Emerging security issues
Drought and famine crisis
Over the past few months, the Horn of Africa has endured its most severe drought in over fifty years, further amplifying Somalia’s already devastating internal crisis, as over 12.4 million people across Ethiopia, Westgate Mall siege in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013. In recent weeks, they have carried out a spate of attacks in Kenya, and Somalia have found their basic security jeopardized and are in need of humanitarian assistance (IRIN 2011). While Somaliland has not faced the same challenges as south-central Somalia, its population is nonetheless at grave risk. Access to clean and affordable water is the most significant crisis as prices have risen to unsustainable levels, forcing communities to rely on unsanitary water to survive. The drought fuels the already deteriorating pastoral and livestock situation, as grasslands become sparser while livestock are dying at an alarming rate. Somalilanders are subsequently unable to pay for increased food or medicine prices and remain alarmingly vulnerable to dysentery, malaria, and tuberculosis. Each day, thousands of Somalis migrate towards the already overcrowded and under-resourced refugee camps (located on the border with Kenya, as well as on the Somaliland/Puntland border) and place additional pressure on aid workers and their limited resources. While over USD 1 billion has been committed to delivering vital provisions across the Horn of Africa, experts project that the sum is only half of what is needed to supply basic provisions across Somalia.
The international community’s disproportionate focus on Kenya and south-central Somalia has left Somaliland to fend for itself, as the region requires a significant influx of aid resources to rehabilitate the thousands of malnourished refugees in the Sanaag province. However, on 12 August 2011, Vice President Abdirahman A. Ismail announced that Somaliland would dispatch humanitarian aid to south-central Somalia and readily cooperate with all international efforts to ameliorate the crisis. While it is reasonable to criticize Somaliland for its month-long diplomatic silence following the UN’s declaration of famine in portions of Somalia, it must also be noted that the government’s first humanitarian mission will also be its first engagement with Somalia’s TFG in a number of years. This reverse of Somaliland’s foreign policy underscores the gravity of the famine and indicates Somaliland’s growing capacity within the international context. Nonetheless, as the drought is expected to last until January 2012, the already high death totals may continue to rise before the crisis is relieved.
Border conflict with Puntland
Somaliland and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland contest the Sool and Sanaag provinces that border the two areas. Armed conflict began in 2007 when local antagonisms over diya compensations and allegiances to Somaliland spilled into the larger communities. However, the current drought has amplified the importance of the area’s scarce water sources and grazing pastures, leading to an alarming increase in armed conflict. On 2 June 2011, Puntland-sponsored Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) militias attacked Somaliland’s military base in Las Anod, the capital of the Sool Province. Political and traditional leaders were quick to convene in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to negotiate an end to the violence and reiterate their commitment to peaceful coexistence. However, violence erupted two weeks later when Puntland militias launched an unsuccessful attack on Somaliland forces in Tukaraq. It is crucial to note that political officials on both sides have accused the TFG of mobilizing SSC militias and instigating violence; the SomalilandPress confirmed “in the last several months the TFG has been arming SSC militias in an attempt to create a conflict between Somaliland and Puntland in a mini-proxy war of its own” (SomalilandPress 2011b). On 22 June 2011, Somaliland officials and SSC representatives convened at a peace conference in the Sool town of Widhwidh. Similar to many of Somaliland’s peace processes, the Widhwidh Conference was locally organized and broadly supported by constituencies across the region. Both parties emerged from the meetings with a commitment to maintain peace as well as increase dialogue between one another. However, on 10 August 2011, a Puntland-supported militia ambushed, captured, and killed members of a Somaliland delegation outside of Las Anod, headed by MP Saleeban Yusuf Ali Koore. Ahmad Haji Ali Adami, Somaliland’s Minister of Defense, responded that his country would not tolerate repeated violations of Somaliland’s sovereignty by stating:
The Armed Forces of Somaliland is here to protect the people of Somaliland anytime and anywhere they are in harm’s way, any threat to our people and country will not be tolerated… Every action has a reaction, and we are very displeased by the actions of the Puntland government. We will let Puntland know about this displeasure. It is our obligation to protect our country and our people and therefore our military will not sit and watch idly (Guled 2011c:1).
Given the contentious relationship between Somaliland and Puntland, along with the additional stress applied by the famine and drought crisis, leaders must be wary of this emerging conflict and its potential negative ramifications on the region’s stability.
Al-Shabaab
Until order and security are restored in south-central Somalia, the al-Shabaab radical Islamic faction will continue to pose a threat to Somaliland. Spawned in opposition to the TFG, al-Shabaab comprises a number of hardline Somali youth factions who seek to both repel the international community from Somalia and to impose their strict interpretations of Sharia Islamic law. The faction has gained international notoriety for their ties to the al-Qaeda terrorist network; recruiting of foreign soldiers to the jihad in Somalia; and incorporation of suicide bombings into its most recent field missions. Its general unwillingness to cooperate with international aid workers attempting to deliver emergency food supplies has posed a grave challenge to Somalis: all five regions of south-central Somalia in which famine has been declared18 are under the heavy al-Shabaab influence.
It is crucial to understand that al-Shabaab is not a unified militia, as competition between moderate and extremist ideologies fissures the hierarchy and feeds into its constant struggle to coordinate efforts between its semiautonomous and poorly resourced cells. Al-Shabaab does not operate in Somaliland as the government actively captures, prosecutes and jails its fighters and affiliates. However, the region nonetheless remains threatened by the faction’s continued operations in the Somali Republic.
Al-Shabaab’s recent commitment to international attacks, highlighted by the suicide bombing at a Kampala sports-bar during the 2010 World Cup, underscores the threat that Somaliland faces as one attack can completely warp a region’s internal dynamics. On 6 August 2011, a number of al-Shabaab cells withdrew from Mogadishu, allowing for the first humanitarian airlifts to the capital in over five years. While AMISOM declared victory over the movement, al-Shabaab spokesmen claimed that the group had devised a new strategy and had not abandoned the conflict. An area of particular concern is the Somaliland/ Puntland border conflicts, where spoiler actions from the Islamic militant faction could trigger further fighting.
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