Chapter 1
Introduction
Anyone who has watched enough documentaries on dangerous or ‘no-go’ places in the world is sure to hear about Somaliland at some point. Somaliland is a ‘place that does not exist’. Officially on most government no-go lists because it is technically a part of Somalia, the idea of traveling to Somaliland has an air of intrigue, mystery and daring to it. Anyone actually planning a trip to Somaliland, though, will encounter a different experience. Visitors can obtain visas from small offices hosting Somaliland consulates prior to their arrival (these are unofficial offices, of course. In London it can be found in a standard terrace on a back street in Whitechapel). Regular flights from Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Dubai on major carriers make Somaliland easy to reach. As mysterious travel goes, it is all fairly mundane. Upon arrival, you disembark in a relatively developed airport, pass through immigration and customs, and are met outside by taxi drivers in cars with Somaliland license plates clamoring to get your custom. The roads in the cities are paved and maintained, the Somaliland flag flies above most buildings and adorns almost anything imaginable in a show of nationalistic pride. it is against the law to use certain plastic bags in the market as the thin blue variety have a tendency to escape and collect in the bushes and trees, turning them an odd shade of blue in an otherwise dusty and brown environment. The democratic government is stable, political debate is commonly heard in most tea houses and cafes, and the opposition is very vocal. The capital, Hargeisa, is growing, it is vibrant and it is booming. Most notable, though, is the remarkably peaceful and orderly nature of Somaliland. The conflict that plagues the south is conspicuously absent, and sometimes you have to remind yourself that you are indeed technically in Somalia. Ask any Somalilander why Somaliland is different and they are certain to reply with ‘we are not like Somalia. We are civilized and peaceful’. Somaliland may be on the list of places that do not exist, but being in Somaliland tells a completely different story. Somaliland is a state without being a state, and for more than 20 years it has been undergoing, and undertaking, a remarkable self-led statebuilding process. Guided by both external expectations and internal necessities, it has created the apparent antithesis to its parent-state, Somalia. The question is, however, how did it do it?
The 1991 failure and collapse of the state in Somalia ushered in what was to become a long-term and largely unsuccessful effort aimed at internationally driven post-conflict state reconstruction and statebuilding. Since 1992 Somalia has been the subject of numerous peace conferences and a succession of attempts at re-establishing the state apparatus and a government. The current government in Somalia continues to be plagued with difficulties, not only from within the government itself but also from various factions within society, including an increasingly outward looking and al Qaeda aligned militant movement: al-Shabaab. The 2006 return of Somalia’s government from more than a decade in exile in Kenya was not met with jubilation in the streets, but rather the continuation of violence so intense in the capital city of Mogadishu that the returning government opted to base itself in Baidoa, nearly 160 miles away. Today’s unstable and unpredictable situation in Somalia leads one to question the sustainability of not only the current incarnation of the government but also, more broadly, of an externally created government within the archetypal failed state. Despite the persistent failures at re-building the state, the international community and Somalia’s neighbors continue their endeavors aimed at building a stable and accountable Somalia. Where the international community and its statebuilding activity is largely absent, however, pockets of locally created governance have emerged. In many areas outside the major cities, clan governance continues to provide social and physical stability and security to the people. In the northeast province of Puntland, a long-standing regional government offers basic services and security to the population. And in the northwest territory of Somaliland, the most organized and developed of these pockets of governance, a new ‘state’ that exhibits the central democratic government that has so far eluded the south is emerging. It is here that an extraordinary project of domestically-led statebuilding is taking place within the larger failure of Somalia.
Throughout the literature on failed states and that of statebuilding, the on-going project in Somalia is a frequent point of reference. Within these studies the self-declared independent territory of Somaliland is often referred to as a region of Somalia or as a breakaway territory that refuses to engage with the wider project of reconciliation and rebuilding of the state. Whilst it is true that there is minimal contact between Somalia and Somaliland on the nature of Somaliland’s status, the continuation of viewing Somaliland as region or territory of Somalia creates a situation in which the causes for Somaliland’s secession and the successes in creating a state are not acknowledged. Instead, the existence of an independent Somaliland is problematic for the long-standing goal of re-establishing a government able to exercise its power throughout the entirety of Somalia. The insistence on the territorial integrity of Somalia coming from the West as well as strongly from the African Union ensures that very little official attention is paid to the statebuilding process in Somaliland. It therefore remains conspicuously absent from much of the statebuilding policy, practice and literature.
