Internally-driven state-building in Somaliland
At the onset of Somalia’s state collapse in the early 1990s, Somaliland’s traditional leaders and SNM senior officials began to lay the foundation for the creation of a new and independent state. Beginning with local shirs across the country, elders invoked clan affiliations to establish a rapport, end violence and mobilize support for an independent northern territory, a move critical in framing the Barre regime as a common enemy of all northern Somalis. Due to the respected positions they held in Somaliland’s traditional society, these clan elders were able to cut across sub-clan rivalries to develop a broad consensus on the need for peace and stability in the region. Among the most critical arguments advocated by these elders was the opportunity to finally separate the governance of Somaliland from that of south-central Somalia. Barre’s predatory state had targeted northern citizens during the war and devastated the region’s most prominent cities, while the centralization of power in Mogadishu consistently isolated Somalilanders from a significant share of national resources. Thus, elders lobbied for unity amongst all constituents within Somaliland while using south-central Somalia as a constant reference point to elucidate the gravity of the upcoming negotiations, thereby rejecting the notion of Soomaaliweyn. The juxtaposition with the instability in Somalia would become a significant aligning force throughout the state-building process.
In May 1991, the SNM gathered traditional elders representing all northern clans and senior SNM political members in a clan conference (shir beeleedka) in Berbera. Amongst their most important resolutions, the conference’s Central Committee called for the end of all violence in northern Somalia and the creation of an independent Somaliland, based on the sovereignty it previously established in June 1960. Further, the SNM assumed leadership of an interim government for two years under the direction of SNM Chair, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur.’ The agreements arising from the conference also addressed reparations from the conflict: the elders invoked the Somali principle of halaydhalay, a concept that erases all personal grievances and injustices so as to rebuild relations between different parties;14 personal property stolen during the conflict was to be returned to its original owners, and compensation for deaths and property damages would be set aside. Erasing debts between the various diya-paying groups eliminated a number of potential conflicts and paved space for further negotiations between stakeholders. While many conflicts remained unresolved following the conclusion of the conference, a widely-accepted framework for future negotiations had been established.
In October 1992, the SNM government began imploding due to an emerging conflict between two of the organization’s largest Issaq clans: the Habar Yoonis and ‘lise Muuse. During the 1991 National Conference, SNM officials had agreed to let revenues from major transportation infrastructure (primarily the Hargeisa Airport and Berbera Port) accrue to the government. President Tuur sent forces into Berbera to secure the port without first nationalizing the airport, leading the ‘lise Muuse to interpret the decision as a personal attack on their clan and subsequently sparking protracted fighting between them and the Habar Yoonis (the President’s clan). After weeks of failed political negotiations, a group of elders from the Gadabuursi clan family, a subdivision of the minority Dir clan family, intervened and developed a resolution in which all transport infrastructure in Somaliland would be immediately transferred to the government.
This conflict highlighted the unique aspects of Somaliland’s state-building process. First, clan elders became significant and formalized actors in the political process. Second, the fighting between Issaq clans and subsequent mediation from a non-Issaq clan underscored the notion that the Issaq would not dominate the new Somaliland (Logan 2002; Moe 2009; and Walls 2011). Third, the continued commitment to non-violence outlined in the 1991 conference and supported by clan elders remained intact despite the outbreak of small conflict, highlighting the local ownership of the state-building process and continued commitment to the new state.
The next national conference took place from January to May 1993 in Borama and was critical in transferring power to a civilian government. Led by a national council of clan elders, the ‘Borama Grand Conference on National Reconciliation’ comprised over 150 elders along with 700 local observers, advisors and supporters (Logan 2002 and Schoiswohl 2004). The first part of the conference resulted in the ‘Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter,’ which provided an official framework under which future conflicts would be avoided or resolved; the second portion of the conference produced the ‘National Charter’ which consisted of an interim national constitution. During the four months of the conference, the majority of decisions were made through consensus-building amongst all the constituents. Clan elders ran debates and meetings (reminiscent of shir) for virtually every issue addressed, developing widespread support for and ownership of the National Charter (Bradbury 2008 and Walls 2011).
The government that emerged from the conferences contained a rare blend of Western-styled governance institutions and traditional Somali structures, known locally as the beel system. This combination was designed to balance clan representation within the new government so that the institution would best reflect the region’s dynamics and eliminate clan pressures from unnecessarily influencing other branches of the government. This system comprised a bicameral Parliament that housed an Assembly of Elders (Guurti) [Upper House] and an Assembly of Representatives [Lower House]. The Guurti was made up of 82 clan elders from across Somaliland whose primary responsibilities were to maintain Somaliland’s fragile peace by settling security arrangements and mediating all outstanding disputes and any future conflicts (Bradbury 2008). The Guurti then appointed Mohamed Egal as the country’s President for three years.
In addition, the constituents of the Assembly of Representatives were to be determined according to a formula for division of clan power that neutralized competing clan families in Somaliland’s new government. The constituents also agreed that regional and local disputes would be managed by the respective clans through the use of traditional Somali customs, which effectively reduced the administrative burden on the emerging government; ensured the local credibility of those intervening in the conflict; and safeguarded against the rise of a second predatory state. Creating a ‘thin’ and decentralized government, one with a limited mandate and functions, explicitly acknowledged that sensitivity to Somaliland’s contextual realities was imperative towards ensuring the government’s future stability.
Somaliland endured two significant internal conflicts from 1994–1996 when different Issaq sub-clans fought over access to critical resources in Hargeisa and Burao, as well as over political representation within the new government. The Guurti initially intervened but were unable to negotiate a settlement. Nonetheless, their intervention played an important role in calming tensions and opening a dialogue between the conflicting parties. Led by the Peace Committee for Somaliland, a unified collection of Somaliland expatriates representing a broad constituency of clans, civil society pressured the government and the competing sub-clans to participate in the February 1997 Hargeisa Conference. After agreeing to a cessation of violence, the constituencies successfully drafted and affirmed the country’s second interim constitution, broadening the political system from a clan-based electoral representation to a multi-party democracy free of clan or religious affiliations.
Under the direction of the House of Elders and President Egal,15 the Constitutional Committee ensured that the new document would be widely supported throughout Somaliland. Each article and clause was read and discussed amongst delegates, who routinely consulted their constituencies for advice and support. This affair produced “a remarkably comprehensive collective constitutional artefact, utilizing a notably high level of public deliberation in the process” (Walls 2011:175). On 31 May 2001, Somaliland conducted a national referendum in which 97 percent of voters affirmed the new constitution.
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