Chapter 5
The emergence of the new state
The extreme militarization of society and the collapse of Somalia’s central government have garnered much attention in contemporary literature, particularly within those works concerned with failed states. Somalia is often regarded as the archetypal case of state failure, as since 1991 no lasting or legitimately accepted government has existed to organize and run what are considered to be normal state affairs. Even though Somalia lacks a central government, the state does not persist in anarchy as pockets of governance have emerged from the clan system, religious movements and even the militarized movements to provide public and political goods within and throughout Somalia.
By the time of the 1991 collapse and failure of the state, a significant change in Somali society was the channels through which the clans interacted. Competition over political and economic resources determined interactions, just as they had done in the pre-colonial era when grazing and water resources were the point of contention. With insertion into the international system of states and with a highly militarized society, though, the methods and objectives of these contests, and the role of the clan within them, had changed. Once primarily an agent of societal stability and governance maintained through negotiated co-existence and appeasement, in post-1991 Somalia many of the clans in the south became associated with the existence of warlords who had played on clan divisions for their own rise, even though the warlords were not necessarily a component of the clan. In parts of Somalia, particularly in the south-central regions where the clan system had been most disrupted through the previous eras of rule, the warlords and subsequent militarized movements became the substitute for the state. In other areas, particularly Somaliland, Puntland and northern regions in southern Somalia, however, the clan system remained more intact and therefore maintained more of a position of power within society. Within and below the large-scale struggles for power in Somalia, the traditional clan system provide Somali society with traditional forms of governance in a ‘stateless’ state.[303]In spite of attempts at or success in disrupting clan control, outside of the central political realm Somalis throughout most of the country continued to turn to their clans for survival and protection when life got tough. Menkhaus identifies a ‘radical localization’ of the political landscape within Somalia, with collective security ensured through local structures such as the clan as well as through shari’a courts in neighborhoods and villages, and even through locally created and supported police forces.[304] In the economic sector, the ‘wide-ranging kinship system that facilitates personal contacts and strategic relationships’ helped establish a ‘second economy’ within Somalia.[305] Grassroots developmental projects in large cities such as Hargeisa and Borama, largely funded by clan-associated remittance money from members of the Somali diaspora, provide development of physical infrastructure as well as social services such as health care and education within those northern cities.[306] In many areas of Somalia, including areas where violent contestation between both intra-Somali parties as well as between external actors and Somali parties continues to be violent and destructive, the clan system has filled the vacancy left by the absence of government and uncontested political and social control. In most instances these are isolated pockets of governance. However, clan governance does play a large role in larger organized governments as well.
Just as the political situation in Somalia and Somaliland cannot be understood without first understanding the social and political forces that shaped it, neither can the statebuilding process in Somaliland be understood without first examining the circumstances surrounding the declaration of independence forces surrounding and underpinning the creation of the new state. States and territories do not simply break-up often, and lasting claims of independence are rare. The creation of a new, and especially stable or peaceful, state is even rarer. This chapter focuses on the period of Somaliland’s declaration of independence during a time of collapse in Somalia, the foundations for the institutional state and the initial stages of institutional statebuilding. Central to this process was bringing together the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ mechanisms of governance – balancing the internal and external demands – within the emerging government. Doing this, however, resulted not only in the establishing of institutions, but also a locally owned state. Whilst this chapter focuses on the institutional component of statebuilding, the following chapter has a specific focus on the clan as a stabilizing and facilitating actor in the legitimizing of the state during the statebuilding, and indeed nation-building or identity-building, process. The role of clans in Somaliland is central to understanding the development of the state in Somaliland.
The Rise of the Somali National Movement and the Fall of Siyad Barre
in response to the increasing centralization of resources and power under Siyad barre, as well as increasing governmental brutality against anyone suspected of being disloyal to the dictator, the Somalis turned to their clans for not only basic needs, but also for protection from barre’s government troops. A number of failed coup attempts after the Ogaden War caused barre to tighten his hold on the population through heightened reprisal violence and pre-emptive persecutions.[307] To counter the well-armed military, many clans and sub-clans formed their own militias for the protection of their people and resources, and armed resistance groups emerged throughout the state. These bands of militias were a key component of the overthrow of barre as they actively sought regime change in the state. In the former British Protectorate, the largest and strongest militia was the Isaaq-led Somali National Movement (SNM).
The liberation struggle in Somaliland began with the April 1981 formation of the SNM in London. Formed from a succession of various political organizations created by Isaaq businessmen, students, former civil servants and former politicians who were living in the United Kingdom, the SNM emerged following the merger of the UK organizations with similar groups from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab emirates. The initial intent of the political organizations preceding the SNM was not to become an armed liberation front. Rather, these groups formed in response to new policies enacted by Barre which were viewed as direct attacks on Isaaq living abroad. Following a meeting of the newly formed SNM congress in October 1981, however, the official position changed to one of liberation, with the expressed aim of ridding Somalia of barre and instituting a democratic government in Somalia that would be inclusive of and based on the clan system.[308] According to Lewis, upon its formation the SNM ‘articulated Isaaq grievances ranging from inadequate political representation, neglect in development, and the frustration of local businessmen and exporters chafing at economic controls’[309] These grievances also included violent and repressive tactics used by the barre regime in the north. From the outset, the SNM conveyed that even though it was primarily an Isaaq movement and at the start membership and leadership of the SNM was almost exclusively limited to the Isaaq clan,[310] it was fighting for all of Somalia and as such it would eventually coordinate its efforts with its counterparts in the south. The SNM was fighting for the overthrow of Barre, not the independence of Somaliland. The SNM was one of two political units to emerge from the clan militias, the other being the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed. Structurally and logistically, the SNM was both a political and military organization formed within the Isaaq population. The movement consisted of two separate wings: a political wing tasked with making necessary political decisions and garnering logistical and physical support for the movement; and the military wing responsible for fighting Barre’s forces. For many involved in the SNM, the military wing was necessary for the struggle, but the political component was of primary importance and the focal point of the movement and its goal of giving the government back to the people.[311] Largely because of the existence of a separate political wing, the SNM had the ‘ability, capacity and interest to form an effective government’ in Somalia.[312] The political wing itself acted as a quasi-government for the movement, making important decisions concerning the actions of the movement as well as functioning as a diplomatic entity for the SNM. the practice of participatory democracy in the SNM’s Central Committee brought traditional Somali decision making practices into the body, and the institutionalization of a council of clan elders (Guurti)[313] into the political wing established a system of checks and balances to constrain the actions of the military movement and to give the SNM the social and political capacity necessary to promulgate its stated aim of a democratic government. This focus on consensus politics and the inclusion of the familiar and traditional clan system secured support from a majority of the people affected by Barre’s retaliatory campaigns. The actions of the SNM during the campaign not only created trust in the movement, but also facilitated the political foundations that would emerge following the military victory.
