Chapter 7
Somaliland at the crossroads?
In Somaliland, the utilization of the clan elders for the establishment of peace and stability enabled the creation of a foundation upon which to create a state as well as creating a necessary link between ‘old’ Somali governance and the desired ‘new’ democracy. As with any political process or governing system, though, change is inevitable and flexibility is necessary. Somaliland is certainly not immune from this. The utilization and inclusion of the clan in Somaliland’s statebuilding process from the beginning has been vital not only for stability, but also for legitimacy. the Guurti’s legitimacy, whilst rooted in its role in the fight against Barre, its role in post-conflict peacebuilding, and its role in ‘upholding customary principles of consensus and inclusion to counterbalance the competitive nature of multi-party politics’,[507] also stems from trust and familiarity. As the representation the clan, and through that society, in the turbulent political process and system, it was central to rooting society in the statebuilding process and arguably in rooting the state in society, thereby serving to shrink the legitimacy gap often encountered in externally-led statebuilding. As gees notes, ‘many people are nostalgic about the Guurti because in troubled times when we needed them the Guurti was there’.[508] Certainly, the Guurti worked hard throughout the fight against Barre and through the early stages of statebuilding. However, without its traditional association the body would have been little more than another political actor; the Guurti has been an agent of legitimization not merely because of its work but also because of its connotation. As the state develops and as the ‘new’ becomes more familiar, though, the role of the ‘old’ Guurti has changed. no longer with its importance derived primarily through clan association, the Guurti is finding itself a target of the sociopolitical change that it had been so instrumental in leading and mediating. The Guurti, once viewed as invaluable to stability, is now the subject of an uncertain future within Somaliland. But that uncertainty should not be taken as a negative. Rather, it is a sign of a developing political system.
With the introduction of democratic practices in the territory, the position of the now politicized but still unelected traditional authority is the government is being called into question. Because statebuilding is a process, as Somaliland – both as a state and as an idea – grows, change is inevitable. The inclusion of the clan and the nature of that inclusion is one such area where change is possible. Somaliland has evolved, and as it has the necessity of the clan inclusion is being questioned. In line with common perceptions of traditional or indigenous authorities, many in Somaliland and the influential Somaliland Diaspora view the centralized clan and modern democracy as being incompatible. Many of the concerns surrounding the position of the Guurti stem from the extraordinary amount of power the body possesses within the government; constitutional ambiguity once vital to providing the flexibility necessary for the creation of the government is now seen as problematic as the government consolidates and the democratization process moves forward. Indeed, fear of this came to a head with the series of postponements of the presidential elections starting in 2008, with accusations that the Guurti had been corrupted and co-opted by the president as a means to ensure his continuation in power, resulting in a disruption of the democratic process.[509] With unquestioned influence over society acquired from its traditional association and with seemingly unchecked power within the government, many fear a Guurti run amuck. As is common in Somali society, this is best summarized through the use of a proverb. As former Vice President Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah explains, ‘there are small camels and big camels. If you see the small camels here and then destroying this and this, it is nothing. But if you see the she camel, the big she camel doing the same thing that’s terrible’.[510] If problems arise with the responsible actor – the she camel – who is to guide the rest? Put differently, and using another proverb, who heals the doctor when the doctor is sick?[511]
Whilst heightened during the presidential election crisis, questions over the future of the Guurti reached a pinnacle in 2006, and it is this point that best exemplifies not only questions pertaining to the future of the clan in the government, but also the continuation of the statebuilding process in Somaliland. With the term of the House of Elders set to expire in October 2006 and with no officially recognized law filling a constitutional gap concerning the method through which to determine new membership, the position of the body in the government and its assumed powers came under scrutiny. A string of events leading to extreme contention within the government raised serious questions about the future of not only the house of elders, but also the developing government, and the future of the hybrid nature of the government became the center of debate. The issue to be addressed, therefore, is the future of the traditional authority in Somaliland’s democratizing government. The purpose of this chapter is to examine this firstly by explaining the incendiary point for this debate: law 19 and the Guurti’s extension of its own mandated term in office. Following this, three positions in the debate emanating from this crisis will be presented, leading to an examination of the question of the future for the Guurti and the hybridity of the Somaliland state. Finally, a conclusion on the evolving position of the traditional authority in the growing Somaliland government will be offered. The purpose here is not to demonstrate that all is lost in Somaliland, but rather to identify the current debates over the future of the Guurti and the clan in the government. It is to look at the process in Somaliland as just that: a process rather than a project. As the process continues and as the state, domestic expectations of the state and, indeed, the nation evolve, is the clan – such a vital actor at the state – still needed or desired?
Law 19 and the Controversial Self-Extension
As is common in the Somaliland constitution, provisions for flexibility and growth were included in many articles, including those pertaining to the upper house. When the framework needed to be translated into practice, however, problems and concerns arose. The ambiguous language of the Somaliland constitution has proven beneficial throughout the statebuilding process, providing the flexibility necessary for fostering and creating a state structure and practices that are well suited to the needs of the territory. As the state develops, however, these ambiguities are becoming evident and, in some instances, problematic for the state apparatus. The lack of clarity over determining the membership of the House of elders is one such instance.
The crisis over the Guurti can be traced to constitutional wording concerning determining the membership of the upper house. Actions by all branches of the Somaliland government in attempting to resolve this ambiguity created a constitutional crisis that opened debate on the hybrid nature of the government.[512] As article 58 of the Somaliland constitution stipulates:
- The members of the house of elders shall be elected in a manner to be determined by law.
- The period of office of the House of Elders is six (6) years beginning from the date of its first meeting.
