Understanding Statebuilding: Traditional Governance And The Modern State In Somaliland

Chapter 6

The Institutionalization Of The Traditional

The clan and the Guurti in Somaliland added much needed legitimacy to the newly forming state. The deviance from the norm stemming from this has not been ignored, though. In a June 2005 report commissioned by the World Bank, Ahmed Mohammed Hashi identifies the central inclusion of the clan in the government as the point of potential instability in the Somaliland state. He argues that if the clan continues to be part of the central government Somaliland will be plagued by the same clan struggles and warfare found in Somalia.^[402] Although this is only one report, it reflects the distrust and deviance associated with the inclusion of the unknown into a central government; in this case it is specific to Somaliland. To be clear, the inclusion of the clan in the central government is not the cause of Somaliland’s continued non-recognition; complex regional considerations, peace initiatives for Somalia and policies of the African Union as well as non-African actors have thus far prevented recognition of Somaliland. However, the notable inclusion of the clan in the government of a Somali state is perceived of as a significant risk factor for instability and violence. With the continued volatility in the south of Somalia, and with the clan, until very recently, being targeted as a key component of this instability, it is curious that in Somaliland the clan has had and continues to have such a place of prominence within the modern democratizing government.

It is common in literature on Somaliland to see the clan and the Guurti referred to as the ‘spine’ of Somaliland. Often this is discussed in terms of the Guurti in its institutional capacity; its role in the building of the institutions of the state and in the transition to democracy. However, this role extends beyond the institutional. in Somaliland, the clan and the Guurti also guide and underpin the process of legitimizing the state and, indeed, the process of socio-political change that is vital not only to building a Somaliland identity but also to aspects of nation-building. As Lewis notes,

The Somali clan system serves as a mechanism of solidarity and fragmentation as well as competition and coalition building. It is this enigma of the functions of the clan system – its capacity to serve as a mechanism of solidarity and warfare, its vulnerability to fragmentation and the weakness of its mechanism of leadership accountability – which needs to be understood. Somaliland adapted these features and functions of clan organization in its strategies of organizing resistance to the regime, resolving conflicts within the movement during the struggle, as well as in postwar reconciliation and in building political consensus.^[403]

Building the institutions of the state can take place without nation-building, but in order to be successful and to be legitimately accepted, it has to take place concurrently with nation-building. As the nation is not only reflective of a popular collective defined by ethnic, religious or cultural identity but is also defined by and reflective of political culture – expectations of governance and the state – the nation plays an important role in the legitimization of the state; the institutions and the nation must be reflective of and embedded within each other. In Somaliland, statebuilding and nation-building are taking place concurrently. Initially invoking a separate Somaliland identity brought about through common political experiences and separateness within the Somali ethnicity and originally rooting the state within common understandings and expectations of governance, the SNM began to build the state on foundations within the community and the burgeoning Somaliland nation. As the statebuilding process progresses, nation-building also progresses concurrently; as governance changes, the expectations for that governance and the identity of Somaliland are also changing. As Sisk notes, consolidating peace and building a state is ‘not simply a matter of rebuilding state capacity based on what was there before, or ‘recovery’; statebuilding is about transformation of both state and society’.^[404] Although certainly not the only actor or factor involved, the clan and clan governance have been an instrumental component of these tandem processes. In Somaliland, the clan has facilitated a link between state and society and a reciprocal investment of one in the other.

Ironically, though, despite Somaliland’s success in building a strengthening state that has strong domestic legitimacy, for many who study statebuilding or many in the policy realm, and reflected in Hashi’s report, Somaliland’s methods would be questioned because of the dependence on and centrality of the clan and the Guurti. As identified previously, there is an inherent distrust of unfamiliar mechanisms of governance within the liberal state and thus statebuilding. Whilst it is common practice within development and statebuilding projects to utilize traditional or indigenous actors and structures, those are rarely incorporated into the central structure of the state and, as Ghani and Lockhart acknowledge, are used as intermediaries between the local population and the interveners.^[405] However, this relationship is not characterized by autonomy of the domestic but rather the domestic as a subject to external sovereignty. As Woodward identifies, however, ‘the crucial element of stabilized statebuilding is deference to the new authorities and compliance with their rules and decisions, in sum, the state’s authority’. In this aspect of statebuilding, ‘the period of transition from civil war to peace has particular characteristics unrelated to other statebuilding conditions – the required complement of nation-building’. An internal process central to statebuilding success, it is necessary to create a political community and its implied obligations. Indeed, the creation of a new state’s authority is a ‘symbolic contest of nation-building’,^[406] and in Somaliland the clan, and trust fostered in and by the clan, was central to this.

Throughout the campaign of the SNM the Somaliland clans were integral to the success of the liberation struggle as well as post-conflict reconciliation and state formation. Although the clans were vital to the emergence of an independent Somaliland, out of the SNM campaign and rule emerged not an absolute dependence on the clan, but rather a democratic government rooted in traditional Somali practices, including customary laws and the moderating roles and practices of clan elders; the clan intrinsically underpins the government and the state.^[407] The result was intertwining of the modern and traditional, physically within the legislative branch and as a mediation body, and practically and symbolically as a link between the state and society, the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ and the external and the internal. Somaliland’s Guurti is a legislative body within the government, but it is also a clan body and as such its responsibilities reflect democratic demands as well as both traditional and symbolic expectations of the guurti.^[408]In institutionalizing the Guurti, Somaliland established a hybrid political order as a key component of its statebuilding strategy. But Somaliland’s hybridity went beyond just the composition and practice of the institutions; the utilization, integration and dependence on the clan and clan governance mechanisms makes both practical and symbolic traditional governance part of the statebuilding process and part of the state. Whilst the aim of the SNM had been creating a democratic government in Somalia, after the declaration of independence this goal became one for Somaliland. As Abdullahi Duale articulates, however, ‘[y]ou just cannot impose democracy. It has to come from within’. He goes on to argue that Somaliland had to create a government from the bottom up, and they had to ‘do it [their] own way’.^[409] For Somaliland, this meant including traditional structures of governance in what would become a democratic government, not only for the sake of stability but more importantly for legitimacy of the ongoing process of statebuilding, of the government and of the state itself. Whilst certainly not the only actor in Somaliland’s statebuilding project, the clan acts as not only an actor but also a foundational structure, making it central to the overall project.^[410] This chapter examines the foundational role and evolution of the clan as a political and legitimizing actor as well as the process of ‘locally owning’ the state. Beginning with the role of the clan during the liberation struggle, this chapter examines the foundations of the state and nation-building processes, focusing on the inclusion of the clan and traditional practice, building the state from within and the legitimizing functions those served.

The Clan and the Council of Elders: A Pillar of the SNM

For Somali society, ‘[t]he clan is everything. It is the basis of all. Social, economic, political, all’.^[411] Historically, ‘[c]ollective action through kinship’ provided physical, political, social and economic security.^[412] As power increasingly centralized in the country under barre, Somalis turned to the clan for provision and protection. In Somaliland, where the clan system had been less disrupted by events such as colonization and government practices than other areas of Somalia, this clan allegiance and dependence, together with the influence of elders over their clans, contributed to the success of the liberation movement throughout the long campaign against barre. It is during this period that the institutionalized Guurti emerged as a mechanism of centralized governance, a role that would become a component of centralized government. It was also during this period that the social foundations for the Somaliland state were laid.

