The 2024 MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland reignited Djibouti-Somaliland friction, exposing deeper competition over Berbera, trade, security and Red Sea influence
By Analytica Team
The Memorandum of Understanding signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024 was designed to address one of the Horn of Africa’s most persistent strategic problems: how a landlocked Ethiopia could secure reliable access to the sea.
Instead, the agreement exposed and intensified another regional rivalry — between Somaliland and Djibouti.
Under the MoU, Ethiopia was to gain access to a coastal area near Berbera through a long-term lease, while Somaliland said the arrangement could pave the way for Ethiopian recognition of its independence. Although the full agreement was not publicly disclosed, its announcement immediately unsettled Somalia, Djibouti and other regional governments.
The arrangement was later overtaken by a Turkish-mediated understanding between Ethiopia and Somalia, which sought to resolve the dispute over Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions through negotiations involving Mogadishu.
But the political consequences of the 2024 MoU endured.
For Djibouti, the agreement raised the prospect that Ethiopia — its most important economic customer — could eventually redirect part of its trade toward Berbera. For Somaliland, it represented one of the most consequential diplomatic openings in more than three decades of de facto self-rule.
The result was a familiar Horn of Africa dynamic: one government’s strategic opportunity quickly became another’s perceived threat.
Djibouti’s Economic Vulnerability
Djibouti’s influence in the region has long rested on geography and infrastructure.
Situated at the entrance to the Red Sea, the country has developed an extensive port and logistics network that handles much of Ethiopia’s international trade. Revenues from that traffic have become central to Djibouti’s economy and have helped finance its position as a major commercial and military hub.
The country’s strategic importance extends beyond trade. Djibouti hosts military facilities operated by several foreign powers and has established itself as one of the region’s most important platforms for international security operations.
That model depends partly on Ethiopia remaining heavily reliant on Djibouti’s transport corridors.
The possibility of a competing Ethiopian route through Berbera therefore carried implications beyond port competition.
If Ethiopia were able to move a significant share of its imports and exports through Somaliland, Djibouti could lose revenue, bargaining power and some of the strategic leverage derived from its role as Ethiopia’s principal maritime gateway.
For Somaliland, however, the calculation was almost the reverse.
Berbera offered Hargeisa a chance to demonstrate that its geographic position could generate economic and geopolitical value. An agreement with Ethiopia, one of Africa’s most influential states, also appeared to offer something even more valuable: a possible path toward international recognition.
A Diplomatic Breakthrough for Hargeisa
Somaliland declared its restoration of independence in 1991 but has remained internationally unrecognized.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU appeared to challenge that diplomatic status quo.
Hargeisa presented the agreement as evidence that Somaliland could attract major regional partnerships without formal recognition from the international community. Ethiopia’s reported willingness to consider recognition in connection with the maritime arrangement raised the stakes considerably.
The agreement also linked Somaliland’s recognition campaign to a concrete strategic asset: access to the Gulf of Aden.
That combination made the MoU difficult for neighboring governments to ignore.
Somalia’s federal government immediately condemned the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintaining that Somaliland remains part of Somalia.
Djibouti broadly shared Mogadishu’s position on Somalia’s territorial integrity, even as its public response was generally more measured.
Behind the diplomatic language, however, the agreement exposed deeper economic and strategic competition.
The Awdal Dimension
The western Somaliland region of Awdal added another layer of complexity.
Awdal borders Djibouti and includes Zeila, a historic port whose location gives it particular importance in the politics of the western Gulf of Aden.
The area also has extensive cross-border family, commercial and clan connections. Communities on both sides of the frontier have maintained social ties that predate the modern borders.
Those connections became increasingly politicized after the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement.
Somaliland officials accused Djibouti of using cross-border relationships to support groups challenging Hargeisa’s authority in Awdal and Salal. Among the allegations were claims that Djibouti had hosted or assisted Issa and Gadabuursi figures involved in political mobilization against Somaliland authorities.
Djibouti has denied such allegations, portraying its regional policy as an effort to preserve stability and support Somalia’s territorial unity.
The competing narratives illustrate how quickly local disputes can become entangled with regional geopolitics.
A local argument over political representation, territory or development can acquire an entirely different meaning when neighboring governments are suspected of backing opposing sides.
From Economic Competition to Political Friction
The tensions did not remain confined to diplomatic statements.
Somaliland suspended certain sand exports from the Salal region to Djibouti, citing licensing requirements. The decision was widely interpreted as part of a broader deterioration in relations.
Meanwhile, Djibouti was accused of providing space to members of the Awdal State Movement, which has advocated greater regional autonomy and closer political ties with Somalia’s federal structures.
Protests and clashes in and around Zeila increasingly became intertwined with competing narratives about sovereignty, identity and foreign interference.
