The article “Puntland vs. Somaliland: A Comparative Analysis of Terrorism Combat – Harboring Extremism vs. Defending Against Extremism” discusses the issue of terrorism in Puntland and Somaliland, focusing on the Islamic State (ISIS) presence in Puntland, particularly its connections to local clan dynamics and political situations.
Key points include accusations against Somaliland, evidence suggesting ISIS operates openly in Puntland, especially in Bosaso, generating significant revenue through taxation and extortion—over $6 million annually. Skepticism around anti-ISIS operations is also raised, with many believing this is a superficial effort aimed at securing international funding rather than a sincere attempt to combat terrorism.
The Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, part of the larger Majeerteen clan, plays a significant role in ISIS leadership, harboring grievances due to political marginalization by rival clans, which drives some members to support ISIS. ISIS finances itself by taxing local businesses and exploiting natural resources, taking advantage of the trade activities in Puntland’s ports. The leadership of ISIS in Puntland is predominantly from the Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, linking clan politics directly to the region’s militant activities and complicating anti-terrorism efforts.
A report from the U.S. Treasury identifies individuals in Puntland who facilitate financing for terrorist groups, including arms trafficking and logistical support. This network is closely tied to Al-Qaeda and indicates that Puntland plays a critical role in enabling terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The article argues that Puntland’s internal dynamics, particularly its clan rivalries and governance issues, significantly underpin the ongoing presence and operations of ISIS in the region.
The port city of Bosaso is highlighted as a strategic location for arms smuggling, particularly from Yemen, which provides logistics and arms to terrorist groups. Recent interceptions of vessels, such as the Marwan 1, demonstrate the scale of this illicit trade, raising concerns about accountability.
Puntland’s activities contribute significantly to global terrorism concerns, as arms traffickers and facilitators continue to operate with little restraint. Despite claims by the Puntland government of combating ISIS, ongoing militant operations suggest a lack of serious action. The international community is urged to hold Puntland accountable, cut off its support for these groups, and address the broader issues of terrorism in the region.
The article compares the counterterrorism strategies of Somaliland and Puntland, highlighting that Puntland has become a base for terrorist groups like ISIS, while Somaliland effectively prevents such groups from establishing a significant presence. Somaliland has maintained strict control, utilizing local governance and intelligence networks to keep its communities secure. However, the ISIS presence in nearby Puntland poses a potential threat, as Puntland’s ports facilitate ISIS operations and funding.
International recognition of Somaliland would enhance its counterterrorism efforts by allowing access to more resources, support, and training. Without this recognition, Somaliland struggles to fully capitalize on its strategic position against extremism. With adequate international support, Somaliland could be a stronger force in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
The complete article is as follows:
Puntland vs. Somaliland: A Comparative Analysis of Terrorism Combat – Harboring Extremism vs. Defending Against Extremism
By Ibrahim Muse
Recently, certain politicians and officials from the Puntland region, including former president Abdiweli Gaas, have been spreading baseless accusations claiming that Somaliland has connections with the Islamic State operating in the mountainous Bari region of Puntland. These allegations are entirely unfounded and lack credible evidence. It appears that Puntland is attempting to deflect attention from its own documented ties with the Islamic State and the group’s activities within its territory, including the free operation of the Islamic State through Puntland’s ports, such as Bosaso.
In reality, credible reports and evidence from sources such as the United Nations, international terrorism monitoring groups, and independent researchers reveal that the Islamic State operates freely in Puntland, generating significant revenue—estimated at nearly $6 million annually—through taxes and other means.
This article aims to debunk Puntland’s claims and expose the deep and intertwined connections between Puntland and the Islamic State. By presenting verified findings and concrete reports, we will shed light on how the group has been able to sustain itself within Puntland, including the exploitation of its ports and financial networks.
In recent months, the Puntland authorities have launched what they call the “Hillaac Operation” against the Islamic State (ISIS) operating within their borders. However, many observers have expressed skepticism regarding the sincerity of this initiative, with claims that the operation is merely a façade designed to attract international funding. Despite the operation’s announcement, ISIS continues to operate openly within Puntland, especially in the region’s ports, including Bosaso—the economic heart of the semi-autonomous region. These concerns are compounded by Puntland’s fractured relationship with the Somali Federal Government, leaving the region desperate for financial support from foreign powers.