The first SNM constitution, created in 1981, mandated that clan units should be respected in any new government and that cooperation between the clans should be based on customary law (xeer) rather than through government mandates or force.^[413] The SNM constitution also gave clan elders an important role as grassroots decision makers; a role which would later be elevated to a much larger scale.

With this recognition of the centrality and importance of the clan, the SNM proposed combining ‘the advantages of Somali democracy and egalitarianism with the benefits of modern national government’;^[414] by elevating the concept of xeer to the national level and utilizing traditional practices in conjunction with modern democratic principles and practices the SNM anticipated effective, fair and peaceful governance in Somalia. this amalgamation of modern democracy and traditional Somali clan governance was also seen as the ideal way to address the issue of ‘destructive clannism’, a recurring problem in post-colonial Somalia and one that was a significant factor in the establishment of Barre’s draconian anti-clan policies. By incorporating the clan rather than removing it or outlawing it, the SNM envisioned a disaggregated federal system with regional clan-based administrations responsible for the delivery of most public and political goods. As Drysdale notes, by placing primacy in the clan as a useful, necessary and stabilizing element in a new government rather than as a divisive political factor, the SNM was successful in reversing attitudes against clannism that had been prevalent under barre.^[415] The proposal of decentralized rule throughout Somalia reflected the reality of clan dominance in geographic regions within Somalia, and also expressed both fears of oppression and nationalist desires existent amongst some clans, including the Isaaq. Devolution of power to the regional governments would place the majority of Somaliland under Isaaq rule and the majority of Isaaq under Somaliland rule.^[416] By using the clan structures as a part of a federal democratic government, the leadership of the pre-1991 SNM envisioned the creation of a stable, and safe, political system in Somalia.

The Isaaq-dominated SNM also fully utilized the clan system and clan loyalties within the structure of the movement itself. Although the Isaaq clan is sub-divided into powerful sub-clan groupings, the concept of clan balance determined leadership within the movement, with the senior positions in the SNM rotated amongst the various sub-clans to ensure Isaaq solidarity and cooperation. in the broader movement, individuals were of lesser importance than the group; a practice that was demonstrated by the exclusion of certain SNM supporters from the minority Gadabuursi and Darood clans as they were unable to ‘carry their clans with them’ in support of the movement. Clan distribution was also used to determine the collection of funds for the movement; operating funds for the SNM were collected in a similar manner to that of diya payments.^[417] From the beginning the SNM depended on the support of the clan groups for its continued operation and later, for its success. First almost entirely dependent on the Isaaq, the SNM eventually became more inclusive of all of the Somaliland clans.

Whilst some viewed the Isaaq exclusivity of the SNM as tribalism or extreme Isaaq nationalism, an explanation based upon the practicalities of clan exclusivity is more likely than any extremist agenda. Barre’s oppression against the Isaaq clan was seen by many as justification for action against the regime, and increased totalitarian measures experienced in the northwest fueled Isaaq support for the SNM prior to the start of the war. As Somali clans act collectively when threatened, even with sub-clan divisions and competition within the Isaaq clan itself, a unified position was possible because of barre’s policy against the Isaaq as a whole. Because of this, gathering needed logistical support from the Isaaq was less complex than it would have been if other clans and their specific considerations or grievances had been included. Also, an element of trust played into the Isaaq exclusivity. When members of the Hawiye clan, which comprised the majority of the United Somali Congress (USC) in Somalia, approached the SNM asking to take part in the SNM Congress in London, they were refused participation as it was suspected that the Hawiye were complicit with the barre regime and inclusion of the Hawiye would introduce the risk of internal SNM policies and actions being passed on to the dictator. Although elements of Isaaq nationalism cannot be entirely discounted, the functioning of the Somali clan system creates a situation in which depending on a single clan is more practical than being all inclusive.

During its time in London, the involvement of clan leadership in the SNM had been important for negotiating support within the UK and other areas with large Isaaq populations. Following its move to Ethiopia clan elders were tasked with a more active role, thus became entrenched in the operations of the movement. Because of its difficult history with the Somali population in the Ogaden, the Ethiopian government viewed all Somalis as being problematic and treated them as such. The Ogaden War also made the Ethiopian government wary of the intention of liberation movements, particularly those based within the Somali population. As a result, the Ethiopian government forcefully acted against the SNM in an attempt to quash any potential conflicts within Ethiopia itself. For the SNM leadership, ‘that was a headache … we found out Barre had a fifth column in Ethiopia [fighting us]’.^[418] as a way of convincing the Ethiopian government of the validity of the SNM presence in the country, and that the SNM was not targeting the Ethiopian government but rather the Barre regime, the first SNM council of elders (guurti)^[419] was convened by the movement’s political leadership.

The guurti has long been integral to the Somali clan governance system. as the most respected council in the Somali-inhabited territories, the traditionally ad hoc body is responsible for resolving differences within or between the clans or to unite the clans in times of crisis or war and is therefore a vital component of clan governance. The SNM first utilized this traditional body in 1982 to reconcile between the SNM and the Ethiopian government, thereby elevating the guurti to a quasi-diplomatic position between a liberation movement and a foreign state government. As Hassan Issa, the man in charge of convening this first SNM Guurti, recalls, the predominantly Isaaq elders were ‘rounded up’ from the clans in Ethiopia and ‘taken in the back of a pick-up truck’ to Addis Ababa where they met with Ethiopian authorities to ‘educate’ them about the SNM.^[420] When asked why the elders were tasked with this rather than a political or military figure, Issa simply replied, ‘[I]t’s Africa’.^[421] The SNM leadership felt that the elders, including two sultans, would garner more respect from the Ethiopian authorities than an official from the liberation movement as traditional figures would be more trusted than a political or military representative. The utilization of the elders in this regard was for a very specific purpose: to invoke respect from the Ethiopian authorities in order to garner Ethiopian support for the SNM. According to Issa, the guurti ‘did a fantastic job’ and the clan body therefore became a tool for the SNM.^[422] As such, the body assumed its traditional role and became a mediation and reconciliation body for the movement. With the first SNM Guurti, however, how the clan was used changed as this new form of guurti, albeit a body tasked with reconciliation and mediation within the Somali population, also took on the added role of convincing and campaigning actors outside the Somali population on behalf of the SNM. Through this, the clan became a tool of the movement and the utilization of the guurti by the SNM made the traditional institution a part of the movement’s apparatus.

