Somaliland’s western conflict near Awdal and Zeila is examined as a wider geopolitical struggle involving Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Türkiye, Egypt and Red Sea security
By Eng. Abdi Ali Barkhad
The intermittent conflict in western Somaliland has continued for almost a year. Although it is often presented as a local political or clan dispute, the strategic location of the fighting suggests that the issue deserves to be examined from a much broader regional perspective.
Western Somaliland, particularly the Awdal region and the area around Zeila, is located close to both Ethiopia and Djibouti and has direct access to the Gulf of Aden. This makes the area strategically important not only to Somaliland but also to Ethiopia, Djibouti and other regional and international actors.
The key question is therefore whether the conflict is really only about Somaliland—or whether Somaliland has become one front in a much larger geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa.
Ethiopia depends heavily on external maritime access for its international trade, and Djibouti has historically served as its principal maritime gateway. The Addis Ababa–Djibouti transport corridor is therefore of major economic and strategic importance to Ethiopia.
Any prolonged insecurity affecting western Somaliland, Djibouti or the surrounding border areas could potentially have consequences for this strategic corridor.
For this reason, Ethiopia should not view the conflict in western Somaliland simply as an internal Somaliland affair. Addis Ababa has a direct national-security interest in preventing instability from spreading across the border and threatening regional trade routes.
The strategic importance of Zeila should also not be underestimated. Its geographical position near Djibouti and Ethiopia gives it potential importance in future regional transportation, maritime and security calculations.
The Horn of Africa has experienced major geopolitical changes during the past several months.
Ethiopia is seeking greater strategic control over its maritime access. Djibouti wants to preserve its position as Ethiopia’s principal gateway. Somalia is attempting to strengthen its federal authority while expanding its international security partnerships. Türkiye has significantly expanded its military and political relationship with Somalia, while Egypt maintains major strategic interests in Sudan, the Red Sea and the Nile Basin.
At the same time, the war in Sudan has created another major source of regional instability.
The conflict involving the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has increasingly acquired a regional dimension, with reports and allegations concerning external support, logistics and supply networks.
Any specific claim that a particular government is directly supporting armed groups or using Somaliland as a supply corridor must be supported by credible evidence. However, the wider geopolitical risk should not be ignored.
The war in Sudan has transformed the strategic environment surrounding the Red Sea. Sudan’s geographical position links the Red Sea with North Africa, the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East.
As competing powers seek influence over the Red Sea, ports and trade routes become increasingly important.
Somaliland’s long coastline, especially the strategic position of Berbera, gives it growing importance in this environment.
For that reason, the continuing conflict in western Somaliland could have implications beyond the immediate communities involved. If regional powers begin to view Somaliland’s territory or coastline as part of their wider strategic calculations, a local conflict could gradually become a proxy conflict.
That would be dangerous for Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the wider region.
One of the most important questions is the role of Ethiopia.
If armed groups operating from Ethiopian territory are involved in attacks or destabilization along the Somaliland border, Addis Ababa has a responsibility to investigate and stop such activities.
Ethiopia possesses extensive security and intelligence capabilities. If armed movements are operating close to its border without effective intervention, there is a legitimate question regarding how Addis Ababa is assessing the situation.
There are two possibilities.
Either Ethiopia is fully aware of what is happening and has decided that political considerations require restraint, or the Ethiopian security establishment has not adequately assessed the seriousness of the problem.
In either case, the situation requires urgent strategic review.
Ethiopia should pay particular attention to developments around Zeila, Awdal and the wider border area because instability there could eventually affect Ethiopian security and economic interests.
The conflict must not be reduced to a simple confrontation between clans.
The Issa are a cross-border community living in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somaliland. The Gadabursi are also a major community in the region. Political or military actions undertaken by specific individuals or organizations should not automatically be attributed to entire communities.
This distinction is extremely important.
If armed groups operating from Ethiopia are involved in the conflict, the Ethiopian government should deal with those armed groups directly. The objective should be to prevent cross-border military activity not to create another ethnic or clan confrontation.
Likewise, if individual political actors among the Gadabursi community maintain relationships with Villa Somalia, Türkiye or other external actors, those relationships should be assessed individually and on the basis of evidence.
The greatest danger would be allowing a regional geopolitical competition to become permanent clan conflict.
The Horn of Africa has repeatedly suffered from conflicts in which local disputes become connected to the interests of outside powers.
This is exactly what must be prevented in western Somaliland.
External actors may have different interests in Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Sudan and the Red Sea. When these interests overlap, local grievances can become instruments of broader geopolitical competition.
If this happens, the local population pays the price while external actors pursue their strategic objectives.
Somaliland therefore needs to look beyond the immediate battlefield and understand the larger strategic environment.
The same responsibility applies to Ethiopia and Djibouti.
No country should allow its territory or border communities to be used as platforms for destabilizing neighboring states.
The first priority should be intelligence and security cooperation.
Somaliland and Ethiopia should establish stronger direct channels for exchanging information about cross-border armed movements, smuggling, terrorism and other security threats.
Ethiopia should prevent armed groups operating from its territory from conducting attacks against Somaliland.
Somaliland should strengthen border security and intelligence capabilities while avoiding policies that turn the crisis into a generalized clan confrontation.
Djibouti should also play a constructive role in preventing cross-border tensions from escalating.
At the same time, regional governments should reject the use of proxy forces as instruments of foreign policy.
Bottom line
The conflict in western Somaliland should not be dismissed as merely a local dispute.
Its location between Somaliland, Ethiopia and Djibouti, together with the growing strategic importance of the Red Sea, Ethiopia’s search for secure maritime access and the continuing war in Sudan, gives the situation a much wider geopolitical significance.
The central issue is therefore not only who controls a particular area in western Somaliland.
The larger question is whether the region is being drawn into a wider strategic confrontation involving Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and external powers.
For Somaliland, the priority must be to protect its territory and population while preventing the conflict from becoming a proxy battlefield.
For Ethiopia, the priority should be to ensure that its territory is not used by armed groups to destabilize a neighboring territory.
For Djibouti and Somalia, the priority should be regional stability rather than the escalation of local disputes.
The people of Western Somaliland need peace, security, and development not conflict driven by the competing strategic interests of regional and external powers. Growing geopolitical rivalry involving Türkiye, Egypt,and Somalia risks turning the region into a theatre for proxy competition.
People should not be used as instruments in foreign strategic agendas or regional power struggles. Western Somaliland needs stability, dialogue, and development, while the sovereignty and interests of its people must come before the geopolitical ambitions of outside powers.