The insistence on an externally-led project of creating a central democratic state in Somalia reflects the current development trend of promulgating a universally applied style of state. Indeed, statebuilding in Somalia, as the first post-Cold War statebuilding project informed by the idealistic New World Order, marked the start of the promotion of an idealized modern democratic state through statebuilding and development projects. With a flux of new Eastern European states creating increased competition for investment and development assistance from the West, the message portrayed to states seeking support regarding what was needed to obtain support became clear. As Dowden, in reference to African states, recollects:
Europe and America gave African governments three conditions for their continued, if diminishing support: pursue free market policies, as laid down in the Washington consensus, respect human rights, and hold democratic elections – by which they meant multi-party democracy.[1]
These demands reflect wider expectations of what the state should be. However, whilst broader academic examinations of the state and the changing understanding of it are nothing new, within literature and indeed policy on statebuilding, what the state ‘is’ is often assumed rather than analyzed. And whilst expectations of what the state should be are commonly found within development literature and policy, these too reflect assumptions surrounding the state. The literature on theory and philosophy of the state is vast, and the intention here is not to provide an overarching theoretical picture of the state. What is of primary interest, however, is how the state is portrayed and treated in practice and the assumptions and expectations encompassing and underpinning that. It is this treatment that informs not only external policies, but also in some instances internal action.
The ‘State’
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia is widely accepted as the landmark agreement that laid the foundation for the creation of independent demarcated sovereign states as well as the beginnings of the interstate system. Control of territory and a monopolization of force necessary to extract rents and taxes was considered vital to the growth and sustainability of the state.[2] Indeed, the early emphasis on control of a clearly demarcated territory as the primary characteristic of the state is still reflected in Max Weber’s widely accepted definition of the state.[3] the Westphalian state and the development of the concept of sovereignty, with the emphasis on the sovereign’s ability to control a territory and accumulate the capital necessary to ensure and maintain the territorial integrity and security of the state, left little room or concern for what took place within the boundaries of the state. even within Weber’s augmentation of the rudimentary Westphalian conception of the state, where there is an acknowledgment of the empirical actions of the state, the concern with the empirical maintains the focus on state actions in maintaining juridical security and control within the state rather than the more human focused state actions that have become associated with more contemporary assessments of the state. Consistently for Weber, if the monopoly of force by the national government is absent, the territory exists in a realm of statelessness. Whilst social, humanitarian, economic and political responsibilities may be interpretively derived from this definition through an examination of the elements of control or organization, whether charismatic leadership, traditional leadership, or bureaucratic control,[4] engrained in this definition is the persistent emphasis placed on the monopolization or legitimization of force necessary to first achieve and then maintain statehood. This force-centric understanding of the state continues to underpin contemporary conceptions of the state, yet they do not occupy the entirety of the space in understandings and expectations of what the state is and should be.
Whilst control and a monopoly of force remain essential components of modern statehood, the evolution of what it means to be a state has resulted in increased importance being placed on the actions of the central government outside the realm of physical or territorial security. Drawing on the criteria of statehood codified in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and duties of states, Ian Brownlie describes the state as a legal entity – recognized by international law – with four main elements: a defined territory; a permanent population; an effective government; and independence, or the right to enter into relations with other states.[5] although the Montevideo convention simply states ‘government’ as one of its criteria for statehood, Brownlie added emphasis on the internal occurrences and practices of the sovereign with his identification of ‘effective government’. In a similar theme, Robert Jackson articulates that modern states must exhibit not only juridical – or legal territorial – statehood, but also empirical statehood – or fulfilling domestic sovereign responsibilities through institutional authority and organizational capacity – in order to be ‘complete’ states.[6] Development and statebuilding policy and discourse extend the empirical much further than Jackson’s authority-based conception and into the realm of good governance. indeed, the mere existence of the term ‘failed state’ indicates the dominant expectation that even though the state may juridically and therefore legally exist, merely maintaining sovereign borders is not enough to fully meet modern expectations of statehood.