Article 62 of the Somaliland constitution then reads:
[t]he inaugural meeting of the House of Elders shall take place within 30 (thirty) days of the date when their selection is completed.[513]
Ambiguity in language used in the clauses pertaining to whether the upper house is elected (doorasho) or selected (xulashadiisa) proved problematic in terms of procedures leading to the end of the term of the first constitutional Guurti. in addition, the phrase ‘to be determined by law’, whilst a common phrase within the Somaliland Constitution and a point of flexibility, mandates that clarification on specific procedures to take place, presumably before the end of the first Guurti’s term.[514] It is also important to note that no mention of popular elections is made in reference to the upper house, again falling under the auspices of the ‘to be determined by law’ provision. Whilst the SNM Guurti and the first civilian house of elders were selected, the vague and unclear constitutional wording raised the question of whether the house is to be ‘elected’ and therefore subject to democratization, or whether the constitutional wording mandates continued selection by the clans.
As explained in chapter 6, the house of elders has the power to extend the mandated terms of the elected government bodies. Whilst this power has proved valuable in the creation of the government, allowing for stability to be established before the first round of democratic elections as well as providing a constitutional safety net for the introduction of democratic practices, the power of extension is unclear when it comes to the mandate of the Guurti itself. Unlike for those branches of government specifically intended to be subject to democratic elections, the constitution does not specify what is to take place in the event that no law has been passed closing the gap concerning the procedure for determining the membership of the Guurti. With the end of the upper house’s term imminent, in May 2006 the Guurti extended its own mandate, sparking governmental infighting between the house of elders, House of Representatives, President and Supreme Court. The resulting struggles for and exertions of power threatened to bring the legislative process to a halt and deadlock the government. As a result, debate on the political implications of the Guurti’s self-extension and the body’s future placement within the government began. At the center of the debate over the self-extension are two actions: a disputed 2003 law; and a 2006 collaborative act by the President, the Supreme Court and the Guurti itself.
In 2003, the House of Representatives took a step towards closing the constitutional gap pertaining to determining the membership of the house of Elders by passing a bill that has come to be known as Law 19. In this law it was stated:
in case that the Guurti nomination cannot be held because of circumstances beyond control or because of technical problems, the president can propose to the House of Representatives for the House to review the justified proposal and to decide on an appropriate time frame required to overcome the obstacles.[515]
Originally part of a larger now-abandoned bill proposing procedures for the indirect election of the Guurti, law 19 was introduced as a separate piece of legislation and passed by the House of Representatives on 25 March 2003. After reportedly also being passed through the house of elders, the bill was supposedly signed by then President Dahir Rayale Kahin. law 19 grants the power of extension for the upper house to the house of representatives upon the request of the president, ensuring not only the continued integrity of the Guurti in a situation where an extension of its term was necessary, but also removing the possibility of the body indefinitely securing its position by unilaterally extending its own mandate. Placing this responsibility with the House of Representatives and the president created a legal check on the power of the Guurti and on the other branches of government; placing this power within two separate branches reduced the possibility of either the House of Representatives or the president co-opting the upper house. Law 19 effectively began the process of reigning in the potentially very powerful Guurti. However, in May 2006, as the expiration for the term of the Guurti drew near, the body extended its own mandate for an additional four years following a direct presidential request for the action.[516] The President’s proposal, drawn up following a pre-emptive consultation with the Supreme Court, identifies constitutional articles that loosely interpreted establish a constitutional basis for the self-extension. the justification derived from this interpretation was simple: means through which to determine the membership of the Guurti had not yet been established; the Guurti is the only body in the government with the constitutionally determined power to extend any term of office; therefore the Guurti could and should extend its own term in order to maintain the legal and practical integrity of the body.[517] Citing the recent democratizing moves made with the parliamentary and presidential elections, the president stemmed calls for the immediate election of the body by making the case for the extension rather than immediate elections. He maintained that firstly the uncertainty over whether the body would be elected or selected had yet to be resolved. Rayale also explained that an extension of the mandate was preferred over immediately re-determining the membership as the recent national elections for the president and the House of Representatives had caused voter fatigue. he continued in arguing that the territory did not have the resources or the logistical capabilities to stage another round of elections so soon after the September 2005 elections for the lower house. In addition, it was claimed, the lack of a national census and voter registration procedures would make electing the membership determined by clan representation rather than geographical location a logistical ‘nightmare’.[518] Therefore, the president proposed a four-year extension of the Guurti’s mandate in order to allow for the establishment of acceptable procedures for determining the future membership of the house. Rayale sought advice from the Supreme Court prior to the self-extension, thus compiling a constitutional argument for the action.[519] The court determined that the Guurti’s role maintained importance in Somaliland and therefore could not be compromised by insecurity surrounding its membership. The justices also deemed that because of internal and regional factors such as confrontation within the eastern provinces and the rise of the Union of Islamic courts in the south, as well as economic insecurity, Somaliland was in a ‘delicate situation [and they] don’t know when it [could] explode’.[520] Because of this, and because there was no constitutional provision for the extension of the Guurti’s mandate, it was concluded that the president had the power to ask the Guurti to extend its own mandate. As the leading justice on the court at the time stated, ‘[w]e give our advice constitutionally. As a constitutional court we have the right to arbitrate disputes. We gave the green light to the president to extend the term of the Guurti. That’s all we did’.[521]
The action taken by the president, however, was immediately met with extreme opposition from members of parliament, members of civil society, and even some clan elders themselves. This opposition was not directed as much at Rayale’s refutation of elections but rather focused on the manner in which this transpired and the disregarding of law 19. Indeed, the president and his administration, as well as many members of the Guurti, denied the existence of law 19, maintaining that the bill was never signed by the president and therefore has no legal foundation.[522] The Supreme Court went as far as stating that law 19, if it existed, would be unconstitutional as the court had determined that only the Guurti has the power to extend mandates.[523] The President consulting the Supreme Court before making this recommendation rather than allowing the court to make a post-facto interpretation has led many to believe that the president used the court to bypass law 19, effectively nullifying this legislation and subverting the democratically elected house. Many of those in opposition to Rayale’s actions speculated that by using the court to legally justify the Guurti’s self-extension, thereby securing the position of the membership for another four years, the president was co-opting the upper house in order to counter the actions of the newly elected and opposition-controlled House of Representatives. Some, such as Dr Aden Abokor, go as far as indicating that Rayale may have ‘scratched the back’ of the Guurti in order to ensure an extension of his own position following the end of his term of office in May 2008.[524] As predicted by Dr Abokor, in April 2008, citing security concerns, the Guurti extended the term of the president by one year. Subsequent postponements of the election followed until the elections were finally held in June 2010. What may have been a decision justifiably based on maintaining peace and security in the territory was not received as such, but rather was seen as manipulation of the upper house by the president as a means of securing the political positions of all involved. There had long been a fear in Somaliland that the Guurti had been corrupted into a political tool under the presidency of Egal. Following the self-extension crisis, this fear translated into vocal and public suspicions about the nature of the clan body in the government. Trust in the body that had derived from the traditional association and respect for the elders and their work, and the stabilizing legitimacy stemming from that was significantly undermined by this crisis. For many, the Guurti was no longer the traditional mechanism of government incorporated into the modern government, but instead was a powerful body comprised of self-interested politicians that could easily be bought.