In February 1982 the SNM moved its base of operations from London to Ethiopia where the movement gained assistance from the Ethiopian government and rooted its support in the Isaaq in the country. [314] From there the SNM waged open rebellion against the Barre regime through incursions, attacking army positions in Somaliland before returning to Ethiopia. Barre responded to this campaign with ‘disproportionate violence’ against the population in the north and in particular the Isaaq, marking the start of the movement’s involvement in Somalia’s civil war.[315] The mounting repression against the Isaaq in the northwest that had started during the Ogaden War and increased following the emergence of the SNM was documented by Africa Watch:
[t]he government exploited the emergence of the SNM to justify indiscriminate violence against individuals and groups that criticized government policies and leadership, or merely because of clan affiliation … Whenever the SNM launched an attack … that area was subject to harsh reprisals, including summary execution, the burning of villages, the destruction of reservoirs, the indiscriminate planting of landmines and the killing and confiscation of livestock, the lifeline of the nomads.[316]
In spite of the violence waged against the Isaaq within Somalia, because of its base in Ethiopia the SNM was able to escape prolonged direct confrontation with barre’s forces. In April 1988, however, barre and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam agreed to halt support to Somali armed movements based within the two states. As a result, the SNM lost support from the Ethiopian government and lost its base of operations. If the campaign was to continue, the SNM had no choice but to go into Somalia and fight.[317] In May 1988, the SNM forces began their move into Somalia by taking control of Hargeisa and Somaliland’s second city, Burco. Barre’s response to these actions was a new level of violence to handle the ‘Isaaq problem’,[318] ordering the shelling and aerial bombardment of the major cities in the northwest and the systematic destruction of Isaaq dwellings, settlements and water points. These reprisal attacks forced an estimated 300,000 Isaaq and non-Isaaq to flee to Ethiopia.[319] With assistance from clan elders from all the Somaliland clans and sub-clans affected by barre, the SNM garnered enough physical and logistical support from the influx of refugees to enable its continuing move into Somalia. The Isaaq in the north, facing further isolation and exploitation in addition to violence from the barre regime, had long since turned to the clan for protection, and the emergence of the SNM offered this on a larger scale. Whereas military action initially concentrated on the Isaaq, other clans were not immune to large scale attacks and bombardments. Broad hard-won support for the SNM throughout the territory and amongst the different clans meant that although still dominated by the majority clan, the SNM became a Somaliland movement rather than just an Isaaq movement. As this happened, almost the entirety of Somaliland became the target of increasing state violence. The disillusionment with Somali unity that had emerged during the democratic government became cemented in the northern mindset. As the war intensified and the violence increased, though, the stated aim of the SNM continued to be the overthrow of Siyad barre rather than independence for Somaliland.
In January 1991 the USC ousted barre from Mogadishu and the SNM began its final campaign in the north. After continued fighting and a bloody campaign,[320] the SNM claimed victory over the army of Somalia in the territory in February 1991.[321] The SNM took no part in fighting that took place in Mogadishu following the overthrow of barre and it was excluded from the post-barre political arrangement in the south. Being omitted from political occurrences in post-conflict Somalia, although viewed as disastrous at the time because of the political ideals espoused by the SNM and the sense of ongoing exclusion, would prove to be an advantage to the people of Somaliland. Whilst the south continued to descend into chaos, the people of the north began the long process of reconciliation and reconstruction. The end of barre’s regime brought the beginning of state collapse and central government failure for the south, but also brought promise to the north.
The road to peace in Somaliland was not bloodless, and the end of the civil war did bring retributive acts against those who had supported barre or those who were in opposition to the SNM. Because of actions of the SNM, however, this violence was kept to a minimum. Once Hargeisa was liberated, the SNM Chairman of the central committee, Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’, immediately sent SNM commanders and clan elders throughout Somaliland with instructions for the SNM and the people to not seek revenge against those in the north that had supported barre.[322] This was not wholly successful in stopping revenge attacks, but it did succeed in preventing many of them. Although the civil war had created divisions in Somaliland society, the majority of the population had in some way supported the SNM. Because of this and the non-violent post-war stance of the SNM, even though a level of animosity existed between the Isaaq and other communities the cessation of hostilities was expedited.[323] The fact that the SNM were the ‘victors’, a place of respect and political power in Somali society, helped with this process. In addition to its immediate efforts, the SNM leadership allowed for a reconciliation process led by the elders of the Somaliland clans rather than asserting its authority in the territory through force; this step helped bring about an end to the fighting and laid the foundations for the envisaged democratic government.[324] The bottomup road to peace and reconstruction was the first and only avenue taken.
In February 1991, the SNM and the elders of Somaliland began the peacemaking process by convening the first of many national shir (see Chapter 6). This process of national conferences aimed to reconcile the fractured Somaliland society, with reconciliation efforts falling primarily on the shoulders of clan elders. at the second of these national conferences held at Burco in April and May 1991, the representatives of the Somaliland people resolved to create a new and independent state, and the agreement reached there established the ‘cornerstone of the peace’ that allowed for the creation of a government in Somaliland.[325] A succession of national conferences and local initiatives has continued since 1991, working for further reconciliation as well as a strengthening of governance and government – institutional statebuilding – in the territory.