This quasi-political incarnation of the Guurti thus emerged as a created institution, acting first as a mediator between the SNM and the Ethiopian government and later between the SNM and the Somali population. When the SNM was expelled from Ethiopia, the movement was forced to look elsewhere for the resources needed to maintain its campaign. This changed situation brought about the re-emergence of the formal SNM Guurti. The second incarnation worked in the same manner as the previous body, but this time the elders were co-opted to garner the support of Ethiopian Somalis as well as the large Somaliland refugee population that had crossed the border following attacks by the Somalia military. Under the SNM clan elders were brought together to serve a specific purpose: to further the cause of the liberation movement. The eventual permanency of the SNM Guurti as an institution moved it away from its traditional ad hoc and decentralized nature. Instead of the elders convening and exercising power and control outside the purview of the state or central political body in response to a specific situation as traditional guurti had done, the created Guurti became a body that was dispatched on behalf of the SNM. The ad hoc council was thus transformed into a mobile political body that became a valuable component of the SNM leadership.

Even though the targets of Barre’s attacks in the north were primarily the Isaaq, all the northern clans were affected by the violence. Because many of the attacks were in retaliation for SNM actions and raids into Somaliland, though, support for the SNM within both in Somaliland and Ethiopia faced uncertainty as suffering increased. In targeting the Isaaq, Barre was not only fighting against those he viewed as rebellious, but also outwardly identifying the Isaaq and the SNM as the root cause of the suffering of the non-Isaaq population. Barre’s divide-and-rule tactic threatened the survival of the SNM, as in continuing their actions the liberation movement was creating a situation in which it could have been defeated by the people it was trying to liberate. Because of this, the SNM was forced to move away from its Isaaq exclusivity in order to incorporate the other clans into the movement’s operations and garner the support of the Somaliland population as a whole. Once again, the SNM utilized the clan elders, dispatching the Guurti to reconcile with the non-Isaaq clans and to bring them into the support base of the SNM. the Guurti was therefore tasked with linking the active SNM struggle to the new cross-clan refugee population as well as those remaining in the cities, and as the war continued so did the Guurti in negotiating with the clans and widening the support base for the SNM in northern Somalia.^[423] The SNM Guurti continued this role when the SNM moved its base into Somaliland in 1988, and by 1990 the SNM and the Guurti had expanded to include all Somaliland clans.^[424] By April 1990 the Guurti was formally institutionalized into the SNM governing structure as a separate branch of the leadership, making the traditional structure a permanent institution and giving it a leading role in the liberation movement.^[425] The Guurti is widely credited with obtaining logistical, financial and military support necessary for the SNM to move into Somalia, allowing it to directly confront Barre’s troops. According to Dr Aden Abokor:

[t]he only institution supporting the SNM was the institution of the clan. Everything was a contribution from the clan. Guns came from the clan. People came from the clan. Food came from the clan. Everything came from the clan.^[426]

However, despite the new cross-clan base, ‘[a]s the scope of military operations widened and intensified the clan basis of units became, if anything, more sharply delineated’.^[427] During the period of all-out war against Barre (1988–1990), the SNM had five ‘regular’ regiments comprised of the major Isaaq sub-clans, and other clans were encouraged to create their own fighting factions instead of joining one of the Isaaq regiments.^[428] As a result, SNM military units were formed along strict clan and sub-clan lines with each unit fighting primarily within their own territory. To avoid clashes and misunderstandings between sub-clans, the SNM Guurti strove to ensure balance and cooperation between the clan units fighting for the movement.^[429] During the liberation struggle ‘the $6 million question was how to involve the masses’.[430] The solution reached by the SNM was the utilization of clan loyalties and governance. The elders were a key element in this, acting as a driving force by ‘spreading the word of revolt and win[ning] support’ of the Somaliland population both within Somalia and in Ethiopia.^[431] Because of the relationship between the Guurti and society, and therefore the SNM and the people, the elders continually acted as a point of reassurance for the people during the conflict. Following the devastation of the civil war and the collapse of the government in Mogadishu, the people of Somaliland turned to the familiar and trusted clans and the ostensibly apolitical elders for provision and security. The Guurti therefore ‘came into their own, empowered by civil war and devastation’.^[432] Taking on the vital role of reconciliation in a war-torn society, the body once again became an agent of reassurance, mediation and leadership in post-war Somaliland.

The National Conferences: Traditional Peacemaking and Modern State-Making

During the war the SNM ‘was able to not feed war against Barrism with Isaaqism’ and eventually became a movement for all of the north.^[433] Lewis notes that the SNM was successful in gaining the support of the population because it was a ‘grassroots movement which sprang from the tribal structures of Somali society and not a movement based on the theoretical discourse of a few intellectuals or the blind determination of a few hotheads’.^[434] The democratic nature of the SNM, together with its multifaceted decentralized leadership, are counted among the more valued legacies inherited from the movement by post-war Somaliland.^[435] A component of this leadership, the institutionalization of traditional leadership, is also an invaluable legacy that contributed greatly to the establishment and maintenance of stability in the territory following the end of barre’s rule.

Although the SNM had incorporated all of the Somaliland clans in some capacity by the end of the war, it was still seen by many as ‘an armed expression of the Isaaq people’.^[436] As such, tensions between the Isaaq and those clans that had largely supported of Barre – the Gadabuursi and Ise (Dir sub-clans), and the Dhulbahante and the Warsangeli (Darood sub-clans)^[437] – threatened a continuation of the civil war in the north. Because of this potential, following the end of the conflict with Barre the SNM and the Guurti took steps towards the regional reconciliation they deemed necessary for the successful implementation of a federal Somalia government. As Hassan Issa acknowledges, the SNM and its supporters ‘wanted something greater than revenge’.^[438] Despite the continued opposition, ‘given the role played by the marginal clans in the anti-SNM campaign, the SNM’s behavior in the very first few days of the takeover had a great importance for the possibility of northern cohesion’.^[439] in areas where pro-barre and anti-SNM elements were strong, the first point of concern was limiting retributive between the various clan groupings; many involved in this process recall the SNM’s desire for forgiveness rather than retribution against those who had opposed them and, in some instances, their victory. The SNM leadership discerned that continued fighting or forceful domination would only hinder achieving the end goal of democratic government in Somalia; before the needs for democracy could be addressed the fractures within society needed to first be closed. According to Ali Farah, the clans ‘needed reconciliation between them rather than the democratic process. They needed the Guurti’s help for this … [they] changed confrontation into negotiation’.^[440] One vital component of the clan system is negotiation and compromise leading to co-existence of competing familial groups; peaceful or cooperative inter- and intra-clan relations are balanced upon carefully negotiated agreements reached by the ‘peacemaker’ clan elders, often within a Guurti.[441] The SNM heavily depended upon these elders as a vital reconciliation and mediation body in the process of reconciling and reconstructing a war-torn society and in creating a state. Reconciliation was the leading priority, and through a succession of national clan conferences the elders, as both a traditional guurti as well as an institution of the SNM, were again utilized to bring the clans together to support the larger project. Even though the SNM and the Guurti did not gain the full support of all the clans – opposition to the boundaries of Somaliland and the existence of the government continues today, primarily in the eastern provinces of Sanaag and Sool – the actions of the SNM and the Guurti are credited with success in reducing violence in the territory and establishing peaceful foundations upon which to build the bigger political project.