Whilst some viewed the self-extension crisis as indicative of inevitable problems with the inclusion of the clan in the Somaliland government, others perceived a structural deficiency that had the potential to destabilize the new state. Still others viewed no problem, instead claiming that Somaliland was simply experiencing growing pains. Whilst there are strong claims on all sides, the root of this debate can be identified not as the Guurti’s self-extension and the president’s actions, but rather the position and functions of the traditional authority in the hybrid state. The self-extension crisis tested the strength of the Somaliland government and raised concerns about the current balance between traditional Somali governance structures and modern democratic government. It is interesting to note that at the time of writing, the legal issues at the root of the crisis have yet to be resolved, and the composition and constitutional mandates for the clan body remain the same. however, that does not mean that the role or importance of the clan body in the central government has remained static; the self-extension crisis had a significant impact on not only the legitimacy of and given by the body, but also the balance between the old and the new in the government. Reconciling the new with the old in Somaliland was beneficial to the early stages of the statebuilding process, especially in establishing the foundations for the state and in introducing the externally-valued democratic component of the government, but what to do with the old when the new takes root? The proceeding section will address this, identifying problems arising from the changing power relationships within the hybrid government.
The President vs. The House vs. The House vs. The Supreme Court
One of the key concerns highlighted by the self-extension crisis is the changing power relationship resulting from the parliamentary elections. Whereas the membership of the pre-election house of representatives had been nominated by the clans and approved by the president, the 2005 elections significantly altered the influence the president had over the membership of the lower house. This alteration, coupled with the change in party composition within the house, thereby transformed the relationship between the president and parliament. With the opposition parties winning the majority of seats in the lower house, for the first time in its brief history the Somaliland government in its entirety was not controlled by Egal’s party (UDUB). Although meant to be apolitical, it is widely acknowledged that the majority of the members of the upper house have long belonged to the UDUB party, which was not a serious or outward concern whilst UDUB held a majority throughout the government. With the lower house being controlled by the opposition parties, however, the politically neutral stance of the upper house was called into question and the legislative division between the political parties unsurprisingly brought with it new problems.
The official reasoning for the Guurti’s self-extension was it was necessary for the stability of Somaliland and the government. However, there was much speculation within Somaliland’s civil society that the president feared for the safety of his own political position and thus seized upon the impending expiration of the term of the house of elders as a means through which to balance his own power against that of the newly elected House of Representatives. Much of the debate surrounding this action centered on this speculation. as the end of the Guurti’s mandate approached the lower house prepared to build upon the legal guidelines established by the disputed law 19 by proposing a bill that would establish popular elections for the upper house, thereby making a statement of intent that potentially posed a threat to Rayale’s future in the government.[525] The Guurti had developed a close working relationship with Egal during Somaliland’s early years; both had been integral actors in the early statebuilding and Egal has capitalized on the power and influence that the Guurti had offered. As a member of Egal’s UDUB party, Rayale enjoyed many benefits of that close relationship. In proposing to potentially open the body to control by the opposition parties, the president’s position could be threatened if another close election like the one in 2003 were to take place. In addition to this, with a fully elected parliament and increased democratic accountability, the power of the presidency would be severely checked. Thus, the speculation emerged that by maintaining an appointed House of Elders the president was able to promise job security for the current membership as a way to maintain executive influence and power within the parliament; influence and power that could be significantly lessened with an elected body. In denying the existence of law 19 and bypassing the lower house in the extension of the Guurti’s mandate, the president could ensure his continued influence. In return, the members of the House of Elders would be guaranteed an extension of their own positions. This alleged patronage would allow for the president to balance the power of an elected and very vocal opposition-led House of Representatives, a body which has shown its intent to act as a severe check on the otherwise unimpeded powers of the presidency. Backed by the Supreme Court, which was already known to be non-independent, this move gave the Somaliland executive immense power. Interestingly, if something similar had happened whilst Egal was president it likely would not have attracted the same level of negative attention. However, the Somaliland state had grown and developed significantly since the time of Egal. An Egal-style presidency, one characterized by significant political latitude, was no longer possible, and the self-extension crisis made that very apparent.
Regardless of the actual reasoning behind the action, however, in extending the Guurti’s mandate the president and the Guurti have not only alienated the House of Representatives, but have also unintentionally empowered the body. In what is seen as an indicator of the commitment being made to the process of democratization, the House of Representatives refused to step aside for what was widely perceived to be corruption on the part of the president and the ruling party and instead made their displeasure known both verbally and in action. Immediately following the Guurti’s self-extension, the House of Representatives refused to address bills proposed by the president or the Guurti, arguing that the legislative process had been compromised by the actions of the executive, the court and the upper house. In turn, the Guurti and the President also refused to compromise on legislation coming from the House of Representatives, effectively bringing the legislative process to a standstill. Although this initially appeared as a major obstacle and destabilizing incident, negotiations to resolve the impasse soon began. Although the public representation of the crisis is centered on the self-extension, the crux of the resulting debate over the house of elders is not the inclusion of the clan or even the extension of the Guurti’s mandate but rather the placement and functions of the institution within the evolving government. As a result, the balance in the relationships in government, particularly between the traditional and the modern, are being re-examined and reconsidered by the government and other political and civil society elites in the territory in order to determine the best way forward for Somaliland.