Going It Alone: The Declaration of Independence and the Beginnings of the State
Although the creation of a government is only one component of Somaliland’s statebuilding process, as an unrecognized state the style and functions of government are important in the strategy to obtain recognition of sovereign statehood. Indeed, if recognition had been the goal from the start, the style and function of government would have been predetermined. However, the roots for the style of government chosen in Somaliland existed prior to any irredentist or secessionist claims. Indeed, the political leadership brought ideas of Western democracy and liberal government to Somaliland through the SNM its inception in London, and it was these desires that provided not only a starting point, but also a goal for what would be the new institutions of state.
The initial goal of the SNM was realized when Siyad barre was driven from power in January 1991, but the exclusion of the SNM from the newly formed interim government in Mogadishu created concerns of further repression of the north if the union were to continue.[326] Under popular pressure the SNM leadership was compelled to consider and then formulate plans for secession. On 18 May 1991 the representatives at the Burco Conference revoked the 1960 and 1961 Acts of Union and declared the secession of the republic of Somaliland from Somalia. based on the territorial boundaries of the British Protectorate of Somaliland at the time of its independence, the creation of the new republic was a ‘pragmatic stance to distance the north from the factional fighting in the south’, as well as a recognition that the people of the north, particularly the Isaaq, had minimal physical, economic, social or political stake in Somalia. According to Bradbury, it was also believed that the foundations of security and stability in the north would attract much needed international aid that would not be linked with or conditional upon occurrences in the south.[327] Declaring independence was a relatively simple task. The creation of a state, on the other hand, was a monumental undertaking as the new leadership needed to prove both to its people and the international community that it was not going to be another Somalia.
Following the declaration of independence, the SNM quickly established a government based on the structure of and formed from the leadership of the movement. The SNM had always advocated that the clan could not be ignored in Somali politics as ‘the clan system lay at the root of political stability, social cohesion and economic activity’.[328] The previous two governmental eras had proved that the clan and politics were inseparably intertwined. Within the SNM there was a realization that the clan was the center of not only individual but collective identity, and the strength derived from that drove through the center of all social and economic activity, including politics. thus, the intention of the leadership was not to remove that force from political life, but instead to create a modern democratic government that also included traditional Somali practices, including customary social contracts (xeer) and the moderating roles and practices of clan elders, as ‘without the traditional sector protecting the integrity of its values, a reversion to authoritarian rule over the democratic essence of the body politic could not be excluded’.[329] The hybrid government that resulted is specifically tailored to Somaliland, and this is often credited with the establishment of peace and stability in the territory. As Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah notes, the hybrid system ‘began from when we [the SNM] were in the bush’ when a council of clan elders (Guurti) was incorporated into the political operations of the SNM.[330] The fusion of this stabilizing clan governance structure with the stated democratic desires of the SNM carried over into the immediate post-independence statebuilding period and into Somaliland’s government.
Following the declaration of independence the SNM did not automatically assume control over the territory. Instead, the first government that was formulated at Burco was mandated to the SNM by the clan elders at the conference, thereby legitimizing the rule of the movement through the sanction of the elders. the political-military separation established by the SNM during the liberation struggle eased the transition between liberation movement and ruling regime as the political structures were already in existence and were translated into the government structure. The political wing of the SNM, which had acted in the role of the executive during the liberation struggle, assumed leadership of the territory under former chairman of the SNM cum interim president, Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’. The legislative branch of the new government also came from the SNM: one house of the new bicameral legislature came from the SNM central Committee, whilst the other was filled by the elders (Guurti) who had assisted the SNM during their military campaign.
Tuur’s interim administration was tasked with two key issues. First, peace needed to be established throughout the territory and fighting between those who had supported barre and those who had not, as well as between clans attempting to profit from the chaotic situation, had to be stopped. The institutionalized Guurti together with local clan elders were instrumental in achieving this. Second was building a functioning government in the new state, which proved to be fraught with difficulties. As Lewis notes, Somaliland’s initial years were testing and Tuur struggled to generate the income needed to finance the government. In addition, the continued existence of militias undermined public security and the government’s attempts at reconciling the rifts created by the war.[331] Tensions within the SNM also quickly became apparent as factional pursuits emerged in the absence of the common and unifying enemy, barre. As a result, lasting support for Tuur’s administration was difficult to obtain; his ability to complete the tasks was questioned and lack of cohesion within the SNM threatened to derail the interim administration.
In 1992, fighting again broke out in Somaliland between Tuur’s government forces and a coalition of militias loosely based on clans and linked with opposition factions within the SNM. The violence that started in Burco and quickly spread to Berbera and Hargeisa ‘reduced [Somaliland] to a state of near-anarchy’.[332] Throughout the Somalia civil war clan elders had been vital to gaining popular support for the SNM, and in the post-war return to fighting the SNM leadership and the population again turned to the clan elders, this time the now permanent Guurti, for guidance and assistance with reconciliation. In October 1992, at the town of Sheik, the Guurti, as a body of the government, negotiated a cease-fire to end the conflict. Another national reconciliation conference, the 1993 Grand Borama conference, was convened to address the causes of the violence.