Somali society is characterized by confrontation, and military strength is the final sanction in any relationship. Therefore as the victors of war it was the responsibility and the right of the SNM to take the lead in the post-war north; the SNM was empowered from within. as Samatar articulates, however, ‘I can recall no other example of a liberation movement which won power through the barrel of the gun and which was simultaneously so uninterested in ruling with its gun’.^[442] Because of its position of power as the victor the SNM was ‘able to sue for peace from a position of strength’ rather than demanding compliance through force.^[443] Minorities did not have much choice other than comply with the actions of the militarily superior SNM, as ‘they had been given peace on a silver platter’.^[444] Although the initiative for reconciliation in post-war Somaliland came from the SNM, the leadership again relied heavily on clan elders to negotiate a settlement between the clans as well as between society and the liberation movement.^[445] In post-conflict Somaliland, community meetings (shir) involving the clans and led by guurti became an important component of negotiating a peaceful settlement and creating stability throughout the territory.^[446] These ‘national’ shir, in addition to being peacebuilding conferences, resulted in the creation of the structure, function and purpose of the Somaliland government. Importantly, these shir also firmly rooted the Somaliland state in grassroots governance mechanisms, establishing local ownership from the start and domestically legitimizing the state not only through the process but also through the actors involved. The Somaliland state came from within.

The Berbera Conference, 1991

It is important to note that national shir were rare occurrences in northern Somalia, with the last one prior to 1991 being held in 1954 in response to the British ceding a portion of Somaliland grazing area to Ethiopia.^[447] With the need for inter and intraclan reconciliation, however, a national meeting was the optimal prospect. The first of these was the brotherhood conference of the northern clans held in Berbera in February 1991. at what Guurti member Haji Abdi Hussein refers to as ‘the declaration of Peace conference’, the SNM leadership, various Isaaq clan elders and representatives of the minority clans came together to begin the reconciliation process.^[448] In addition to the SNM Guurti, local guurti and individual clan elders were also part of the peace process, and at Berbera they were charged with the important task of negotiating and maintaining peace locally. Although convened by the SNM leadership, the Berbera conference was composed of and managed by clan elders, and it was this conference that ‘demonstrated the skillfulness of the traditional elders in peacemaking and conflict management, a sign that confirms the richness of the peace making culture of Somaliland communities’.^[449]

The objective of the Berbera Conference was to restore trust and confidence between the Isaaq and the non-Isaaq clans, and the start of this reconciliation process was the most obvious outcome of the shir. This conference achieved what one observer described as ‘the SNM’s conciliatory policy of peaceful coexistence between all the clans’,^[450] and at Berbera a ‘surprising degree of peace [was] secured, largely through the efforts of the traditional clan elders’.^[451] Holding a national conference to address post-war issues and possibilities set a precedent for post-war Somaliland. Although this first conference differed from those which followed in that it was convened and led by the SNM not the clans, it nevertheless laid the groundwork for larger conferences that would take place between April 1991 and February 1997. Instead of exhibiting authority through force, the SNM leadership consented to a peaceful community and clan-led process through these conferences, thereby invocating clan elders as those responsible for peace and reconciliation in post-war Somaliland.^[452] Through this, they would also become an important actor in the statebuilding process.

The Burco Conference, 1991

The first conference following Berbera was the Grand Conference of Northern clans held in Burco in April and May 1991. Convened and run by clan elders, it was at this conference that they exhibited the powerful position they had within the territory.^[453] At Burco the former SNM Guurti asserted itself as an autonomous force and firmly established its role as an institution in the leadership of the territory. As Höhne notes, the Burco conference was the starting point for the new political powers that the Guurti has gained since 1991.^[454]

The leaders and decision makers at Burco were clan elders, but other sectors of Somaliland society also took part. The purpose of the conference was to finalize and formalize the peace agreements that had been reached at the Berbera Conference and to continue discussion of Somaliland’s place in the unified state of Somalia. However, the conference agenda was altered in May when Somaliland’s independence was declared and creating a state became a primary concern. at Burco the elders tasked the SNM leadership with heading a new transitional government, not only appointing the membership but also in effect transferring sovereign power to the transitional government. The Guurti became an integral component of this new government, with the elders who were delegates at the Burco Conference filling the membership of the interim upper house of parliament. As both a legislative body and an advisory council the Guurti existed as both a traditional body and an institution within the government. This duality made the body concurrently both internal and external to the new government, sitting both within and above the institutions and the process.

In the early years of the emerging state the most important role for the Guurti was that of peacemaking and peacekeeping, and a significant accomplishment of the Guurti was grassroots reconciliation. Haji Abdi Hussein notes that the Guurti knew that a government could not be initiated with hostility remaining in the community, particularly if that government was to exercise power-sharing between the clans. Therefore, in the capacity of reconciliation the Guurti was a ‘stepping stool for independence’.^[455] during the two-year rule of the SNM the Guurti continued to expand its place within the new state and to entrench its position as a governing institution, undertaking or participating in major peace and security building initiatives such as demobilizing militias and assisting local guurti in quelling outbreaks of violence. Twenty local peace and reconciliation conferences took place between the Burco Conference and the next national shir in 1993, including the Sheikh Conference in October 1992 at which the government gained control of the port of Berbera.^[456] Whilst these were not national conferences, the new Somaliland Guurti was involved in most, sending delegates to the local negotiations. As an active presence in both local and national governance structures and initiatives, the Guurti’s influence extended far beyond that of the troubled transitional Tuur administration. During this period ‘the Guurti was more interactive and productive than the government’ and the body grew in importance and power as it was through the clan institution that continuity of the government was maintained.[457] Through the institutional representation of the traditional clan structure, the body was able to include the communities and clans not only in the government but also in creating the foundations for the state and the state apparatus through the utilization of traditional governance practices.

The Borama Conference, 1993

In 1993 Somaliland held its next national conference in Borama, the ‘capital’ of the Gadabuursi clan. The decision to hold the conference amongst the Gadabuursi was a way to show that the state being created was not an Isaaq one.[458] The clan elders took further steps in removing the association with Isaaq dominance when they transferred rule in the territory from the Isaaq-associated SNM to a civilian administration. The peaceful transfer to civilian rule marked the start of the process of creating a democratic state in Somaliland. One hundred and fifty voting members from all the Somaliland clans took part in the clan controlled five-month long Borama Conference in what Prunier identifies as a showcase of the Somali decision making process.[459] As much a healing process as a political meeting, the Borama conference became an arena in which the balance between the clans was of prime importance. As Prunier notes, ‘electing the new president became almost a side issue … the political and cultural display of social dynamics became essential’.[460] As the first national meeting since the declaration of independence, grievances about the direction of Somaliland were aired and dynamic negotiations continued.

