Israeli recognition of Somaliland creates a diplomatic quandary, intensifying regional tensions with Somalia, Türkiye and Djibouti while testing Hargeisa’s diplomatic strategy
By Jamal Abdi
On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member state to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state. Images of Somalilanders celebrating with the flags of Israel and Somaliland side by side were broadcast by international media, bringing Somaliland to the attention of global audiences.
For Somalilanders, Israel’s move towards recognition was long overdue, and the prevailing sentiment was that 34 years of political wilderness had come to an end. So far, however, no other country has recognized Somaliland.
Communities that had fought on opposing sides of a long civil war voluntarily negotiated peace, rejected external involvement in their peace process and built an inclusive democratic state from scratch. As a result, Somaliland was seen as an “oasis of stability”, “the little country that can” and as a “beacon of hope” in an otherwise volatile region.
Disrupting Turkiye
Israel’s impetus for recognizing Somaliland extends beyond addressing the immediate challenge posed by the Houthis in Yemen, located across the Gulf of Aden from Somaliland.
A careful analysis reveals that Israel, rather than addressing acute challenges, may be motivated by long-term geostrategic calculations – namely, to counter and disrupt Turkiye’s attempt to establish itself as a dominant force in the increasingly important Horn of Africa region.
Turkiye has invested heavily in both Somalia, where it maintains its largest embassy and military bases, and Ethiopia. In Israel, Turkiye is increasingly being discussed as a geopolitical adversary that must be addressed.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in February stated publicly that Turkiye constitutes a strategic threat to Israel, describing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “a sophisticated and dangerous adversary who wants to surround Israel”.
Somaliland’s precarious strategic position
Neighboring Djibouti benefits significantly from landlocked Ethiopia – a country of more than 100 million people, relying on Djibouti’s ports for much of its trade. Somaliland’s Berbera Port, in which the United Arab Emirates has invested heavily, is viewed as a potential competitor.
A recognized Somaliland is perceived by Djibouti as a potential threat to its economic and strategic interests. These concerns were further intensified when Somaliland and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding in 2024, which included provisions for Ethiopian access to the sea in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Somaliland.
Most significantly, Somalia – backed by Turkiye, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar – strongly opposes Somaliland’s independence and has sought to ignite and exploit internal divisions and tensions within, as the country seeks and welcomes support wherever it can find it.
The criticism directed at Somaliland appears deeply unfounded – it has neither contributed to nor enabled Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, nor has it sided with Israel in a conflict against another Muslim-majority country. The same cannot be said of several Muslim-majority states that have condemned Somaliland for its rapprochement with Israel.
During the Gaza war, Egypt’s trade with Israel increased by $199m, while Jordan’s increased by $41m. Turkiye initially announced a suspension of trade with Israel, but subsequent reports indicated that commercial ties continued. Following the Gaza war, Egypt signed a $35bn natural gas deal with Israel.
In the ongoing US-Israel conflict with Iran, all Gulf Cooperation Council member states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – to varying degrees, have supported the US and Israel against Iran, a Muslim-majority country. The criticism directed at Somaliland is often framed as an expression of solidarity with the Palestinians but is driven primarily by geopolitical concerns.
Addressing hostile narratives
It is therefore imperative that Somaliland, led by President Abdirahman Mohamed ‘Irro’ Abdullahi, urgently develops a strategy to effectively address hostile narratives and protect the soft power it has spent decades cultivating.
Positions are not filled by those best equipped to perform them
With a young and well-educated population, Somaliland has no shortage of human capital. Its inability to effectively address criticism – thereby weakening its soft power – reflects a deeper structural problem.
A central challenge is the increasingly limited importance of merit in relation to senior appointments.
The most qualified candidates are often overlooked in favor of individuals who support or finance the president’s election campaign. The result is that positions are not filled by those best equipped to perform them. This weakens institutional capacity, reduces the effectiveness of government decision-making and limits Somaliland’s ability to respond strategically to external challenges.
Published originally at the Africa Report on August 11, 2026
Jamal Abdi is a PhD Candidate in Politics and International Relations at Keele University, UK. Drawing on extensive field work, his research focuses on peace and state building in Somaliland. He holds a MSc in European and International Relations from Linkoping University