The Borama conference was an important milestone in the formation of the government in Somaliland. It was a ‘make or break event’ in the creation of the state for on the agenda were two vital items: reconciliation and security, and statebuilding. A national committee of 150 Somaliland elders representing all the Somaliland clans and sub-clans comprised the voting delegation at the conference, and during the four months of the conference more than 2000 Somalilanders attended or participated.[333] Significantly, the Borama Conference, as with most of the national shir, was funded almost entirely by Somalilanders and members of the diaspora. Without the pressures exerted by external donors, the people of Somaliland, which included the diaspora community, were able to establish what they perceived of as best for the territory at that given time. In the words of Gerard Prunier, Somaliland ‘[went] it alone’.[334]
Rejecting ‘Anarchy’: Peace, Reconciliation and Making Somaliland
Whilst the international community was present in Somalia under the guise of the United Nations Operations in Somalia, the leaders in Somaliland clearly expressed their desire for the UN to stay out of the northern territory. Somaliland’s quest to be treated separately from the south in regards to aid or international assistance became apparent almost immediately when Somaliland’s leaders were offered UN assistance through UNOSOM ii. As the aid would have been under the auspices of the UN’s statebuilding project aimed at reconstructing a unified and functioning Somalia, this assistance was refused. As Abdullahi Duale recalls, when UNOSOM commander admiral Jonathan Howe met with leaders in Hargeisa they told him, ‘thank you, but we don’t need your help’. He continues in his reflection in stating, ‘[w]e appreciated Operation restore hope, or whatever it was called, but we were busy with institution building’.[335] In rejecting international assistance, Somaliland also rejected internationally led mediation and reconstruction efforts; instead depending on conflict resolution mechanisms present in the clan system and clan governance structures to create the foundations for the state. Starting with Burco, a series of national shir took place aimed at ending the violence and, following Borama, establishing the framework and guidelines for the procedural and institutional structure of a new state. The agreements made at Burco ended the violence resulting from the Somalia civil war and began to lay the foundations for the introduction of a new government. The 1993 Borama conference continued these processes.[336]
At the Borama Conference two significant agreements were made: the National Charter and the Peace Charter. Together these formed Somaliland’s first interim constitution and served as the basis for continued peacemaking and state formation during the transition period. In addition, at Borama the clan elders serving as representatives of the communities transferred power from the SNM factional rule to a civilian system characterized by community-based governance (beel) and power-sharing between the clans. Remarkably, in accordance with the agreement established by the elders at the 1991 Burco conference, after two years of rule the SNM leadership peacefully stepped down in order to allow the civilian administration appointed by the elders at the Borama Conference to take control of the territory and continue the creation of a state. Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, the first prime minister of Somaliland in 1960 and the last civilian prime minister of Somalia in 1969, was appointed as the first civilian president and was tasked with leading the transition to the beel based government.[337] Although not chosen through a national plebiscite but rather by the council of clan elders, Egal was a highly respected and experienced leader who was regarded as the ‘right person for the job’ of guiding the territory through the period of state formation.[338] the Borama Conference not only succeeded in establishing a legal framework for the government and transferring power to civilian rule, but it also marked the start of the local efforts undertaken to establish a modern Somaliland state.
The establishment of the Peace charter and the national charter laid constitutional foundations upon which the new government would be built. The Peace charter was created as a direct response to security issues that arose after independence was declared, in particular the fighting that had broken out in 1992. The charter not only recognized the importance of the clan elders in ending that conflict and emphasized their position in reconciliation and peacemaking, but also officially regularized and institutionalized the role of elders in establishing and strengthening security in the territory. As an agreement between clans and therefore binding customary law (xeer), the Peace Charter established a structure in which demobilization of the militias and the remaining SNM factions could take place, and in which law enforcement and the judicial system could be established.[339] It therefore ‘set out a clear code of conduct, which the council of elders and people of Somaliland were to follow, so that harmony and security could exist as desired at independence’.[340] This legal acknowledgment of the importance of clan elders in establishing a secure environment conducive to the creation of a state not only tasked the elders with the maintenance of stability, but it also constitutionally sanctioned the institutionalization of the previously ad hoc guurti as a governmental body.
Whereas the Peace charter was concerned with establishing and maintaining a stable and secure environment, the national charter addressed the need for state institutions founded on that stability. Ratified with a two-year mandate, the National Charter outlined the framework for the new government institutions and mandated the creation of a permanent constitution under which a democratic government would develop. The government outlined by the national charter was not only to be a modern democracy, but it also allowed for every clan and subclan to be represented in the parliament. It also promoted consensus politics, a type of decision making with a long history in Somali society. In essence, the national charter ‘established a government rooted in a clan system with a fusion of the western system’.[341] The fusion of the ‘old’ – the Somali clan system – with the ‘new’ – modern democracy – is regarded as the cornerstone of stability in the Somaliland government. When Somaliland turned its attention to seeking sovereign recognition, that fusion of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ became one of the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’.
With the Peace Charter firmly identifying the need for peace and stability upon which a government could be created, and with the national charter establishing the foundations for a hybrid government tailored to Somaliland, the intentions of those involved in creating these two documents were clear. Bradbury notes that within both Charters there are clear links to the original vision of radical governance reform proposed by the SNM, who envisioned a democratic government rooted in the clan system.[342] As Lewis notes, the most novel feature of the new government structure was its hybrid nature:
An imaginative innovation in the shape of a bicameral legislature, with a nonelected upper house of traditional elders (the guurti), and an elected lower house of representatives: a kind of compromise between the old clan-based SNM and the exigencies of modern administration.[343]
Starting with the first national conference at Berbera, the clan elders had played a vital role in the establishment of peace in the territory and in laying the foundations for the government. As such, many involved in the creation of Somaliland’s government claim that the clan elders provided the bedrock for the establishment of Somaliland and the spine for the continued stability of the emerging state.[344]
The importance of the clan system in the new government was enforced in the institutionalization of the clan elders as the upper house of parliament – a house responsible for the maintenance of peace and stability as well as mediating and guiding the statebuilding process. Because of their respected position both within and outside of the emerging political structures, the elders became the impartial and selfless ‘King Makers’[345] who were responsible for sanctioning the new government and appointing its members. The prominent placement and power of the clan elders in the central government not only confirms the importance of the clans in the territory, but also reflects the recognition that the inclusion of the clan system was essential to the success of creating the new state.
With the foundations laid at the Borama conference, President Egal began constructing the state in Somaliland. With the assistance of the clan elders and starting with the basic foundations of security, the Egal administration was able to make advances in moving from existing as a break-away territory to creating a separate state. The first step in this was the demobilization of the militias begun in 1993 and undertaken primarily by the upper house of parliament through negotiations and agreements with local clan elders. Although complete demobilization and disarmament did not take place, as early as February 1994 an estimated 5000 militias had been disbanded and disarmed.[346] While demobilization was not as effective in the eastern Sanaag and Sool provinces, the main population centers in the west as well as the route from the port of Berbera to Hargeisa were secured. In addition, through his clan associations Egal was able to gain control of the port of Berbera, the primary import-export center and a major source of revenue for Somaliland.[347] With the improved security situation and control of the port, Egal was able to drastically increase financial resources available to the government as taxes could be levied throughout the territory and customs duties were collected.[348] In addition, increased security brought more investment money from the Diaspora community which funded projects such as improving infrastructure and establishing businesses.[349] Under Egal security in the territory drastically improved and the economy boomed.