at Borama the Guurti again proved its dual internal-external capacity and importance by not only continuing as a legislative component of the new government, but also in its advisory capacity by creating the institutions of the state and determining their membership. Just as it had been for the interim government, the civilian government’s authority originated from the clan elders. As Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’ states ‘[a]fter we settled things, we called the government to come to us’.^[461] At the Borama conference the Guurti assumed the powers of the SNM administration after the liberation movement relinquished control of the government, and therefore assumed the power of governing the territory. For a brief period in April and May 1993, the Guurti was the government.^[462] Although rule by the Guurti was only for the duration of transition from military to civilian rule, it was during this time that the trust and respect of the elders became palpable; the elders holding onto power and not continuing the transition to a civilian rule was not a consideration by those involved. Following the 1991 Burco conference, the Guurti and other clan elders had emerged with a reputation of being selfless, wise, courageous and peaceful because of the manner in which they had managed the conference and the successful reconciliation efforts. As Dr Abdirahman Yusuf Artan recalls, the elders ‘really got their name and reputation there’.^[463] The delegates at Borama carried this reputation with them, and their voluntary participation in the conference and the administrative transition exhibited their commitment to a peaceful and stable future for the territory. With the Guurti viewed as the neutral body that could be entrusted with handing the government back to the people, it was the elders at the Borama conference that chose, appointed and empowered the new civilian administration headed by Egal.^[464] Because of this role, the Guurti is often considered to be the ‘father’ of Somaliland and its success.^[465] Mohammed said Gees acknowledges the institution’s foundational importance in identifying the Guurti as ‘the seed’ of the Somaliland government. Gees takes this further, though, in recognizing not only the Guurti’s capacity to anoint the civilian administration with governing power, but also the position of the elders as the metaphorical rock of the Somaliland state: ‘because of them, there is rule of law, order, a social system, etc. [they were] absolutely necessary for state-building’.^[466] In addition to the body’s role in appointing the government, the Guurti also acted in an advisory, almost parental capacity to the new government to ensure that the statebuilding process stayed on track. The Guurti was the backbone supporting the new state. The role of a central and permanent Guurti developed significantly during and after the Borama conference. Whereas under the transitional Guurti had been sanctioned as the peacemakers and the keepers of traditional, religious and cultural values, it was at Borama that the current role of the Guurti was constitutionally codified within the National Charter as a body with both legislative and traditional or cultural responsibilities within the hybrid government.^[467] This new role inarguably again changed the nature of the clan body by placing it firmly within the political structure of the state. Although it maintained its stabilizing influence, following Borama the Guurti went from being a primarily reconciliatory body to becoming part of the political machinery of Somaliland.

The Hargeisa Conference, 1996–1997

One final major national conference was held in Hargeisa in 1996–1997. Partly in response to a renewal of violence in Somaliland, and partly as a means of ending deadlock between Egal and the Parliament over the drafting of a permanent constitution, the Hargeisa conference was a means of bringing together a fragmented population as well as a divided government. Whilst previous conferences were clan-based conferences with the onus being on the Guurti for reconciliation and beginning the creation of a state, the Hargeisa conference was a political conference that was labelled a ‘national conference’ rather than a ‘clan conference’. Although the Hargeisa conference was announced by the house of Elders, it was convened and financed by Egal’s government rather than the people and the diaspora as past conferences had been. Petitions to establish a neutral guurti and preparatory committee were rejected by the government and the nearly 300 participants were hand-picked by the president.^[468] With Egal controlling so much of the process, many maintain that the Hargeisa conference was more an exercise of Egal’s control over the peace process and the state, including the Guurti, than a shir in the way that Berbera, Burco and Borama had been.^[469] Even though the Guurti was instrumental in reaching a peace agreement that ended the renewed violence, the body’s internal-external position was changing as the Guurti became more entrenched in Egal’s government; the dual positioning of the Guurti became an important resource for the president. The strong rule of Egal overshadowed the role of the Guurti, and as Bradbury notes, ‘Egal’s influence over the conference damaged the credibility of a national shir as a mechanism for political change in the future’.^[470] These changing power relationships, leading to and part of the alteration and arguable politicization of the Guurti, have had a significant impact on the present-day government, posing challenges and raising questions about the future role of the clan institution in the central government.

After nearly five months of negotiations, the Hargeisa Conference resulted in significant changes for Somaliland. A peace agreement was signed, bringing an end to the fighting, and Egal was re-selected as president. More noteworthy, however, the conference resulted in the start of a transition from the community or clan based (beel) government system that had thus far characterized the government to a multi-party democratic system.^[471] An interim constitution reflecting this was established and the process of creating a permanent constitution was began. It was under this constitution, ratified in 2001, that the current position, powers and responsibilities of the Guurti were established. It is this constitutional placement and the symbolic role of the traditional structure within a democratizing government that is the focus of the next section.

Table 6.1 Key Somaliland National Conferences

Note: table compiled by author using Somaliland academy for Peace and development records; Somaliland Guurti archives; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit.

The Constitutional Guurti

Although the shape and function of the Guurti has been developing since its inception in 1982, the 2001 Constitution officially codifies its role in Somaliland’s multi-party democratic government. Articles 57 to 79 of the Somaliland constitution specify both legislative and traditional duties of the house. Constitutionally, members of the House of Elders must be at least forty-five years old and must be male. In contrast to the House of Representatives, there are no formal education requirements other than a ‘good knowledge of the religion [Islam]’ and being ‘versed in the traditions’.^[472] There is also no stipulation for the member to hold a titled position. In terms of clan composition, following the Hargeisa conference the membership of the house was amended to be more inclusive of all the clans of Somaliland so as to widen participation and representation. as a result, the membership is currently ‘selected according to a consociational rule which divides posts according to a delicate balance respectful of clan weight and the right of minorities’,^[473] with the Isaaq subclans holding the majority of seats. The constitutional term of office for the House of elders is six years, although constitutional ambiguity over how the membership will be chosen in the future has yet to be resolved, leading to significant debate and, as will be examined in chapter 7, a re-examination of the placement of the traditional body in the central government.

The current membership of the Guurti was nominated and selected by their sub-clan and their appointments were confirmed by the president. There are currently no specifications on how the members are chosen by their sub-clans. In terms of accountability, although many members claim to represent all of Somaliland, whether they represent their sub-clan or all the people is debated. Many in the House of Representatives, however, argue that as they are not checked by the population through elections, the Guurti members are accountable only to themselves and the president. Accusations also surface regarding the urban-rural distribution of seats, with claims that the majority of Guurti seats are held by subclan members from the major cities, resulting in the nomadic population and those in the rural areas being under-represented in the upper house.^[474] Some within the government and civil society in Somaliland also argue that as a traditional body, the Guurti reached its pinnacle at the Borama conference, after which it was coopted by Egal as a political tool. Others, however, maintain that the traditional nature of the Guurti has not been eroded and is in fact the strongest facet of the Somaliland government.^[475] Regardless of the criticisms, the inclusion of the Guurti is significant not only in the context of stability in peacebuilding and statebuilding, but also because of its perceived deviance. Three key roles of the Guurti in the government and the statebuilding process are widely identified: as a legislative organ; as the representation of the clan system and Somali traditions; and as the mediation and advisory body.