Lines Drawn in the Sand
The Guurti’s self-extension and the ensuing stalemate created a crisis in the government which many feared would derail the successes in Somaliland’s continuing statebuilding process. The crisis also put the neutrality and reputation of the Guurti in ‘disrepute’, thereby damaging the tradition-based mediating role of the house.[526] Although the seemingly related dispute emanating from the later extension of the president’s mandate was resolved and elections were held, the future for determining the membership of the Guurti remains uncertain.[527] The self-extension set a precedent granting immeasurable power both to the executive as well as the upper house of parliament, but conversely it also created an opportunity in which discussion over the future nature and composition of the government could take place. The circumstances surrounding the extension of the Guurti’s mandate sparked open debate on how to determine the membership of the upper house, but more fundamentally it introduced discussion on the place of traditional authority and the relationship between old and new in Somaliland’s growing and evolving government.
Whilst the crisis resulting from the self-extension of the Guurti is just one of many obstacles facing Somaliland’s government, it was the first significant test of the marriage between traditional Somali governance and modern democratic government. The stable hybridity of the Somaliland government approached a crossroads with the self-extension of the Guurti: the governance system evolving with the introduction of democratic practices could either successfully overcome this obstacle or it could grind to a halt, thereby raising doubts about the future of the government. The self-extension was a divisive as well as decisive moment. If the changing power relationship instigated by the 2005 parliamentary elections kindled a situation in which checks and balances within the government were functionally nullified, what was the purpose of continuing with the project of democracy? More fundamentally, with a perceived link within the government and in society between democracy and recognition, what would be the purpose of continuing with the process of self-led statebuilding? With accusations rampant between the various branches of government, the possibility of a breakdown in the growing state in Somaliland became a threat. With the governmental body specifically tasked with reconciliation between branches of government firmly entrenched in the middle of the crisis, the question being asked was, what is the future for Somaliland’s continuing project of creating a state?
In September 2006, and in reaction to the self-extension crisis, the House of Representatives pushed through legislation establishing electoral law for the Guurti. [528] Although the legislation was quickly defeated by the upper house, it was the first concrete attempt at formally and legally altering the nature of the House of elders from a traditional body to a modern political and democratically elected one. This attempted change was highly significant for the territory. The formation of the government in Somaliland was built on the recognition that incorporating the clan was necessary as modern democracy could not be introduced or succeed without mediation between traditional Somali governance structures and modern political parties and democratic government. The creation and inclusion of the Guurti was the agent of this, even if the reconciling role undertaken by the body was more symbolic than functional. By formally transforming this traditional body into an elected body invariably open to party politics, the nature of the body would also change, effectively disconnecting the previously essential traditional element of the government. Within Somaliland debate over this issue is on-going. Opinion is divided as to whether or not the government, or the people, are ready to remove the traditional body, and therefore the symbolic clan association, from the institutions of the state. Within the government and amongst political and civic leaders, three sides to the debate maintain three different yet significant contributions on the future of the hybrid Somaliland government. there are those who believe that the formal inclusion of the clan elders as elders must remain a vital component in the Somaliland government; those who believe that the inclusion of the traditional is retarding the modernization process undertaken with the introduction of democratic practices; and those who bridge the divide in advocating that although the role of the elders will change in time, the territory is not yet ready to lose the stabilizing impact of the traditional body.[529] For all three sides, the method through which the membership of the upper house is chosen, and the impact of those methods on the balance within government and between government and society, is the center of discussion. For that reason, discussion here must address these three positions on determining the membership of the upper house in order to offer analysis on the evolving relationship between the old and the new in Somaliland’s government and statebuilding process. Whilst the membership in these ‘camps’ is not static and exclusive, each is dominated by a sector of the elites guiding and driving the statebuilding process in Somaliland.
Maintaining the Status Quo
The first of the positions within the debate is best described as the ‘UDUB camp’ as it is primarily composed of most of the Guurti membership and leading UDUB party members, including members of previous administrations, the supreme Court, and UDUB members in the House of Representatives. Identified by many as the instigators of the crisis because of the actions that enabled the self-extension, this side of the debate argues that the Guurti continues to be a ‘necessary and vital pillar’ that cannot be left out of the government.[530] This belief is furthered by Guurti member Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’, who claims that the members of the elected House of Representatives may know democracy they ‘learned elsewhere’, but they are ‘still young and do not know what [they] are doing’.[531] Because of the continued importance of the clan in maintaining stability, the Guurti remains a vital component in ensuring that the democracy known by the members of the lower house matches the needs of Somaliland. there is also a firm belief within this camp that the Guurti will be necessary until Somaliland is recognized by the international community, as the Guurti is filling the gap of recognition by ensuring there is peace in the territory as well as ensuring that there is more guiding the state than the young men in the house of representatives, many of whom are Diaspora returnees and did not take part in the early stages of statebuilding.[532] In its many roles the Guurti often acted as a court of last resort, ensuring that stability in the territory and the government was maintained and that the statebuilding project was not derailed.[533] As such, the Guurti has been necessary to alleviate tension within society as well as within the balance between the modern and the traditional, a role that those in this camp maintain is still necessary. this argument is summarized best by former foreign minister Abdullahi Duale who recognizes that in the statebuilding process ‘there are sometimes gray areas’, and the Guurti helps prevent serious mistakes that Duale claims ‘we can ill-afford’. In its numerous roles the upper house has acted as a Somaliland ‘think tank’, providing much needed guidance and advice when a ‘win-win situation’ is needed.[534] in other words, the Guurti acts as the ‘head of them [all]’ in order to temper the potential repercussions of marrying the old and the new and the internal and the external.[535] Because of this, this camp maintains, the manner of the clan inclusion in the government must not be altered. Those holding this position in the debate view the Guurti not as a problematic traditional institution, but as an essential pillar of the government.
