The article “Red Sea is not the Suez Canal: What Will Be the Outcome of Egyptian Intervention in Ethiopia’s Sea Access Quest?” by Miessa Elema Robe, PhD, discusses the geopolitical dynamics surrounding Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea, particularly in light of Egyptian intervention.
The article builds on a previous piece published by the author, which examined Ethiopia’s efforts to secure maritime access through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland. This MoU is significant as it could enhance Ethiopia’s trade and economic opportunities, while also benefiting Somaliland.
The author highlights the historical opposition from Egypt towards Ethiopia’s aspirations for sea access. This opposition is rooted in longstanding geopolitical rivalries, particularly concerning water resources and regional influence. The current Egyptian government, led by President el-Sisi, is portrayed as continuing this tradition of resistance.
The article touches on the legal rights of landlocked countries, like Ethiopia, to access coastlines under international law. The author argues that Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access is not only a matter of national interest but also has historical precedents that support its claims.
The author emphasizes the importance of regional cooperation, particularly the role of Somalia. The suggestion is made that Somalia could benefit more from direct negotiations with Ethiopia and Somaliland rather than relying on external alliances, which could lead to security challenges.
In this second article, the author aims to analyze the latest developments in the region, particularly Egypt’s interventions and their potential outcomes. It also seeks to provide recommendations for Somalia on how to foster better relations with both Ethiopia and Somaliland.
Overall, the article sets the stage for a nuanced discussion about the complexities of regional politics in the Horn of Africa, the historical context of Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, and the implications of external interventions, particularly from Egypt.
The author appears to advocate for a cooperative approach among the Horn of Africa nations to address these challenges.
The full article is as follows:
Red Sea is not the Suez Canal: What Will Be the Outcome of Egyptian Intervention in Ethiopia’s Sea Access Quest?
By Miessa Elema Robe, PhD
Introduction
On August 27, 2024, I published a detailed article entitled “Can an Egypt-led Alliance Stand in Ethiopia’s Way of Securing Access to the Sea?”, which received both converging and diverging feedback. My previous article explored Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access, following a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland, with a focus on regional dynamics, especially Egypt’s counter-alliances, Ethiopia’s position, and Somalia’s role in fostering peace and cooperation in the Horn of Africa.
In that article, I analyzed how the MoU could significantly boost Ethiopia’s trade and economic prospects while benefiting Somaliland through increased economic activity. The central focus was Egypt’s historical opposition to Ethiopia’s national interests, with the current Egyptian government under President el-Sisi continuing efforts to block Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations, as his predecessors did.
Moreover, I examined whether landlocked countries like Ethiopia have the legal right to access coastlines under international law. I argued that, despite Egypt’s long-standing resistance, Ethiopia’s efforts to secure access to the sea are both persistent and rooted in history. In the final section, I suggested that Somalia would benefit more from direct negotiations with Ethiopia and Somaliland than from external alliances that could pose significant security challenges, both domestically and regionally.
In this second article, I analyze the latest developments among these countries, emphasizing Egypt’s ongoing intervention, its potential outcomes, and what Somalia must do to restore friendly cooperation with both Ethiopia and Somaliland.
1. Egypt’s Intervention: Can it achieve its Goals?
The day after my article titled “Can an Egypt-led alliance stand in Ethiopia’s way of securing access to the sea?” was published in the Addis Standard, reports emerged that the Egyptian government, led by President El-Sisi, began deploying tens of thousands of troops, along with heavy arms cargo, to Somalia according to their bilateral military protocol signed weeks ago.
Friends of mine, both in Ethiopia and abroad, as well as some readers of my previous article, sent me dozens of emails and even called, questioning whether I had inside information given the timing of the article.
I informed them that I had no internal information about the Egyptian government’s actions, only my scholarly and policy insights.
On September 1, 2024, we also learned from the media that the Egyptian government sent a letter to the United Nations Security Council, stating that Egypt was boycotting the fifth stage of the first filling of the GERD reservoir and the operation of the 3rd and 4th turbines of the GERD, labeling it as “unilateral.”
In my earlier article, I argued that Egypt’s intervention in Ethiopia’s vision regarding access to and from the sea is not new, as its antagonism is deeply rooted in Nile politics, as reiterated in the letter issued on September 1, 2024.