Puntland’s administration has long been accused of playing a “catch and release” game with terrorist operatives. This is not an accusation taken lightly by the international community. In 2016, the United Nations Monitoring Group documented cases where individuals arrested for links to terrorist organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, were released as part of a larger amnesty program instituted by then-President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gass.” This policy of leniency for suspected terrorists is well-established, and it continues to raise questions about Puntland’s true stance on combating terrorism.
The Clans and the Financing of Terrorism
The clan dynamics in Puntland play a crucial role in the region’s relationship with terrorist organizations, particularly ISIS. The leadership of ISIS-Somalia, the affiliate of the Islamic State in the Horn of Africa, is composed primarily of members from the Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, which is part of the larger Majeerteen clan. This group’s primary financial income comes from extorting businesses in Puntland, particularly those operating within the bustling port city of Bosaso. According to reports, ISIS-Somalia has managed to generate over $6 million since 2022 by taxing local traders and businesses, especially those involved in the export of small quantities of gold from the Bari region.
The tax system imposed by ISIS in Puntland is a heavy burden on local businesses. The region’s ports, such as Bosaso, are vital for trade, and ISIS has long maintained a stranglehold on the local economy by demanding extortionate taxes from traders. Local businessmen, especially in Bosaso’s markets, have been forced to comply with the group’s demands to avoid retaliation. As one frankincense trader pointed out in a recent interview with VICE News, ISIS and Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State collect more taxes from local businesses than the Puntland government itself.
This financial model has allowed ISIS to expand its operations in Puntland, especially in areas such as the Golis mountain range, which serves as a stronghold for the group. The control of these strategic locations has given ISIS the ability to extend its influence across Puntland, ensuring its grip on local commerce and facilitating its broader objectives in Somalia. ISIS-Somalia sustains itself financially through a combination of illicit taxation and natural resource exploitation. Reports indicate that the group has accumulated over $6 million since 2022 through:
- Taxing businesses and traders at Bosaso Port
- Extorting gold miners in the Bari region
These funds are used to support the group’s operations, including recruitment, training, and logistical operations. The steady flow of income from these sources has allowed ISIS-Somalia to maintain its presence in Puntland and expand its influence.
Clan Dynamics and Islamic State in Puntland
The Islamic State terrorist’s soldiers and leadership are predominantly drawn from the Cali Saleebaan, a small sub-clan of the Darod/Majeerteen. “This sub-clan harbors grievances over the governing arrangements in Puntland, where their rivals, particularly the Mohamud Saleebaan, hold the most influence. These tensions have repeatedly flared between the Cali Saleebaan and Mohamud Saleebaan. In 2016, one such dispute escalated into an armed resistance campaign by the Cali Saleebaan, which only subsided when Puntland authorities promised to allocate more government positions to their members.
”Crisis Group. Puntland’s political landscape is heavily shaped by clan rivalries, with the Cali Saleebaan sub-clan of the Majeerteen playing a central role in the leadership of ISIS-Somalia. The group’s founder, Abdulqadir Muumin Yusuf, and many of its senior members, including Mahad Macalin Jajab, hail from this clan. The Cali Saleebaan clan has historically felt marginalized by the dominance of the Mohamud Saleebaan clan in Puntland’s governance. This political exclusion has contributed to the rise of ISIS-Somalia, as members of the Cali Saleebaan find common cause with the group.
In 2016, tensions between the two clans escalated into an armed resistance campaign, which subsided only after the Puntland government promised more political representation for the Cali Saleebaan. Today, the leadership of ISIS-Somalia, including the head of the group Cabdiqani Luqmaan is primarily composed of fighters from Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, further intertwining Puntland’s clan politics with the region’s militant activities.
Further Structure of the Islamic State in Somalia and Clan Dynamics in Their Leaders
1: Abdulqadir Muumin Yusuf (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Founder and father of ISIS-Somalia, and the group’s Emir for East and Central Africa. A former UK resident, Muumin returned to Somalia in 2010 and initially joined Al-Shabaab. In 2015, he split from Al-Shabaab to establish ISIS-Somalia.
2: Mahad Macalin Jajab (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Known as “Caaw Geelle” within the group, he has served as the deputy Emir and head of ISIS-Somalia’s propaganda wing. In 2018, he was designated a global terrorist by the U.S. for smuggling fighters and weapons into Somalia.