This position also maintains that the house of elders is primarily a legislative body. Despite this, however, the leaders of the Guurti project self-importance, stating that the clan-based institution continues to act as a bridge and is thus the enabling factor for stability and democracy to succeed in the territory. In essence, the members of the house often perceive of themselves as the ‘effective link between all parties, all people’ that is necessary for the continuation of the government.[536] This placement as both a part of and at the same time external to the legislature not only reflects the Guurti’s internal-external capacity, but also contributes to a sweeping confusion concerning the present and future role of the body. This ill-defined dual-faceted nature of the upper house, both internal-external and legislative-reconciliatory (quasi-judicial), creates an uneasy functional relationship between the roles within the house. With the legislative role viewed as a more secure position for the future, the membership portrays this as the primary function of the body. at the same time, however, the Guurti and the rest of the UDUB camp argue against electing the members of the upper house, stating that the body must maintain its clan base in order to remain distinct from and, more importantly, elevated above the lower house and party politics. This position claims that introducing elections to the upper house would forever eradicate the function of traditional structures in the government, which is something they argue Somaliland simply cannot do.[537] as such, as this position upholds, any changes in the nature or functions of the body that have taken place are predominantly rhetorical and maintaining the status quo in regards to the Guurti is the optimal option for continued stability in the government.
Elect the Guurti
The second position in the debate is situated at the other end of the spectrum and is propelled by members of the Kulmiye and UCID parties, particularly those members in the House of Representatives. Within this strand of the argument there is a strong push for a more modern Somaliland government. Many feel that by maintaining even the notion of the traditional in the government democracy’s potential can never be fulfilled. The unelected legislative body is seen as a hindrance to the democratic ideal and is therefore preventing Somaliland from becoming a successful and acceptable modern state. As MP Abdirahman Osman Alin Shirwac notes, ‘[Somaliland] cannot change society, modernize society in the future with the institution of the traditional holding it back. We are stuck in one place and that is very dangerous’.[538] The belief that society and the government must modernize in order for Somaliland to be a state capable of earning international recognition is commonly expressed by those positioning themselves within this camp.
Those maintaining this position widely believe that modernization will take place primarily through democratization, and thus the once integral inclusion of the traditional is no longer needed and could become a destabilizing factor. This is best summarized by MP Ibrahim Jama Ali ‘Reyte’:
[p]eople go on about the hybrid state, that the state should be indigenous. It should be based on local cultures, peculiarities, etc. Every state should reflect that. It should be decided from within and designed to serve the interests of society. But the state needs to be controlled by the people. The only way to do this is through democratization … The state is not hybrid, it is natural. We have finally settled on one form. We should stick to it. Somaliland cannot invent something new. None of this hybrid nonsense.[539]
As indicated by the attempts at mandating popular elections for the upper house, the lower house has pushed for democratization of the Somaliland government to also include the Guurti. The argument presented as justification for this is a lengthy one. It is maintained that the self-extension of the Guurti is indicative of the increasing politicization of the upper house, as well as fears that the house of elders could be dangerously co-opted by a branch of government to balance against another. because of this, as long as the upper house continues to exercise legislative powers that can check, and in some instances halt, the actions of the elected lower house or to advise the president, the unelected Guurti is an obstacle to successful modern democratic government in the territory. Those within this camp maintain that a bicameral parliament continues to be important, but not with its current unelected and ‘easily manipulated’ body.[540]As the Speaker of the House of Representatives remarks, ‘[it is] only UDUB in the House of Elders. They are unelected … There is no fair debate’.[541] In addition, and reminiscent of the World Bank report by Hashi, within this camp it is argued that in maintaining the high position of the clan in the political system the Guurti is holding the territory back, preventing modernization and leaving an opening for clan confrontation to re-emerge within the government. Therefore, according to this position, the current form of the Guurti is posing a threat to the future stability and success of the government.[542]
Whilst distrust of the close ties with the UDUB party heavily factors into this position, attitudes of superiority based on education within this group are also important. The requirements for membership of the upper house do not contain educational qualifications aside from knowledge of religion and culture. Constitutionally, members of the lower house must have at least a secondary education. In practice, many members of the lower house are diaspora returnees and were therefore many were educated in Europe. Many also come from professions such as medicine, education and law. Summarized in an analogy provided by Bashe Mohammed Farah, having an uneducated legislative body with veto power is akin to having a five-year old proofreading a piece of academic writing. Many within the lower house find it insulting that the ‘old men’ have a powerful veto over the more educated and ‘democratically experienced’ lower house’s legislative endeavors. Farah continues with the argument in maintaining that if the system of checks and balances in the government is to be effective, the membership of both houses needs to be equally qualified and knowledgeable to ensure that the parliament is in a better position to balance the powerful executive.[543] Whilst some members of the lower house find it troublesome or even insulting that their knowledge and experience can be overridden by the elders, it is within the latter part of that argument where the primary concern of many of those maintaining this position lies. Many believe the membership of the Guurti to be ‘uneducated old men’ who are ‘not capable of reading and writing’.[544] Because of this an element of insecurity exists for those within the House of Elders; in the small Somaliland economy there is shrinking opportunity, particularly for those with little or no education. As such, it is claimed that the men in the upper house can be easily ‘bought’ in exchange for job security. As Ali Farah relates, Egal granted the upper house ‘unnecessary legislative power to secure his position’, and that since then the members of the Guurti have been nothing more than people who serve the president in order to secure their own positions.[545] According to this stance, this mutually beneficial relationship for the president and the elders thus undermines the system of checks and balances and threatens the progression of democratization within Somaliland, regardless of the political affiliation of the president.
