India weighs its options as Horn of Africa tensions deepen around Somaliland, the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, with Israel, Turkey, China and the U.S. expanding their strategic interests
NEW DELHI/HARGEISA — India is facing a more complicated strategic landscape in the Horn of Africa as rival powers deepen their involvement around the Red Sea, Somaliland’s international position evolves and the security threat posed by Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis continues to reshape calculations across one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
The assessment, discussed in a recent StratNews Global interview with East Africa specialist Prof. Peter Kagwanja, comes as Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reports of possible further U.S. engagement have pushed the self-governing territory closer to the center of Red Sea geopolitics.
For India, the stakes are primarily commercial and strategic. The Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb form a critical maritime link between the Indian Ocean and markets in Europe and North America, making instability along the route a direct concern for Indian trade.
“India is shaping its policy in the Horn of Africa,” Kagwanja said in the interview. While he said he had seen relatively limited Indian engagement with Somalia itself, he argued that New Delhi has a clear interest in the Red Sea because it is an important route for Indian goods and services moving toward European and North American markets.
That calculation could become more complicated as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, China, Israel and the United States compete for influence across the Horn and the wider Red Sea region.
Somaliland emerges as a strategic fault line
Somaliland, which restored its independence from Somalia in 1991, has long sought international recognition while maintaining its own government and security institutions in Hargeisa.
Its strategic location along the Gulf of Aden has increasingly attracted attention. The territory controls the coastline opposite Yemen, close to the Bab el-Mandeb, a maritime chokepoint through which substantial volumes of global trade pass.
Kagwanja characterized Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as fundamentally strategic, arguing that access to the territory’s Berbera port could provide Israel and potentially other partners with a position from which to monitor or respond to threats emanating from Yemen.
“It’s a strategic choice,” Kagwanja said, describing Berbera as a potential location from which to counter the Houthis and other threats originating in the Red Sea.
His assessment reflects the broader strategic importance of geography in the region. Djibouti, immediately west of Somaliland, already hosts military facilities used by several major powers, including the United States, China and France. That concentration has made the area one of the world’s most militarized strategic locations.
Berbera offers an alternative position farther along the Gulf of Aden, although the extent to which foreign governments might seek military access there remains a matter of evolving policy and diplomacy.
For Somaliland, the emerging competition offers both opportunity and risk. After decades without broad international recognition, closer relations with powerful external actors could strengthen its diplomatic position and generate economic and security partnerships. But deeper involvement in Middle Eastern rivalries could also expose the territory to conflicts beyond its immediate borders.
India watches a changing Red Sea
India has traditionally approached the Horn of Africa through trade, maritime security, diaspora ties and broader engagement with African economies rather than through the kind of overt military competition associated with some other powers.
That may become harder to sustain as geopolitical competition intensifies.
Indian commercial interests depend heavily on secure maritime routes linking the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and European markets. Disruptions in the Red Sea have already demonstrated how quickly instability around the Bab el-Mandeb can affect global shipping patterns and costs.
Kagwanja described India as a major but relatively understated actor in the wider region.
“India is still to come to the party” in terms of directly intervening in Horn of Africa geopolitics, he said, while noting New Delhi’s growing role through trade, technology, medical diplomacy and engagement with African states.
India also has substantial historical and contemporary economic connections across East Africa, including Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Those relationships give New Delhi channels through which to monitor developments without necessarily adopting the more militarized posture of competing powers.
Turkey adds another layer to India’s calculations
Turkey’s expanding footprint in Somalia and the wider Horn is another factor India will have to consider.
Ankara has developed extensive security, political and economic ties with Mogadishu and maintains a significant military-training presence in Somalia. Its growing role has contributed to a broader competition among external powers seeking influence along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean approaches.
Kagwanja argued that Turkey has become one of the most influential external actors in Somalia, while other regional powers — including the UAE, Qatar and Egypt — have also sought to shape political and security developments.
For India, the significance extends beyond Somalia itself.