As Jessop notes, the notion of what it means to be a state is a perpetually incomplete and constantly evolving understanding.[7] Although Jessop discusses the changing nature of the state as a result of changing economic practice, the observation can also be applied to changes resulting from normative values determining what it means to be a state. In other words, what has changed is not the state, per se, but rather the conception or understanding of the state. This is clear in evolving understandings not only since its inception at Westphalia but also since the time of Weber’s now dominant conception of the state was written.[8] Concerns over the empirical attributes of statehood have gone beyond a sovereign or government able to exert institutional control and authority through a monopolization of force. Following rapid decolonization, juridical statehood trumped the existence of an empirical state, and as such, according to Jackson,
Many [ex-colonial states] have not yet been authorized and empowered domestically and consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states … They disclose limited empirical statehood: their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organized power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare.[9]
caught in the geopolitical struggle of the cold War, however, the concern regarding many of these new states, as well as many ‘old’ states, was predominantly ideological; again the empirical concerns stopped at whether the state was ‘for us or against us’. it was not until the end of the cold War that focus increasingly and rapidly shifted towards the relationship between the state, governance and the population: a focus dominated by issues now associated with not only good, but also legitimate governance and the exercising of empirical sovereignty within those states that Jackson implies were ‘behind’ or ‘problematic’ from the start. Vital to this shift is the expectation of international political and financial cooperation, perceived to best be achieved through the establishment of liberal democracies. indeed, the push for familiar and proven liberal democracies as a ‘sure bet’ form of statehood reflects the prioritization of external expectations of the state; expectations that are perceived to be necessary not only for the legitimacy and security of the state in question, but also for the political, physical and economic security of the system. It must be clear, though, that the legitimacy referred to here is not solely domestic acceptance of a government; it also refers to an international acceptance of the actions and functions of the state.
In the 1990s, humanitarian considerations and good governance replaced ideological leanings and the militarization of the state as points of attention. as evidenced in President George H.W. bush’s short-lived new World Order, and later prevalent in the output and actions of the United nations, as well as the advent of humanitarian intervention, the empirical actions of state leadership in regards to the treatment and conditions of the populace challenged the state’s juridical sovereign right to non-intervention.[10] Whilst provision of public goods and empirical statehood are not new concepts in relation to the state, the conception of expected state action, both externally and domestically, shifted from a focus on force or control to a focus on provision, both to the international community and the domestic population of the state in question. It is within this realm where the legal state separates from the normative state. Whereas there continues to be an emphasis on the legalistic monopolization of force, contemporary conceptions of effective statehood have come to include the state’s ability to provide for its citizens in the realm of territorial security as well as in terms of political, social, economic, and human security. Whilst the legal definition of sovereignty and statehood has changed little since the formation of the early European states, the normative conception of statehood has evolved. Further, following the end of the Cold War the notion of a link between the liberal state and systemic security became dominant, firmly entrenching the empirical occurrences in an individual state in the security of others, particularly the liberal democratic states of the West. With this link made, threats emanating from states became much more than just military or territorial ones and not only the style of state but also domestic actions of the government became a concern of more than just the population inhabiting a sovereign territory.
In his oft-cited work, Rotberg expounds upon the increasing emphasis on state expectation and provisions in maintaining that modern states are responsible for mediating the ‘constraints and challenges of the international arena’ with the ‘dynamism of their own internal economic, political, and social realities’. Noting the importance of security in the conception, and indeed in Rotberg’s work on assessment of the state, he also notes that it is not the sole purpose for the existence of a state:
[n]ation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders) … modern states focus and answer the concerns and demands of citizenries … [political goods] encompass indigenous expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions.[11]
Rotberg accurately and succinctly captures the picture of state expectation that is widely found within policy and practice. He stresses that the provision of political goods is vital to the domestic legitimacy of the state, and as such in assessing the performance, or even worthiness, of a state key political goods are hierarchically identified as valid tools of judgment and evaluation. States that do not fulfil these criteria are ‘failing’ or ‘failed’, in this assessment, making those that do ‘successful’. Within this, territorial security is the top priority for successful states, and Rotberg makes clear the importance placed on the existence of an acceptable or successful liberal state for global security. however, other more social-political goods are also ranked as being fundamental to a state’s legitimacy and success, such as enforceable rule of law, free and fair participation in the political process, the provision of social goods such as health care and education, physical and economic infrastructure, communications infrastructure, environmental protection, sound and logical fiscal policy and even the promotion of civil society.[12] Under these assessments, states are not functioning or legitimate if they are lacking in the empirical provision of public goods that are perceived as essential to effective rule. States that fail this assessment are targets for attention or some form of intervention, be it through a direct presence or some form of conditional aid. Successful states perform in a way that legitimizes governmental rule both domestically and internationally by protecting the interests and security of not only the sovereign and the territory, but the population as well. Failed or failing states must be ‘fixed’ for the benefit of all.[13] Although the sovereign boundaries of recognized states stand, absolute sovereignty is no longer a guarantee. Whilst physical intervention in various forms is a common feature in development and security policies, what is less obvious is ideational intervention; a form of intervention that can be both externally enacted and domestically adopted.
