1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical considerations underlying this thesis. Therein, I suggest conceiving of the state as one of several socio-political regimes within a society and propose that state-making was ultimately about the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ within a geographically defined population. Accordingly, I claim that trends of state-making and state-breaking can be understood as processes of changing levels in institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. The chapter furthermore contends that the standardization and survival of institutions and socio-cognitive systems largely hinges on central administration. The fundamental hypothesis I advance is that outcomes of regime standardization are greatly determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or exploit administrative structures. I also maintain a number of further arguments. First, I suggest that periods of regime change, which are characteristic of state-making endeavors, are inherently crisis-prone, as a modification of the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that structure a society goes in tandem with shifts in power. Second, I argue that processes of regime change are generally driven by elites, as it is largely this social stratum that holds the capacity for regime negotiation and standardization. Furthermore, I postulate that war can be conducive to state-making under the condition that it contributes to the standardization of a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.
Chapter 3 applies the analytical prism of regime standardization to the Somali state trajectories of the 1960s and early- to mid-1970s. The chapter’s first part addresses the puzzle of why the previously promising state-making endeavor of the 1960s came to falter. After tracing some of the most prominent historical developments in early-independent Somalia the section highlights some of the challenges that came with the unification of the British and Italian Somali territories. Against this background, the chapter argues that, after an initial increase in regime standardization on the part of the state, the 1960s were largely characterized by a pluralization of regimes. The chapter’s second part considers the coup d’état of 1969, the installation of a military dictatorship, and its implications for statemaking. Thereby, the section speaks to the question of why Somalia was able to experience a phase of progressive state-making under Barre’s early rule and how this was undertaken. Essentially, the section suggests that with the takeover of the military government trends in favor of the standardization of an authoritative set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems started to set in.
A first analysis of the role war played for Somali state trajectories is undertaken in Chapter 4. The chapter addresses the questions of how the Ogaden War of 1977/78 and the insurgency war led by the Somali National Movement (SNM) in north-west Somalia in the 1980s impacted the subsequent state trajectories, and why they had such differential effects on processes of state (un)making. I propose that the Ogaden War heralded a situation in which Barre was increasingly bereft of his ability to conduct institutional and sociocognitive standardization, thus leading to the unmaking of the Somali state. With regards to the civil war, it is, however, less clear as to how much it contributed to an enhancement of particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that would lend themselves to explaining the alleged state-making success of Somaliland. While it seems as if the war did not lead to outright regime standardization, the chapter uncovers certain developments that were constitutive of state-making.
Subsequent to this historical application of the regime standardization prism, the thesis delves into analyzing Somaliland’s state-making project. Contesting established paradigms, Chapter 5 shows that the polity’s state-making process was neither as unique nor as peaceful as generally claimed. While showing that Somaliland’s state-making endeavor has numerous parallels to earlier state-making projects within and outside of Somali territories, the chapter furthermore contests that it was the legendary ‘traditional authorities’ with their inclination towards ‘grassroots democracy’ that lay at the heart of the polity’s development. Based on empirical findings I claim that Somaliland owes its trajectory largely to the shrewd and authoritarian politics of President Egal, who did not even balk at instigating a civil war in order to consolidate his power and reconstruct a previously deconstructed state. The chapter illustrates that whereas the 1991-1993 period was marked by processes of state-breaking, the subsequent years were largely characterized by a fortification of processes of regime standardization, the foundations of which had already partly been laid during the course of the civil war of the 1980s.
Chapter 6 continues to analyze Somaliland’s state-making trajectory, scrutinizing the common propositions that democratization and decentralization were not only thoroughly beneficial for its development, but also genuine. Drawing upon empirical evidence, I propose that the process of democratization was flawed, turning it into little more than a continuation of Egal’s authoritarian politics ‘by other means’. Moreover, the effect of democratization on state-making appears to have been ambivalent, not least because it heralded a process of political decentralization, which impeded the maintenance of regime standardization during the 2000s. In light of these developments the chapter argues that, from the state-making point of view, both democratization and decentralization took place prematurely, putting significant brakes on the broadcasting and implementation of a single authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.
The analysis of Somaliland’s state trajectory between the early-1990s and the late-2000s is completed by an investigation of the degree of state-making it had achieved by the end of its first two decades. Examining developments in its administrative architecture, security apparatus, resource mobilization patterns and media landscape, amongst others, Chapter 7 puts the overly optimistic representation of Somaliland commonly found in the literature into question, proposing not only that the republic’s state-making endeavor was far from concluded by 2012, but also that the consolidation of this state remained limited. A central finding is that regime standardization was – to the extent that it occurred – largely confined to the Hargeysa-Berbera-Burao ‘heartland’ of the Isaaq clan and remained mostly absent from the ‘hinterland’. Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, summarizes some of the key findings and discusses their implications for theory, policy and future research on Somalia and Somaliland.
About the Author
Dr. Dominik Balthasar holds a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellowship for International Relations and Security (TAPIR, 2012-14), in the framework of which he has worked with an for the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House, UK), the United States Institute of Peace (USIP, US), and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS, FR). Dominik’s work focuses on issues pertaining to conflict, fragility, and international development assistance, with a particular geographical emphasis on Somalia. He holds an MSc and PhD in international development from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE, UK) and can be reached under dominik (at) balthasar-online.de.
