Somaliland’s Berbera Port emerges as a strategic hub in the UAE’s African push, reshaping trade, security and regional geopolitics across the Horn of Africa
BERBERA, Somaliland — On the edge of the Gulf of Aden, the cranes towering over Berbera’s deepwater port are evidence of a transformation that extends far beyond Somaliland’s coastline.
For centuries, the port has attracted foreign powers because of its position along one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. Ottoman buildings, British military remnants and a Soviet-era airstrip remain reminders of earlier strategic contests.
Today, the most visible sign of outside influence is modern: a line of ship-to-shore gantry cranes erected by DP World, the Dubai government-owned logistics company that has committed hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuilding Berbera.
The project has made Somaliland one of the most important showcases of the United Arab Emirates’ expanding economic and strategic presence in Africa.
The Financial Times, in a report published Aug. 4, described the UAE’s wider African strategy as an increasingly intertwined network of ports, investment, agriculture, mining and security relationships. Berbera stands out as one of the clearest examples of that model, where commercial infrastructure and geopolitical interests converge.
For Somaliland, the stakes are particularly high.
The territory has operated with its own government and institutions since declaring the restoration of its independence in 1991, but its campaign for international recognition remains unresolved. Berbera has consequently become more than an economic project: It is a strategic asset that could strengthen Somaliland’s regional importance and its case for deeper international engagement.
Berbera as the UAE’s gateway to the Horn
The UAE’s expansion into Africa began in large part with ports.
DP World initially developed terminals in countries including Djibouti, Mozambique and Senegal before expanding its network across the continent. Together with Abu Dhabi Ports, it now operates or is developing ports, inland terminals and free zones in 13 African countries, according to the FT.
Berbera represents a particularly ambitious component of that network.
DP World’s investment of roughly $450 million has included new port infrastructure, storage facilities and a 250-kilometer highway connecting Berbera with Ethiopia.
The strategy is based on a simple proposition: develop the infrastructure before demand fully materializes, then position the port to capture trade as regional commerce grows.
Joseph Oguta, a Kenyan national who manages the nearby DP World free zone, said the remaining obstacles to Berbera’s expansion would eventually be overcome.
“There are things that need to fall in place, but it’s a matter of time,” Oguta said.
He rejected the suggestion that DP World was acting as the advance force of an Emirati imperial project.
“We are not playing Vasco da Gama here,” he said, invoking the Portuguese navigator whose voyages helped open African and Asian maritime routes to European colonial powers.
But the broader UAE strategy makes Berbera difficult to view solely through a commercial lens.
Where commerce meets security
According to the FT report, DP World’s 30-year agreement to lease the Berbera port was negotiated alongside arrangements giving the UAE control or access to nearby military infrastructure, including a naval facility and the Soviet-era airstrip.
Recent satellite imagery cited by the newspaper showed additional bunkers and military facilities near the runway.
The combination reflects the dual-track nature of the UAE’s engagement in the Horn of Africa.
Dubai has built its global influence around trade, logistics and ports. Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, has become the center of the federation’s political and security power.
In Berbera, those interests intersect.
The port offers commercial access to the region while its location provides strategic visibility over shipping routes through the Gulf of Aden and toward the Red Sea.
The UAE has long cited maritime security and the need to counter piracy, militant Islamist organizations and threats emanating from Yemen as reasons for its security relationships in the region.
For Somaliland, however, the economic dimension is at least as important.
Berbera is being positioned as a gateway for Ethiopia, a landlocked country with a population of about 120 million that currently depends heavily on neighboring Djibouti for international maritime access.
In 2023, the World Bank and S&P Global ranked Berbera as the most efficient port in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the FT.
DP World has committed to doubling the port’s capacity, but realizing that ambition depends partly on whether Ethiopia can redirect a substantial share of its trade away from Djibouti.
That possibility has profound geopolitical implications.
Somaliland’s strategic calculation
For Somaliland, the Berbera corridor offers an opportunity to convert geography into economic and diplomatic leverage.
A successful trade route connecting Ethiopia to the Gulf of Aden could generate transit revenues, stimulate logistics and manufacturing, expand employment and strengthen Somaliland’s position as a regional commercial hub.
It could also make Somaliland increasingly difficult for international policymakers to overlook.
But the port operates within a contested political environment.
Somalia’s federal government rejects Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty and regards the territory as part of Somalia. Somaliland, by contrast, argues that its political status is rooted in its separate colonial history, its brief independence in 1960 and its decision to restore sovereignty after the collapse of Somalia’s central government.
The FT report notes that Somaliland’s recognition campaign has become an obstacle to the full realization of Berbera’s potential, particularly because Ethiopia’s use of the corridor carries consequences for Somalia and the wider region.
The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland therefore places Abu Dhabi inside one of the Horn of Africa’s most sensitive political disputes.
For Hargeisa, the relationship is a strategic balancing act: attract foreign capital and security partnerships while ensuring that the country’s most important infrastructure strengthens, rather than diminishes, its economic sovereignty.
An African strategy measured in ports, land and minerals
Berbera is only one piece of a much larger Emirati expansion.
Under President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE has sought to position itself as a major post-oil economy with interests extending across Africa.
Its investments range from ports and logistics to industrial agriculture, renewable energy and mining.
The FT reported that the UAE has announced more than $168 billion in African investments since 2017, according to fDi Markets data, although some projects have been delayed or failed to materialize.
One major investment vehicle is International Holding Company, chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s national security adviser and brother of MBZ.
The projects span the continent: a proposed $10 billion wind farm in Egypt, a $4 billion refinery in Uganda and a $1.2 billion port project in Senegal are among those cited by the FT.
The UAE says its willingness to invest in countries facing large infrastructure deficits represents a willingness to take risks that Western investors sometimes avoid.