This emphasis on conforming to the dominant international norms informs projects aimed at responding to or remedying state failure, including statebuilding projects.[14] The response to what are seen as financial, political social and security concerns or problems is a prescribed ‘one size fits all’ approach[15] to modern idealized statehood in order to create stability in not only the state in question, but also the international system of states. This ‘ideal’ state conforms to liberal notions of acceptable statehood, exhibiting not only a democratic government and a secure territory, but also exercising good governance, providing public and political goods to the population, engaging in the international economy through liberal policies and eager for political interactions with other states and international institutions. In other words, the ‘ideal’ state is one which is ‘governed’ within the liberal rubric: it is one in which political, economic and security threats are eliminated and the practices, policies and structures of the state are familiar and easily accessible to the international community. The ideal state, therefore, is an extension of liberal intervention and as such is subject to the control or subjugation of powerful states and international institutions. It does not reflect an already existing state structure, but rather comprises a wish list of sorts; it is a composition of factors that together would make the perfect acceptable or successful state not only for security, but also for political and economic relationships with powerful actors in the international community. The promulgation of the ideal state is more a liberal tool than an achievable reality.
The Ideal Modern State and Indigenous Governance Structures
Within literature and policy on state failure, statebuilding and state development the successful or acceptable – the ideal – state is portrayed as one that complies with the normative framework of the modern state. As Berger notes, the growing body of literature concerned with failed and failing states ‘attempts to facilitate the formulation of policies that will reverse this trend and create a world order of stable, economically dynamic and secure nation-states’.[16] This is also reflected by the technocratic Ghani and Lockhart in the subtitle of their book, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World.[17] Failed, fragile, weak or collapsed states are seen as states in crisis and as such are threatening to the cohesiveness and stability of the international system of states. Because of this there is a perceived incompatibility of failed or fragile states and the international system of states, thereby forcing the system to seek a way to strengthen its weaker chains. As Weiner indicates, weak, failed or fragile states create the threat of a bad neighborhood, with the problems of one state quickly spreading to impact upon the others in its proximity.[18] In line with this, failed, weak, fragile or collapsed states can be seen as crudely akin to a crack house in a residential neighborhood: the malignant force of a failed state threatens the stability of a surrounding area and therefore must be addressed. Since removal of the entity is unfathomable under current rules of the international system, the response is a prescriptive remedy similar to an urban regeneration scheme that would be established to address a problematic neighborhood. Berger associates this increased prescriptive attention with an emerging crisis of the nation-state system, with states failing to meet the rigorous demands of modern statehood threatening the stability of a system built on and dependent upon the functioning or legitimate sovereign states. however, the current means of addressing these problems itself are problematic in that the impending crisis is not one which can be addressed by ‘technocratic prescriptions for the creation or stabilization of particular collapsing or failing nation-states or the rehabilitation of the nation-state’, but rather the international community must reconsider the dictate of what is acceptable in the modern state.[19]as models of development have largely been dictated by the dominant discourses of the period, policies such as the push for political reform based on democracy’s third wave, the economic sector oriented Washington consensus and increased awareness of and concern for social and human security within sovereign states have significantly informed today’s development policy and therefore the normative framework for acceptable statehood.[20] Modernization of state institutions and practices is integral to this framework; ‘backwards’ traditional, indigenous or non-democratic structures and procedures are not efficient or effective in meeting the ideals being presented. Thus, modernization of political and economic structures through democratization, good governance practices and liberal economics becomes a vital component of the state. Even though a definitive statement of ideal statehood does not exist, policies such as Structural Adjustment Programs and aid conditionality, together with the promotion of good governance and the modernization of institutions and government through development policies and, in extreme cases, interventionist statebuilding, support the perception of an ideal, preferred, or acceptable state. As previously discussed, there exists a notion of the type of state that is preferred by the international community; a type of state that is viewed as secure and stable and is preferable to engage with on the social, economic and political levels. In addition to a liberal economy and democracy, the ideal state exhibited within this discourse is one that provides what Jackson terms empirical statehood and what Rotberg identifies as public and political goods.[21] Whilst there are no specifically stated parameters for this state, the popular characteristics defined by developed states and presented in literature and policy create a picture of the ideal that developing states should strive to become and what the international community should build through development projects and statebuilding interventions.
