The Politics Of The 1969 Somali Coup

Similarly, when the former police commander and first Vice-President General Korshell was abruptly arrested and charged with organizing an ‘imperialist’ counter-revolution, some commentators interpreted this as a shrewd move devised to correct the S.R.C.’s sup­posed over-representation of senior Darod members. And those critics who at the time of the coup smugly asserted that General Siyad was a `mere Negib’ who would be swept from power into obscurity once the real militants’ of the revolution (the young majors and colonels) came to the top, have since found it necessary to revise their opinions.

For the astute maneuvers within the S.R.C. which led to the appointment as Army Commander of one of his closest dependents, and to the ex­pulsion or neutralization of many of his potential rivals, have greatly enhanced the Head of State’s reputation as a master of political strategy, and contributed to his personal image as an outstanding example of the Somali conception of the ‘Big Man’.

Further evidence of General Siyad’s political adroitness can be seen in his creation in November 1971 of a personal advisory board, or cabinet, of three leading members of the S.R.C. to debate policies before their submission to the Council as a whole.

Those who adopt this traditionalist approach in analyzing the for­tunes of members of the S.R.C. in terms of an internal power struggle along lineage lines, see confirmation rather than a contradiction in the actual charges which are employed to discredit Council members who have fallen from grace. Most Somalis are far too sophisticated to take seriously the accusations of ‘failing in revolutionary zeal’ which have accompanied some unexpectedly abrupt demotions.

The rapid turn-over of Vice-Presidents on similar counter-revolutionary charges,¹⁴ also tends to reinforce the public’s impression of a cut-throat struggle for power which, if conducted in a tougher style, recalls the endless factionalism of previous civilian governments.

Speculations of this sort, however, are now best-kept secret, since the airing of any opinion which can be construed as hostile to the regime is a very serious offense indeed. The inveterate tea-shop gossip, with its scandalous accounts of the latest escapades of the Republic’s leading politicians, which was such a characteristic feature of the urban scene in the `bad old days’ of civilian rule, has disappeared.

Idle chatter has thus certainly been silenced: but so has the healthy and freely voiced public criticism which any government must heed if it seeks to retain the goodwill and respect of the governed. The voice of the dead, however, is not so easily silenced. One recent expression of opposition to the present regime reportedly assumed the form of letters addressed to the Head of State written posthumously by his old colleague the assassinated President, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke.

These sinister messages from the grave were predictably enough of the wish you were here’ type, and copies were found lying about in Mogadishu’s central market. A sick political joke? Scarcely in the circumstances; but certainly a gesture very much in the Somali style.

If efforts to galvanize the citizens of the Republic into approved activity have not been as successful as was originally anticipated, at least the new regime can legitimately claim to have made more impact in foreign relations than its civilian predecessors. Following its Russian military connexions, it has leaned to the East where previous civilian governments leaned to the West.

Thus, at the price of alienating America and jeopardizing a large component of U.S. aid, the Republic’s new leaders have entered into relations with North Vietnam, North Korea, and, to the embarrassment of Bonn, with East Germany. These moves do not, however, seem to have much affected existing links with Italy and the E.E.C., or with Britain. Nor does the country’s growing economic dependence on Russia seem so far to have had any perceptible influ­ence on relations with China, which remain cordial if inscrutable.¹⁵

In the more immediate Middle East context, General Siyad’s vigorous espousal of a form of socialism which he finds fully compatible with Islam seems likely to place Somalia more definitely amongst the radical Arab states. In inter-African affairs and in the O.A.U., the Republic seems to play a more effective role than it used to, although here it generally continues with greater emphasis on the tradition established by Egal, the last civilian Premier.

Finally, and contrary to what might have been expected of a military government, the new regime has also continued to follow his conciliatory path in building stronger and more effective links with both Ethiopia and Kenya, and has displayed little evidence of adopting a more militant stance on the issue of Somali unification. This is not as paradoxical as it may seem. For as long as the present Government feels insecure within the Republic, the prospect of committing substantial fighting resources on the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders is scarcely attractive.

Indeed, it seems most significant that of the many accusations made against the former police chief and Vice-President, General Korshell, one of the most damning was that he was alleged to be intriguing to create trouble with the Ethiopians. Here surely we see openly displayed the Head of State’s private nightmare and, we must presume, the hope of some of his opponents.

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