Oxford policy fellow Merit Habib Metta argues that the United States should back Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland, saying it could reduce Red Sea tensions, strengthen regional stability, and advance Western strategic interests in the Horn of Africa
By Saxafi Media Staff
HARGEISA, Somaliland — As tensions mount across the Horn of Africa, a new policy analysis from an Oxford University scholar argues that one of the region’s most contentious diplomatic questions could also offer one of its few peaceful solutions.
In an article titled “Why the U.S. Should Encourage Ethiopian Recognition of Somaliland,” which was originally published in the National Interest, Merit Habib Metta, a policy fellow at the Pinsker Center and a final-year History and Politics student at the University of Oxford’s St John’s College, contends that Washington should quietly facilitate Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland as part of a broader effort to stabilize one of the world’s most strategically important regions.
Her central argument is that Ethiopia’s unresolved search for reliable access to the Red Sea has become a primary driver of escalating tensions with Eritrea and could fuel another regional conflict unless diplomatic alternatives are pursued.
“Revisiting Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland could address Ethiopia’s Red Sea insecurity and reduce the spread of violence,” Metta writes. “Decisive action is needed from Washington, however, to encourage this dormant solution in the face of local opposition.”
A Region Approaching Another Crisis
Metta frames the Horn of Africa as standing at a dangerous geopolitical crossroads.
Nearly four years after the Pretoria Agreement formally ended the devastating Tigray War, relations between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) have again deteriorated.
The analysis points to renewed political disputes, the reinstatement of Tigray’s pre-war regional council, and reports of forced recruitment by TPLF-aligned forces as evidence that northern Ethiopia could once again descend into conflict.
That instability, she argues, risks drawing Eritrea back into hostilities.
Although Ethiopia and Eritrea fought alongside one another against the TPLF during the 2020–2022 war, Addis Ababa now accuses Asmara of again supporting TPLF elements—a development that could transform localized unrest into a wider regional confrontation.
According to Metta, the consequences would extend well beyond Ethiopia’s borders.
Renewed war could undermine counterterrorism operations against al-Shabaab, disrupt one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors, and deepen geopolitical competition in the Red Sea.
Ethiopia’s Red Sea Dilemma
At the center of Metta’s analysis lies Ethiopia’s decades-long search for maritime access.
Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993 left Ethiopia landlocked, successive Ethiopian governments have viewed access to the Red Sea as a strategic necessity.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly emphasized the importance of securing maritime access, rhetoric that has fueled concern in neighboring Eritrea that Ethiopia could eventually seek control of the Port of Assab.
Metta argues that these fears have become one of the principal drivers of worsening relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara.
Instead of pursuing access through confrontation, she contends, Ethiopia already possesses a viable diplomatic alternative.
Somaliland as a Strategic Alternative
That alternative, Metta argues, is Somaliland.
She describes Somaliland as a territory that has operated as a de facto independent state since restoring its sovereignty in 1991, maintaining democratic institutions, its own currency, functioning security services, and regular elections despite the absence of broad international recognition.
“The country has operated as a de facto state for over three decades, with its own currency, airport and democratic institutions,” she notes.
According to the article, formal Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland would not merely acknowledge political realities on the ground—it could fundamentally reshape regional security dynamics.
Revisiting the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding
Central to Metta’s proposal is the January 1, 2024 Memorandum of Understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
The agreement reportedly envisioned Ethiopia receiving access to approximately 20 kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline in exchange for consideration of formal diplomatic recognition.
Although implementation stalled after strong objections from Somalia and subsequent Turkish mediation through the Ankara Declaration, Metta argues that the agreement remains the least confrontational path available to Ethiopia.
Rather than seeking access through disputed territory elsewhere along the Red Sea, Addis Ababa could strengthen cooperation with Somaliland while reducing regional tensions.