The Modern: The Legislative Body

The legislative role of the House of Elders is the most defined of its roles, with duties pertaining to legislation clearly specified in the constitution. As a component of the institutional state apparatus, constitutionally the house of elders has sole purview over matters relating to religion, culture, traditions and security, thereby granting the upper house total power in issues pertaining to those areas. Its primary purpose in this regard is to ensure that proposed bills do not contradict cultural or religious laws and stipulations. Although constitutionally there is limited provision for the body or individual members to originate legislation pertaining to other areas, in practice this is often overlooked.^[476] in its legislative capacity, the house also acts in an advisory capacity, exercising powers of review and revision over legislation passed by the lower house; a responsibility which is both its most important and its most contested legislative power. When asked, members of the upper house respond that the legislative function of the Guurti is an important component of the Somaliland government, just as the Senate is important in the United States and the House of Lords in Britain.^[477] Indeed, members of the Guurti often compare the body’s legislative capacity to those Western legislative institutions. However, in Somaliland the utilization of the unelected body as a presidential tool, especially under Egal, as well as lack of resolution over the selection of members, creates concern over the power of the house in its legislative advisory capacity, a concern that will be discussed in the following chapter. Whilst the legislative role of the Guurti is subject to debate, in terms of the statebuilding process it is secondary to the body’s other roles. Resolving questions about the institutionalized legislative role of the house is a component of the ongoing statebuilding process, but the remaining two roles are more significant for the early stages of building the Somaliland state. Its role as a legislative body gave the clan governance mechanism a place within the formal institutions of the government, but it also formalized the role of the clan within the governance structures of the modern state.

The Traditional: Representing the Clan System

Due to the structure and functions of the Somali clan system, sustained cooperation between the clans and sometimes sub-clans through institutions is difficult. Because of this, inter-clan governing structures in Somali society were historically ad hoc as they were adapted well to the needs of the nomadic Somali population as well as to the self-sufficiency of the clan system.^[478] A permanent clan council was unparalleled in Somali society prior to the establishment of the Guurti. During the transition from the barre regime to a Somaliland government, however, the lasting presence of the traditional body became vital to the success and survival of the nascent state. Because of this, the nature of the inclusion of the Guurti in the governing of Somaliland was ‘based on the idea, the understanding, that in Somali culture elders always had a unique role’.^[479]

Whilst the Guurti’s legislative purpose is clearly laid out in the constitution, another significant role of the body is more symbolic in nature: representing the clan system. Although the protection of tradition and culture is a mandated responsibility for the Guurti, its role in this regard goes beyond the legislative capacity articulated in the constitution. Whilst the house of elders is a component of the modern institutional structure, the Guurti is also the inclusion of the clan that the SNM deemed necessary for the success of the state and democracy in Somaliland. Thus, the house of elders, as both a legislative organ and the institutionalization of the traditional governing structures, is a permanent representation of the Somaliland clans in the government. As one member of the upper house states, including the clan through the council of elders ensures that the government in Somaliland ‘matches [Somaliland] culture’.^[480] In this capacity, the House of Elders plays the vital role of not only linking the government to the people, but also ensuring that the functions and benefits of the clan system are not lost in the modern government. In this role, the inclusion of the post-war era clan body – a trusted body of leadership and governance – is not only a point of continuity and reassurance within the forming government and state, but it is also a domestically legitimizing actor.

In this role the Guurti also acts as a safety net. As Mohammed Hassan ‘Gani’ observes, when the state is weak, absent or violent the clan fills the gaps of social, economic, political and security provision typically managed by the state.^[481] In the former British Protectorate, clan structures were largely maintained out of necessity throughout the first Somalia government and Barre’s regime as provision and security came primarily from the clan rather than the state. Once the state collapsed and ‘peace and reconciliation were the most immediate need’, traditional and religious leaders once again ‘organized themselves to fill the vacuum of no central authority’.^[482] Hassan Issa notes that in the nomadic society the only authority was the clan, so it is ‘natural’ for those authorities to re-emerge outside the purview of the state in times of crisis or state weakness.^[483] Therefore, during the creation of the state in Somaliland, because the state was ‘weak’ the ‘Guurti [was] everything’.^[484] In post-war Somaliland, however, the clan authority did not re-emerge uncontested as the sole authority, nor is it being empowered external to the state apparatus. in creating the government, Somaliland’s leaders ‘ex post facto accepted and partly legalized existing power-positions that had developed during the times of civil war, state-collapse and state reconstruction’, drawing upon the powerful position that clan elders held during these times of crisis as a component of the foundations for the state.^[485] In post-barre Somaliland the state is empowering the continuation of this powerful position through the institutionalization of the clan, and as a result the authority of the clan is emerging within the state apparatus. At the same time, however, the clan authority is also affording legitimacy to the government domestically. The traditional authority that rose up during times of crisis and helped establish the foundations for the new state has not faded into the background upon the arrival of the government, but instead exists both within and alongside the central governing structure, creating a centralized and permanent amalgamation of state and clan.

Höhne notes that the Latin roots of the word ‘tradition’ (Tradere) mean ‘pass something’ or ‘hand something over’, observing that ‘[t]his points to the active, process-oriented aspect of tradition, which connects the present with the past in a dynamic way’.^[486] in other words, traditional leaders often ‘mediate the link between the past, present and future’^[487] with indigenous institutions ‘often represent[ing] ways of doing things that have been handed down through successive generations’. As such, ‘they are usually well-recognized and long accepted, and often carry the force of legitimacy’.^[488] As traditional authorities have roles that are ‘perceived as having a link to the past’, a positive association with the familiar governance structure grants then legitimacy from their followers.^[489] One member of the Somaliland House of Elders exemplifies these observations and associations in stating ‘[o]ur culture gives us the power’.^[490] As a former vice president of Somaliland also acknowledges, there must be an element of clan governance in the government in order to gain the confidence of the people.^[491] The people’s trust in the government is deeply entwined with the legitimacy held, and given, by the traditional authority.

In Somaliland, the Guurti is inextricably linked to both the state and the people through the common denominator of the pervasive clan. Because of this, the government institution has been in a position where it is both a part of the state and the society, as well as a bridge between the two, linking the state to society and society to the state and ‘hold[ing] together the government, society and culture’.^[492] With the introduction of a democratic government, the traditional authority in the government became a point of reassurance for a population that had very little, if any, experience of democracy. in this ‘Somaliland democracy’, the inclusion of the clan elders was a vital component as ‘culture makes the system stable’;^[493] in a time of upheaval and transition, the inclusion of the Guurti was an association to the familiar clan governance in an otherwise unfamiliar system. Whereas in many parts of the south the clan was a point of contention, in the north the leaders were able to utilize the clan to bridge the gap between the government project and the population. In its internal-external capacity, the Guurti became a chain linking the familiar forms of governance with the new; a tempering link that eased the creation of a central government in a territory that was understandably wary of centralized rule. Because of the ‘turbulent times’ and the recent history of Somaliland, it was not possible to ‘get rid of the old ways quickly’, thereby reinforcing the importance of the old in the new government. As a part of both the modern and the traditional, the upper house helped ease tensions in the transitions and transformations taking place in Somaliland. With the inclusion of the Guurti and by negotiating Somaliland culture and traditions with democracy and the modern state, the creators of the government and those that followed established a point of resilience that was invaluable in the socio-political upheaval that is statebuilding.

