposition and international partners, changes course entirely. He seizes the slim and short-term opportunity presented by the national dialogue process to resuscitate the National Consultative Council (NCC) and build sufficient consensus to mount a joint counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab.
In contrast with HSM’s recent preoccupation with liberating his own Wa’eysle / Abgaal homeland from Al-Shabaab, this would entail staging – as soon as possible – coordinated offensives from Jubaland and South West State towards jihadist strongholds in Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle, relieving the current pressure on the capital.
This, in turn, would require dedicated support from Ethiopia and Kenya, whose forces possess offensive capabilities and force multipliers that their local Somali counterparts do not. Likewise, coordinated air strikes from the US, Türkiye, and the UAE would be much better employed in support of such a concerted offensive than to scatter Al-Shabaab fighters in remote parts of Hirshabelle and Galmudug.
At the same time, securing support from within the Hawiye clan would be essential to stabilizing Mogadishu and ensuring that Al-Shabaab doesn’t pre-empt joint military action by accelerating its infiltration of the capital. This would necessitate accommodating the repeated demands of Hawiye opposition leaders, for example, that Villa Somalia freeze and repeal amendments to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution, which introduce egregiously centralizing and Islamist text, as well as the unworkable one-person, one-vote (OPOV) plan, which eliminates any prospect of a free and fair vote by awarding election management to the Ministry of Interior.
These will likely be only the most urgent steps towards longer-term political negotiations, in which HSM would probably have to accept some kind of hybrid electoral model in May 2026 while a new and impartial PM is appointed to oversee the final months of his term. Even more importantly, HSM should announce he will not run again for the presidency, dispelling concerns that he has called for national dialogue only to save his own skin and placate international partners rather than reviving trust in and progress towards a comprehensive political settlement.
The second scenario– and perhaps the most likely– is that Hassan Sheikh makes minimal political and security concessions and reforms as part of this national dialogue process. Only under immense pressure did the president call for the ‘unity’ talks, but little comprehensive outreach has so far been made to the national opposition and the estranged regional administrations.
Further evidence that the president does not want to cede power is the planned trip of PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Las Anod in the Sool region. Claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland, Barre’s visit is a clear affront to both as Villa Somalia hopes to burnish its nationalist credentials by reaching out to SSC-Khaatumo and by destabilizing Somaliland to dissuade the Trump administration from boosting its quest for international recognition.
The second scenario– and perhaps the most likely– is that Hassan Sheikh tries – but most likely fails – to keep on “muddling through”. Villa Somalia would continue to privilege optics over substance, entertaining dialogue with the national opposition and the estranged regional administrations without any genuine intention of making concessions or achieving compromise.
HSM’s offer to hand “exclusive operational control” of Bosaaso to the US government just days before inviting the Puntland president for talks in Mogadishu is emblematic of such a flippant approach. Similarly, the planned trip of PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Las Anod in the Sool region is a clear affront to both Puntland and Somaliland, suggesting that Villa Somalia continues to assign higher priority to burnishing its nationalist profile than to building bridges with federal member states.
In this scenario, the SNA continues to flounder, unable to repulse Al-Shabaab in Middle Shabelle and becoming further siloed in Lower Shabelle. The jihadists may not take Mogadishu, but they increasingly penetrate the capital by seizing peripheral areas such as Baraawe and stepping up their attacks. The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), still beset by funding problems, can only provide Forward Operating Base (FOB) security, bunkered down in a handful of towns and unable to offer significant offensive capacity. With no funding for the latest iteration of the AU peacekeeping mission forthcoming and troop-contributing countries going into arrears, there is a growing risk that it will collapse entirely in mid-2025.
Unwilling to enact substantive political changes, Hassan Sheikh likely ploughs on with some version of the unworkable OPOV scheme in Mogadishu, alongside a handful of towns in Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and possibly South West State (assuming that South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen remains within Villa Somalia’s camp rather than orchestrating his own re-election).
More broadly, relations between the Federal Member States and Mogadishu inevitably deteriorate further, while Hawiye opposition leaders in the capital, including former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, continue to forsake the polls and mobilize a Badbaado Qaran (National Salvation) 2.0 in the streets of the capital. Mogadishu itself is then carved up between three main factions– Villa Somalia, the Hawiye opposition, and Al-Shabaab.
The third– and worst-case scenario– is that, despite announcing the national dialogue, President Hassan Sheikh makes no political or security reforms. Al-Shabaab tightens its cordon around Mogadishu, seeking to persuade federal leaders and their international partners to abandon the capital without a fight. UN and embassies are evacuated with the support of AUSSOM and other partner military forces.
At this point, Al-Shabaab becomes the de facto authority in Mogadishu, leaving the international community with the choice of either recognizing the jihadists as the sovereign government or working with a coalition of Somali administrations and factions opposed to the militants.
Sadly, the coming months do not offer much cause for optimism in Somalia– even if the worst-case scenario can be avoided. HSM may be able to muddle through for the time being militarily, particularly in the event of a Turkish SADAT intervention, but Somalia has a wretched history of foreign troop deployments, and it remains no alternative for sober, cohesive, political, and security reform.
So, with little time remaining to rescue Somalia’s shambolic federal government from itself, two issues must now be immediately prioritized– HSM withdrawing his candidacy in 2026 and identifying a credible, impartial guarantor to underwrite the outcome of a national dialogue. This may seem like a price too high to meet the demand of Villa Somalia’s incumbents, but the cost of dithering will be even higher.
This article originally appeared in Sahan Research’s thrice-weekly bulletin “The Somali Wire,” Issue No. 808, on April 07, 2025.