Whereas Tuur’s rule was characterized by inadequacy, Egal’s administration was able to ride the ‘wave of euphoria after Borama’ and oversaw remarkable progress in establishing the institutions and functions of a state.[350] Key to this progress, though, was Egal. In his discussions on statebuilding, Call identifies three resources that are crucial for consolidating state power and for statebuilding success: coercion, capital and charisma.[351] In Somaliland, Egal provided the resource of charisma. A career politician, he was both a revolutionary and had a reputation tainted with failure and corruption. He had been educated in London, campaigned for Somaliland’s independence from the British, was Prime Minister of Somalia at the time of Barre’s coup, had ambiguous links with Barre’s regime, and had not been a part of the SNM. However, he had connections with wealthy merchants who valued his clan ties to the port of Berbera, and he was the leader of Somaliland during its few days of post-colonial independence. As a seasoned politician, he was well-known and had an international reputation as a statesman.[352] He was popular and trusted. Throughout his rule his charisma and influence, as well as his popularity and veneration from the people, greatly benefited the emerging state. Egal was the ‘man who made the base foundation for Somaliland. He knew the culture of the elders, he knew the culture of the people, and he knew the culture of the west. He knew how to bring them together’.[353]Although Egal was revered, his clan connections and political savvy cannot be overlooked: in many ways he was an opportunist, not necessarily for himself but for the project, and he utilized numerous avenues to press the statebuilding project further. Egal maintained tight control over Somaliland, not in a dictatorial manner but as a strong leader managing the creation of the government and the infrastructure of the state. Under the guidance of Egal, state ministries were established, government buildings were built or restored, the central bank of Somaliland was re-opened, a new currency was printed and introduced, regular business working hours were established and a civil service agency was created. A national army, customs offices, local and regional judicial systems, a legal system and a police force were also established. The infrastructure of the major population centers was repaired and work began on improving transportation links between the major cities. Communications links were improved and links were made to domestic and foreign NGOs and the UN through the newly created planning ministry. Schools were set up, hospitals were re-opened and sanitation services were established. A minimum wage was introduced and civil servants were paid regularly. A working relationship was also begun between the central government and regional authorities within Somaliland.[354] In addition, the government institutions first mandated by the National Charter began to function and to govern. Laws were passed and the legal system, comprised of both ‘modern’ and customary laws – was updated. The Egal administration was building the attributes of statehood – the public goods articulated by Rotberg – concurrently with building the institutions of a state from the ground up. All the trappings of statehood were beginning to emerge, even those often overlooked such as the printing of postage stamps and the composition of a national anthem. Building on the extraordinary security measures accomplished with the help of the Somaliland clans, the Egal administration began ticking the boxes of acceptable modern statehood.
Although considerable progress was made establishing the institutions of government in the first two years of Egal’s rule, the state remained politically fragile and was increasingly vulnerable to a shift in power between clans and politicians.[355] The potential for instability and return to conflict is reflected in the high cost of security in the first year: 50 per cent of government spending went to defense and the police, whereas health and education received only 17 per cent jointly.[356] This fragility was exposed when fighting again broke out in the territory in 1994. Largely sparked by opposition to the government and fueled by desires for personal gain, this return to conflict was a substantial setback for the new state.
a combination of factors, including inter-clan hostilities, continuing dissatisfaction from SNM factions that felt the government had ‘slipped from their hands’,[357] the clash of powerful egos, unremitting struggles over control of Hargeisa airport, and a backlash against attempts at expanding government control outside the capital city came to a head when ‘the Borama process moved from the conference hall to the proving grounds of Somaliland’.[358] The return of fighting first broke out in Hargeisa and quickly spread to Burco. It was seen by many non-Isaaq clans as an Isaaq problem that concerned only the political and economic elite. Despite this belief, the conflict involved the heaviest fighting since the civil war, with tens of thousands of people fleeing Hargeisa and Burco and with widespread destruction of property.[359] The war also damaged confidence in the new government and its ability to maintain order and security within the territory. As Bradbury notes, ‘the war threw Somaliland’s viability into doubt’.[360] In order to resolve the conflict, the Guurti opened negotiations and mediation efforts and another national conference was convened in Hargeisa beginning in 1996. At the conclusion of this five month conference a peace agreement was reached, ending Somaliland’s last major conflict to date. The grievances of those in opposition to the government were also addressed and the reconciliation process was expanded beyond the clans, resulting in greater inclusion within the government as well as peaceful means through which to address opposition opinions and groups. Just as importantly, though, were the endorsing of a new provisional constitution to replace the national charter and the establishment of a schedule for the transition to a multi-party democracy.[361] Egal was re-elected as president by the delegates and a new vice president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, was chosen. Faith in the government and its ability to end conflict and maintain the peace had been severely damaged by the conflict, but after steps taken at Hargeisa confidence was partially restored and the next step in creating a multi-party democracy was taken.
Codifying the Hybrid: The Constitution and Democratic Elections
The founders of the state made it clear that the government structure and functions must be mandated and defined by a constitution and thus it became a priority to make Somaliland a constitutional state. Creating the Somaliland Constitution was a lengthy and difficult undertaking, but as Abdullahi Duale states, ‘[you] can’t draw a constitution overnight and say this is it’.[362] With the new interim constitution drafted at the Hargeisa Conference in place, in 1997 work was begun on a permanent constitution. The final product was then adopted in 2001 following a national referendum.[363]The national constitution of Somaliland is a compromise between two separate drafts: the interim constitution and a draft proposed by Egal. After lengthy negotiation and compromise between the two drafts, the final constitution was ratified by a margin of one vote in Parliament and a national referendum was prepared.[364] Even with a completed document to put before the people, Egal faced significant opposition as the document mandating democratic elections potentially threatened the political positions of those already in the government. With this as well as public uncertainty following the lengthy process, the Egal administration needed to push hard to gain popular support for the document. Thus the president very publicly linked a yes vote for the constitution as a yes vote for independent statehood, implying that the democratic practices to be established by the constitution were a pre-requisite for international recognition of statehood.[365] The campaign was successful: the 2001 national referendum returned public approval for the constitution and it was quickly ratified by Somaliland’s parliament. The power of the new constitution and the stability of the new government were put to the test, however, when in May 2002 Egal died suddenly. Upon hearing the news, one government minister is reported to have wept ‘not because Egal died, but because of what will happen to [Somaliland]’.[366] These fears were unfounded, however, when the constitution was closely followed and Vice President Rayale peacefully took office.[367] The first of many tests for the Somaliland constitution was passed, and opposition to the process of introducing democracy was diminishing in Somaliland.