Because of the expressed legislative role of the body, many in the government argue that the inclusion of the traditional is merely symbolic, acting more as a point of reference and reassurance for the population than as a traditional body in practice. Few would dispute the importance of Guurti in this role, however, recognizing that the transition period would have been more difficult without the presence of the ‘old’ clan governance in the ‘new’ government. Just as it did during the SNM campaign and the immediate post-war reconciliation period, the Guurti’s place in reconciling the old and the new and mediating between the traditional and the modern, even if only as a symbolic presence, created stability and lent legitimacy to the government, making this a vital role of the body.

The Bridge: Mediator and Advisor

The role of the Guurti as a bridge extends beyond the symbolic representation of the clan system in a democratic government. This role also extends into another more practical function of the body: the mediation capacity of the council of elders. The constitution grants the upper house the power to advise and oversee the government as well as alert the house of representatives of any ‘shortcomings of the administration of the government’.^[494] These constitutional responsibilities have been broadly interpreted by the government and the body itself during the formation of the government, with considerable latitude conceded, resulting in the Guurti’s intended role as the mediating influence in Somaliland politics and the state formation process.^[495] As part of this, the upper house has been handed the responsibility to reconcile between branches of the government and more controversially, the power to extend the mandates of the branches of government if the need arises.

Whereas in its more symbolic role the house of elders connects the people to the government through the institution of the clan, here the Guurti acts in a quasijudicial manner that is similar to the historic role of the ad hoc clan councils as the Guurti becomes the mediator within the government itself. In this mediation role, the Guurti not only upholds its responsibility to ensure that the government actions do not contradict culture and tradition, but also ensures that contention within the government is resolved. One value of indigenous institutions is that they ‘reflect fundamental understandings among affected individuals, who must deal with each other within the context of a particular problem area on how to overcome dilemmas of collective action’.^[496] Whilst there is a broad range of situations in which this is applicable, including conflict resolution and development, it is also appropriate when discussing the Guurti’s role in intra-governmental reconciliation. During the process of statebuilding in Somaliland, the Guurti, as the representation of clan governance and also because of this, has repeatedly provided fora in which problems can be addressed and resolved, as well as in some instances acting as the referee in those fora. even though the body’s role in the statebuilding process changed following the Hargeisa conference as it became more closely and openly aligned with the Egal administration, the advisory capacity of the Guurti continued, ensuring its placement as a body both within and suspended outside the government. As one member of the House of Elders remarks, the continuing and complex internal-external placement of the Guurti has made the body ‘a bridge between the government [president] and the parliament’, even though it itself is a component of that parliament.^[497] As well as acting as a bridge, and sometimes a buffer, the upper house has also acted as a political seismograph, cautioning when the actions or inactions of the government pose a threat to stability in the state as a whole. Although this role has weakened in recent times, it was an important component of the early stages of statebuilding. Indeed, part of the upper house’s capacity in this role is to fill in where the government is weak, again reverting to clan governance as a fallback when it is needed for continuity and stability. Both the mediation and the advisory roles that have emerged derive from the Guurti’s traditional association, but with the upper house mediating and advising within a government of which it is a part it has been granted immeasurable power in determining the future course of the government and therefore itself.

The Guurti has regularly exerted its role as mediator and advisor, most notably when changes in the composite membership of the government has threatened stability or presented challenges to the state. Following the 2003 presidential election in which an 80 vote margin separated the winner and the runner-up, the Guurti negotiated the concession of the runner-up candidate; this intervention was viewed by many as a politically neutral action carried out in the interest of maintaining stability in the first major test of democratic elections in the territory. The result was a peaceful outcome, a continuation of the integrity of the government and the electoral process, and a smooth transition from an appointed to an elected presidency. The Guurti also exercised its role as mediator following the 2005 House of Representatives election. When the newly elected lower house held its first session, contention between the political parties over leadership of the house ensued. The resulting stalemate threatened to destabilize the government and undermine the election process. The Guurti intervened, negotiating an agreement between all three parties that gave control of the house to a coalition of the opposition parties.^[498] The Guurti is often looked to when an intra-governmental problem arises, and this quasi-judicial role has been invaluable in maintaining governmental stability during the process of statebuilding. In many ways, the upper house has ensured that political positions and relationships within the Somaliland government remain balanced, cooling hotspots before they can develop into serious threats to the continuation of the statebuilding and democratization processes. Changing attitudes towards the upper house and significant actions undertaken by the house itself, however, threaten this role. The members of the body are increasingly viewed as politicians rather than traditional elders, and the legitimacy stemming from the traditional nature of the body has been compromised.^[499] However, the changing nature of the body does not negate the role it has played to date in the statebuilding process.

in its advisory capacity the Guurti also acts as an overseer of the government, testing the state of affairs of both the government and the territory and advising on what is needed for continued stability. Whilst this responsibility could fall under the house’s security responsibilities, in practice this has extended beyond that outlined in the constitution and instead reflects the role of the Guurti established in the 1993 Peace charter. This is most evidently expressed in the house’s ability to extend the mandates of the branches of government in times when it is determined that elections or other membership changes would be impossible, impractical or destabilizing. This power allows for the Guurti alone to extend the term of office of the members of government and also allows for the body to propose the postponement of elections. Whilst the Guurti itself cannot officially cancel or reschedule the electoral process, by extending the mandate of a governmental body or institution the house is effectively doing just that. Prior to the first presidential election in 2003 the Guurti exercised the power of extension in order to ensure that elections took place only when stability and logistical capacity were assured. The mandate of the lower house was also extended in 2005 to allow more time to prepare for elections. More controversially, in 2006, the Guurti extended its own mandate, citing election fatigue and uncertainty over the procedures for determining membership of the house as the reasons for postponement. This power was again exercised with the postponement of the 2008 local and presidential elections as security concerns in the eastern provinces of Sanaag and Sool were deemed prohibitive to conducting national elections. the presidential election was postponed a further three times due a myriad of considerations, including problems with the voter registration process, infighting between the political parties over when the elections would be held and deep mistrust and suspicion within and between political actors within Somaliland, including the Guurti.^[500] Presidential elections were ultimately held in 2010, and the result was a peaceful process and a prompt and peaceful transition of power between political parties. However, the crisis over the elections, a crisis which had begun with the Guurti’s 2006 self-extension, posed a severe and significant threat to not only democracy but also political stability in Somaliland. The Guurti’s power of extension has proved itself problematic, and because of the declined impartiality and increased politicization of the body the power of extension must be curtailed for the sake of future stability and continued political development in Somaliland (see Chapter 7). Indeed, the 2006 and 2010 crises effectively ended the Guurti’s role in this capacity, and it is questionable as to whether the body maintains the trust needed to act in its role as government advisor. However, during the early stages of creating and strengthening the state and modern democratic practices, the Guurti’s advisory and mediation role within the government was invaluable in ensuring continuity of and trust in the democratization process and to maintain stability in the territory.

