Analysis on the Red Sea opening Israel cannot afford to lose as strategic competition heats up in Somaliland and Bab el-Mandeb
By Nassir Hussein Kahin
Somaliland offers Israel a rare strategic opportunity—but competing powers are working to close the window before recognition becomes an enduring partnership.
Somaliland is becoming the southern front of a wider struggle over the Red Sea. Israel has recognition and goodwill, but its competitors are building influence, alliances and facts on the ground. If Jerusalem treats Somaliland as a symbolic diplomatic victory rather than a strategic partnership, the window may begin to close.
There is an easy way to explain what is happening between Israel and Türkiye: two regional powers increasingly distrust each other. But that explanation is no longer enough.
The competition now stretches from Greece and Cyprus through Syria and the Red Sea to Somalia and Somaliland. It involves military bases, ports, air-defense systems, energy routes, diplomatic recognition, maritime chokepoints and a widening battle over public opinion. Somaliland sits directly in the middle of it. That is what makes the present moment more important—and more dangerous—than it first appears.
Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland on 26 December 2025. Six months later, Somaliland’s president was received in Israel, its embassy opened in Jerusalem and security cooperation had begun. A Knesset account of the presidential visit reflected how quickly the relationship had moved from recognition to high-level state engagement. Israel suddenly had something it had lacked for years: a friendly partner on the African side of the Gulf of Aden, facing Yemen and sitting close to Bab el-Mandeb.
Recognition also triggered an immediate counter-reaction. Somalia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and a much wider group of Arab, Muslim and African states publicly rejected Israel’s move and rallied around Somalia’s territorial claim. China opposed the relationship for its own reasons, especially Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan. A joint statement published by Qatar showed the breadth of the diplomatic opposition.
These governments are not all pursuing the same policy. They should not be portrayed as a secret coalition operating from a single command room. Their interests nevertheless converge on one outcome: preventing Somaliland from becoming a durable Israeli strategic foothold on the Red Sea.
That convergence may matter more than formal coordination. The deeper contest is whether Israel can turn recognition into an anchored partnership before overlapping external pressure raises the political, economic and security cost beyond what Somaliland can comfortably bear.
Somaliland Is the Prize Because Geography Cannot Be Moved
Somaliland’s importance begins with the map. Berbera faces one of the world’s most important shipping corridors. To the northwest lies Bab el-Mandeb. Across the Gulf of Aden is Yemen. To the east are the approaches to the Indian Ocean. Behind Somaliland sits landlocked Ethiopia, with a population of more than 100 million and a longstanding search for reliable access to the sea.
That geography helps explain why the UAE invested heavily in Berbera, why Ethiopia has pursued maritime access, why Taiwan considers Somaliland strategically useful, why Washington has repeatedly shown interest in Berbera and why Israel saw value in recognition. It also explains why so many other states do not want the strategic balance there to change.
For Israel, Somaliland could offer something Djibouti cannot easily provide: a friendly political environment close to Yemen without the restrictions created by Djibouti’s crowded foreign military presence and close relationship with China. China already operates its first overseas military support base in Djibouti. Türkiye has built deep military and political influence in Somalia. The UAE is entrenched at Berbera. The Red Sea is therefore not an empty strategic space waiting to be organized. It is crowded, competitive and increasingly militarized. Israel entered late. That is why time matters.
Pressure from Both East and West
The greatest mistake Israel could make would be to look only at Berbera and Hargeisa. Somaliland’s vulnerabilities lie partly on its periphery.
In the east, the conflict around Las Anod has already altered the political landscape. Mogadishu recognized the North-East Somalia administration as a federal member state and converted a local territorial dispute into a federal political instrument. The European Union Agency for Asylum’s Sool assessment reported federal-aligned control in eastern Sool while Somaliland retained territory farther west. It also recorded an important distinction often lost in political rhetoric: although the new administration claimed Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, it reportedly had no actual presence in Sanaag at the time covered by the assessment.
Somalia has not militarily taken eastern Somaliland as a whole. But it has gained leverage over the recognition debate. Every additional political or administrative structure recognized from Mogadishu weakens the presentation of Somaliland’s former British colonial borders as a settled and governable unit. This is why the eastern question is no longer only an internal local dispute. It has been weaponized to become part of the international argument over recognition.
