As Iran and Houthis tighten maritime pressure, policy analyst says Berbera’s strategic location and Somaliland’s pro-Western orientation make it an indispensable partner for restoring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf region
HARGEISA — As Iran intensifies pressure on some of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, Washington should fundamentally rethink its strategy in the Horn of Africa and embrace Somaliland as a critical security partner, according to Middle East analyst Michael Rubin.
Writing amid escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, Rubin contends that the United States cannot effectively counter Iran’s regional strategy or secure global shipping lanes without deepening ties with Somaliland, the self-governing territory that has operated independently from Somalia since 1991.
“The reason why Somaliland is crucial to winning the war is its strategic geography,” Rubin writes. “Embracing Somaliland will.”
His argument comes as maritime security has become a defining issue for global commerce. Iran’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz and continued Houthi attacks on commercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have disrupted international trade, raising shipping costs and renewing concerns over the vulnerability of the world’s maritime chokepoints.
Rubin Rejects Criticism of Trump’s Iran Policy
Rubin opens by challenging critics who blame President Donald Trump’s military actions against Iran for the current escalation in regional tensions.
He argues that attributing Iran’s aggressive posture solely to recent U.S. military action overlooks longer-term strategic realities within the Islamic Republic.
According to Rubin, Iran’s leadership transition was already inevitable because of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advanced age and health concerns.
“The notion that the Islamic Republic would remain cautious and restrained… ignores Khamenei’s age,” Rubin writes, arguing that Tehran’s succession plans were already well underway regardless of American military decisions.
He also disputes claims that Iran’s efforts to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz are simply retaliation for U.S. actions.
Instead, Rubin argues that Tehran had already tested similar tactics through its Houthi allies in Yemen well before the current conflict intensified.
A Strategy Tested in the Red Sea
According to Rubin, the Houthis established what he describes as an “invisible line” across the Gulf of Aden, using Iranian intelligence support and Russian satellite capabilities to monitor commercial shipping.
Ships crossing the area, he alleges, faced demands for payment in exchange for safe passage.
Those refusing to comply risked drone strikes, missile attacks or naval mines.
Rubin presents this strategy as part of Iran’s broader effort to weaponize maritime chokepoints rather than an isolated response to recent events.
“The Houthis maintained an invisible line in the Gulf of Aden,” he writes, describing a system that sought to impose costs on international commerce before broader regional hostilities erupted.
A Historical Parallel
Rubin argues that domestic political debates should not distract Washington from addressing what he views as a growing strategic threat.
Drawing a comparison to World War II, he cites the U.S. defeat at Bataan in 1942, arguing that short-term setbacks should not dictate long-term strategic decisions.
“If Trump means to win the war against Iran and the Houthis to restore freedom of navigation through the world’s choke points,” Rubin writes, “it is time to bring the State Department into line.”
Somaliland at the Center of the Strategy
The core of Rubin’s argument centers on Somaliland.
He criticizes what he characterizes as decades of U.S. diplomatic adherence to a “One Somalia” policy, which he traces to decisions made during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state and which he says has continued under Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Rubin argues that Washington’s policy has failed to account for Somaliland’s distinct political trajectory.
He contrasts Somaliland’s development since 1991 with Somalia’s continued struggles with insecurity.
“While Somalia descended into chaos and warlordism, Somaliland embraced democracy and remained open for business,” he writes.
Rubin also highlights Somaliland’s foreign policy orientation.
“While Somalia then tilted toward China and Turkey, Somaliland aligned itself with Taiwan and Israel,” he writes.
He further argues that Somaliland’s internal security record distinguishes it from neighboring regions.
“While terrorism is a weekly feature of life in Mogadishu, there has not been a terrorist attack in Somaliland in almost 20 years.”
Challenging the Diplomatic Status Quo
Rubin also questions the legal rationale behind continued U.S. support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.
He argues that international history includes numerous examples of federations dissolving peacefully into their constituent parts, citing Czechoslovakia, the former United Arab Republic, Senegambia and the Soviet Union.
Given Somalia’s prolonged instability, Rubin contends that forcing Somaliland to remain subordinate to Mogadishu ignores political realities on the ground.
He argues that the policy is inconsistent with historical precedent and no longer reflects regional realities.
Why Berbera Matters
Rubin identifies Somaliland’s strategic geography as the decisive factor supporting closer U.S. engagement.
Stretching roughly 530 miles along the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland occupies a commanding position overlooking maritime approaches linking the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean.
At the center of that coastline lies the Port of Berbera.
Rubin notes that the deep-water port and its adjacent airfield have undergone significant modernization, creating what he describes as one of Africa’s best-equipped logistics hubs.
He argues that Berbera could support anti-piracy operations, counter-Houthi missions and naval logistics closer to operational areas than existing facilities.
“The port could also help resupply U.S. Navy ships at sea closer to Hormuz,” Rubin writes.
Beyond security, Rubin sees economic opportunity.
He argues that Somaliland’s preference for investment over foreign aid, combined with reported deposits of rare earth minerals, could create new opportunities for American businesses if Washington were to strengthen bilateral ties.
A Call for Strategic Realignment
Rubin concludes that the United States should reconsider long-standing diplomatic assumptions in favor of a policy driven by strategic necessity.
He argues that successful maritime security requires partnerships with reliable regional actors capable of supporting military logistics, protecting trade routes and contributing to long-term regional stability.
“Rubio may default to State Department groupthink,” Rubin writes. “But that has never won a war. Embracing Somaliland will.”
Whether U.S. policymakers ultimately adopt that recommendation remains uncertain.
But as maritime insecurity continues to reshape strategic thinking from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, Somaliland’s location, infrastructure and political stability are likely to remain central to debates over the future of American engagement in the Horn of Africa.