Whilst all the roles of the Guurti define its capacity as an integral component of both the government and society, the Guurti membership widely maintains that their most important contributions are keeping the peace, both within the territory and within the government. Interestingly, however, the body views itself as a legislative body first and a reconciliation or mediation body second.^[501] In its self-written public presentation of purpose, the Guurti portrays itself as a modern governmental institution, with its legislative capacity of primary importance.^[502] In speaking with numerous members of the house, they indicate that maintaining the legislative position is a means of ensuring a future role for the body; by positioning the body as legislative rather than reconciliatory, there is justification for the house within a modern democratic government. Some members also discuss the legislative position in relation to the British House of Lords or the American senate, removing the connotation of the clan and positing the institution as a legislative body akin to those in Western states. In doing this, however, those members may be looking to the future, but they are also omitting the vital advisory, mediation and reconciliation roles that have been exercised by the Guurti and were definitive of its position within the government. As a legislative body the Guurti is an institution of modern government, but its duality as a body both within and external to the government provided the guidance and bridges without which the successes in Somaliland would not be as marked.

Conclusions

although the traditional guurti has been altered by circumstance and political actions to fit its contemporary institutionalized role, the trusted clan association has contributed to the upper house’s success, not only in the area of security but also in obtaining popular support for the government and the introduction of democratic concepts and practices. As Lewis identifies:

[I]n comparison with the heavy-handed and largely unsuccessful Un and other international efforts to impose peace from the top in southern Somalia, this [peace and statebuilding in Somaliland] was an impressive testimony to the effectiveness of traditional grass-roots Somali diplomacy.^[503]

Leaders in the north were able to utilize the clan – both practically and symbolically – to facilitate the introduction of a central democratic government and also to ensure continued stability throughout the statebuilding process. Potentially an area of competing legitimacy in post-war Somaliland,^[504] the legitimizing power of the clan was accounted for through its inclusion in the government and the state. This inclusion was a benefit to the process. Indeed, through negotiation, mediation and facilitation, clan elders, through countless local shir and guurti, have contributed to the maintenance of peace, stability and co-existence within a potentially volatile and often politically fragile society.^[505] With the introduction of democratic government, the traditional authority in the government, tasked with guidance as well as restraint, became a point of reassurance for a population that had very little, if any, experience of democracy and had very violent experiences with centralized rule. According to Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, those responsible for the creation of Somaliland had observed that they could not ‘jump from the lowest part of the ladder to the top; we needed the Guurti, and we needed them to make the clans share something. This was preferable to imposing democracy that no one knew’.^[506] With the inclusion of the Guurti and by negotiating Somaliland culture and traditions with democracy and the modern state, the creators of the government and those that followed founded a system of governance that works for Somaliland. Even though the role of the clan in the government may be largely symbolic, nonetheless it has been an important component of the governing of Somaliland.

Positing the traditional body within the government, however, further altered the traditional notion of the body and changed the nature of the council of elders as the historically apolitical body became a legislative institution in a multi-party democratic government structure. Although the Guurti does in many ways resemble the traditional body that negotiated agreements and established customary law, it is also now directly implicated in the political practice of creating legislation and functioning as a government institution, making political neutrality difficult if not impossible. Further, the Guurti is entrenched in the political realm as the advisor and referee of the government; even if the body does maintain impartiality, its involvement in this capacity makes it an intrinsic actor in the political process. Just as Mohammed said gees sees the Somali people as existing in both the Somali and the Western worlds, so does the Guurti, existing in both the old and new ways of governing in Somaliland.

Many in the Somaliland government claim that the both the SNM Guurti and the multifaceted house of elders is why peace has been sustained in Somaliland but not Somalia. The inclusion of clan governance did contribute to the stability of the territory and the political process, but one must be careful as to not place all the credit with the Guurti as other significant factors contributing to Somaliland’s success were also present. Certainly the benign neglect of the British colonizers and isolation in the unified state allowed for the continuation of clan practices and the emergence of a sense of solidarity in the face of neglect and violence. In addition, the dominance of the Isaaq in the territory and the SNM, and the SNM’s status of victor over Barre, helped ease the post-conflict transition to independent statehood and stability. The non-interference of the international community must also not be overlooked. Without the presence of foreign peacekeepers or statebuilders, Somaliland was able to foster peace and to domestically create a government, making it a Somaliland project rather than an international project as is seen in the south. Finally, as an internal-external actor the diaspora, through funding and political guidance, has had an incalculable impact. The inclusion of these other factors in the consideration of accomplishments in the north, however, does not minimize the role of the clan and of the grassroots process. Although the Guurti may have had more favorable conditions in which to work than it would have had in the south, this does not exclude the value of its presence in not only peace and reconciliation but also the creation of a government and a state. Somaliland was able to achieve what has been accomplished without the interference of the international community; and because the external influences were minimal, Somaliland was able to create a state in a way that was seen as best for Somaliland. Rather than the traditional authority acting as a backwards or unpredictable actor in the state, the inclusion of the clan, dependence on the clan and, when needed, primacy of the clan has been vital in the creation of a stable territory and a stable government in Somaliland. For Somaliland, the institutionalized traditional authority is not a sacrifice of acceptable statehood, but rather a necessity for acceptable statehood to be achieved in the emerging state.

Many within the government are apt to emphasize that the inclusion of the traditional sets the aspiring state apart from established Western states, but they also recognize that for Somaliland this deviation was essential for the introduction of the modern government. Influenced by external global discourses, those creating the Somaliland government incorporated normative ideals for success whilst at the same time tailoring these in order to prevent a repeat of past problems and failures of government. In Somaliland, history, culture and tradition were incorporated into the statebuilding process in order to foster stability; the state came from within Somaliland rather than as part of a package from the outside. Although the path has not been entirely smooth, the creation of a hybrid government in Somaliland has allowed for the statebuilding process to take place. However, as the government in Somaliland continues to stabilize and grow, and as democratic governance and practices in Somaliland continue to take hold, the necessity of the body in its traditionally associated capacities is being questioned. The question now facing the territory is how long can the hybrid survive? The relationship between old and new is changing and evolving as political space in Somaliland stabilizes and develops. The changing relationships in Somaliland show that the statebuilding process is ongoing, and with that they bring to the fore important considerations for the future. Somaliland presents the case that statebuilding does not stop with the establishment of institutions. More significantly, though, Somaliland also raises questions pertaining to the linearity of statebuilding. The inclusion of the clan may have been vital to the establishment and early stages of the statebuilding process in Somaliland, but is it still necessary for the continuation of the process? It is very likely that the future structure of the state in Somaliland will not include the clan. However, the flexibility in the structure and the process that allows for this evolution and change, at least in Somaliland, was certainly afforded to it by the clan.

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