Three Central Propositions
The central purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the cogency of three main propositions that emerge through theoretical consideration and the examination of three case studies, one of them in extensive empirical detail. The project’s main proposition – and most original theoretical contribution – lies in conceptualizing state-making as a process of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Institutional standardization underlies state-building and is understood as a process whereby a single set of ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990; North et al. 2006) gains dominance within a given society – i.e. a condition in which all major role relationships are regularized by a preponderant organization. Likewise, sociocognitive standardization underlies nation-building and is defined as a process whereby one common set of ‘rules of the mind’ – i.e. socio-cognitive elements such as language or mental maps – becomes dominant within a politically defined population. In order to refer to both of these processes, I will apply the term of regime standardization.
The analytical understanding of state trajectories in terms of changing levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization is based on a reinterpretation of well-established arguments in the literature on state-building and nation-building respectively and aims at reconstructing the common bonds between these sets of literature that were weakened in the 1980s (Eriksen 2006:1). Whereas classical accounts of state-building emphasize the creation and enforcement of a common institutional framework, also the literature on nation-building prominently features the element of standardization. Whether generated by industrialization (Gellner 2006), language or education (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1977:135), or warfare (Simmel 1964; Howard 1978; Tilly 1992), it is socio-cognitive standardization that constitutes the basic red line running through all of these explanations of nationalism. While the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’ does not establish causal explanations, this lense is to improve our understanding of state trajectories.
As its second key proposition, the thesis advances the ‘central administration thesis’. Following the established argument that administration, understood as the “management of public affairs” (OED 1989), is central to state-building,16 and combining it with the modernist perspective on nation-building that argues that “administrative organizations create meaning” (Anderson 1983:53),17 I advocate not only that state- and nation-building are inextricably interlinked, but also that significant changes in a society’s collective institutional and identity parameters are to be ascribed to modifications in their form of organization. Alterations in a society’s institutional structure generally go in tandem with modifications in its socio-cognitive configuration. Consequently, I suggest that it is central state administration that is key in driving processes of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. The fundamental hypothesis advanced here is that state trajectories are largely determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or exploit central and political administrative institutions and organizations.
The third main proposition I put forth is that war can foster and catalyze processes of state-making, under the condition that it promotes institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. This proposition leans on the bellicist tradition – with its emphasis on the importance of war for state-building and nationalism18 – but is distinct in that it treats large-scale organized violence ‘merely’ as an antecedent condition, rather than an all-defining independent variable. While challenging those who advocate that war was a daemon of decay that constituted nothing but “tragic vicious circles” (World Bank 2008; Collier 2004; Leander 2004) that amounted to “nothing less than doom” (Mohamoud 2006:15), the project similarly distances itself from those propagating war as an angel of order (Luttwack 1999). Rather, this thesis sets out to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war, arguing that particular aspects of violent conflict may be constitutive of state-making.19
These propositions inherently challenge the frequently made argument that state-making projects are no longer on the agenda of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa (Kaplan 1994),20 which is plagued by violent disorder and state-breaking (Bayart et al. 1999; Chabal/Daloz 1999), and where “chances of success for state-building in the early 21st century are […] constrained, if not completely obsolete (Berger/Weber 2008:198).21 Subjecting this common view to critical scrutiny I suggest that despite superficial symptoms of decline, processes of state-making have not vanished from the African continent – if only because “[state] collapse is likely to inaugurate fresh or renewed processes of state formation” (Doornbos 2002b:798; Eisenstadt 1988). How the three main propositions and a number of minor ones develop throughout this thesis relate to the literature on state-building, nation-building and to Somalia and Somaliland is discussed subsequently.
[su_button url=”https://saxafimedia.com/state-making-in-somalia-and-somaliland/5/” style=”soft” size=”12″ wide=”yes” center=”yes” text_shadow=”0px 0px 0px #FFFFFF” rel=”lightbox”]CONTINUE READING ON THE NEXT PAGE >[/su_button]
