Somaliland is emerging as a potential flashpoint in the Houthi-Israel rivalry, with a new report alleging Houthi efforts to establish logistics links while Israel reportedly plans a military foothold near Berbera
Somaliland is emerging as a potentially important front in the widening strategic confrontation between Yemen’s Houthis and Israel, according to a new Century International report that describes alleged efforts by the Iran-backed movement to develop logistics networks along the Somali coast.
The report, From Spoke to Hub: The Houthis in Africa, portrays the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea as an increasingly interconnected security environment in which the Houthis are attempting to expand beyond Yemen. Within that broader network, Somaliland receives particular attention because of its location opposite Yemen and its growing strategic relationship with Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
The report stops short of establishing a permanent Houthi presence in Somaliland. Instead, it says regional sources allege that the group has attempted to establish a foothold in Durduri, a village in northeastern Somaliland. The report explicitly notes that local sources dispute the allegation, underscoring the uncertainty surrounding the claim.
That distinction is significant. The evidence presented does not demonstrate that the Houthis control territory or operate an established base in Somaliland. Rather, it suggests an alleged effort to develop logistical access that could eventually support the movement’s wider networks across the Gulf of Aden.
A Strategic Location Across the Gulf of Aden
The report argues that Somaliland and Puntland have historically served as important gateways for illicit arms flows into Somalia because of their relatively stable coastal administrations and proximity to Yemen.
Since around 2015, according to the report, Iranian vessels and dhows have been involved in transferring weapons through networks connecting Yemen and the Somali coast. Houthi-linked actors subsequently sought to consolidate control over these routes rather than relying exclusively on independent smugglers.
The logic behind developing a logistical presence on the African side of the Gulf of Aden is straightforward: cargo stored on land could be moved in smaller quantities and at different times, potentially making detection more difficult.
The report says that if the Houthis could establish storage facilities in Somaliland or Puntland, they could “stagger shipments,” making maritime interdiction more difficult.
For Somaliland, the allegation places its northern coastline within a much larger contest over control of the waterways linking the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Indian Ocean.
Durduri Allegation Remains Disputed
The most direct Somaliland-specific allegation concerns Durduri.
According to the report, regional security sources claimed that Houthi operatives had attempted to establish a presence there. But the authors also recorded contrary accounts from local sources, which disputed the allegation.
That caveat matters because the report itself repeatedly distinguishes between documented activity and claims that remain difficult to independently corroborate. Its broader methodology combines interviews, satellite imagery, shipping data, telephone records and other sources, while acknowledging that the strength of evidence varies from case to case.
There is therefore a difference between evidence of Houthi-linked smuggling networks operating across the Gulf of Aden and evidence that the movement has established a durable operational base inside Somaliland.
The available material supports the former more strongly than the latter.
Hargeisa Appears in the Houthi–al-Shabaab Network
Somaliland also appears in the report through the movements of Ahmed Elmi Samatar, a Somali national described as an alleged intermediary between al-Shabaab and the Houthis.
Samatar was detained in Yemen in 2024 after Yemeni security forces accused him of facilitating contacts and travel between the two groups. The report says he later was released in Aden in November 2025, reportedly as part of a prisoner exchange.
After his release, according to Somali intelligence sources cited by the researchers, Samatar traveled to Hargeisa before returning to Jilib, the de facto center of al-Shabaab-controlled territory. The report says mobile-phone location data corroborated the intelligence sources’ account.
The Hargeisa reference does not, by itself, establish cooperation between Somaliland authorities and either the Houthis or al-Shabaab. Nor does the report make such a claim.
Instead, it places Hargeisa on the travel route of an individual whom the report identifies as having played a role in the Houthi–al-Shabaab relationship.
That distinction is crucial given Somaliland’s stated opposition to al-Shabaab and its long-standing efforts to maintain security along its territory and coastline.
Israel’s Expanding Strategic Interest
The report links the alleged Houthi interest in Somaliland to a second development: Israel’s expanding strategic engagement with the territory.
According to the report, Israeli policymakers became increasingly interested in establishing a presence in the Horn of Africa as the Houthis intensified missile and drone attacks against Israel after late 2023.
The report cites a March 2026 Bloomberg report that Israel was planning a permanent military base in Somaliland intended to counter the Houthis. It further says Somaliland officials had indicated that Israel would be allowed to “gather intelligence on and conduct operations against” the Yemeni movement.
The report also states that Israel recognized Somaliland’s independence in December 2025 and that, during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war with Iran, Israel reportedly established a fighter-jet refueling facility in Somaliland.
These claims place Somaliland at the center of a potentially consequential strategic equation: Israel sees the territory as a possible platform from which to monitor or counter the Houthis, while the Houthis and their allies could increasingly view Israeli facilities or infrastructure in Somaliland as potential targets.
Berbera’s Strategic Importance
The report also highlights the wider Israeli and Emirati footprint along the Somaliland coast.
It says the UAE has maintained a presence in Somaliland since an agreement with the authorities in 2017 and reports that Abu Dhabi is building a major airbase near Berbera.
The significance of Berbera extends beyond the immediate Houthi–Israel confrontation. Its location on the Gulf of Aden gives the port strategic value for maritime surveillance, commercial shipping and military logistics.
The report argues that the combination of an emerging Israeli presence and an established Emirati footprint could alter the calculations of both the Houthis and al-Shabaab.
“Al-Shabaab and the Houthis increasingly view Emirati and Israeli policy in the region as interlocking,” the report says, describing the perception of a coordinated network of bases and security relationships along the Somali coast.
For Somaliland, that creates a complicated strategic environment. A stronger relationship with Israel and the UAE may increase its geopolitical importance while simultaneously increasing its exposure to actors hostile to those countries.
A New Security Dilemma for Somaliland
The report’s Somaliland-related findings point to a broader security dilemma rather than a confirmed Houthi military presence.
On one side, Somaliland’s location and growing external partnerships are increasing its strategic value. Israel’s recognition and reported interest in establishing a military foothold have elevated the territory’s importance in the Red Sea security architecture.
On the other, the same developments could make Somaliland more visible to the Houthis and their emerging network of nonstate partners.
The report specifically warns that a more permanent Houthi presence in Somaliland or Puntland could provide a staging point for arms and personnel transfers toward the Somali interior. It also says such a presence could potentially enable attacks against military facilities that Israel is reportedly planning in Somaliland.
Yet the report does not establish that such attacks are imminent, nor does it establish that the Houthis have already created the infrastructure required to conduct them.
Somaliland at the Edge of a Wider Conflict System
The central conclusion is that Somaliland is becoming entangled in a security system that extends well beyond its own borders.
The Houthis are attempting to transform themselves from a Yemeni armed movement into a regional network hub, according to Century International. Their activities across the Gulf of Aden involve relationships with smugglers, African communities and armed groups, while the wider ecosystem connects Yemen with Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan.
For Somaliland, the implications are particularly acute.
The territory’s strategic geography has long been an asset. But as the Red Sea becomes more militarized and competition between Israel, Iran, the Houthis and their respective partners intensifies, that geography may also become a source of vulnerability.
The evidence in the report does not establish that the Houthis have secured a permanent operational base in Somaliland. It does, however, identify allegations of Houthi efforts to establish logistical links, document the passage of a Houthi–al-Shabaab intermediary through Hargeisa, and describe a growing Israeli strategic interest in Somaliland.
Taken together, those developments suggest that Somaliland is no longer merely adjacent to the Red Sea’s expanding security competition. It is increasingly becoming part of it.