The danger was not simply that Djibouti and Somaliland disagreed.
It was that local political grievances could become proxies for a wider struggle over the strategic direction of the region.
Israel’s Recognition Changed the Equation
The relationship deteriorated further after Israel recognized Somaliland in December 2025.
Djibouti responded by closing Somaliland’s liaison office and taking other measures affecting Somaliland-linked officials and representatives, according to accounts cited in the regional dispute. Somaliland subsequently recalled its representative and imposed reciprocal restrictions, including measures affecting Djibouti-linked aviation.
The deterioration also coincided with increased tensions around the Awdal frontier.
In January 2026, Somaliland forces conducted an operation in the Zeila district against a group that some sources said had crossed from Djibouti. The incident underscored how quickly political disputes could acquire a security dimension.
By August 2026, Somaliland’s Interior Minister had publicly accused Djibouti, alongside Somalia and Turkey, of external interference that Hargeisa said was contributing to instability in Awdal and Salal.
Such accusations remain politically contested, and they should not be treated as established fact without independent verification.
But their importance lies in what they reveal about the depth of mistrust between the two sides.
The MoU Was a Catalyst, Not the Cause
The 2024 agreement did not create the underlying tensions.
The rivalry predates it.
Historical border questions, competing political identities, cross-border clan networks and economic competition had already shaped relations among Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia.
What the MoU did was bring those disputes into sharper focus.
It created a perception in Djibouti that Somaliland’s relationship with Ethiopia could threaten established economic and strategic arrangements. At the same time, Somaliland increasingly viewed Djibouti’s actions through the lens of its own struggle for recognition.
That produced a potentially destabilizing zero-sum logic.
A gain for Berbera could be interpreted as a loss for Djibouti.
Greater Ethiopian access to Somaliland could be seen as a threat to Djibouti’s economic model.
Greater international recognition for Somaliland could be interpreted in Mogadishu and some regional capitals as a challenge to Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Infrastructure became part of the same contest.
Road improvements connecting Djibouti with Zeila and Borama, for example, could be viewed as ordinary development projects — or, amid heightened tensions, as instruments for extending political and economic influence.
The Wider Red Sea Contest
The Djibouti-Somaliland rivalry cannot be separated from the broader transformation of the Red Sea and western Indian Ocean.
The region has become increasingly crowded with competing interests involving Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, China and other external powers.
Ports have become strategic assets. Maritime routes have become security priorities. Military access has become a source of leverage.
In that environment, Berbera’s location gives Somaliland importance beyond the question of its political status.
For Djibouti, maintaining its position as a principal regional logistics and security hub is similarly strategic.
The competition is therefore not simply about one port against another.
It is about who controls the infrastructure, partnerships and corridors that will shape trade and security around the Gulf of Aden.
Why the Border Remains Vulnerable
As of mid-2026, Djibouti and Somaliland have avoided open interstate conflict.
Cross-border commerce and movement have not disappeared, while traditional mediation and government-led efforts continue to seek ways of containing tensions in western Somaliland.
But the underlying risks remain.
A localized confrontation in Awdal or Salal could quickly acquire a regional dimension if either side believes an external government is supporting its opponent. The involvement of outside powers makes that possibility more complicated.
The Horn of Africa has repeatedly demonstrated how local grievances can become entangled with interstate competition.
A dispute that begins over land, political representation or trade can eventually be framed as part of a struggle over sovereignty and strategic access.
That is what makes the western Somaliland-Djibouti frontier particularly sensitive.
The Unfinished Consequences of 2024
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU was ultimately only one document in a much larger regional contest.
But it changed the political calculations around it.
For Somaliland, the agreement demonstrated the potential value of its geography and strengthened its argument that international actors have strategic reasons to engage directly with Hargeisa.
For Djibouti, it exposed the vulnerability inherent in an economy and geopolitical model heavily dependent on regional transit.
And for Somalia, it reinforced the challenge posed by Somaliland’s expanding network of international relationships.
The central lesson is that economic corridors in the Horn of Africa rarely remain purely economic.
Ports, roads and maritime access carry political meaning because they redistribute influence.
The 2024 MoU did not create the Djibouti-Somaliland rivalry. It gave an old rivalry a new strategic focus.
The immediate priority for both sides is therefore not simply to prevent another diplomatic rupture. It is to separate legitimate security and economic interests from the zero-sum assumptions that have increasingly defined their relationship.
That will require sustained engagement between Djibouti and Hargeisa, credible mechanisms for managing border incidents and greater transparency around external involvement in local political disputes.
Without those safeguards, the western Gulf of Aden will remain vulnerable to a dangerous cycle in which commercial competition feeds political mistrust, political mistrust fuels local confrontation, and local confrontation draws in increasingly powerful regional and international actors.