The structure of the government found in the constitution mirrors that established by the national charter: an executive led by a president, a bicameral legislature, and a supreme or constitutional court.[368] The constitution mandates that the president, vice president and lower house of parliament be elected through popular elections, and that government ministers and court justices be appointed by the president and confirmed by both houses of parliament. The lower house of parliament is the house of representatives and is comprised of 82 members chosen through popular elections and representing geographic regions. The upper house of parliament is where the institutional inclusion of the clan in Somaliland’s hybrid government is found. Codified in the constitution, the House of Elders (Guurti) is the continuation of the permanent clan council that first emerged within the SNM leadership, and its membership is drawn solely from clan elders. The membership of the house of elders continues to be nominated by their respective clans and officially appointed by the president, and the 82 appointed voting members[369] of the upper house technically represent their clans, although many members of the house claim they represent all of Somaliland.[370] The membership of Somaliland’s Guurti functions both as a clan council and as a parliamentary body.
Although the House of Representatives ‘forms the first part of the country’s legislature, passing laws and approving and overseeing the general political situation and the direction of the country’, the upper house also holds significant powers.[371] The house of elders also holds legislative powers, and all legislation passing through the lower house except for those pertaining to the budget and finance must be passed by the upper house before being signed into law by the president. The Guurti, as the representation of the clan, also has sole jurisdiction over legislation concerning religion, traditions and culture. Whilst the legislative duties are important, more crucially the Guurti continues to be responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in the territory as well as reconciling between the people and the government and within the government itself. As the general secretary of the Guurti states, ‘the Guurti is both legislative and cultural. It still plays an important role in linking the two. You can’t just impose democracy. The Guurti acts as a link between the old and the new’.[372] The Guurti also acts as the key advisor to the government, and as such has a wide purview of powers that are rarely checked. As part of this role, the upper house has the exclusive power to extend the terms of any member or branch of the government, a power that has been exercised on a number of occasions when it was deemed that the territory is not capable of holding elections due to lack of resources, instability, or war.[373] As the physical as well as symbolic inclusion of the clan and the traditional practices of clan governance, the house of elders is seen by many as the spine of the Somaliland government, a position which grants it broad power.
Powers of the other two branches of government are also defined by the constitution. As expected, the Supreme Court is the highest appeals court in Somaliland and is responsible for interpreting the constitution. Powers granted to the president, on the other hand, are broad and highly interpretable. The constitution is often referred to amongst government officials and members of civil society as ‘Egal’s suit’ as it gave the first civilian president wide latitude with which to create the state.[374] Given Egal’s esteemed status in the territory and his political prowess, these broad powers benefited the stability of the territory and the government as they paved the way for quick reform as well as creating a means through which security and stability problems could be immediately addressed.[375] Although seen as problematic by some both within and outside of Somaliland, without giving Egal this wide purview it is likely that the early years of statebuilding would have been significantly more difficult for the state.[376] With the strengthening of institutions and practices, and with the popular election of both the president and the House of Representatives, however, the ‘suit’ no longer fits the purpose, and the broad powers given to the President are beginning to be checked by the representatives of the people. The resultant changing dynamics of the government are exposing the holes in the constitution that had allowed for the growth of the government, but are now ‘creating more problems than solving’.[377] However, the government, civil society and the Somaliland population continue to address these problems and negotiate lasting solutions to them, thus continuing the process of institution building and statebuilding.
Although the Somaliland government is grounded in the clans, safeguards have been put in place to protect against the destructive clan politics that plagued the 1960–1969 government of Somalia. These measures primarily restrict political parties and electoral practices. The constitution allows for only three political parties which cannot be clan based and must be representative of all the Somaliland clans. These parties were officially confirmed following local elections held in 2002, with the three parties obtaining the largest number of votes in that election – Ururka Dimugraadiga Ummadda Bahawday (UDUB), Kulmiye and Ururka Caddaalada iyo Daryeelka (UCID)[378] – becoming the official parties. An elaborate practice of party-list proportional representation is another means through which to protect against clan politics. In this system, theoretically the party becomes more important than the clan in determining representation, although in reality the backing of clan leadership of often needed for a person to become a candidate.[379] With the clan as the dominant organized social community in Somaliland, it continues to play a role in the political process, but limitations placed on its infiltration into the party realm have thus far eliminated the one clan one party practice that plagued Somalia’s democratic government.
On its path to creating a modern democracy, Somaliland has so far held four national elections. Voter education drives have been consistently held during which the purpose and procedure of democratic elections have been explained both through community meanings and individual action as well as through pamphlet distribution.[380] The first democratic election was the 2002 local elections which also determined the three official political parties. In 2003 presidential elections were held in which President Rayale, representing the UDUB party, was narrowly elected for another term in office by a margin of 80 votes.[381] Despite the close result, the runner-up refused calls from his party, Kulmiye, to establish a rival government in the territory and instead chose to respect the electoral process. This election marked the first peaceful contest over leadership of the forming state. Deemed relatively free and fair by international observers, the 2005 parliamentary elections were also conducted peacefully.[382] Problems arose following the vote, however, when the popularly elected majority comprising the two opposition parties was incorporated into a government that had previously been dominated by Egal’s party (UDUB). Contention over leadership of the newly elected House of Representatives emerged, but was resolved peacefully through negotiations moderated by the house of elders and with the opposition parties maintaining the power and influence associated with their electoral victories. The next rounds of local and presidential elections were scheduled to take place in early 2008, but instead took place in 2010, after which Somaliland experienced its first transfer of party power at the executive level. Work has begun on creating a national electoral roll, and voter turnout is high. Although the election process in Somaliland has not been flawless, as one Somali researcher states, ‘[t]his country is a lab … We’re still going through the process, still experimenting’.[383] Despite the minor problems encountered, beginning to introduce and establish the democratic component of the hybrid government was a milestone in the statebuilding process in Somaliland.