Turkey’s relationship with Pakistan adds another dimension to New Delhi’s calculations. India and Pakistan remain strategic rivals, and any expansion of Turkish influence into maritime infrastructure or security arrangements near the western Indian Ocean is likely to receive close attention in New Delhi.
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan add to regional volatility
The Horn’s instability cannot be reduced to the Israel-Houthi confrontation.
Ethiopia remains entangled in unresolved tensions involving the Tigray region, Amhara forces and neighboring Eritrea. Questions over Ethiopia’s long-standing dependence on Djibouti for maritime trade have also intensified debate over its search for alternative access to the Red Sea.
Ethiopia’s 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, which envisaged arrangements for access to the coast, triggered a major diplomatic dispute with Somalia. The episode underscored how questions of ports and maritime access can rapidly become matters of national sovereignty and regional security.
Kagwanja also pointed to tensions involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt, arguing that unresolved territorial, ethnic and political disputes continue to create opportunities for conflicts to spill across borders.
The situation in Sudan, meanwhile, remains another major source of instability, with the country’s civil war adding to the security pressures surrounding the Horn.
Taken together, these overlapping disputes create a region in which commercial corridors, military access, domestic politics and external alliances increasingly intersect.
Houthis keep the Red Sea at the center
The Houthi movement in Yemen has become a central factor in the region’s strategic calculations because of its ability to threaten international shipping in and around the Red Sea.
The group, which is aligned with Iran, has attacked commercial and military targets during the wider regional conflict, forcing shipping companies and governments to reassess the risks associated with the Bab el-Mandeb route.
Kagwanja argued that the Houthis’ strategic importance extends beyond their territorial control inside Yemen.
He described the movement as an established regional force whose ability to disrupt maritime traffic has helped turn the Red Sea into a major arena of geopolitical competition.
That development helps explain why Somaliland has acquired greater strategic significance. Berbera sits on the opposite side of the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, giving it geographic relevance for governments concerned about maritime surveillance and security.
But any attempt to turn Somaliland into a platform for broader regional confrontation would carry risks. Somalia continues to reject Somaliland’s claim to independence, while the African Union has historically emphasized territorial integrity and existing borders.
China remains a critical variable
China is another actor India cannot ignore.
Beijing maintains a military base in neighboring Djibouti and has extensive commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s relations with Taiwan add another layer of sensitivity because Beijing considers Taiwan part of China and opposes official relations between Taiwan and entities it regards as sovereign states.
Somaliland and Taiwan have maintained representative offices and developed cooperation in areas including health, agriculture, education and technology.
That relationship means developments in Somaliland are not merely a Red Sea issue. They can also intersect with the wider strategic rivalry between China and the United States.
For India, which has its own complex relationship with China and remains active in the Indo-Pacific, the Horn increasingly looks like an extension of the broader maritime competition stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea.
A strategic choice for New Delhi
The emerging landscape presents India with a difficult balancing act.
New Delhi has strong reasons to protect the maritime routes connecting its economy to European and North American markets. At the same time, overtly aligning itself with one side of the increasingly fragmented Horn and Red Sea competition could complicate its relationships with African governments and regional powers.
India’s approach is therefore likely to remain heavily focused on maritime security, trade, diplomatic engagement and economic partnerships rather than a rapid expansion of military commitments.
But the strategic environment is changing.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, the continuing Houthi threat, Turkey’s expanding role in Somalia, Ethiopia’s search for reliable Red Sea access, Egypt’s growing involvement in Somalia and China’s established military presence in Djibouti are collectively transforming the Horn from a peripheral concern into an increasingly important theater of Indian Ocean strategy.
For New Delhi, the question is no longer whether the Horn of Africa matters. It is how deeply India must become involved to protect its interests without becoming entangled in the region’s overlapping rivalries.
As Kagwanja put it, India is already watching closely. The next question is whether it will move from observation to a more defined strategic role.
Watch the full video interview
Surya Gangadharan