3: Abdirahman Faahiye Ciise (Harti, Dashiishe): Also known as “Ahmed Adan” and “Khalid,” Faahiye has been a top commander and deputy Emir of ISIS-Somalia. He is suspected to be the current Emir following Abdulqadir Muumin’s promotion to regional leadership.
4: Abuu Yusuf (Majeerteen): Head of ISIS-Somalia’s foreign fighters. He is a U.S. citizen who previously lived in America before joining the group.
5: Cabdixakiin Dhoqob (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Former head of ISIS-Somalia’s political affairs. He was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Bari, leaving his successor unknown.
6: Cabdiqani Luqmaan (Majeerteen, Cali Saleebaan): Chief of military operations. Some reports suggest he might belong to the Leelkase sub-clan instead of Harti.
7: Jacfar Dabaashaan (Majeerteen, Cismaan Maxamuud): Senior figure within the group, with significant operational responsibilities.
The Cali Saleebaan sub-clan, which dominates ISIS-Somalia’s leadership, harbors deep grievances over its perceived marginalization by Puntland’s government, which is dominated by rival clans, particularly the Mohamud Saleebaan. This dynamic complicates efforts to defeat the group, as it often finds support in the areas it inhabits. Many residents from the same clan feel marginalized and harbor grievances against Puntland’s dominant Mohamud Saleebaan clan, leading to a sense of alignment with the group.
OFAC Report: Exposing the Facilitators of Terrorist Financing
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released a report detailing individuals who facilitate the financing of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS. These individuals, primarily based in Puntland, Somalia, are actively involved in illegal arms trafficking and have significant business ties to these extremist groups. According to the report, eight individuals from Puntland have been named as key players in this network, serving as suppliers of arms and logistical support to Al-Shabaab and ISIS in Somalia.
Key Individuals and Activities in Puntland
- Liibaan Yuusuf Maxamed
- A senior operative of Al-Shabaab, responsible for security and kidnappings.
- Owns Liibaan General Trading Co., which is implicated in facilitating arms for Al-Shabaab.
- Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed Cumar
- Member of ISIS-Somalia and a key arms trafficker operating between Yemen and Somalia. Involved in over $2 million in illegal arms trade between 2020 and 2024.
- Mahad Ciise Aadan
- Smuggler linked to multiple illegal arms trade networks in Puntland.
- Supplied arms to both ISIS-Somalia and Al-Shabaab, moving nearly $800,000 worth of arms between 2015 and 2020.
- Ciise Maxamuud Yuusuf
- Facilitator of arms and logistics for ISIS-Somalia in Puntland’s Bari region.
- Cabdiraxmaan Faahiye Ciise Maxamuud
- Senior ISIS-Somalia operative who coordinated suicide bombings, including the 2017 attack in Bosaso.
- Axmed Xaaji Cali Xaaji Cumar
- A key leader of ISIS-Somalia’s arms smuggling operations in Puntland, playing a critical role in ISIS-Somalia’s leadership structure.
The report highlights how Puntland has become a hub for these activities, raising questions about the region’s role in enabling terrorist financing and arms trade. The networks operating between Puntland, Yemen, and Somalia have close ties with Al-Qaeda, further exacerbating the issue. The international community is well aware of these networks, as highlighted in the OFAC report.
The continued operation of these arms traffickers in Puntland underscores the region’s role as a critical enabler of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The evidence outlined in the OFAC report points to Puntland as a significant source of support for terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab and ISIS. These networks, operating with apparent impunity, facilitate the arms trade and logistical support that sustain these extremist groups, underscoring the region’s complicity in perpetuating terrorism.
This is not only a regional issue but a global security concern. Interestingly Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf the head of the finance office of the Somalia-based affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a former Minister from Puntland during @aliabdiweli. Another clear example of the intersection between clan politics and the influence of the Islamic State: prolific OFAC-designated arms trafficker and Al-Shabaab affiliate Ahmed Mataan has been installed as the leader (Beeldaaje) of his sub-clan during a ceremony in Bosaso, Puntland.
The Arms Smuggling Nexus: Bosaso Port’s Role in Arming Extremists
Puntland’s ports, particularly Bosaso, have become central to the region’s illicit activities, including arms trafficking. The port’s location along the Gulf of Aden makes it an ideal conduit for the illegal trade of weapons and ammunition. Recent reports indicate that vessels from Yemen frequently dock in Bosaso to offload weapons, which are then distributed to extremist groups operating in the region, including ISIS.