“Our engagement is not transactional; it is guided by shared values and a vision for sustainable development and inclusive growth,” a UAE official told the FT.
The official described relations with African countries as based on “mutual trust, respect and a shared vision for a more prosperous future for our peoples.”
But critics argue that the scale and structure of Emirati investment can create new forms of dependency.
“There is a need to appreciate the limits of Africa’s agency,” said Mehari Taddele Maru, an Ethiopian academic and expert on regional peace and security. “The resources [the UAE is] deploying are huge.”
From infrastructure to influence
The concern is not simply the amount of UAE money flowing into Africa, but the combination of economic and security relationships.
Eleonora Ardemagni, an Italian academic specializing in Gulf affairs, describes ports as “vectors of influence at the core of the UAE’s Africa policy.”
Nadim Koteich, a Lebanese-Emirati media executive and policy adviser, offers a more positive interpretation.
“Africa is one of the emerging lungs of the global economy,” Koteich said. “It sits at the intersection of the US-China cold war, it has an Arab-Islamic dimension, and the UAE needs a stake not just in Africa’s future but in defining its stability and prosperity.”
“What Abu Dhabi is building is not a portfolio, it’s a system,” he said.
That system is visible in Berbera.
The port is connected to roads, a free zone and a potential Ethiopian trade corridor. Its location also makes it relevant to maritime security. Together, those components create an integrated strategic platform rather than a single isolated investment.
The question is whether such integration ultimately benefits the host country as much as the investor.
Sudan casts a shadow
The most controversial dimension of the UAE’s African strategy is Sudan.
The FT report describes allegations surrounding the movement of gold from Sudan following the outbreak of civil war in April 2023. A witness alleged that gold taken during the early fighting was transported through Chad and South Sudan before being flown to the UAE.
The allegations are disputed.
The Rapid Support Forces deny involvement in the alleged theft, while the UAE denies providing military or financial support to either side in Sudan’s war.
A UAE spokesperson told the FT that “the UAE has not provided and is not providing military or financial support to any warring party in Sudan.”
The newspaper also reported that U.N. experts, Western intelligence agencies, flight-tracking specialists and human-rights organizations have investigated supply routes allegedly supporting the RSF.
The allegations have contributed to a broader debate over the relationship between Emirati commercial interests and military influence in the Horn of Africa.
A senior Muslim leader in West Africa told the FT that, unlike China, the UAE — particularly Abu Dhabi — had inserted itself negatively into African politics.
“The problem with the UAE here in Africa is the inexplicable ambition to control the whole region,” said Yemane Gebremeskel, Eritrea’s information minister.
“It started with dominating a constellation of satellite ports throughout eastern Africa but seems to have morphed into much larger power projection and resource exploitation,” he said.
Abu Dhabi disputes that interpretation.
Koteich acknowledges that economic and security interests can overlap but rejects the idea that military power is the fundamental objective.
“For the UAE the security dimension in certain places overlaps with the economic one, but that’s a bug in the strategy, not a feature,” he said. “The driving force is economic development and supply chain integration.”
The UAE and Somaliland’s economic future
For Somaliland, the distinction matters.
The territory needs infrastructure, investment and access to international markets. Berbera provides all three possibilities.
But Somaliland also needs to preserve control over the strategic decisions that determine how its infrastructure is used and how the benefits are distributed.
That makes the UAE relationship fundamentally different from a conventional port concession.
Berbera sits at the intersection of several ambitions: Somaliland’s search for recognition, Ethiopia’s desire for diversified maritime access, the UAE’s global logistics network, Gulf competition, Red Sea security and the increasingly important trade routes connecting Africa and Asia.
The port’s future will therefore be shaped not only by cranes and containers but by diplomacy.
If Ethiopia succeeds in shifting significant trade through Berbera, the economic consequences could be substantial. Somaliland could become a more important logistics and transit hub, while Ethiopia would gain an alternative to its dependence on Djibouti.
For the UAE, a successful Berbera corridor would strengthen another link in its African logistics chain.
And for international powers increasingly concerned with Red Sea security, Berbera offers a strategically located platform close to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
A new kind of external power
The UAE is not alone in expanding its African presence.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have also increased their economic and diplomatic engagement as Western donor influence has weakened in parts of the continent.
But analysts cited by the FT regard the UAE as particularly active.
“The UAE has entrenched significant alliances in many African countries both at government level but also with other actors,” Ardemagni said.
The UAE’s model is different from the large-scale infrastructure lending traditionally associated with China. It is also different from the aid-driven engagement of many Western governments.
Its influence is built through commercial assets, logistics networks, investment capital, agricultural land, mineral resources and security relationships.
That makes the model potentially powerful — and difficult to categorize.
Maru describes the challenge as one of managing a powerful middle state without losing national agency.
“The UAE is a middle power which doesn’t follow norms of engagement,” he said.
For African governments, he argued, the answer is not necessarily to reject Emirati investment.
“It’s about taming their behaviour … while getting their investment,” he said.
“They are our neighbours. They will be involved,” Maru added. “But how do you maximise the benefits to countries and not to the individuals or racketeers?”
For Somaliland, that question is already being played out at Berbera.
The cranes above the port symbolize an economic transformation that would have been difficult to imagine a decade ago. But they also symbolize the new strategic competition surrounding the Horn of Africa.
Somaliland has acquired an asset of growing international importance. The challenge now is to ensure that Berbera becomes not simply a gateway for Emirati influence, but a foundation for Somaliland’s own economic power.
The answer may determine whether the UAE’s presence becomes a model of mutually beneficial investment — or another chapter in Africa’s long history of powerful outsiders turning strategic geography into leverage.