Although much has been accomplished in Somaliland, those involved in creating the state realize that the framework, both on paper and in practice, is not perfect, and as of yet many functions of the emerging state are still weak. The framework for the government and the wording of the constitution indicate that a greater provision of public goods is aspired to, but the government of Somaliland does not yet have the resources or the institutional capacity to expand upon those provisions begun by Egal. Accusations of corruption or abuse of power have been rare, but have still arisen. There is some discontent with the three current parties, with groups arguing that because of a maturing of the system the option of choosing new parties should be made available. Some also argue that the constitutionally mandated three party limit is exclusionary and should be eliminated.[384] Curtailing freedoms expected in a liberal democracy, particularly freedom of the press, has also been a concern.[385] What has been successful, however, is establishing peace and security within the territory, which is not a small accomplishment when compared with the chaotic and violent situation that exists in most of southern Somalia. The nascent state in Somaliland has the foundations for further political and social development and provision, but has yet to fully realize them.
State-Democracy-Recognition
As Bryden argues, Somaliland ‘fulfils the principle criteria’ for statehood.[386] The aspiring state reflects the normative values of acceptable statehood, an attribute that makes it complicit with the pressures of the international community even in the absence of direct international action. From the beginning, the process of statebuilding in Somaliland has been propelled by a group of self-socialized elites within the territory who push for compliance with the norms of statehood that are seen as necessary for recognition, but who also strive to ensure that the state being created is one that reflects the needs of Somaliland. The result of this is the hybrid reconciliation between the ‘old’ Somali governance and the ‘new’ liberal democratic practices in the Somaliland government; a reconciliation that also works to balance the demands between the external and the internal. initially composed of SNM political leadership, this group continues to evolve as the statebuilding process continues, and is increasingly becoming composed of diaspora members and diaspora returnees with experience of European and American government systems; the ‘old guard’ of the SNM is being replaced by the ‘new’ and the internal is being increasingly supplemented by the external. Both the old and the new – the internal and the external – however, continue to strive to prove to both the international community and the Somaliland people that Somaliland can be a successful and acceptable state.
The crux of meeting normative demands and creating the hybrid state in Somaliland was the introduction of a multiparty democratic system. The original objective of the SNM was the establishment of a democratic government as a means of returning the government to the people, and the introduction of democracy in Somaliland goes back to the democratic practices of the SNM at its inception.[387] Although the stated aim of the SNM was to give the government back to the people, it is unclear if a Western-style democracy was the intended aim, or even if how to introduce this new form of government to the population had been considered. As the intention of the SNM was not the creation of an independent state in Somaliland, though, it can be assumed that democratic government was not proffered to appease the international community but was instead was what the SNM leadership thought was best for Somalia. However, the emphasis on recognition now places the modern democratic government in a new context and it is at the center of Somaliland’s claims for statehood.
Regardless of whom one speaks to in the government of Somaliland, whether it is a top ranking cabinet official or an elected member of parliament, the conversation consistently begins with the story about the SNM struggle and then the formation of Somaliland. The story almost always includes mention of the success of the most recent democratic elections and concludes with a strong statement about how Somaliland deserves to be recognized. It would be rare for anyone involved in the creation of Somaliland or those in the current government to publicly state that Somaliland’s push for democracy is propelled, at least in part, by the quest for recognition. Whilst direct statements are not likely, however, there is much that indicates that democracy and the quest for recognition have become linked. Much can be taken from statements, particularly early speeches by President Egal that indicate that democracy had obtained a second purpose other than returning the government to the people. in a speech prior to the 2001 constitutional referendum in which Egal had linked democratic government with recognition, the president stated, ‘[w]e could only be accepted as a member of the world community if we move to a new stage of nationhood … The international community does not recognize congregations of clans, each remaining independently separate’.[388] Current government actions continue to link style of government with recognition. Reflecting this, a former elected vice president indicates that today the primary goal of the government is for Somaliland to be recognized, with ‘all other problems [being] secondary’.[389] Former Minister of Foreign affairs Abdullahi Duale goes further in recognizing that although necessary, democracy was unknown to the majority of the population of Somaliland and ‘[t]eaching and introducing the democratic process itself was a huge challenge … We put the package together and sold it to the people. It’s a miracle it happened’.[390] There is a sense from some that Somaliland is merely imitating democracy, with the institutions and practices being created because of the importance placed on the appearance of a democratic government.[391] Regardless of the initial motivations, however, with recognition being the primary objective and with a connection being made between style of government and recognized statehood, the push for continued democratization cannot be separated from the quest to be a legally recognized state.
It is very difficult to discuss Somaliland in any capacity without some mention of recognition. As Bryden appropriately notes, the pursuit of international recognition has become a ‘sort of national obsession’ in Somaliland.[392] Whilst for many Somalilanders the benefit of legal statehood would be improved economic opportunities, the recognition campaign is driven by the political. the existence of a democratic government within the territory, whilst created as part of the bigger scheme to give the government back to the people, is now utilized as the central focus of the campaign and the primary evidence of deserving legal statehood. In other words, the argument being made is that the territory has earned sovereignty through exhibiting preferable and acceptable empirical statehood. Whereas a strong legal justification for recognition can be made based on brief period of sovereign independence in 1960, the campaign for statehood has grown to encompass this acceptableness, and as such the style and appearance of the state and the government has become a vehicle through which recognition is sought. With sovereign statehood being a pre-requisite for the acquisition of resources and entry into international frameworks, organizations and legal codes, the statebuilding process and the democratizing government in Somaliland have become part of a complex and very politically rooted strategy for recognition and extraversion. as such, the growth, strengthening and modern practices of the Somaliland state must be viewed not only as part of fulfilling the initial desires of the founders of Somaliland, but also as fulfilling international normative demands for acceptable statehood.