The danger takes a different form in the west. Awdal remains under Somaliland control, but the region experienced serious unrest around the Xeer Ciise controversy. An EUAA assessment of Somaliland noted that some demonstrators carried the Awdal State movement flag and that the unrest included calls for greater regional autonomy and closer alignment with Somalia’s federal government. The report also recorded allegations—not proven findings—that Djiboutian media had promoted a cross-border Issa narrative capable of giving Djibouti influence along Somaliland’s western coast. This explains why Awdal and Zeila matter to Djibouti.
A stronger Berbera, a more internationally recognized Somaliland and a possible Israeli or American security relationship with Hargeisa could gradually reduce Djibouti’s exceptional position as the region’s principal foreign-base and logistics hub. Djibouti therefore has a clear strategic interest in events on Somaliland’s western edge even when direct responsibility for local unrest cannot be established.
The competition consequently touches both ends of Somaliland. In the east, Mogadishu has gained political leverage through North-East Somalia. In the west, genuine local grievances create openings that outside actors can amplify or exploit. This is how a small state is often weakened: not through a conventional invasion, but through the gradual internationalization of local disputes.
Türkiye Has the Strongest Position
Among the states opposing Israel’s Somaliland relationship, Türkiye deserves the closest attention.
Ankara’s position in Somalia has been built over more than a decade. Türkiye trains Somali forces at TURKSOM, supplies military equipment, maintains troops, supports the federal government politically and now protects Turkish offshore energy operations with naval assets. In its own public messaging, the Turkish presidency described Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity as a priority and rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.
Türkiye’s activity at sea has also grown. Turkish naval vessels have escorted the offshore drilling fleet, while the Turkish Defence Ministry described deployments across the Gulf of Aden, Somali waters and the Arabian Sea. This gives Ankara an unusually broad footprint combining military training, naval presence, energy exploration, commercial interests, political influence and long-term defense cooperation. That makes the Somali theatre inseparable from the Israel–Türkiye rivalry.
Türkiye has something Israel currently lacks: institutional depth. Israel has recognition. Türkiye has embedded relationships. Israel has political goodwill in Hargeisa. Türkiye has military infrastructure, trained Somali forces, commercial interests and a government in Mogadishu that regards Somaliland as part of its territory.
A flag and an embassy matter, but they do not by themselves change the strategic balance. Türkiye has spent years building leverage. Israel has only begun.
The Makkah Pact Changes the Equation
The Makkah Joint Defense Agreement adds another layer. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are no longer discussing security cooperation only in general terms. On 31 August, they agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, led initially by a Pakistani secretary-general. They also committed themselves to military cohesion, defense-industrial cooperation, technology development and joint production, according to Reuters’ report on the agreement’s institutionalization.
This does not create a NATO overnight. There is still no publicly announced integrated military headquarters, standing multinational force or unified air-defense command. But the direction is clear: Türkiye is building strategic depth outside NATO.
For Israel, that matters because the same Türkiye competing with it in Syria and backing Somalia against Somaliland now sits inside another formal collective-defense structure. Israeli planners must at least consider whether a clash with Türkiye could activate political, intelligence or military responses beyond Türkiye itself.
The greatest mistake would be to assume that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan automatically share every Turkish objective. They do not. Saudi interests are more complicated. Riyadh retains compelling reasons to preserve its relationship with Washington and the possibility of future normalization with Israel. It also has its own competition with the UAE in the Horn. A Reuters analysis of Saudi–UAE rivalry in Africa described Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt and Qatar as increasingly aligned in pushing back against Emirati influence in parts of the region.
That rivalry matters for Somaliland because Abu Dhabi is Hargeisa’s most important Gulf partner. Saudi opposition to Israel’s recognition should therefore not be reduced to ideology alone. It also belongs to a contest over the future balance of the Horn.
Egypt Sees Somaliland Through Ethiopia
Egypt’s interest is different again. Cairo’s support for Somalia is closely tied to its strategic rivalry with Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s attempt to secure maritime access through Somaliland transformed the recognition question from a distant diplomatic dispute into part of the Nile and Red Sea balance.
Egypt therefore has strong reasons to reinforce Mogadishu, block Ethiopian strategic access where possible and oppose recognition of Somaliland. After Israel recognized Somaliland, Cairo actively mobilized diplomatic opposition. Egypt requested discussion within the African Union Peace and Security Council and repeatedly described recognition as a threat to Somalia’s sovereignty and regional stability. The Egyptian State Information Service summarized Cairo’s position.
For Israel, this creates an awkward situation. Egypt is not Türkiye. It has a peace treaty with Israel and remains an indispensable security actor around Gaza, Sinai and the eastern Mediterranean.
