Irro’s Red Sea Gambit positions Somaliland as a strategic security partner, offering its coastline and Berbera port to help secure vital Red Sea trade routes in exchange for greater international recognition
Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, has spent much of his political career arguing that his territory deserves to be treated as a state. Now he is making a more consequential argument: that Somaliland can also become an important part of the security architecture protecting one of the world’s most strategic waterways.
Known widely as Irro, the 70-year-old former diplomat became president in December 2024 after defeating incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi. Somaliland restored its independence from Somalia in 1991, but for decades its claim to sovereignty has won little formal international recognition.
That changed dramatically in December 2025, when Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland.
“The world has been ignoring Somaliland for 35 years,” Irro said in an interview with The Economist. “Our message is that we are a responsible partner” in security and trade.
His argument is straightforward. As attacks by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi movement have disrupted shipping through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, the Horn of Africa has assumed greater strategic importance. Somaliland, with a long coastline overlooking the Gulf of Aden and a deep-water port at Berbera, believes it can offer foreign powers something they increasingly need: access.
Irro has therefore begun presenting Somaliland as a potential alternative to Djibouti, the small neighboring state that has become one of the world’s most concentrated military hubs.
A strategic coastline
Djibouti has benefited enormously from its location at the entrance to the Red Sea. The country hosts military facilities operated by the United States, China, France and other powers, while its ports provide a critical maritime outlet for landlocked Ethiopia.
Irro wants Somaliland to capture part of that strategic and commercial business.
The centerpiece is Berbera, where the United Arab Emirates has invested heavily in port infrastructure. The port sits on the Gulf of Aden, outside the immediate reach of the conflict in Yemen but close enough to the Bab el-Mandeb to be strategically significant.
Somaliland is also trying to deepen its economic relationship with Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country and one of the world’s largest landlocked economies. Addis Ababa has long depended heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade, but Somaliland argues that Berbera can provide an alternative route.
The calculation is both economic and geopolitical: more Ethiopian trade through Berbera would strengthen Somaliland’s commercial position, while a greater international military presence could make foreign governments more invested in the territory’s stability.
Irro is openly courting Washington.
He wants the United States to consider establishing a military facility around Berbera, arguing that access to Somaliland could provide additional options for operations aimed at protecting maritime traffic and countering threats from Yemen.
“There is no Israeli or American presence yet,” Irro said, rejecting reports that the two countries are already establishing military positions at Berbera.
But he made clear that the door is open.
“If they are interested,” he said, Somaliland would be prepared to offer both Israel and the United States military facilities.
That proposition carries risks as well as opportunities.
Recognition for strategic relevance
For Somaliland, the attraction of a closer relationship with Washington goes beyond military cooperation. The ultimate prize remains formal American recognition.
Irro is expected to travel to Washington next month, where he hopes to meet President Donald Trump. Such a meeting would be symbolically significant: no Somaliland president has previously held a direct meeting with a sitting American president.
“We expect the recognition of the United States some time in the future,” Irro said. He also predicted that Somaliland could receive recognition from at least one additional country before the end of the year.
The strategy represents a shift in emphasis.
For years, Somaliland’s diplomatic case rested largely on history, self-government and its relative political stability compared with much of Somalia. Irro is adding another argument: Somaliland can provide tangible strategic value to major powers.
The wager is that recognition will become easier to justify if governments conclude that Somaliland is not simply seeking sovereignty, but can contribute to the security of a major international trade corridor.
Yet that same strategy could undermine one of Somaliland’s strongest traditional arguments.
The price of becoming a military hub
Somaliland has cultivated a reputation for relative stability in a region where armed conflict and political fragmentation are common. Turning Berbera into a significant foreign military hub could expose the territory to precisely the kind of regional confrontation it has historically sought to avoid.
The Houthis have already threatened Israeli military facilities in Somaliland. An American installation could become another potential target.
That creates an uncomfortable contradiction for Irro. The foreign military presence he sees as a route to international recognition could also make Somaliland a more attractive target for armed groups.
Regional politics complicate the calculation further.
Djibouti has little incentive to welcome a rival port and potential military hub emerging along the Gulf of Aden. Somalia, meanwhile, continues to regard Somaliland as part of its territory and rejects its claim to independence.
Irro has accused Somalia of considering military mobilization along Somaliland’s southern frontier.
“This is not a peace recipe,” he said.
Somaliland’s relationship with Turkey adds another layer of complexity. Ankara has positioned itself as an important partner of Somalia and has repeatedly attempted to mediate between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Several rounds of talks have failed to resolve the central dispute over Somaliland’s status.
The widening confrontation between Turkey and Israel makes the diplomatic terrain still more difficult.
Irro, however, appears undeterred.
“Next time they can happen in Tel Aviv,” he said with a laugh when discussing possible future negotiations.
A gamble with uncertain returns
The fundamental question is whether Somaliland can convert strategic usefulness into diplomatic recognition without sacrificing the stability that made its case attractive in the first place.
The geography is compelling. Berbera lies near one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, while Ethiopia offers a potentially enormous landlocked market. The UAE’s investment has already helped establish Berbera as a more credible commercial port.
But geography alone does not guarantee recognition.
For Washington, any decision to recognize Somaliland would carry consequences for relations with Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Turkey and other regional powers. It could also complicate American efforts to contain instability around the Red Sea without becoming more deeply entangled in the region’s rivalries.
A military base could therefore be both Somaliland’s strongest bargaining chip and its greatest vulnerability.
Irro understands that recognition comes with a price. His argument is that Somaliland has already paid the price of international neglect for more than three decades.
“There is nothing free in the world,” he said.
That may be the clearest description yet of his strategy. Somaliland is offering its coastline, its port and its geopolitical position in exchange for something it has pursued since 1991: a place in the international system.
The unresolved question is how much security risk Somaliland is willing to assume—and how much instability its neighbors and potential partners are willing to tolerate—in return for that place.
