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The article “The Rise of the BRICS and Egypt-Ethiopia Tensions” discusses escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa, particularly between Ethiopia and Egypt, amid geopolitical rivalries and the influence of the BRICS bloc.

Key points include:

  1. Tensions in the Horn of Africa: There are increasing conflicts, particularly related to Egypt’s potential military involvement in Somalia. This situation is exacerbated by alliances formed along the lines of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have differing interests in the region.

  2. Geopolitical Alliances: Egypt aligns with Saudi Arabia, especially regarding issues like the Gaza conflict and the Sudanese civil war, while Ethiopia is more aligned with the UAE. This division reflects a broader regional struggle for power and resources, often leading to armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.

  3. The Role of BRICS: Egypt and Ethiopia are both part of the BRICS group, which includes countries like Iran and Russia. This bloc is not ideologically unified but shares interests in reducing U.S. dollar dominance and pursuing strategic investments in resources, rather than focusing on humanitarian issues.

  4. Investments by Gulf Monarchies: Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested heavily in the Horn of Africa to secure resources and mitigate climate vulnerabilities. This has led to a scramble for land and resources, particularly in Sudan.

  5. Proxy Conflicts: The article highlights the use of proxy forces in regional conflicts, with Eritrea supporting Ethiopian militias against the Ethiopian government. The dynamics of these conflicts are complicated by the involvement of Gulf states.

  6. Limited Role of BRICS: Despite both Ethiopia and Egypt being BRICS members, the group is unlikely to mediate their conflicts. The article suggests that the future of regional stability is uncertain, with rising tensions and potential for miscalculations.

Overall, the situation in the Horn of Africa is characterized by complex geopolitical rivalries, resource competition, and the impact of external powers, with little hope for a peaceful resolution.

The full article is as follows:

The Rise of the BRICS and Egypt-Ethiopia Tensions

The Rise of the BRICS and Egypt-Ethiopia TensionsThe past fortnight has seen tensions across the Horn of Africa escalate at an alarming rate. The geopolitical competitors of Ethiopia and Egypt are facing off over the proposed deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia, with the danger of yet another internationalized conflict erupting in the Horn rising. Other countries are quietly assembling behind their respective allies. So far, this has largely broken down along the Saudi-Emirati schism that is playing out across the increasingly anarchic ‘Red Sea Arena.’ The current crisis can also be understood in the context of the interconnected rise of the BRICS, a paralyzed multi-lateral system, and a regional order in flux.

As is the case in the Sudanese conflict, Egypt and Ethiopia fall on opposing sides of the Saudi-Emirati divide across the Red Sea. Despite the reports of a UAE bailout earlier this year, Cairo remains aligned with Saudi Arabia, particularly over Israel’s invasion of Gaza and their mutual support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the ongoing civil war.

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Others, to greater and lesser extents, are also aligned with Riyadh, including Eritrea and Djibouti. Within the Saudi orbit, not all relations between these actors are equal or peaceable, but most enjoy Riyadh’s largesse and investment, which has come in the form of major port deals in Djibouti and mining extraction licenses in Eritrea.

By extension, the Abu Dhabi-oriented actors, particularly Ethiopia, Somaliland, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Chad, make up the other flank of the schism. Within Somalia, the Emiratis also enjoy a close relationship with the Jubaland and Puntland administrations.

Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, among others, perceive the littoral states on the Red Sea as an extension of their security and political spheres of interest. The zero-sum game to deny their competitors access, previously Qatar and Iran, has seen a neo-colonial scramble for natural resources in the Horn as well as a securitization of the Red Sea countries.

Today, on either side of the Red Sea, armed conflict, mass displacement, and food insecurity are becoming the norm—not the exception. Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among others, are all grappling with intersecting and compounding security, humanitarian, and governance crises, which have eroded government presence in the peripheries.

Consequently, unstable and irrational regimes have become answerable to their Gulf patrons, who care little for democracy and have driven a renewed focus on a distorted ‘sovereignty’ that is centered on extracting international and domestic rents.

What is also notable about the latest political crisis engulfing the Horn is that both Ethiopia and Egypt are members of the insurgent BRICS bloc. On 1 January, Egypt, Iran, the UAE, and Ethiopia officially joined the group, while Saudi Arabia and Argentina were also invited. The bloc is far from ideologically united, but they share an interest in de-dollarization, the undermining of the supremacy of the US currency, and a shared vision of illiberal international relations.

Iran and Russia want to undermine US hegemony and ‘sanctions-bust,’ while China seeks to erode, not entirely dismantle, the USD. Most member states are concerned not about the massive displacement and food crises roiling the Horn or issues of democracy and governance but about strategic investments in critical resources such as agricultural land and water.

The petro-monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested USD billions in shoring up their vulnerability to the climate crisis and food insecurity by buying up vast tracts of land across the Horn, particularly in Sudan. In particular, Abu Dhabi, or more accurately, Dubai, has monopolized the largely informal Sahelian gold trade—one of the principal resources that underpins currency. And it was only a matter of time before Turkey, though a NATO member, sought to join BRICS, as announced on 2 September.

For several years, the Recep Tayyip Erdogan administration has been operating with a kind of BRICS rationale, balancing a relationship with Russia and the West while pursuing strategic relationships with countries like Ethiopia and Somalia.

The ongoing 9th Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing also points to where we can expect regimes to align if Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia end up clashing, through proxies or otherwise. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), his Eritrean counterpart Isaias Afwerki, and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed were all present in the Chinese capital. Since his return to office in 2022, HSM and Afwerki have struck up a close alliance, with the former traveling half a dozen times to Asmara, including soon after the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was announced on 1 January 2024.

In Beijing, HSM and Afwerki met again alongside their foreign ministers and proclaimed their support for each other once more. Eritrea is firmly in the Cairo/Mogadishu camp, supportive of any agenda that might destabilize or undermine its southern neighbor. The calamitous partnership between Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki is long gone, collapsing in the aftermath of the war on Tigray.

The former allies are now facing off in Ethiopia’s Amhara region, with Asmara providing clandestine military support to select Fano militias, with which it forged close ties during the ethnic cleansing of Western Tigray. Proxy forces have long been a feature of armed conflict in the Horn of Africa, but an increasingly militarily assertive Gulf has also warped this dynamic.

The BRICS is not a multilateral designed to soothe internal conflict or establish a new vision of governance and security. Though Egypt and Ethiopia are both member-states, do not expect the organization to step in to facilitate dialogue. ‘Pax Americana’ was always something of a misnomer, underwritten by immense military and economic force, but the next iteration of the regional and global order does not promise to offer greater stability or equitable governance. Tensions are rising once more in the Horn, with few easy off-ramps and plenty of room for miscalculation.

This article first appeared in Sahan Research’s weekly bulletin “The Horn Edition,” Issue No. 50, on September 5, 2024.