Djibouti has emerged as a key Houthi logistics and smuggling hub, with alleged networks exploiting its ports, trade routes and Bab el-Mandeb location to move cargo toward Yemen
By Saxafi Media Staff
Djibouti has emerged as a significant logistical node in the Houthi movement’s expanding smuggling network across the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, according to a new Century International investigation that traces how the Yemeni group has increasingly exploited the country’s strategic location, busy ports and commercial trade links.
The report, From Spoke to Hub: The Houthis in Africa, says the Houthis began shifting more of their logistics toward Djibouti from around 2022, as maritime interdiction efforts intensified in the Gulf of Aden and the group increasingly sought commercially sourced components and raw materials for weapons production.
Djibouti’s location at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb, combined with its role as a major regional center for container transshipment and dhow traffic, makes it particularly attractive to clandestine networks. The investigation says the volume and complexity of maritime traffic can make suspicious shipments harder to identify, while vessels entering the Red Sea face fewer opportunities for interception.
From Trade Hub to Houthi Logistics Base
The relationship between Yemen and Djibouti predates the current Houthi network. According to the report, Yemeni businessmen with links to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh established businesses and even a bank in Djibouti as the country developed into a regional trade and financial center during the 2000s.
During the early years of Yemen’s war, businessmen associated with Saleh allegedly used Djibouti to facilitate trade and financial transfers. The report says those activities helped demonstrate the country’s potential as a bridge between Yemen and international commercial networks.
After the Houthis killed Saleh in 2017 and many of his associates left Sana’a, the group reportedly moved to develop its own infrastructure in Djibouti.
Around 2022, according to the investigation, the Houthis sent a former Yemeni customs official to establish and oversee a smuggling operation. The operative allegedly created shell companies that received goods arriving by container ships and cargo vessels before breaking down the shipments and transferring them by dhow to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
Djiboutian authorities detained the operative in early 2024 and transferred him to Yemeni authorities, where he disclosed details of the network, the report says. But the arrest apparently did not end the operation. A second operative is alleged to have subsequently taken over the network.
The 77 Logistics Connection
The investigation points to local commercial companies as another component of the alleged logistics chain.
Multiple shipments intercepted by Yemeni forces reportedly contained cargo that had been imported into Djibouti by 77 Logistics. The report says the company’s parent entity is reportedly owned by Youssouf Omar Guelleh, brother of Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh. The ownership allegation is attributed to shipping records and intelligence claims cited by the researchers, rather than presented as an established finding by the report itself.
One of the most significant cases involved the dhow Al-Sherwa, seized in 2025 by Yemen’s National Resistance Forces.
Yemeni officials said the vessel was carrying approximately 750 tons of military hardware, including Iranian missiles and missile components, drone engines, radar equipment and communications systems. The seizure was described by the Yemeni side as the largest arms interdiction since the beginning of the Yemen war.
According to testimony attributed to the vessel’s captain, the Al-Sherwa had made approximately 12 voyages from Djibouti to the Houthi-controlled port of Salif since early 2024. The vessel’s recovered manifest reportedly showed a role for 77 Logistics in facilitating some of the cargo.
Chemicals and Electronic Components
The investigation describes the Al-Sherwa shipment as part of a broader flow rather than an isolated case.
Between 2023 and 2025, two Djibouti-based companies that researchers linked to Houthi networks through interdiction records imported an estimated 7,500 to 8,500 tons of ammonium nitrate and other chemicals into Djibouti using commercial transportation, according to the report.
The materials were subsequently moved toward Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen using commercial shipping, dhows and smaller vessels. The shipments reportedly also included millions of electronic detonators used in Houthi improvised explosive devices and drones.
The report is careful, however, about the extent to which Djiboutian officials or institutions were knowingly involved.
Western officials and regional sources told the researchers that some Djiboutian port and other officials were likely involved in the smuggling but characterized their motivation as essentially commercial rather than ideological. Djiboutian authorities rejected allegations of complicity and said they were investigating the shipments and Houthi networks operating in the country.
That distinction is important. The investigation documents alleged use of Djibouti’s commercial infrastructure by Houthi-linked networks, but it does not establish that the Djiboutian government as a whole supports the Houthi movement.
A Strategic Commercial Advantage
Djibouti’s commercial importance grew as Houthi attacks disrupted shipping through the Red Sea.
Between 2023 and 2025, major shipping companies increasingly used Djibouti as a transshipment point, unloading containers there for onward movement on smaller vessels rather than sending large commercial ships through the increasingly dangerous Red Sea route.
The report cites data showing that Djibouti’s share of transshipment activity rose from 19 percent in early December 2023 to 60 percent in April 2024. Lloyd’s List Intelligence also recorded a 59 percent increase in vessel calls at Djibouti during the first half of 2024, with preliminary cargo volumes rising by roughly 77 percent.
The commercial windfall was acknowledged by Djibouti Ports and Free Zone officials. Its head told Bloomberg that Djibouti was “doing good business because of the bad luck of others.”
That surge in legitimate maritime activity, however, also created conditions that could benefit illicit networks.
For the Houthis, the same infrastructure that made Djibouti an attractive commercial transshipment center could provide cover for moving sensitive cargo into Yemen.
Djibouti’s Other Role: An Afar Recruitment Gateway
Djibouti also appears in the report in connection with an earlier Houthi effort to cultivate Afar recruits.
The Afar community stretches across Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia and has longstanding social and commercial links across the Bab el-Mandeb. The investigation says Houthi outreach to the Afar community included individuals traveling from Obock in northern Djibouti by small boat to Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.
The report identifies Mohammed Alawsan, an Afari previously affiliated with the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization, as a central figure in the relationship. By 2016, the Houthis had allegedly established a training base for him in Yemen and placed him in charge of an Afari community there.
The researchers say Afaris traveled from Obock to Yemen in small groups, with the Houthis offering financial, political and military support, including the possibility of training in Iran.
The relationship eventually collapsed. According to the report, Afari recruits resisted Houthi ideological indoctrination and suffered significant casualties after being deployed in the Yemen war. Alawsan organized protests and a strike before being arrested in 2024 and later executed by the Houthis, the investigation says.
Despite that rupture, Houthi outreach to Afar networks reportedly continued.
An Afari leader cited in the report said Houthi messages were transmitted through Eritrean opposition figures and included offers of training and weapons. The leader rejected the approach, warning that cooperation would draw the Afar into a broader regional conflict and increase instability.
A Vulnerable Maritime Crossroads
Taken together, the investigation portrays Djibouti as more than a geographic waypoint.
Its position beside the Bab el-Mandeb, established maritime infrastructure, extensive commercial traffic and longstanding connections with Yemen have made it a valuable environment for Houthi logistics. At the same time, the country has benefited economically from the disruption that the Houthi campaign has caused to conventional Red Sea shipping.
That creates a difficult security paradox: the same commercial openness that has strengthened Djibouti’s role as a regional trade hub can also make it attractive to illicit networks seeking to move cargo toward Yemen.
The Century International investigation does not establish that Djibouti’s government is directing or politically sponsoring Houthi operations. Instead, it documents allegations of Houthi efforts to exploit commercial networks and local intermediaries while noting Djiboutian authorities’ denial of complicity.
For Djibouti, the stakes extend beyond individual smuggling cases. As Houthi networks become more sophisticated and maritime competition around the Bab el-Mandeb intensifies, the country’s ports are increasingly positioned at the intersection of legitimate global commerce, regional security and clandestine supply chains.
