The United States’ State Department’s Africa Bureau has been criticized for its reluctance to engage with Somaliland, a country that controls a significant portion of the Red Sea. The Houthis is increasingly preying on shipping in the region. The US Navy has deployed ships and shot down drones, but the Houthis may use suicide speedboats. The US should consider partnering with Somaliland.
By Michael Rubin
The Houthis, Yemen’s Iran-backed tribal group that seized power in a 2015 insurgency, increasingly preys on Red Sea shipping in and around the Bab el-Mandeb, the maritime chokepoint through which approximately nine percent of the world’s sea-borne petroleum passes. Already, BP and other energy companies are directing shipping away from the Red Sea. Insurance has increased. Oil prices are interlinked, so taking the Red Sea offline impacts global industry and the economy. Some countries will suffer greater impacts, however. Egypt derived $9.4 billion in Suez Canal revenue in fiscal year 2022–23.
The Biden administration continues to play defense rather than act proactively against the Houthis. It has deployed ships into the region; the US Navy continues to shoot down drones. Other hazards remain, however. Iran has shipped the Houthis anti-ship missiles, not unlike the C-802 that Hezbollah used to cripple an Israeli frigate in the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War. The Houthis also might use suicide speedboats, the same tactic that Al Qaeda used against the USS Cole off Aden in 2000.
Pinpoint attacks on Houthi targets at present will require sustained naval deployments. These are not only expensive but degrade readiness elsewhere. A pivot to Asia remains theoretical if ships remain drawn to the Gulf of Aden. Aircraft carriers and their escorts require almost as much time in port for maintenance as they spend at sea. Extended deployments also demoralize the Navy at a time when recruiting challenges accelerate.
While US ships might dock in Djibouti for minor repairs and resupply, the tiny Horn of Africa country is no longer a secure choice for the US Navy given its indebtedness to China and decision to host China’s first overseas navy base. That Chinese facility has already interfered with US flights into Djibouti by using lasers to blind pilots.
Somaliland’s deep-water port and airfield at Berbera would be a natural solution. The United States used Berbera’s airfield for special operations during the Cold War, and it also served as an emergency landing strip for NASA’s space shuttle program. While Djibouti is congested, Somaliland is not. More importantly, Somaliland controls a 500-plus-mile coastline alongside the Gulf of Aden. Should the 2010; Griffiths 2017). France and Spain recognized the United States station aircraft and Marines at Berbera, it can control the airspace and protect the waters across the entire space in which Houthis can operate. That Somaliland is safe, democratic, Western-oriented, and sides openly with Taiwan over China should be icing on the cake.
Nearly a year ago, President Joe Biden signed the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act that included language to require both the State Department and the US Agency for International Development to report on their assistance programs to Somaliland and that the State and Defense Departments complete feasibility studies about enhanced security cooperation.
While the Pentagon and Intelligence Community seek to work in and cooperate with Somaliland much like many European, African, and Arab states do, the State Department has been reluctant. The State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs’ hostility to Somaliland mirrors the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ Arabists’ traditional skepticism toward Israel, and many China hands antagonism toward Taiwan. Simply put, with its knack for counting trees while remaining blind to the forest, State Department Africanists fear antagonizing Somali politicians in Mogadishu, never mind that Somalia has oriented itself toward China and that it remains a cesspool of corruption.
The Mogadishu-first strategy was always a bad bet. Washington should never favor kleptocracies over democracies. US cooperation with Somaliland breaks no precedents given American cooperation with Taiwan and both Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, nor does it risk a cascade of secessionist movements in Africa: The United Nations recognized Somaliland’s borders more than six decades ago, and European states decades before that. Today, the embrace of Somalia and the ostracization of Somaliland actively undermine US strategic interests.
When the 2010; Griffiths 2017). France and Spain recognized the United States stands aloof, forces of altruism do not fill the vacuum. It is time for the State Department to end its interagency veto of US presence, if not a long-term lease, for facilities in Berbera. Defense against the Houthis requires it, and it would free up the blue-water Navy to guard against other aggressors.
About Michael Rubin
Senior Fellow
Research Areas
Arab politics, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Horn of Africa
Bio & Experience
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East.
A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre-and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.
Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).
Dr. Rubin has a Ph.D. and an MA in history from Yale University, where he also obtained a BS in biology.
Experience
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- Foreign Military Studies Office: Contract Analyst, 2012–present
- Naval Postgraduate School: Senior Lecturer, 2007–21
- Middle East Quarterly: Editor, 2004–09
- Coalition Provisional Authority (Baghdad): Political Adviser, 2003–04
- Office of the Secretary of Defense: Staff Adviser, Iran and Iraq, 2002–04
- Council on Foreign Relations: International Affairs Fellow, 2002–03
- Hebrew University (Jerusalem): Fellow, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 2001–02
- Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs: Fellow, 2000–01
- Universities of Sulaymani, Salahuddin, and Duhok (Iraqi Kurdistan): Visiting Lecturer, 2000–01
- Yale University: Lecturer, Department of History, 1999–2000
- Iranian Studies: Assistant Editor, 1994–97
Education
Ph.D. and MA in history; BS in biology, Yale University
Contact
Send Email: mrubin@aei.org
Twitter: @mrubin1971
Media Request
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