Competition for influence in the Red Sea region is a significant geopolitical dynamic that is being closely monitored by various stakeholders. The strategic importance of the Red Sea has led to increased competition among countries seeking to assert their presence and control in this crucial maritime area.
By Dr Muhammad Akram Zaheer
Recent reports indicate that the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Russian government are on the verge of finalizing a significant military and economic agreement. This potential deal underscores Russia’s strategic interest in gaining access to ports along the Red Sea, a move aimed at bolstering its naval capabilities and expanding its geopolitical influence in the region.
Moreover, Russia seeks to forge stronger political and military alliances across Africa, using partnerships with countries like Sudan to enhance its global stature, counter Western influence, and explore new economic opportunities. Lieutenant General Yasir al-Atta confirmed in late May the nearing conclusion of negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Russia. The proposed agreement would allow Russia to establish a naval support facility on the Red Sea, marking a pivotal step in their bilateral relations. In exchange, Sudan would receive weapons and ammunition, reflecting Sudan’s strategic maneuvering amid dissatisfaction with Western Nations for their perceived inaction against external support to their adversaries, particularly the Rapid Support Forces involved in Sudan’s civil conflict.
Initially slated for completion since February 2023, progress on the agreement was hindered by Sudan’s internal strife. Russia’s motivation also lies in strengthening ties with African nations facing sanctions from Western powers. However, regional tensions, notably involving the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar concerning Sudan’s conflict, as well as ongoing issues in the Red Sea, have complicated matters. These complexities have impeded effective responses to challenges like the Houthis’ attacks, highlighting the geopolitical intricacies influencing both the agreement and regional stability.
Simultaneously, Russia and China are intensifying efforts to consolidate their positions in the Red Sea area. Russia, in collaboration with Eritrea, is advancing plans to establish a naval facility at Massawa port, a development affirmed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to Eritrea in January 2023.
This move underscores Russia’s ambition to secure additional strategic ports in the Red Sea beyond Sudan. Meanwhile, China’s presence near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical maritime route linking the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, is expanding. With a military base in Djibouti, China has expanded its naval operations, exemplified by the presence of an Iranian spy ship nearby, signaling deepening military engagement in the region.
These concerted efforts by Russia and China to enhance their influence in the Red Sea area are viewed as challenges to the policy objectives of the Biden administration in Africa. As both powers assert their presence through strategic partnerships and military expansions, they are reshaping the geopolitical landscape, potentially altering traditional spheres of influence and global power dynamics in Africa.
Critics, such as Senator James Risch, argue that the current U.S. approach is ineffective. Risch proposes strengthening ties with Somaliland as a countermeasure against China’s and Iran’s growing influence. The recent maneuvers by Russia and China underscore the strategic significance of the Red Sea in terms of both military dominance and economic control. Russia, leveraging attacks by Houthi rebels on commercial vessels, seeks to bolster its influence by offering safe passage to ships under the Russian flag.
Furthermore, there are concerns that Russia may collaborate with the Houthis to deploy sea mines, disrupting maritime traffic and potentially coercing ships to seek safety under Russian jurisdiction. Additionally, Russia might forge alliances with various factions in the Horn of Africa to evade international sanctions, facilitating illicit trade in oil and grain, which could alleviate energy and food shortages exacerbated by U.S. sanctions related to the conflict in Ukraine.
Russia has also employed “grain diplomacy,” supplying significant amounts of grain to several African nations, including Somalia, and forgiving substantial debts, such as $684 million owed by Somalia. This assistance is particularly appealing to Somalia, grappling with financial constraints exacerbated by the ongoing conflict with al-Shabaab. As tensions escalate between Somalia and Somaliland, especially ahead of Somaliland’s upcoming elections in November, Somalia may increasingly turn to Russia and China for support.
Notably, opposition leader and former Russian ambassador Abdirahman Irro advocates for closer ties with China, potentially influencing Somalia’s foreign policy decisions.
There are growing apprehensions that Russia may interfere in Somaliland’s electoral processes or disrupt its agreements, such as the strategic port deal with Ethiopia, in order to gain access to the port of Berbera. Africa’s vulnerability to heightened Russian engagement is compounded by perceived U.S. policy gaps in the region.
The Horn of Africa, encompassing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, holds immense strategic importance for global maritime trade and security. Control over this region confers significant geopolitical advantages, making it a focal point for competing military and economic powers.
Russia’s expanding presence in Africa spans military cooperation, arms sales, and economic investments, filling voids left by diminishing U.S. engagement. The prospect of Russia militarizing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden raises considerable concerns, potentially destabilizing an already fragile region and extending repercussions to global security, including the Middle East. Such developments could precipitate an arms race and exacerbate existing conflicts.
To mitigate these risks, the Biden administration must adopt a robust response, revisiting initiatives like the Somaliland Partnership Act. This proposed legislation advocates for the formal recognition and support of Somaliland, praised for its stable governance and strategic positioning. By collaborating with Somaliland, the U.S. could effectively counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in the region, while securing a crucial ally in the Horn of Africa.
Moreover, enhanced collaboration with the Department of Defense is imperative. A comprehensive military strategy, encompassing joint exercises, security assistance, and infrastructure development, would fortify regional stability and dissuade adversarial incursions.
The evolving dynamics in the Horn of Africa demand proactive U.S. engagement to preserve equilibrium and prevent unilateral dominance by any foreign power. By strategically aligning with stable regional partners like Somaliland and bolstering military cooperation, the US. can safeguard its interests while promoting peace and security in this pivotal maritime corridor.
Dr Muhammad Akram Zaheer