This recent behavior by Egypt against Ethiopia reminded me of Robert J. Art’s theory, “The Four Functions of Force,” which includes defense, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering. I found that the last function, swaggering, has been displayed in Egypt’s presence in Somalia. Swaggering, as seen in Egypt’s actions against Ethiopia, is a symbolic display of power intended to demonstrate a state’s capabilities and willingness to use force if necessary, aiming to bolster its own reputation and deter potential challenges from adversaries. Egypt’s military displays appear to threaten Ethiopia and discourage it from pursuing access to the Red Sea, though both the people and the government of Ethiopia have dismissed it as a joke.
However, given the historical antagonism between Ethiopia and Egypt, it seems unlikely that this recent intervention will achieve its intended results. I can confidently assert that an Egypt-led alliance is unlikely to succeed for at least three fundamental reasons.
First, global experience suggests that military interventions rarely achieve their objectives. Second, from a regional perspective, no state can successfully form counter-alliances in the fragile Horn of Africa region except to feed its own ego.
Considering Ethiopia and Somalia as examples, these neighboring nations share linguistic and cultural backgrounds, extensive borders with unifying natural resources, and similar socioeconomic conditions. No external power can gain sustainable benefits by fostering antagonism in this region.
Third, Ethiopia’s historical and current positions prevent Egypt from achieving political and military success through this recent intervention. No Ethiopian would welcome an Egypt-led intervention, despite the presence of political factions within the country.
Historically, Ethiopians resist external interventions. Even if they conflict among themselves, they will unite against an external power perceived as exploiting their situation. This resistance stems from Ethiopia’s history of avoiding colonialism and a preference for resolving conflicts domestically rather than allowing external interference. Due to this deeply rooted political culture, Egypt is unlikely to achieve significant policy benefits from this intervention. Sensibly, it would be more beneficial for El-Sisi’s government to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Ethiopia and Somaliland to resolve any disputes.
2. Ethiopia’s Stance: Calls for inclusive agreements
Following Egypt’s military deployment in Somalia, the FDRE government issued a press statement on August 28, 2024, reminding that Ethiopia has worked tirelessly for the peace and security of Somalia and the region. It called for the Somali government to stop colluding with external actors aiming to destabilize the region. In the same press statement, Ethiopia strongly asserted that it cannot tolerate actions that endanger the gains made against regional and international terrorist groups.
On August 31, 2024, in an interview with the BBC, Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, stated that Djibouti offers the Tadjoura port to be fully administered by Ethiopia with the aim of easing tensions in the Horn of Africa and ensuring Ethiopia’s access to the sea. However, the Ethiopian government has not yet publicly responded to this latest invitation from Djibouti.
Ethiopia is the most populous among the 44 landlocked countries worldwide, with an estimated population of 120 million. Not only is Ethiopia’s population significant, but geographically, it shares close borders with Red Sea coastal areas, making Ethiopia’s claims to access the sea more sensible and legitimate. Bordered by Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, and Somaliland, Ethiopia’s geographic and economic significance makes cooperation with these countries for mutual interests feasible. If the countries in this region can overcome preexisting political conflicts, such cooperation could be beneficial for all.
On the other hand, several international conventions allow landlocked countries access to and from the sea. These include the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other prevailing laws, which underscore that landlocked countries have the right of access to and from the sea through the territory of transit states by all means of transport. UN Resolution 390 (V), declared in December 1950, also highlights Ethiopia’s right to access to and from the sea, noting that Ethiopia’s claims based on geographic, historical, ethnic, or economic reasons, including its legitimate need for adequate access to the sea, were lawfully granted, though this declaration was not considered during Eritrea’s secession.
To address this issue, there are various modalities for agreements, including bilateral, sub-regional, or regional ones. Ethiopia has also declared its readiness to share whatever is necessary with any country providing coastal access, including offering shares in its prestigious organizations such as airlines, telecommunications, and electricity.
Months ago, while researching this topic, I came across the story of Ukraine and Moldova, which offers valuable lessons for the current issue. After the dissolution of the former USSR, Moldova became a landlocked country despite its proximity to the Black Sea. An article titled “Time-Worn Village in Moldova Springs Back to Life, Thanks to Port,” published by the New York Times, predicted how Moldovan citizens’ lives would change with the development of a port.