Berbera’s Rising Strategic Value
Metta also emphasizes the growing importance of Berbera Port, whose modernization and expanding transport corridor have transformed Somaliland into an increasingly significant logistics hub.
Today, Ethiopia continues to route roughly 95 percent of its international trade through neighboring Djibouti.
Diversifying that dependence, she argues, would improve Ethiopia’s economic resilience while strengthening regional commercial integration.
Expanded access to Berbera would also reinforce Somaliland’s position as an emerging gateway between the Horn of Africa and global shipping routes.
Why Washington Should Act
While acknowledging that recognition remains politically sensitive, Metta argues that the United States should play a more active diplomatic role.
“Washington should quietly encourage Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland,” she writes.
She argues that such diplomacy would strengthen long-term American strategic interests while reinforcing relationships with regional partners that already possess significant economic stakes in Somaliland.
The United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Ethiopia all maintain interests connected to Berbera’s continued development.
At the same time, Metta argues that Somaliland’s strategic value has increased as China continues expanding its economic and military presence across the Red Sea, particularly in neighboring Djibouti.
According to the analysis, early U.S. engagement with Somaliland could generate long-term economic and security benefits.
Containing Conflict Rather Than Solving Every Problem
Metta is careful not to portray Somaliland recognition as a comprehensive solution to Ethiopia’s internal political challenges.
Tigray’s political divisions, she notes, remain rooted in domestic grievances that cannot be resolved through maritime access alone.
Instead, she argues recognition could serve a narrower—but still significant—strategic purpose.
“What Somaliland recognition could provide is conflict containment,” she writes.
If Ethiopia secured reliable military and commercial access through Somaliland, Eritrea’s concerns over Ethiopian ambitions toward Assab could diminish, potentially reducing Asmara’s incentive to support anti-government forces inside Ethiopia.
In that scenario, Somaliland recognition would function less as a symbolic diplomatic act than as a mechanism for preventing broader regional escalation.
Regional Resistance Remains Strong
The article acknowledges that significant diplomatic obstacles remain.
Somalia has consistently rejected any move toward recognition of Somaliland and strongly opposed the 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding.
Turkey has likewise emerged as one of Mogadishu’s closest international partners, maintaining its largest overseas military installation—Camp TURKSOM—in Somalia while supporting Somalia’s territorial claims.
Metta also identifies Egypt as another important regional actor opposing Somaliland’s recognition while strengthening ties with Somalia and Eritrea amid broader disputes with Ethiopia over Nile waters.
Together, she argues, these competing regional interests have made Ethiopian recognition politically difficult despite its potential strategic benefits.
Rethinking U.S. Policy
The United States continues to recognize Somalia’s territorial integrity under its long-standing “One Somalia” policy.
Metta cites a recent State Department position reaffirming that Washington recognizes “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, which includes the region of Somaliland.”
She argues, however, that changing geopolitical realities warrant renewed diplomatic thinking.
According to the article, recognition remains the least violent long-term solution to Ethiopia’s maritime dilemma, but fears of regional backlash continue to discourage Addis Ababa from taking that step.
Israeli diplomatic engagement with Ethiopia demonstrates growing international interest in the issue, she writes, but Washington’s participation would be essential if broader diplomatic momentum is to develop.
A Call for Preventive Diplomacy
Metta concludes that the Horn of Africa is entering a decisive period marked by renewed instability in northern Ethiopia, food insecurity, growing geopolitical competition, and heightened tensions surrounding Red Sea access.
Without stronger diplomatic engagement, she warns, Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive rhetoric over maritime access could eventually translate into military confrontation.
“Without decisive U.S. involvement, diplomacy is increasingly likely to give way to confrontation, closing one of the few peaceful avenues to resolving Ethiopia’s Red Sea dilemma,” she concludes.
For Metta, encouraging dialogue between Ethiopia and Somaliland is not simply about recognition—it is about preventing another war in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions while strengthening long-term regional stability through diplomacy rather than force.
