The Politics Of The 1969 Somali Coup

In so far as it is possible to discern any general public response to these dramatic events which had taken place very quickly, and ap­parently without a single shot being fired, the sudden and triumphal entrance of the army onto the political stage appears to have been greeted with cautious optimism and with a mixture of respect and fear. Prior to this, the army had played no direct part in the internal affairs of the Republic; although its leaders had their links with politicians, the army had not been directly employed to support any of the previous civilian governments.

Its significance lay primarily in external affairs —as a shield against the Ethiopians and Kenyans, and as a symbol for the vigorous pursuit of the Somali unification struggle. It had in fact been in action against Ethiopia in 1964 and had also participated more or less clandestinely in the Somali guerilla campaign in northern Kenya. It is only fair to point out, however, that much of the day-to-day border patrolling was carried out by special units of the armed, carabinieri-style police force.

This raises the important issue of the relationship between these two bodies. Historically the army is largely an off-shoot of the police, formed initially in 1958 and strengthened by the incorporation of the former British Somaliland Scouts unit after independence. As with the police, its officers have been trained in Italy, Britain, Egypt, and Russia, and sometimes in several of these countries. Both forces probably contain an equally representative cross-section of the general Somali population with, however, in each case very few recruits from the southern Somali cultivators.¹¹

Their distinctiveness as separate organizations with different roles was accentuated by the fact that the first Commander of the Army was Hawiye (General Daud, who died in 1965), while the police com­mandant (General Abshir) was drawn from the Darod. These differences bred a tradition of comradely rivalry between the two forces and made it seem perfectly logical that while until 1969 the United States should be the main source of arms and support for the police, Russia should fulfill the same role for the army. This, of course, did not prevent both forces jointly drawing on further aid from other friendly countries, including Italy, Egypt, Britain, and Germany.

By 1969 there was no doubt which of the two competitors had become the senior partner, both in size and military equipment. But, as their mutual support in the coup demonstrates, their rivalry had by no means exhausted their capacity to co-operate. The at least tacit help of the police was also, I think, very important for the military as an additional source of legitimacy for their intervention in the affairs of the nation. What might have happened had fighting actually broken out, either as the civilian politicians were rounded up or with the intervention of the police, is impossible to predict.

Any open conflict would, however, have severely tested the esprit de corps of the army. It is also, I am sure, highly significant that at no point since assuming power has the Supreme Revolutionary Council sought to suggest any link between the revolution and the assassination of the late President Shirmarke. Indeed quite the contrary. Far from becoming a hero, the assassin was swiftly brought to trial, sentenced, and executed; and the many allega­tions of corruption and nepotism which have been so freely applied to their civilian predecessors have most noticeably not been directed at all at the ex-President. He remains an official hero; after all, he is dead.

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