The institutional components of the state in Somaliland are not perfect, and Somaliland is continuing to ‘learn’ democracy. The newness of this system of government cannot be overlooked. Those who were involved in creating the state recognized that the introduction of democratic practices would not be easy as they could not ‘jump from point A to E without going through B, C, and D’.[393] This challenge was met through hybridity: using the old to introduce the new and depending on the old to foster cooperation in the hybrid system.[394] Although this system also creates particular obstacles, the hybrid Somaliland democracy is often credited with maintaining the foundational peace and stability necessary for the creation of the state. As Bobe Yusuf Duale recognizes, the people of Somaliland ‘live in two worlds, the west and the clan’, and the government reflects this duplicity of life.[395] It is this duality that will be the focus of the following chapters.
Conclusions
When in 1991 long-term instability resulted in the collapse of the state, the people of the north seized upon the opportunity to remove themselves from the Somalia union. It was at this here that the state of Somaliland was born.
As will be further explored in the following chapter, the methods employed by the statebuilders in Somaliland were more than just institution building; they were nation-building and statebuilding, with legitimacy coming from within rather than from the outside. Instrumental to both – institution building and the legitimization of the statebuilding process and the resulting state – was the clan, specifically the Guurti. indeed, the clan and traditional practices – the ‘old’ – themselves became institutions throughout this process, incorporated into the formal structure of the state with traditional practices both underpinning and existing in tandem with ‘modern’ state practices. The purpose-driven and permanent institutionalization of the traditional guurti granted recognition to the elders. This acknowledged the historical debt owed to the clans by the SNM while simultaneously recognizing their continued importance in the political process. This recognition brought the once non-centralized and ad hoc clan governance structure into the central government of the forming state. The inclusion of the traditional leadership brought an immediate legitimacy to the statebuilding project; the Guurti provided a stable base for the new structures, meaning the new state would not face the accusation of being ‘built on sand’. Throughout the statebuilding process, the institutionalized Guurti, acting as a clan body, was used in lieu of international mediators and statebuilders to carry out and oversee conflict resolution and the formation of a government. In the national shir reconciliation conferences, the clans of Somaliland came together in discussion and negotiation and the agreements reached became customary law (xeer), thereby binding all of the clans to the outcome. Throughout this series of national shir the clan system, clan elders and traditional practices were used by the SNM, including its institutionalized Guurti, to negotiate a state. At the same time, the clan system, the clan elders and the traditional practices were serving to domestically legitimize the resulting state, setting the stage for the continuation of the statebuilding process within society rather than primarily within the shir.
Mohammed said gees articulates that the attitude at the time of the creation of the government was ‘we don’t want to be old’, reflecting not only a desire to rid Somaliland of the corrupt practices that plagued the Somalia governments, but also a desire for something progressive.[396] For Somaliland, this meant a move towards a modern democratic state. As strong as the push for something new was, however, the value of the old Somali practices and customs were not discounted. Thus, the clan governance system and the social, political and economic control that the clan elders held became integral to creating the foundations upon which a democratic government could be introduced. although the new was believed to be necessary to return the government to the people as well as in the active quest for recognition of sovereign statehood, its existence within the government would not be possible if it did not exist in tandem with the old.
The people involved in creating the state in Somaliland acknowledge that the democratic system that is in place in Somaliland today is not perfect, but that what has been created is ‘the best there is’ at this point.[397] However, that does not exclude, but rather allows for, a continuing process of statebuilding. As a high ranking civil servant succinctly notes, ‘[w]hen we were writing that constitution we were trying to kill one bird with thousands of stones in order to assert our separation’ from the south.[398] Many of the obstacles present in Somaliland today stem from the constitution and its ambiguities. Regardless of the real or potential problems, though, what has taken place in Somaliland since 1991 is remarkable. Out of a violent conflict resulting in the failure of one state, a new state is emerging; one that is overcoming obstacles that have derailed its neighbors for many years. The establishment of a secure and stable environment in which a new style of governing is being introduced is a testament to the devotion of the Somaliland people to this project of statebuilding. That this is domestically driven and is being done almost entirely in the absence of international involvement contrasts sharply to the ‘cookie cutter’ approach to statebuilding that was attempted and failed in Somalia. The success in introducing and establishing components of the acceptable state, though, was dependent on forming a state the Somaliland way. That is, the success in introducing these structural components and practices of the state were dependent upon grounding the state in the Somaliland clans.
Interestingly, though, Somaliland’s key deviation from the preferable or the acceptable is something that has been a vital component of the statebuilding process: the inclusion of traditional or traditional authority in the central government. This inclusion in Somaliland is not an anomaly. Indeed, attention paid to hybrid governance is increasing, and hybridity occurs within many existing states.[399] However, hybrid governments, although not unheard of, are rarer. Hybrid government are those in which differing mechanisms of governance, such as traditional and modern norms and practices, exist within a single political order. Clements defines these political orders, such as that in Botswana, as ‘characterized by a contradictory and dialectic co-existence of forms of socio-political organization that have their roots in both non-state indigenous social structures and introduced state and societal structures’. They emphasize both liberal ideals and power relations outside of the Western liberal model, and as some argue, are a means through which to secure government legitimacy within complex post-conflict or fragile societies.[400] However, establishing hybrid government as an externally-determined policy option or process would be atypical. Although elements of hybrid governance exist in Afghanistan, especially when considering the role of the Jurga, these continue to exist outside of the realm of the formalized state: hybridity in Afghanistan is a tool of governance in Afghanistan rather than a component of the government.[401] Incongruent with the normative liberal model of government, hybrid government is not a path taken within externally-led statebuilding projects. For an unrecognized state seeking for sovereign statehood and therefore striving to comply with normative demands, it seems counterproductive to establish such a deviation in its government structure. The perception of unpredictability and uncertainty that accompanies the inclusion of the traditional signifies that it should not be preferred in such an important position, yet for Somaliland it is a vital component not only in creating the institutional state, but also in creating and domestically legitimizing the state and its identity.
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