The Houthi threat in the Red Sea could reshape Washington’s Somaliland strategy as Berbera offers the U.S. strategic access near the Bab el-Mandeb
By Paul Tilsley
JOHANNESBURG — The expanding threat posed by Iran-backed Houthi forces to shipping in the Red Sea is prompting renewed debate in Washington over how the United States should position its military and diplomatic assets along the Horn of Africa — and whether Somaliland could become a more important partner.
The Houthis’ campaign against commercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, combined with mounting uncertainty around the Strait of Hormuz, has heightened the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. For U.S. policymakers, the pressure is creating a new question: whether Washington needs additional and more reliable access points on Africa’s western shore of the Gulf of Aden.
Somaliland, which restored its independence from Somalia in 1991 and has operated as a de facto self-governing state since then, is increasingly positioning itself as a potential answer.
The country offers Washington access to Berbera, a deep-water port on the Gulf of Aden, along with a major airfield and one of the region’s longest runways. Its proximity to Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb places Somaliland close to a maritime corridor that has become increasingly important to global trade and energy security.
The strategic argument has gained momentum as the Houthis threaten to disrupt shipping through the narrow waterway connecting the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea.
A new strategic calculation
Edmund Fitton-Brown, a former British ambassador to Yemen and senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said China’s growing influence in Djibouti could complicate Washington’s reliance on its principal military hub there.
“China is significantly expanding its military and commercial presence in Djibouti,” Fitton-Brown previously told Fox News Digital.
“There is a sense that Djibouti is not a reliable ally for the U.S. So Somaliland’s time has probably come,” he added.
The United States operates Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, its principal military installation in the Horn of Africa. The base has played a central role in U.S. counterterrorism operations and regional security missions.
But the strategic environment around Djibouti has changed significantly since the United States established its military presence there. China maintains its first overseas military base in the country, while Beijing has expanded its commercial and infrastructure footprint across the region.
For U.S. strategists concerned about redundancy, access and freedom of navigation, Somaliland therefore presents a potentially complementary location rather than simply an alternative to Djibouti.
Major Gen. Ken Ekman, who retired last year after serving as the Department of War’s West Africa Coordination Element lead, said the Houthi threat could force Washington to reconsider its approach to Africa.
“The Houthis could compel a different U.S. strategy in Africa,” Ekman said.
He argued that the militant group is effectively creating another pressure point in the wider Middle East conflict.
“The Houthis are building up a second front in this Middle East conflict,” Ekman said. “It distracts the U.S. and stretches our assets.”
He added that the Houthis appear to be testing American military capabilities and could escalate their maritime campaign as the strategic balance around Hormuz changes.
Why Berbera matters
For Somaliland, the argument is straightforward: geography gives it an unusual degree of strategic relevance.
Berbera sits on the southern side of the Gulf of Aden, relatively close to Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb. The port has undergone substantial modernization, while its adjacent airfield offers additional logistical potential.
Ekman said a shift toward maritime security would alter the priorities of U.S. engagement in the Horn.
“Orienting a Horn of Africa strategy against the Houthis would place a premium on freedom of navigation,” he said. “Somaliland is proximate and overcomes some of the limitations imposed by other regional hosts like Djibouti and Middle East partners.”
That does not necessarily mean replacing Camp Lemonnier. Rather, a second access point could give U.S. planners greater operational flexibility, allowing Washington to diversify its regional footprint and create additional options for logistics, surveillance and maritime security.
Bill Roggio, editor of the Long War Journal, cautioned against assuming that Washington is ready to abandon Somalia in favor of Somaliland.
“The U.S. has expressed displeasure with the Somali government’s rampant corruption and internal infighting with local and regional governments, and with various clans,” Roggio said. “However, full recognition of Somaliland independence would create a major rift between the U.S. and Somalia.”
Roggio nevertheless acknowledged the potential military value of additional access in Somaliland.
“U.S. forces situated at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti are far better situated geographically to deter the Houthis from shutting down the Bab el Mandeb Strait than a potential base in Somaliland,” he said. “That being said, redundancy — a backup plan — is a good thing in military operations.”