For those entities aspiring to legally recognized statehood, however, creating the ideal state can become more than just conforming to a normative model of statehood; it can become the perceived path to recognition and therefore to the political, social and economic interactions and benefits that accompany legal statehood. In reference to the enlargement of the European Union, Ghani and Lockhart paint a picture of a structured path for aspiring member states, with the accession to the EU being the end reward for following the pre-determined rules and regulations for membership.[22] In a similar manner, the benefits of recognized statehood are the carrot being dangled in front of those territories wanting to be states. In the context of what Jean-François Bayart identifies as a strategy of extraversion,[23] or actively seeking external sources of financial or political benefit, creating the ideal state with the aim of gaining recognition of statehood can become a means through which a territorial entity can benefit from interaction with the international community; the state becomes a strategic tool. Through the medium of legally recognized statehood, unrecognized states endeavor to gain access to those areas largely reserved for states, such as legal financial frameworks, developmental assistance through international organizations and increased access to trade and other political activities taking place in the international realm of states. The process of creating an ideal modern state, therefore, can be a means to a financially, politically and socially beneficial end.
The concern here, however, is the uniform approach to creating stable or successful states using the blueprinted framework of the ideal state, particularly within non-Western states or those with a reliance upon or strong tradition of non-Western governance structures. How are local structures and dynamics accommodated in the creation or formation of a state, particularly within territories or entities with little or no experience of the modern or democratic state? Further, the model of modern acceptable or successful statehood discounts the centralization of indigenous or traditional governance structures, particularly in Africa, as they are believed to be backwards, corrupt, unpredictable or unstable. Although indigenous structures are viewed as useful when engaging locally in governance or development projects, as Duffield notes, reminiscent to systems of indirect rule, their role in externally-led projects is accepted only if in a devolved manner.[24] Their exclusion from the central state creates a situation in which the expectation is the creation of a modern and acceptable state in varied social or political contexts. as a result, modes of social and political organization that are specifically tailored to the territory and society, yet do not follow the Western model of statehood, are often the target of reform or co-option by external donors and institutions rather than inclusion in the central mechanisms of government as those unfamiliar alternatives do not conform to the ideal and trusted picture of the successful state.