But Egyptian interests in Somaliland can still work against Israel’s. Regional politics do not divide cleanly into friends and enemies. A country can cooperate with Israel in one theatre while obstructing its objectives in another.
China May Have the Clearest Long-Term Motive
China’s calculation is perhaps the easiest to understand.
Somaliland has maintained close political relations with Taiwan since 2020. Beijing strongly opposes those ties. Somalia, meanwhile, supports the One-China principle, a position reaffirmed by the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Now add Israel
A Somaliland aligned simultaneously with Taiwan, Israel, the UAE and potentially the United States would represent exactly the kind of strategic configuration Beijing does not want near its military facility in Djibouti.
China does not need to direct unrest inside Somaliland to present a serious challenge. Diplomatic pressure, political isolation and firm support for Mogadishu’s territorial position already advance Chinese interests. Reuters reported on Somaliland’s decision to deepen its Taiwan relationship despite opposition from both China and Somalia.
The strategic alignment is unusually clear: Somalia supports Beijing on Taiwan; China supports Somalia against Somaliland; Somaliland supports Taiwan; and Israel recognizes Somaliland. Each relationship reinforces the others.
Qatar’s Role Requires Precision
Qatar has been one of the strongest diplomatic supporters of Somalia’s position.
Doha categorically rejected Israel’s recognition, joined the Organization of Islamic Cooperation campaign against it and repeatedly pledged political and development support to Somalia. Qatar’s foreign ministry published an unequivocal rejection of the recognition announcement.
There have also been reports alleging a broader Turkish, Egyptian and Qatari military project around Las Anod. Those claims deserve investigation. They should not yet be presented as established fact.
The public evidence is much stronger for Qatar’s political, financial and diplomatic support for Mogadishu than for a confirmed Qatari-financed military installation inside disputed Somaliland territory.
The Most Effective Weapon May Be the Narrative
Military bases attract attention because they can be photographed. An information campaign is harder to see and often more effective.
Almost immediately after Israel recognized Somaliland, opponents tied the decision to Gaza, Palestinian displacement and alleged Israeli military plans. A joint statement carried by Egypt warned against any connection between recognition and proposals to move Palestinians out of Gaza.
Somaliland repeatedly denied agreeing to resettle Palestinians. It also denied that recognition automatically gave Israel a military base. In June, Somaliland’s defense minister confirmed Israeli training of Somaliland forces but said there were no negotiations for a base, according to Reuters.
This is where the battle for public opinion becomes decisive. The warnings directed at Somalilanders are simple and emotionally powerful: Israel will bring war; Israel will bring the Houthis; Israel will turn Berbera into a target; Israel will import the Palestinian conflict; Israel will isolate Somaliland from the Muslim world; Israel wants a military colony on the Red Sea.
Some of these are legitimate security questions. Somalilanders have every right to ask what military cooperation would mean for civilian safety, sovereignty and foreign policy. Other claims are repeated as facts without evidence. Once the debate moves into social media, religious rhetoric and regional propaganda, the distinction can disappear quickly.
Not every criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic. Much opposition is rooted in the war in Gaza, solidarity with Palestinians, nationalism or genuine disagreement with Israeli policy.
Some rhetoric, however, crosses into older anti-Semitic conspiracy themes: Jews secretly controlling governments, engineering wars or manipulating countries from behind the scenes. When these ideas enter Somaliland’s debate, rational discussion becomes far more difficult.
The strategic objective does not require everyone to believe the most extreme stories. It requires only enough Somalilanders to fear that friendship with Israel will cost them their religion, security or regional relationships. That may be enough to weaken the partnership from within.
Israel May Be Running Out of Time
Israel has already completed the hardest diplomatic step: it recognized Somaliland. What it has not yet done is convert recognition into enough visible benefit that ordinary Somalilanders can conclude the relationship is worth defending. That is the real race.
Türkiye is building institutions. China has diplomatic leverage. Somalia is building alternative political structures in the east. Djibouti has interests and potential influence in the west. Egypt has strategic reasons to strengthen Mogadishu. Qatar supports Somalia politically and financially. Saudi Arabia joined the diplomatic opposition and is now tied to Türkiye through the Makkah defense architecture.
Israel, meanwhile, risks appearing mainly in social media stories about military bases, Yemen and intelligence operations. That would be a serious strategic mistake.
If Israel becomes associated only with Houthi strikes and military facilities, its opponents will have been handed the strongest possible narrative. Israel’s presence must mean something broader: water, agriculture, hospitals, universities, cybersecurity, fisheries, renewable energy, trade, scholarships, coast-guard development and jobs.