Bosaso Port, located along the Gulf of Aden, plays a dual role in Puntland’s economy. While it facilitates legal commerce, it is also a key point for arms smuggling, particularly from Yemen, that sustains groups like ISIS-Somalia and Al-Shabaab. Vessels traveling from Yemen, often linked to the region’s ongoing conflict, transport weapons and ammunition to Bosaso, where they are redistributed to these militant groups.
The Marwan 1, a vessel previously associated with the “Somali 7” fleet, exemplifies the scale of this illicit trade. On December 1, 2022, the USS Lewis B. Puller intercepted the Marwan 1 in the Gulf of Oman, discovering a large cache of arms including:
- Over 1 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition,
- 25,000 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition,
- 7,000 rocket proximity fuses, and
- 2,100 kilograms of RPG propellant.
The documentation below confirms that the arms-trafficking vessel is registered in #Somalia, with the owners (Somlink Fisheries). This interception highlighted how Puntland ports like Bosaso facilitate the flow of arms to extremist groups, illustrating the critical role Bosaso plays in the broader regional arms trade.
Vessels operating from Yemen and Oman frequently avoid transparency regarding their destinations. In 2022, for instance, the AK HAMBURG anchored at Bosaso without officially reporting its docking. It later engaged in ship-to-ship transfers (STS), as captured by satellite imagery, further raising concerns over the lack of accountability in port activities. This pattern of non-disclosure, exemplified by vague destination codes like “SO BOS,” raises suspicions of deliberate efforts to obscure illicit operations.
An International Security Concern
The implications of Puntland’s role in facilitating terrorism reach far beyond Somalia. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued sanctions against individuals involved in the arms trade and logistics supporting ISIS and Al-Shabaab in the region. These individuals, many of whom are based in Puntland, have played an instrumental role in smuggling weapons and providing logistical support to terrorist groups.
Puntland’s strategic importance in the global fight against terrorism cannot be overstated. The region’s ports serve as gateways for arms trafficking, and its clan dynamics provide fertile ground for extremist ideologies to take root. Despite the Puntland government’s claim to be taking action against ISIS, the group’s continued operations in the region, coupled with the government’s lenient stance toward militants, suggest that Puntland has become a key enabler of terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
The international community must confront this issue head-on, demanding accountability from Puntland’s leaders and urging them to cut off the financial and logistical support that allows groups like ISIS to flourish. Until then, the region will likely remain a haven for terrorism, with devastating consequences for both Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa.
Somaliland vs. Puntland: A Tale of Counterterrorism Strategies and the Threat from ISIS and Al-Shabaab
While Puntland has become a haven for terrorist groups such as ISIS, which has established a stronghold in the region’s ports and exploited clan dynamics for financial gain, Somaliland stands in stark contrast with its robust approach to counterterrorism. The unrecognized republic of Somaliland has successfully kept terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab from gaining a significant foothold within its borders. Unlike Puntland, where ISIS operates with apparent impunity, Somaliland has maintained strict control over its territory, especially in its key cities such as Hargeisa, and has thwarted numerous attempts by Al-Shabaab to infiltrate the region.
Al-Shabaab’s and Islamic State’s inability to establish an enduring presence in Somaliland is due to several key factors. First and foremost, the government of Somaliland has implemented effective, locally-driven governance, ensuring broad community support and establishing a network of local intelligence. This intelligence network, both formal and informal, serves as a vital force multiplier in Somaliland’s fight against extremism. The creation of the Special Protection Unit (SPU) and a dedicated counterterrorism force, supported by training from the UK, bolstered by local community engagement, has allowed Somaliland to remain relatively stable.
Somaliland’s Success in Preventing Al-Shabaab and Islamic State
Despite suffering from attacks in the past, such as the 2008 coordinated bombings, Somaliland has continued to strengthen its security capabilities. The government’s focus on human intelligence (HUMINT) has been a cornerstone of its success. By integrating local communities into the security efforts and fostering trust, Somaliland has been able to detect and thwart Al-Shabaab’s plans. This proactive approach has allowed the government to prevent at least three major terrorist attacks by the group in recent years.