The Ideal ‘State’, Statebuilding and Somaliland
Although the ideal state is a reflection of desires rather than a recreation of an existing state structure, this rubric of statehood is exhibited in policy as the desired outcome of interventionist actions. It extends far beyond active development or statebuilding policy, however. The dominance of this style of state in the normative liberal framework guiding international relations also creates an environment in which alternatives to or deviations from this blueprint of statehood and the path through which to reach it are not trusted, regardless of any success that may be exhibited. As such, international norms of what it means to be a state also direct domestic policy within developing states and, in particular, unrecognized states. For the latter, conforming to these acceptable standards of statehood is considered vital to achieving international recognition. By exploring conceptions of the acceptable or ideal state it is possible to understand, and also critique, the expectations for modern statebuilding. An ideal case study for this is Somaliland. A separate entity from its southern neighbor, Somaliland is often referred to as a model in Africa: on empirical grounds it ‘fulfils the principle criteria for statehood’ and ticks the boxes of what a stable, modern state should be.[25] By all pretenses it is a state, albeit one that lacks international recognition of sovereignty. A 2005 report commissioned by the World Bank, however, unveils a perceived problem with the state in Somaliland: a deviation from the liberal blueprint in the inclusion of traditional authority in the unrecognized state’s central government structure.[26]The stated goal of creating a modern state is the same in both Somalia and Somaliland, but Somaliland has taken a drastically different path to achieving this and has set about creating a state on its own. Its exclusion from international involvement in the statebuilding process, offered under the guise of reconstructing Somalia as a unitary state, however, has meant that the territory has been subjected to little direct interference from the international community. This relative isolation has allowed for Somaliland to define its own conditions for the introduction of demands for modern statehood, including democracy, in the governing structure and practices of the territory. The formation of the state in Somaliland reflects not only the normative dominance of the idealized acceptable or successful modern statehood, but also adapts these demands to Somaliland society. What is being created is a hybrid state that is inclusive of both familiar traditional governance structures as well as the newly introduced modern democratic government.[27]
Outwardly, the outcome of the statebuilding process in Somaliland appears to be a modern democratic state – albeit an unrecognized one – and the modern practices of the state are widely referred to in Somaliland’s quest for international recognition of sovereignty. The imposition of modern democracy within the complexities of Somaliland’s political and social environment was not as simple as just creating a democratic government and modern state practices, however, and was viewed as potentially destabilizing by the founders of Somaliland. Because of this, a compromise was reached between clan governance and modern democracy, resulting in a deviation from the model of the modern state with the formation of a hybrid government in Somaliland. The government is thus a product of reconciliation between ‘old’ traditional structures and the ‘new’ democratic structures and practices, what can also be viewed as domestic needs and external demands, creating a central government inclusive of and dependent upon both. This book examines the creation of such a state, asking why a modern democratic state was created, why the traditional was included in this state, and how the complex relationship between the old and the new functions in the formation, legitimization, growth and future of the state. This book also considers what the implications of the success this hybrid government are for not only for Somaliland, but for the broader picture in the context of the discourses on state formation and statebuilding.
Somaliland proves an interesting case in that what is occurring in the territory is statebuilding, and within that state formation, that is informed and guided by international norms and standards of statehood, but is also proceeding as an indigenous process with minimal direct external intervention.[28] In contrast to the fraught filled long-term international statebuilding project taking place in Somalia, Somaliland is an oasis of calm in the chaos of the archetypal failed state. Although Somaliland appears to conform to the standards and requirements of acceptable statehood, despite its declaration of independence in 1991 it is not recognized as a sovereign entity separate from Somalia. Because of its inability to access international structures and institutions that are reserved for sovereign states, achieving recognition of statehood has become a primary goal of the government in the territory, with the creation of a democratic state at the center of Somaliland’s strategy. Whilst on the surface the state does exhibit the characteristics of a successful modern state and the government engages in an aggressive international public relations campaign advertising and espousing its successes, it does deviate from the ideal statehood mold in that it has incorporated traditional Somali forms of governance in the central state structure in the form of a house of parliament. Whilst the traditional nature of this body is not hidden, its promotion as a primarily legislative body downplays those functions of the institution that are associated with the indigenous clan governance structure.[29] With the objective of obtaining recognition of sovereignty in order to be capable of fully participating in the international system of states, and with the structure and function of the state apparatus appearing to conform to the acceptable state framework, the question must be raised of why a traditional institution was included, and retained, in the government of this aspiring state? Indeed, without the inclusion of this traditional element from the beginning of the process, the territory would not exhibit the level of peace and stability that exists today; and without peace and stability the introduction of a modern, yet foreign, democratic governing structure would have encountered significant difficulties. Whilst the inclusion of the traditional was essential to the initial stages of statebuilding, however, its continuance in the growing and evolving central government has begun to be questioned by elements within the Somaliland government and society. In order to maintain the uniquely Somaliland structure that has ensured stability, re-negotiating the relationship between the old Somali governance system and the new democratic structures and practices in the hybrid government is the focus of the next phase of statebuilding in the territory. Seen as a process rather than a project, this tailoring and continual re-negotiation of the state and statebuilding in Somaliland, as well as the flexibility afforded by that, proves invaluable from an analytical standpoint.