Somaliland seeks a larger role
Somaliland has long argued that its relative political stability, security institutions and strategic location make it a natural partner for Western governments.
Bashir Goth, Somaliland’s representative to the United States, said Hargeisa is already engaged with American officials on regional security.
“The United States needs reliable partners on Africa’s coastline,” Goth told Fox News Digital. “Somaliland is that partner and our defense officials have been in active dialogue with AFRICOM on Red Sea security.”
“Somaliland has the geography, the stability and the will to work closely with Washington — and will continue to do so,” he added.
The argument comes at a critical moment for Somaliland’s campaign for international recognition.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has already altered the diplomatic landscape, while Hargeisa has sought to deepen relations with the United States and other Western and regional powers. Yet Washington has continued to recognize Somalia’s territorial integrity and has not formally endorsed Somaliland’s independence.
That policy remains a significant obstacle.
Washington remains committed to Somalia — for now
U.S. officials have continued to emphasize Washington’s security relationship with Somalia, particularly its support for Somali forces fighting al-Shabaab.
Gen. Dagvin Anderson, commander of U.S. Africa Command, recently highlighted the capabilities of Somalia’s elite Danab forces, describing them as “one of the most capable forces on the continent.”
But Anderson also warned that Washington’s continued engagement depends on Somalia taking greater responsibility for its security institutions.
“If Somalia steps up and the government steps up and takes the lead on this, we will continue to be there because there is mutual interest,” Anderson said.
“But if we can’t see that, and the political instability and political infighting continues, then it’s going to be very hard for us to continue to stay engaged,” he added.
Those remarks have attracted attention in Somaliland, where officials see persistent political divisions in Mogadishu as evidence that Washington may eventually need to reassess how it distributes its regional partnerships.
Still, Roggio said dissatisfaction with Somalia should not be confused with an imminent diplomatic realignment.
Recognition would carry substantial political consequences, potentially provoking a sharp response from Mogadishu and complicating Washington’s broader relationship with Somalia.
AFRICOM deepens engagement with Berbera
Despite the absence of a formal policy shift, U.S. military engagement with Somaliland appears to be expanding.
Anderson recently visited Berbera, where AFRICOM said he assessed the security environment and reviewed the port’s operational capacity.
Around the same period, a Somaliland delegation led by the territory’s defense minister reportedly visited AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, for discussions that included Red Sea security.
The visits have fueled speculation that Washington is examining Somaliland’s potential role in a broader maritime-security strategy.
AFRICOM and the Department of War did not respond to requests for comment on the reported meetings.
A State Department spokesperson, meanwhile, reiterated Washington’s existing position on Somalia.
“The United States works with Somali and international partners to address terrorist threats in Somalia when necessary and appropriate to protect U.S. national security interests,” the spokesperson said.
Washington has also backed Saudi Arabia against the Houthi threat while maintaining consultations with Riyadh.
“The United States stands firmly with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against Houthi terrorism,” a State Department spokesperson said. “We are in close consultation with our Saudi allies and remain committed to their security.”
Recognition is not inevitable
The emerging debate is therefore less about whether Somaliland has strategic value than about how far Washington is prepared to go in converting that value into policy.
For U.S. military planners, Berbera offers geographic proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb, a potential second access point alongside Djibouti and an opportunity to diversify American regional infrastructure at a time of intensifying competition with China and growing Iranian influence.
For Somaliland, closer security cooperation could provide leverage in its decades-long campaign for international recognition.
But military utility does not automatically translate into diplomatic recognition.
The United States would have to weigh the advantages of a closer relationship with Somaliland against the political costs of challenging Somalia’s territorial claims, as well as the wider implications for relations with other African and Arab governments.
The Houthi campaign, however, is changing the strategic equation.
As maritime insecurity extends from the Middle East into the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland’s location is becoming harder for Washington to overlook. Whether that ultimately produces formal recognition remains uncertain. But the case for treating Somaliland as a significant American strategic partner is becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss.