Unease over the ability of the president to co-opt the house of elders has led many to express concerns over the unelected status of the house of elders. The firmly held belief is the constitution stipulates that parliament is elected and therefore the government cannot fulfil its democratic promise unless both houses are elected.[546] As Reyte conveys, the identified problem is not with the institution itself, but the people in it and how they have come to hold their positions: ‘[I]t is not a guurti, it is a House of Parliament, it is legislative … How can we call it legitimate with one person nominating someone and that person becomes a legislator?’[547] The fear within this side of the debate is that if this open door for increased executive power is not closed, and if the body remains unelected, the government ‘will develop into a monster that [Somaliland] cannot remedy’.[548] Although within this strand there is dissatisfaction with the current position of the Guurti, the aim is not to abolish the house of elders but rather to alter it. Those proposing change feel that the traditional body that was instrumental in bringing and maintaining peace and security in the territory has outlived its purpose in the now stable territory; it is time to move beyond the clan and replace the redundant old with the new democratic ideals. Therefore, two possible futures for the Guurti have been proposed: to be an elected body, thereby eliminating the old form of Somali governance; or to be an appointed tradition-based body with no legislative powers. Here a unicameral legislature is preferable to a bicameral body that is not fully elected by the people. For this camp, if the Guurti is to remain unelected its political and legislative capacity must be removed.
Modify in the Future
The third and final position, held primarily by political and social actors external to the government, contains components of both arguments already presented. Removed from the political infighting and positioning taking place in the government, this group presents what is perhaps the least personally motivated assessment. Within this position it is recognized that the current structure of the government is not perfect, particularly in regards to constitutional functions and ambiguities for the president and the Guurti. They recognize that the flexibility of the constitution was initially beneficial, but that fissures that are now becoming apparent can be destabilizing as evidenced by the self-extension crisis. However, this position maintains that these obstacles and potential crises are merely growing pains that must be and will be addressed and resolved. It is acknowledged that in the future the nature and functions of government institutions may change, but it is also recognized that this is part of the statebuilding process. As a result, this side of the debate asserts a more wait-and-see approach: change is inevitable, but change must come through the traditional practices of negotiation, compromise and consensus rather than as the result of quick-fix solutions. This wait-and-see approach does not, however, exclude discussion on the future of the state.
It is maintained that the traditional house is still necessary for the stability of the government and the security of the territory, but that a new balance must be found between the old and the new as democratic practices become more familiar to the government and the people. Mohammed said gees summarizes a belief held by many in stating that as the government gets stronger the Guurti is marginalized as it is no longer the crutch on which Somaliland rests. because the Guurti does not ‘speak the language of democracy that is at the national level’ the fear is that the house will independently begin to seek a new role for itself as a means of strengthening its position, thereby creating the possibility for manipulation by powerful actors. As democratization takes Somaliland into the next phase of the statebuilding process, a new role for the Guurti must be agreed upon by the government and the people so that the body can correspond with the evolving state. Gees offers the epitome of this position: ‘I am not a fan of the Guurti, but I feel they are useful for Somaliland at present. They are doing a good job. But on the other hand, it [creating a state] is a process’.[549] Whilst not proposing the removal of the Guurti from the government, this statement reflects the recognition that the body’s position in the government will change and the influence of the elders will diminish as the state continues to grow. Whilst change in the future is foreseen, what shape that will take is uncertain.
What is believed, though, is that the Guurti alone cannot shape its future. Alterations in the executive and lower house were constitutionally mandated through the introduction of democratic elections. Whilst the modern was expected to grow and evolve, a reactionary change in the traditional was not accounted for. As Bobe Duale Yusuf offers:
[A]s times have changed, no one has revised the role of the Guurti. From time to time we must re-examine their role. We must ask how can we use the Guurti in the democratization process? What type of Guurti is suited to the democratization process? … The Guurti is not living on an island. They are living within society. As society transforms, the Guurti transforms.[550]
At the same time, however, this position maintains that the time has not yet come for large-scale modification of the body’s position and function within the government. Rather, Somaliland must finish the reconciliation process, particularly concerning the eastern provinces of Sanaag and Sool, and until it does so it continues to need a ‘watchdog’ to be ‘looking upon the performance of the government … the Guurti is needed to oversee all this’.[551] This presents a precarious position within which the body must continue to operate; the centrality of the Guurti in the self-extension crisis rendered it incapable of effectively carrying out its oversight or mediation roles and severely damaged its ability to carry out those roles in the future. Therefore, without resolving the crisis regarding determining the membership of the body the upper house and, importantly, its various roles remain in a state of uncertainty. Consequently, according to this position, the future of the Guurti must be carefully negotiated as it is essential to balance the need for change with the need for a continuation of the tradition-associated mediating and reconciling roles in the ongoing building of the Somaliland state.
Although this position maintains that Somaliland is not yet ready to make any drastic changes to the composition or structure of the government, particularly in terms of severing the link between the old and the new, they also uphold that the upper house cannot remain an unelected legislative body indefinitely. As the democratization process continues, the Guurti will be forced to change. Many believe that the future of the Guurti is as a purely legislative body, meaning that elections will take place and the association with the traditional will eventually be removed. Even so, it is believed that electing the Guurti at the end of their original term would have been disastrous. Firstly, it is generally agreed that the territory would not have been ready for another national election, either financially or logistically, and therefore an extension of the house’s mandate was preferable to immediate elections.[552] Secondly, many assert that the ‘new’ in Somaliland is not yet established enough to function as the democracy envisioned by those pushing for a more modern government. It is feared that without the mediating old, the new will not be able to maintain the stability necessary for the continued development of the government. As such, the presence of the old in the government is still needed as a point of reference and reassurance to maintain stability whilst the modern component of the state strengthens. Thus, although the role of the Guurti will inevitably change, according to this camp, Somaliland is not yet strong enough to relinquish its link to the traditional.
