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Notes

  1. University student, Hargeisa, 19 March 2014. The question was posed to one of the authors during his first visit to Somaliland in 2014.
  2. Bekalo, Brophy and Welford, “The Development of Education,” 464.
  3. Abdi, “Education in Somalia.”
  4. Menkhaus, “Governance without Government”; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, “State and Non-State Regulation.”
  5. Hagmann and Hoehne, “Failures of the State Failure.”
  6. Hoehne, “Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia”; Hoehne, “Limits of Hybrid Political Orders”; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland; Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid”; Walls and Kibble, “Beyond Polarity.” Note that Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid”; and especially Hoehne, “Limits of Hybrid Political Orders” argue that while hybridity was productive in establishing political order in Somaliland it is now undermining both traditional and modern authorities.
  7. War-torn Societies Project, Rebuilding Somaliland; Eubank, “Peace-Building without External.”
  8. World Bank, Budget Policy.
  9. Ministry of Finance, Budget 2017.
  10. Ministry of National Planning and Development, Somaliland in Figures, 13th edition, 42.
  11. The name of the village is anonymized.
  12. Migdal and Schlichte, “Rethinking the State.”
  13. Ibid., 14–5.
  14. Ibid., 15.
  15. Mitchell, “The Limits of the State,” 81.
  16. Lund, “Twilight Institutions,” 686.
  17. This concept has been used to refer to the ways in which state and non-state actors coproduce governance. See Clements et al., “State Building Reconsidered”; Boege, Brown, and Nolan, On Hybrid Political Orders; Meagher et al., “Unravelling Public Authority”. Particularly for Somaliland, this concept has been used in a more specific meaning, i.e. to refer to the mixing of traditional and legal-rational (i.e. modern) authorities in the making of the political order in Somaliland. See Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid”; Hoehne, “Limits of Hybrid Political Orders”; Moe, “Hybrid and ‘Everyday’ Political Ordering.”
  18. Olivier de Sardan, “Researching Practical Norms”; Titeca and De Herdt, “Real Governance Beyond the ‘Failed State.’”
  19. Hagmann and Peclard, “Negotiating Statehood.”
  20. Specifically for the education sector, see Titeca et al., “God and Caesar”; De Herdt and Titeca “Governance with Empty Pockets.”
  21. Ibid., 550.
  22. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 170.
  23. Hallet, “Symbolic Power and Organizational Culture,” 133.
  24. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 170.
  25. Loveman, “The Modern State,” 1658.
  26. Ibid.
  27. Ibid
  28. Weber, The Theory of Social, 152–7.
  29. Von Trotha 2001 cited in Hagmann and Péclard, “Negotiating Statehood,” 543.
  30. Migdal and Schlichte, “Rethinking the State.”
  31. Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism.”
  32. Gupta, “Blurred Boundaries.”
  33. Ibid, 389–90.
  34. Mitchell, “Society, Economy and the State Effect.”
  35. Ibid., 83.
  36. Ibid., 84.
  37. Ibid., 83.
  38. Ibid, 84.
  39. Ibid, 95.
  40. Compagnon, “Somali Armed Movements.”
  41. Africa Watch, “Somalia: A Government at War,” 3.
  42. Abdi, “Education in Somalia”; Morah, “Old Institutions, New Opportunities”; Abdinoor, “Constructing Education”; Hoehne, “Education and Peace-Building.”
  43. The first ministry was called the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports.
  44. Abdirahman Aw Ali, former minister of education, Hargeisa, 28 March 2017.
  45. Ibid.
  46. This is a reference to iska wax u qabso – meaning something close to ‘help yourself’, which was a scheme developed during the reign of Siyad Barre. In essence iska wax u qabso was a volunteer project in which people volunteered to construct roads, hospitals and schools (see Mukhtar, Historical Dictionary of Somalia, 177; Ingiriis, The Suicidal State, 85–90). According to some interviewees, the iska wax u qabso scheme was known colloquially as ‘forced voluntarism’.
  47. Hussein Elmi Warsame, former DG of MoEHE, Hargeysa, 14 February 2017.
  48. Lindley, “Transnational Connections”; Hoehne, “Diasporic Engagement”; Hoehne and Ibrahim, “Rebuilding Somaliland through Economic.”
  49. Headteacher, Hargeisa, 16 March 2017.
  50. Ibid
  51. Former Director-General of education, Hargeisa, 2 April 2017.
  52. Ministry employee, Hargeisa, 22 March 2017.
  53. Williams and Cummings, “Education from the Bottom Up.”
  54. Abdullahi Yashin, November 23, 2017.
  55. Morah, “Old Institutions, New Opportunities”; Hassan and Robleh, “Islamic Revival and Education in Somalia.”
  56. The authors know of one case in which a private school was closed for a short period. This was due to suspicions of the school being funded by an organization related to terrorism.
  57. Brown, Final Synthesis Report for the Joint Review of the Educations Sector, Somaliland, 14.
  58. Somaliland National Examination and Certification Board, Grade 8 and form 4 report 2017, 6.
  59. Belonging to an area does not necessarily mean being born in the area. It can also mean being part of the family (sub-clan) residing in the area.
  60. Diaspora group member, Hargeisa, 5 April 2017.
  61. Chairman of community organization, 23 December 2017.
  62. The ministry changed the name to Ministry of Education and Science after the 2017 presidential election.
  63. Loveman, “The Modern State,” 1662–3.
  64. Ibid., 1663.
  65. Interview with a legal advisor, MoEHE, Hargeisa, 4 December 2017.
  66. Interview with community group member, Hargeisa, 2 December 2017.
  67. Interview with education coordinator, MoEHE, Hargeisa, 22 November 2017.
  68. Loveman, “The Modern State,” 1659.
  69. Headteacher, village, 16 July 2016.
  70. Chairman of the community group, Hargeisa, 17 July 2016.
  71. The Somaliland administration is not officially recognized and can therefore not receive bilateral aid. Some development actors are less keen on working with an unrecognized state than others. Thus, all sorts of ‘gymnastics’, as one informant from an NGO put it, are made to the tunnel and reach out for international aid.
  72. Parent, 6 July 2016.
  73. Member of curriculum commission, 18 July 2016; see also Ahmed, “Somaliland: Keep Ideology Out of k-12 Education.”
  74. Ministry of Education and Higher Education, National Education Act 2013, 18.
  75. Education manager, private school association, Hargeisa, 1 February 2017.
  76. Education manager, private school association, Hargeisa, 4 April 2017.
  77. Ibid.
  78. Loveman, “The Modern State,” 1659.
  79. Rahma Ibrahim, director of primary education, 26 February 2017.
  80. Primary teacher, Hargeisa, 2 January 2017.
  81. Salaries are paid in Somaliland shillings in cash. Prior to the policy salaries were SLsh300,000 (approximately US$50 plus top-up salaries from fees), the ministry doubled this to SLsh600,000. It was later raised to 700,000 which due to fluctuation in exchange rates still amounted to approximately US$100. Minimum salaries of teachers have recently been increased to SLsh800,000. Teachers with more seniority can earn SLsh920,000 per month.
  82. Headteacher, Hargeisa, 26 April 2017.
  83. Headteacher, Hargeisa, 3 April 2017.
  84. Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” 83.

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