If Somalilanders can see Israeli technology producing water, helping farmers, improving hospitals and training young people, it becomes harder to persuade them that Israel arrived only to bring another Middle Eastern war. This is not charity. It is strategic statecraft.
The relationship needs a civilian foundation strong enough to survive security crises, changes of government and hostile information campaigns. Without that foundation, even useful defence cooperation could become politically weak and vulnerable.
Israel Should Not Turn Somaliland into a Fortress
The wrong response would be to rush into a large and highly visible Israeli military base. That could produce exactly the reaction Israel’s opponents want.
A better approach is distributed strategic cooperation. Israel can help Somaliland build maritime-domain awareness, coastal radar, counter-drone capacity, intelligence analysis, cybersecurity, search and rescue, coast-guard capability and protection of ports and critical infrastructure.
Berbera can provide logistics and emergency access without becoming an Israeli fortress. Security cooperation should strengthen the Somaliland state rather than simply use Somaliland territory. Israel should also invest politically in Somaliland’s internal resilience. This does not mean interfering in its internal politics. It means helping the state address the development gaps and grievances that outside powers are attempting to exploit.
Awdal needs infrastructure, trade and economic integration. Eastern Somaliland needs political reconciliation, security and economic development. Berbera’s growth must be seen to benefit communities well beyond Berbera. Recognition will mean little if the state becomes weaker at its edges.
Greece, Cyprus and Somaliland Belong in the Same Picture
This is where the Eastern Mediterranean returns to the argument. Israel is building a deep defense relationship with Greece and Cyprus. Greece’s Israeli-supplied air- and missile-defense programme will embed Israeli systems in a strategically sensitive environment west of Türkiye. Israel, Greece and Cyprus are also expanding exercises, maritime cooperation and military planning.
The relationship is not an Article 5 alliance. It is nevertheless becoming a serious strategic network. Israel’s Defense Ministry has spoken publicly about a wider architecture connecting India, the UAE, Israel, Greece and Cyprus. The Israeli Defense Ministry’s regional-architecture statement made that east-to-west concept explicit.
Somaliland makes the concept geographically complete
These are not two formal blocs preparing for war. The relationships overlap, and several states cooperate across the apparent divide.
They are better understood as two different approaches to regional power taking shape across the same maritime space. Türkiye is building political and military depth through institutions and embedded state relationships. Israel is building technological, defense-industrial and maritime connectivity among geographically dispersed partners. Somaliland sits at the hinge between those systems.
The Real Struggle Is over Who Gets There First
Israel’s opponents understand Somaliland’s value. That may be the most important conclusion. Their opposition is not explained only by a sudden concern for Somalia’s constitutional borders. The reaction is intense because recognition changes the strategic-access debate around the Red Sea.
A recognized Somaliland with Israeli, Taiwanese, Emirati and eventually American relationships could alter the balance around Bab el-Mandeb. It could weaken Djibouti’s monopoly, complicate Türkiye’s position in Somalia, frustrate Chinese pressure against Taiwan, give Ethiopia additional maritime options, create a new intelligence and security platform facing Yemen and connect Israel’s Mediterranean partnerships with a wider Indo-Abrahamic maritime network stretching toward India. That is what is at stake.
The contest is not simply about Somaliland receiving another flag at the United Nations. It is about who shapes the political, economic and security order at the southern entrance door to the Red Sea.
Israel opened the door. Its competitors are trying to make walking through it politically expensive.
The danger is not necessarily that Israel will be expelled from Somaliland tomorrow. The greater danger is slower and more familiar: local disputes harden; Mogadishu builds alternative authorities; external governments deepen their influence; anti-Israel narratives become embedded; recognition produces too few economic results; and Somalilanders begin asking what they actually gained.
Several years from now, Israel could discover that it recognized Somaliland first but allowed other powers to shape the environment around it. By then, recognition alone will not be enough.
That is why the strategic window is now. Israel does not need to militarize Somaliland. It needs to make the partnership useful, visible and difficult to reverse.
It must do so before its competitors succeed in turning Somaliland from Israel’s greatest new opportunity on the Red Sea into another lost strategic opening.
Nassir Hussein Kahin is a Hargeisa-based political analyst, educator, journalist, researcher and founder, managing editor and publisher of the independent Horn of Africa Strategic Review. A former editor-in-chief of Somaliland Times and senior editor at African Times, he writes on Israel–Somaliland relations, Red Sea security, recognition diplomacy and strategic competition in the Horn of Africa.