Whilst to an extent Somaliland follows the normative frameworks for acceptable or successful statehood, the inclusion of indigenous or traditional rule in the government sets Somaliland apart from the dominant ‘blueprint approach’. This inclusion still puts Somaliland on the path towards the ideal of liberal democracy, but it does so in a way not defined by the international community but rather by Somaliland itself. The state being created in the territory is one that makes democracy, and the state, work by tailoring the ideal to fit and therefore be possible, and legitimate, in Somaliland. In balancing a desire for recognition of sovereign statehood with the need to create a stable governing structure in Somaliland, the shapers of this government have created an interesting case of statebuilding for study. The case of Somaliland raises interesting questions concerning not only dominant statebuilding and state formation discourse, policy and practice, but also questions the ‘cookie cutter’ approach commonly found in both literature and policy.
The hybrid government in Somaliland was integral to establishing peace and stability, and the statebuilding process taking place in the territory, as a carefully tailored and flexible process, provides empirical grounds for analysis and understanding of statebuilding and what it could be. With that said, it should be noted that whilst the approach to statebuilding taken by Somaliland has been successful, it is not the intention here to suggest that the territory is perfect, or that the territory’s distinctive experience should be carbon copied by other territories or states. What has worked for Somaliland is a tailored fit, and it is one that has been altered and has evolved as obstacles are encountered or as need demands. its importance is not that it has created a blueprint for non-Western statebuilding – Somaliland itself is not and should not be a model – but that what has taken place in Somaliland and what has been created provides analytical commentary not only on the conception of the ideal state, but also on how to achieve it: statebuilding. The territory provides an excellent platform for the study of contemporary statebuilding, particularly how this is shaped or reactive to normative values of statehood. The territory also proves interesting in examining the interaction between Western ideals and traditional practices and structures in contemporary statebuilding. Somaliland is an example of how the model of acceptable statehood fails to acknowledge the importance of local social and political dynamics in contributing to the stability, legitimacy and success of a developing, re-building or forming state, and its process is useful in exploring what statebuilding could, and should, be. It is because of this that the examination of the government in Somaliland here focuses on the deviation that has proved to be the foundation for stability in and legitimacy of the forming state: the inclusion of the indigenous traditional governance structures into the Somaliland government. It must also be noted that it is not the purpose of this book to assess Somaliland through the discourse of right to self-determination. The legal and political complexity surrounding the international community’s response to and policy regarding Somaliland’s declaration of independence is a vast and separate project itself. However, it would be misleading to present the assumption that the inclusion of traditional authority in Somaliland’s government is a reason for lack of recognition. Whilst the power of the clan authority in the institutions and functions of government has been noted as a concern, issues regarding Somaliland’s placement within Somalia and expressed policy protecting territorial integrity in the region are considerable obstacles to recognition. Until Somalia is stabilized, Somaliland is unlikely to be recognized. The isolation due to this, however, has been beneficial to Somaliland as the territory has been granted the time and space to ‘go it alone’.[30]
Challenging the Ideal
The desire to shape states to meet the needs of other more powerful neighbors is not new. Encouraging or forcing conformity for the purposes of cooperation and international stability is a practice that can be traced back to the days of empire. the end of empire and a new order based on the concept of independent sovereign states halted the direct paternalism being used to foster cooperation and relationships based on common values, but it did not end the push for conformity or efforts to encourage, or in some cases impose, it. When the new order appeared challenged due to state failure and fragility, state collapse and state weakness, the need for stability within and amongst sovereign states increased as a priority amongst policymakers and political thinkers, particularly those within the West. Conformity, in the form of liberal democracy and an exhibition of good governance, became a security concern, and the need to maintain international stability amongst independent states has resulted in many projects that have sought to rebuild those that threatened due to failure or collapse. Whilst there are many examples, Somalia exists as both a historic and contemporary model of this impulse. Somaliland, on the other hand, challenges how we understand it.