In addition to its Human Intelligence HUMINT-based counterterrorism strategy, Somaliland’s security forces have been able to thwart piracy, a related form of extremism, using community-based monitoring along the coastline. This citizen-driven approach to security has proven effective and could serve as a model for combating other forms of insurgency.
The Growing Threat of Puntland to Somaliland’s Security
While Somaliland has successfully fought Al-Shabaab within its borders, the growing presence of ISIS in neighboring Puntland poses a significant threat. Puntland’s ports, particularly Bosaso, have become critical hubs for ISIS operations, where the group finances its activities through extortion of local businesses. The tax system imposed by ISIS in Puntland is a major factor enabling their persistence in the region, while Puntland’s lenient stance on terrorism exacerbates the situation. Puntland’s cooperation with terrorist groups and its use of ports to facilitate arms trafficking have wider security implications for the Horn of Africa, with Somaliland and Ethiopia particularly vulnerable to spillover effects.
Somaliland’s borders, particularly the Cal Madaw Mountains and the eastern regions near the Puntland border, are the most susceptible to infiltration from groups like ISIS and Al-Shabaab. Given the porous nature of these borderlands and the limited governance in some areas, terrorist groups have been able to fund madrassas, build relationships with vulnerable communities, and sow discord. The presence of ISIS in Puntland also complicates Somaliland’s security efforts, as terrorist elements can easily operate across the border.
The Role of International Recognition in Enhancing Counterterrorism Efforts
Somaliland’s capacity to combat terrorism in the region would be significantly enhanced if the international community recognized its sovereignty. Despite its achievements in governance and security, Somaliland faces considerable challenges due to its lack of international recognition. It struggles to receive aid or access to resources that could improve its military, intelligence services, and infrastructure. Recognition would not only bolster Somaliland’s financial capacity but also strengthen its counterterrorism efforts by providing more substantial international support.
Somaliland’s anti-terrorism efforts are hampered by its isolation in the international arena. While countries like the UK and the EU provide some aid and training, they are limited in their ability to offer substantial assistance due to Somaliland’s lack of formal recognition. Without international recognition, Somaliland cannot fully leverage its strategic position in the fight against extremism in the Horn of Africa.
The Need for Increased International Support
The international community must recognize Somaliland’s efforts to combat terrorism and offer more robust support. Somaliland has proven that it can govern effectively and combat terrorist groups using locally derived intelligence and community-driven initiatives. However, to continue this fight, especially against the growing threat from Puntland’s links with ISIS, Somaliland needs more resources, training, and international cooperation. By recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty, the global community would provide the necessary tools for Somaliland to secure its borders and continue its counterterrorism efforts against groups like Al-Shabaab and ISIS.
In conclusion, while Puntland remains a hotbed for terrorism and a potential source of instability in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland has demonstrated a much more effective strategy in combating terrorist groups. With the right international support and recognition, Somaliland could become an even more powerful force in the fight against extremism, not only in the Horn of Africa but also in the wider global effort to combat terrorism.
Citations
[1] Courtney Kube, “Global leader of ISIS targeted and possibly killed in U.S. airstrike,” NBC News, June 15, 2024.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Carla Babb, Harun Maruf, and Jeff Seldin, “Islamic State in Somalia poses growing threat, US officials say,” Voice of America, June 18, 2024.
[4] Jeff Seldin, “US watching #ISIS-#Somalia closely, per @USAfricaCommand’s Gen. Michael Langley …,” X, June 27, 2024.
[5] Author (Weiss) interview, Somali security source, Kampala, Uganda, July 2024; “Source: ISIS leader Abdulqadir Mumin survives U.S. airstrike in Somalia,” Hiraan Online, July 10, 2024.
[6] Jason Warner and Caleb Weiss, “A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel 10:10 (2017).
[7] Ibid.; Caleb Weiss, “Jihadi archives: Islamic State’s eulogy of Sudanese jihadist Mohamad Makkawi Ibrahim,” FDD’s Long War Journal, July 5, 2024.
[8] Based on the author’s (Weiss) own compilation of Islamic State-Somalia attack data.
[9] Jay Bahadur, Former UN Sanctions Monitor, 29 May, 2023
[10] U.S. Seizes 1.1 Million Rounds of Ammunition, Other Illegal Weapons in Gulf of Oman, 03 December, 2022.
[11] Treasury Sanctions Terrorist Weapons Trafficking Network in Eastern Africa, 01 November 2022