in relation to the self-extension crisis, criticism from much of Somaliland’s civil society is similar to that of the opposition members of the lower house: it centers not on the extension of the house’s term, but rather on the manner in which this extension was carried out as well as the role the body is playing in the current government. There is a strong desire to protect the house of elders as it is ‘an innovation, an invention, a Somaliland product’.[553] It is argued that as long as the clan remains the basis of Somali life, a representation of that must be included in the government. There is also a strong aversion to creating two similar elected houses of parliament, a consideration that is at odds with the proposition to make the upper house a purely legislative and political body. As Hassan Issa states:
The second chamber should not be the same as the first. They must be different for checks and balances. The second is needed to soften edges, to ameliorate the imperfections of the first. It is needed to soften the dictatorship of the majority.[554]
According to this position, the best option for Somaliland, therefore, is to ensure that the Guurti remains distinctive in its traditional association whilst at the same time finding a way for the body to evolve as the state modernizes. The need for a new role for the house is apparent. However, finding a way to maintain the traditional whilst at the same time responding to the demands of modernization will pose unique problems for Somaliland; problems which are not unanticipated by those within this side of the debate. Even though how this balance is achieved is as of yet uncertain, for this side of the debate the solution to these problems and uncertainties can and must be found through traditional Somali politics: negotiation and compromise to resolve and move beyond the impasse. Without a resolution achieved through consensus, these issues can never fully be resolved.
Beyond the Crossroads?
Throughout the self-extension crisis, the Guurti continued to function as a mediation and consensus-seeking body, both at the local level and at the national level. Within the crisis, the traditional and symbolic practices of the clan in the central government have continued despite the damaged position of the Guurti, raising questions about the possibility of removing the formal clan body without removing clan governance, or the desirability of that. Although the responses to the Guurti’s self-extension varied, the identification of one key realization is consistent throughout: obstacles stemming from the hybrid nature of the government will be encountered during the continued growth and evolution of the state. It is also consistently recognized that addressing and resolving these obstacles and crises that stem from them is a stage of the statebuilding process and part of creating a state that continues to work for Somaliland. As such, the parties involved in the debate have identified several specific concerns to be addressed. Amongst the highlighted issues are those relating to democratic selection and balancing relationships and power in the government.
The self-extension of the Guurti was viewed by many as an attack on the modern democratic component of the government; overpowering and bypassing the house of representatives made the democratically elected lower house appear to be powerless and therefore meaningless. In addition, manipulating constitutional ambiguity threatened the ability of the document to act as a framework or guide for the government and led some to question parliament’s ability to check and therefore constrain the executive. Outsider observation, however, largely viewed the crisis as one of many obstacles to overcome in the statebuilding, nation-building and democratization processes. The crossroads reached in Somaliland meant that the project of introducing democracy either could have been ended with the president’s assertion of power, or the process could be strengthened by the recognition of problems to overcome. Ongoing negotiations to address and resolve the problem indicate the latter.
The crisis emanating from the Guurti’s self-extension highlights a core issue for Somaliland’s government: namely, what happens when the traditionally-based body cannot function in a way that it was originally meant to. Many claim that the disagreement and subsequent distrust between the House of Representatives and the house of elders was orchestrated by then president Rayale as a means through which he could ensure his own political position. However, this accusation remains just that: an accusation. Whether his concern for the stability of the country or his own position was the rationale behind the actions leading to the legislative impasse is uncertain. Regardless of the reasoning, however, the parties’ insistence on these accusations only serves to mask the underlying issue of the evolving position of clan governance in a government that is increasingly becoming ‘newer’. With the upper house in a position that compromises its capacity to mediate and reconcile within the government, two key functions in the continuing stability of the government, concerns over this underlying issue intensify. With its impartiality in doubt, the Guurti’s tradition-based role has been undermined. With the encroachment of the new into the realm of the old, and with the traditional body becoming subject to both beneficial and destructive political practices and influences, the future role for the old and the hybrid are uncertain.
The crossroads reached has raised many important concerns, especially how long is the current state of the once vital hybrid construction beneficially viable to the government and territory? the deepening division is not only one created by actions leading up to the self-extension, but is also indicative of the tension between the old and new: the old Somali clan governance system and the new Western style of democracy introduced by the SNM and furthered largely by returning members of the diaspora. These tensions may have been brought forth by the self-extension, but they have precipitated debate over the future of the house of elders and, more fundamentally, the placement of the traditional in the democratic government. The basis of stability in the formation of the Somaliland state was the inclusion of both traditional structures of governance and modern democratic institutions and practices. However, the basis for the stability necessary to create the state could also be the basis for instability if the relationship between the traditional and modern becomes unbalanced.
Certainly, this debate narrows to the central focus of the integration of both the clans and modern practices and institutions in the government structure. If the clan inclusion continues as it is currently, one set of considerations must be addressed; and if the upper house is altered in the name of modernization another set stemming from the further politicization of the traditional body will have to be resolved. Despite the polarity of the arguments, one conclusion is consistent: the role of the upper house of parliament will change. Whether the body becomes a predominately legislative one upon the phasing out of the selected clan-based membership or whether it loses its legislative powers is yet to be seen. Although many argue that in order for Somaliland to become the ideal democratic state the clan should not have the position that it holds today, it is unlikely that it will disappear entirely within the government; even a lasting symbolic association with the clan would preserve its place and, arguably, be necessary. Resolving the disagreement over the Guurti, however, will inevitably alter the nature of the body and will set the stage for the future role of the traditional authority. Even if only through establishing new rules for membership selection procedures, change is certain for the upper house of parliament.