This book seeks to fill a gap in the literature on statebuilding and Somaliland. Statebuilding literature is rife with criticisms and examples of what has gone wrong, but there is very little on what has gone right. In the literature on Somaliland, there is emphasis on the technical components of the statebuilding process on the one hand,[31] and the role of the clan in Somali society on the other.[32] The literature on Somaliland is also dominated by discussions on and justifications for sovereign recognition. However, there is a distinct lack of literature that brings these areas together. By placing Somaliland in the context of statebuilding and by asking the question ‘what went right’, this book seeks to contribute to bridging that gap. The purpose here is to examine the often mentioned but underexplored aspect of creating the state in Somaliland – the role of the clan – in the context of statebuilding. The focus here is examining the relationship between internal and external demands in the self-led statebuilding process in Somaliland, specifically focusing on the utilization of the clan as a mechanism of that relationship and that process. as a point of ‘deviance’ in Somaliland as the utilization of traditional authority brings with it connotations of unpredictability and backwardness in an otherwise seemingly ‘modern’ democratic state, the inclusion of the clan is particularly interesting, raising the question of why was it included in the process of creating what aspires to be a state that conforms to external expectations. Much of this book is a historical story. By looking at and telling the story of the process through history, it is not only possible to extract the importance of the clan and how it relates to or facilitates internal and external expectations, but also its evolving role in a growing and strengthening ‘state’. This opens the door for placing that very Somaliland necessity – the clan in the state – in the context of statebuilding and in balancing the internal and the external. The constant evolution and renegotiation of the hybrid Somaliland state, processes which have maintained stability thus far, pose significant challenges for discourse and policy that outline specific guidelines and offer blueprints for the development of effective governance and political reform necessary to meet the requirements of the modern acceptable state. In looking at conclusions pertaining to local capabilities and local ownership, negotiation versus imposition, and statebuilding as a process rather than a project, failings of technocratic statebuilding are identified and highlighted.
The book provides a general introduction to conceptions of acceptable statehood found within literature and policy, as well as an explanation and a critical examination of externally-led statebuilding – a form of intervention aimed at creating acceptable or ideal statehood in states perceived to be fragile, failed, failing, threatening or concerning. Within this, problems with externally-led statebuilding are identified, particularly in establishing local ownership and legitimacy within an externally-built state. In contrast to this, domestically-led statebuilding in unrecognized states is introduced, leading to an examination of this process in Somaliland. Before attention is turned to Somaliland, a brief history of the Somali people and the Somalia state, including the role of the clan, is given. Following this, an examination of the statebuilding process in Somaliland, focusing on the role of the clan as a legitimizing actor and the process of locally owning the state, is given. Starting with a critical historical explanation of Somaliland both pre- and post- 1991, the latter half of the book focuses on the utilization of the clan as a mechanism of governance and legitimacy within the statebuilding process in Somaliland and as a means through which the gap between internal and external was bridged. This book then examines problems with the juxtaposing of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ in a modernizing government, posing questions pertaining to what the future Somaliland state will look like as the statebuilding process progresses. Finally, the book concludes with a critical re-examination of not only the hybrid government in Somaliland, but also returning to this in the context of statebuilding and lessons to be drawn from that. This book examines statebuilding as a process rather than a project, and as such it is acknowledged throughout that what is taking place in Somaliland is ongoing. It is also acknowledged throughout that whilst the clan has played a key role in the Somaliland statebuilding process, it is not the only actor involved. Although the focus here is on the clan, other important actors are acknowledged.
The purpose here is not to romanticize the clan and traditional authority in Somaliland, or to see the statebuilding process in Somaliland through rose colored spectacles. To do so would offer a misleading picture of the statebuilding process in Somaliland. After all, the placement of the clan in the central government is Somaliland has not been resulted in a utopian tale or ending. It is fully acknowledged here that the ongoing process in Somaliland has not been problem free and that some of the obstacles facing Somaliland as it continues in its statebuilding process center on the clan inclusion. however, fear of romanticizing an aspect of the process or concerns about accusations of romanticism only result in an incomplete view and therefore understanding of the process, just as disregarding aspects like history excludes contextual information necessary to provide analysis, particularly in regards to political occurrences or structures. With that in mind, these reservations should be considered by the reader, and the examination of the inclusion of the clan should be read as a component, albeit an important component, of the overall ongoing process.
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