Moldova, like Ethiopia, faced significant socioeconomic challenges due to its landlocked status. To address this, Moldova explored various solutions and ultimately reached a favorable agreement with its neighbor, Ukraine. In 1999, Moldova and Ukraine signed a land swap agreement: Moldova ceded an eight-kilometer stretch of land (Palanca) in Ukraine’s Odessa region, and in return, Ukraine granted Moldova several hundred meters of Danube riverfront in Giurgiulesti.
The Giurgiulesti port became operational in 2005, and by the end of 2021, Moldovan trade had increased by 52.4% due to the port’s impact, according to the Ministry of Economy of Moldova.
Given the geographic realities, international conventions, and the successful experience of the Moldova and Ukraine bilateral deal, Ethiopia also has a strong case for securing access to the sea.
3. Why Somalia should reconsider its position
Here, as I attempted to display in my previous article on a similar matter, my answer to this critical question addresses three respective perspectives.
Firstly, the Somali government, headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, should learn from global experiences of external interventions. For instance, as observed in the Middle East, external intervention often contributes to state failure for various reasons. External powers frequently pursue their own strategic interests, interfering in local affairs and exacerbating existing tensions. Moreover, external military interventions can destabilize fragile states, create power vacuums, and fuel violent extremist movements, which Somalia has already been experiencing. Overall, especially in the Middle East, external interventions undermine the sovereignty and legitimacy of states, weaken institutions, and contribute to the breakdown of social cohesion, ultimately leading to state failure. Therefore, it would be sensible for Somalia to refrain from allowing external interventions, both for mutual benefits and for its own survival.
Secondly, it would be better for Somalia to choose negotiation with Ethiopia over allowing external interventions for several logical reasons. Somalia and Ethiopia share a long border and have historical ties that are not easily eroded. Collaboration with Ethiopia on issues such as access to the Red Sea could potentially improve relations between the two countries, fostering regional stability and cooperation. Somalia should consider that Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Red Sea is driven by its landlocked status and desire to secure alternative trade routes for its growing economy and mutual benefits. However, Somalia must carefully consider the implications of siding too closely with external powers, as this could strain relations not only with Ethiopia but also with other regional actors. Somalia needs to prioritize long-term strategic goals over short-term tactical alliances with nations that may have legitimate causes in the region.
Thirdly, Somalia should address its internal failures with Somaliland rather than forming an alliance with Egypt concerning Somaliland’s decision to grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. Engaging directly with Somaliland would allow Somalia to address concerns or disputes through diplomatic channels and potentially reach a mutually beneficial agreement. This approach could promote cooperation and stability within the region. Moreover, constructive dialogue with Somaliland could pave the way for future collaboration and reconciliation, crucial for long-term peace and development. Failing to negotiate with Somaliland and forming an alliance with Egypt could complicate matters and escalate tensions.
Therefore, it would be prudent for Somalia to prioritize direct engagement with Somaliland to maintain control over the situation and work towards a peaceful resolution. This approach could lead to positive outcomes for all parties involved and contribute to lasting peace and cooperation in the Horn of Africa. Hopefully, Somalia will revisit its existing positions and reconsider negotiations over interventions.
Conclusion
The Red Sea serves as a vital maritime link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, making it crucial for seaborne transportation and providing a shorter route for ships traveling between Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Suez Canal, which connects the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, is one of the world’s busiest and most important shipping lanes, facilitating the movement of goods, resources, and energy supplies between regions.
The strategic location of both the Red Sea and the Suez Canal also holds significant geopolitical importance, impacting politics, the economy, and social affairs. From a security perspective, countries view this area as crucial, especially for naval operations, with profound implications for international relations. Nations interested in these strategic maritime areas need to revisit their policies to pursue a win-win approach. Ethiopia is not claiming the Suez Canal, nor is it requesting Egypt to grant it access to the Red Sea.
However, as a key player in the region, Egypt should at least acknowledge Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Red Sea. Failing to recognize Ethiopia’s logical, legal, and legitimate aspirations will not benefit Egypt. If Egypt has any concerns, it would be better to address them through negotiations rather than interventions.
