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The article highlights the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, particularly following Ethiopia’s seizure of Luuq airport. Ethiopia’s strong ties with local Somali clans have led to political conflict in Somalia’s Parliament.

Somalia’s government criticizes Ethiopia for its water resources and sovereignty ambitions, while South West State leaders see alignment as patriotic.

Ethiopia has responded with military readiness and diplomatic defiance, despite concerns about regional organizations’ effectiveness in mediating the situation.

A Week on the Brink, Escalating Ethiopia-Somalia TensionsBy the Somali Wire team

Reports of Ethiopian forces seizing the Luuq airport in Somalia’s Gedo region marks a dangerous new flashpoint in the unraveling relationship between the two countries.

In what has been the most volatile week yet, tensions have reached a fever pitch, with warlike rhetoric and assertive declarations of sovereignty’ signaling a dangerous descent into further confrontation.

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This bold and calculated gamble by Addis signals a stark shift from rhetoric to decisive action, testing Somalia’s resolve but also setting a dangerous precedent for further escalation.

Ethiopia’s military involvement in Somalia began in 2006 and continued with its integration into the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012. Its role as a frontline force against al-Shabaab has proven critical, with Ethiopian forces not only countering insurgents but securing borders and providing essential support to local Somali authorities.

Over the years, Ethiopia has built strong ties with clan populations, forging relationships based on mutual trust. These deep-rooted local connections are difficult to replicate, and any replacement of Ethiopian forces— particularly by Egyptian forces— would likely leave the newcomers isolated and susceptible to Al-Shabaab attacks.

A generally pro-Ethiopia, anti-Egypt sentiment in Somalia’s South West State and Gedo reflects Ethiopia’s deep-rooted connections. Regional lawmakers and other citizens have openly expressed their support for Ethiopian forces, with protesters in South West State holding signs proclaiming, “Masar Ma Rabno (We Don’t Need Egypt)’.

Local administrations for Hudur and Wajid issued a joint statement lauding Ethiopian soldiers for their sacrifice and long-standing cooperation with the community in defending against their enemies.

Tensions in Somalia’s Lower House of Parliament reached a breaking point following the pro-Ethiopia protests, with South West State MPs defending their constituents’ rejection of Egyptian forces, and Hawiye MPs filing a motion accusing them of treason.

After two sessions were postponed amidst heated debate, the Speaker intervened and both sides agreed to “uphold Somalia’s unity and sovereignty.” But within days, South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen praised the South West State lawmakers for supporting the pro-Ethiopia protesters, framing their actions as patriotic, in stark contrast to the federal government’s portrayal of the lawmakers as treasonous.

Somalia’s Minister of Defense Abdulkadir Mohamed Noor then issued a stern warning to Laftagareen, emphasizing that the people of South West State should not be subjected to the authority of what he termed a “historical enemy.”

Shortly after that, in a press briefing, Prime Minister Hamza Barre delivered his most blistering critique of Ethiopia to date, accusing the neighboring state of harboring an aggressive ambition. He said, “Ethiopia wants to either take our waters by force or force us to accept an agreement they made with Somaliland.” Neither of these, he vowed, would succeed under his administration.

The South West State administration’s stance reveals a federal government increasingly isolated from its regions and highlights the ongoing battle over the narrative of sovereignty and national unity. While Mogadishu currently perceives support for Ethiopian forces as a betrayal of national sovereignty, Laftagareen perceives it as necessary and patriotic, to ensure the security and stability of both South West State and Somalia as a whole.

As could be expected, Ethiopia has responded assertively, blending diplomatic defiance with gunboat diplomacy. Over the past week, Addis has issued a series of indirect but still pointed warnings to both Mogadishu and Cairo. The Ethiopian Air Force, in a show of strength, announced heightened vigilance over the country’s eastern airspace, demonstrating it is fully prepared to carry out its national duty.

In a Sovereignty Day address, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reinforced this stance, stating that Ethiopia has never initiated invasions but it has always defended itself against foreign threats. His warning was clear: any attempt to violate Ethiopian sovereignty would be met with serious resistance.

In a more diplomatic move, Ethiopia formally rejected Egypt’s accusations regarding Nile water usage in its letter to the UN Security Council. It asserted that the management of natural resources falls strictly within its national jurisdiction.

At the recently concluded China-Africa Cooperation Summit in Beijing, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reportedly declined to meet with Prime Minister Abiy, despite diplomatic overtures made by Djiboutian and Mauritanian presidents, former Nigerian President Obasanjo, and Kenya’s President William Ruto. To hold public or off-the-record sidebar discussions at such a forum is normal, so Hassan Sheikh’s rejection holds weight.

The fracture between Ethiopia and Somalia has also exposed an unsettling silence at regional and international bodies, including the African Union and IGAD,  casting doubt on their abilities to fulfill their roles. And as tensions escalate, the fate of the Ankara talks slated for next week remains uncertain.

The urgency for effective diplomacy has never been greater. It is crucial for these organizations, alongside the Somali federal government and its federal member states, to actively engage in meaningful dialogue and mediation to prevent further escalation and stabilize the region.

This article originally appeared in Sahan Research’s thrice-weekly bulletin “The Somali Wire,” Issue No. 730, on September 11, 2024.