Conclusions
There is no doubt that the Guurti’s self-extension heightened awareness of obstacles encountered in the continuing process of statebuilding in Somaliland. Political infighting, constitutional weakness and tensions between the old way of governing and the new democratic system, as well as between domestic necessities and external pressures, are all testing the Somaliland people and the hybrid government. With the role of the body charged with mediating conflicts and ameliorating difficulties being called into question, these tests have become much more acute. The Guurti has served as a mediating factor not only for the government institutions and other conflicting parties in the territory, but also for statebuilding process as a whole. The institutionalization of the traditional has served to act as a link, albeit largely symbolically, between traditional Somali politics and the new democratic system of governing. Most people interviewed agree that the Guurti was the key to the success of forming a government, maintaining peace and introducing democracy in Somaliland. The obstacle to address now, however, is maintaining the link to the traditional and its stabilizing influence during and after the continuing democratization of the government. The Guurti was created as an apolitical body whose membership was composed of the men who strived to create peace and stability in the territory and the nascent government. Today’s Guurti, however, is evidence of the increasingly political alterations of the body stemming from its position and power within the government. The self-extension appeared to many to be an action that is vastly different from the appearance of unselfish, community-serving men that the comprised the 1991 Guurti.[555] As part of the machinery of the state, the Guurti has become politicized, whether intentionally or not, and therefore the originally intended composition of the government has been altered: the Guurti has become more dictated to by the political process than originally intended. This alteration itself has raised significant questions for the future role of the body.
One consistent realization in the debates surrounding the Guurti is the need for continued negotiation and re-negotiation between the old and the new – the internal and the external – in the Somaliland government. The hybridity of the government reflects Somaliland’s complex social, political and economic circumstances and the centrality of the clan system, as well as reflecting desires for more economic and political engagement with the international community. This facilitates the success of not only maintaining a balance between society and government, but also a balance between the externally desired modern democratic statehood and the domestically valued clan traditions and governance structures. What is now being called into question is not the success of this creation, but rather its future as the old guard is being questioned by the new. Because of both increasing opportunity and a return of Somalilanders from the diaspora, the number of new elites in Somaliland is growing and the constant tension between the old and new ways of doing things is becoming apparent. As the new members of this group push to realize the idealized modern democratic statehood, however, the danger is that they will push too far, thereby unbalancing the negotiation between the Western and the Somali. On the other hand, if nothing changes the democratic project, and with that the stability of the state and hopes for recognition, will undoubtedly be threatened. With this comes the possibility that the stabilizing distinctiveness of the Somaliland government that has proven to be successful thus far will become a destabilizing point of contention. For the institution that was included in the government in part to help bring about the dream of acceptable modern statehood, little consideration was given for if the dream started to become reality. Therefore, with growth comes the realization for the need to re-negotiate the hybrid nature of the government in order to restore the reconciliation and the balance. The changing juxtaposition of these two governing structures is best viewed as a continuation of the negotiation of the state and a rebalancing of the demands: what was needed at the beginning of the process might not be a component that survives the process in its original form.
Regardless of the problems or obstacles encountered in the continuing statebuilding process in Somaliland, one thing is important to highlight and to bear in mind: the people of Somaliland and their political leaders continue to recognize the need for growth and change and, more importantly, they are addressing these in their own way. Indeed, the hybridization here is more than just the institutionalization of the Guurti; amongst other things it is also evidenced in the reliance on traditional practices of negotiation and consensus. The hybrid nature is the utilization, integration and dependence on traditional practices in addition to the institution. It is part of the foundations of the state and part of the statebuilding process itself. The institutionalization makes it a formal inclusion, but in both practical and symbolic capacities the hybrid goes much deeper. In many ways, the practices of the traditional guurti underpin the statebuilding practice, even in areas where clan elders are not involved or where the central Guurti has been compromised. Statebuilding in Somaliland originally took place through a series of formally held shir, and it continues through informal shir-like negotiations when obstacles arise or when problems loom. As Deputy Speaker of the House of representatives Bashe Mohammed Farah, a proponent of modernizing the Guurti, confidently asserts, the key to continued stability is ‘go[ing] back to traditions. We will solve problems by the traditional way. And we must and we will have the patience to wait’.[556] In Somaliland, the state has, and continues to be, negotiated rather than imposed.
It is impossible to ascertain whether or not Somaliland would have witnessed the stability it has if it had followed a statebuilding blueprint established or imposed by international actors. If the lack of progress in southern Somalia is any indication, though, the road could have been much bumpier if Somaliland would have been engaged in an internationally led project. It is often easy to forget that Somaliland has created as state virtually on its own, yet the isolation of the territory has been a benefit to what has been created. The scarcity of international involvement in Somaliland’s state formation has allowed for the process to reflect Somaliland society and to respond to issues best handled by those who understand Somaliland society and Somali political and societal relations. The emerging state in Somaliland reflects the needs and the desires of the population, and it reflects the political processes of society. The quest for recognition and the desire to be ‘Somaliland’ is a strong component of nation-building in the territory and undoubtedly contributes to the success of the statebuilding process. However, part of the narrative within Somaliland is that without the institutions of state, the dream of recognition cannot be realized; the statebuilding process and the nation-building process are mutually constitutive. The institutions in Somaliland, both tangible bodies and institutions of practice, are not institutions ‘from a box’: they do not come from a template but rather reflect the state that is being built. They reflect the intersection of politics and the population, and they reflect the underlying social structures that shape and determine the relationship between the people and the state. The legitimacy gap indicative of many statebuilding projects is narrow in Somaliland: Society is embedded in the state and the project, and the state is embedded in society.
As needs, desires and demands of society change, as the relationship between the political processes and society changes, and as political culture changes, the state and institutions reflecting those will change. The flexibility to adapt and make those changes is a strength of the Somaliland statebuilding process; a characteristic that is often absent from externally-led statebuilding projects. Even though the growth of the Somaliland state has brought with it delayed concerns, the inclusion of the traditional authority in the government was indeed a benefit to the process from the beginning as it allowed for the foundations on which to build a state. There may still be kinks in the system, and obstacles will continue to appear, but the statebuilding process in Somaliland is ongoing. The debate over the role of the clan is evidence of that. In being a Somaliland project, though, future adjustments to the government are likely to reflect what is desired and needed in Somaliland at that time. The key to future success, therefore, is to continue to negotiate, to continue to compromise, and to continue the process of creating a Somaliland state the Somaliland way.
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