Eritrea’s sovereignty claims face scrutiny as its three-decade record of regional intervention in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia raises questions about non-interference and political double standards
By Habtom Ghebrezghiabher
At the 21st Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on Strengthening Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, held in Luanda on August 30, the Eritrean dictator declared that “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence” are “fundamental and inviolable” principles and condemned “external meddling” in African affairs.
His record tells a different story.
Consider Ukraine. In 2014, Eritrea became the first country to send its foreign minister to Crimea following Russia’s annexation. That same year, Eritrea abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262, which affirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity. In 2022, Eritrea was again an extreme outlier: one of only five countries—and the only African country—to vote against the UN General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia end its use of force against Ukraine and withdraw its troops.
The same dictator who accepted Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory now invokes the sanctity of territorial integrity.
The contradiction is even sharper when it comes to foreign interference. The Eritrean dictator condemns external interference in African affairs while Eritrea serves as a transit hub for foreign weapons and military support entering Sudan, including from Iran and Turkey.
Since independence, the Eritrean dictator has repeatedly interfered in the domestic affairs of other African countries—politically, militarily and through support for armed actors.
In the Great Lakes in the 1990s, he sent Eritrean forces, including special forces, into the region, participating alongside Rwanda and Uganda in the campaign against Mobutu’s Zaire.
In Ethiopia, he supported Ethiopian armed movements against the previous TPLF-led federal government from the 1998 war onward, backing groups including Ginbot 7 among Amhara forces, Demhit among Tigrayan forces and the OLA among Oromo forces, before ultimately sending Eritrean forces into Tigray during the 2020–22 war.
Today, he is backing Fano/Amhara, the TPLF/Tigray and the OLF/Oromo against the PP-led federal government, while repeatedly seeking to influence Ethiopia’s internal political order, including calling for the abandonment of its federal system.
In Sudan, the Eritrean dictator has interfered in Sudanese domestic affairs for more than three decades. In 1994–95, he broke with the al-Bashir government and backed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). By 1996, he was backing the Beja Congress and other Eastern Sudanese opposition groups. In 2003–04, he backed Darfur’s SLM and JEM. Today, he backs the SAF and SAF-aligned forces, including elements of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood within and around the SAF, as well as the Beja and Eastern Corps, while turning Eritrea into a conduit for Iranian and Turkish weapons smuggling.
In Somalia, the Eritrean dictator backed the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 and subsequently supported al-Shabaab and other armed groups against the Somali government, providing arms, financing, training and political support to Somali insurgents. This led the UN Security Council in 2009 to impose sanctions on Eritrea, including an arms embargo, travel restrictions and asset freezes. In 2019–20, he trained thousands of Somali soldiers in Eritrea, some of whom later joined al-Shabaab. He continues to interfere in Somalia’s political and security affairs, including opposing Somalia’s federal system and Somaliland’s independence.
That record raises a straightforward question about the Eritrean dictator’s claim of non-interference.
Consider Somaliland. The Eritrean dictator interferes in Somalia and takes a position on one of its most consequential internal disputes, opposing Somaliland’s independence. Yet if he considers it legitimate to interfere in Somalia in pursuit of his own ideological and political agenda, why should other countries be denied the right to pursue their own interests there? Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is one example.
The same logic applies to Sudan. If the Eritrean dictator can interfere in Sudan and support political and armed actors aligned with his ideological and political agenda, the United Arab Emirates cannot be denied the right to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in Sudan and pursue its own interests there.
The same selectivity appears in his treatment of foreign powers at the African Union. The Eritrean dictator accepts and supports the presence of China, Iran and Turkey, while opposing Israel’s observer status. His objection, therefore, cannot simply be to foreign involvement in African affairs; it appears to depend on who is involved and whether that involvement aligns with his political and ideological agenda.
More troubling is that not a single AU member state has had the dignity to call out the Eritrean dictator for gaslighting the continent.
Taken together, this record makes it difficult to regard the Eritrean dictator’s invocation of sovereignty and non-interference as a consistent doctrine. His record shows repeated interference in the domestic affairs of other African states, support for armed and political actors, and willingness to cultivate foreign military relationships when they serve his political survival and ideological objectives.
What is particularly striking is the absence of any sense of shame. After three decades of intervening in the affairs of other African countries, he now presents, without the slightest acknowledgment of the contradiction, the very principles he has repeatedly disregarded as “fundamental and inviolable.”
