The Politics Of The 1969 Somali Coup

Nevertheless, as in other highly egalitarian cultures, traditional Somali attitudes towards power and authority were distinctly ambivalent. For all their hardy republicanism and individualism, and perhaps indeed because of the very difficulties involved in wielding effective power in such unpropitious conditions, the figure of the tyrant and despot seems always to have held a curious fascination for the pastoral nomads. To some extent this is also a facet of the martial character of traditional Somali society where the display of force, however brutal and merciless, is associated with manly virility and contrasted with weakness, a quality which though despised is held to possess a certain, compensating mystical virtue.

In this generally turbulent society with its mercurial political formations, certain stability was provided in the basic traditional political unit, the so-called dia-paying group’. Rarely boasting more than a few thousand warriors, these groups consisted of closely related patrilineal kinsmen who had combined together for mutual support and were parties to a specific treaty (hem) which contained many features comparable to those of the ‘social contract’ of the political philosophers.

The crucial bond here was the common obligation to pay and receive damages for injury and death (Arabic, dia) in concert. If one member of a group was killed or wounded, his comrades rallied together until revenge or satisfactory damages had been exacted. Fighting, when it occurred, tended to spread rapidly, however, soon involving the members not only of the dia-paying groups directly responsible but also those of more distant kin and allies.

With such rapidly escalating hostilities, where group identities were constantly being enlarged as the more inclusive levels of lineage patriotism became involved, whole clans would eventually be mobilized to defend their component lineages against their foes.

In this context of inter-clan conflict, constituent dia-paying group loyalties would be set aside for the duration of the wider confrontation. As soon as fighting between clans ceased and tension at this level abated, these units would again fall apart into their component lineages.

In such a conflict-ridden culture, peace-makers had clearly an important role to play: and here appropriately religion came to the aid of a divided society. Local Muslim leaders were expected to intercede between men, as much as between men and God. These Sheikhs symbolized the transcendental brotherly love of the Islamic community: and although ultimately forced to rely on traditional lineage ties, were ideally committed to the furtherance of peace between warring clans and lineages. The complementary character of the two roles was reflected in the traditional Somali view that mankind comprised two fundamental categories; men of the sword, and men of God.⁵

This segmentary political system continues to provide the basic framework within which modern Somali political organizations operate. To a significant extent, this is a tribute to the traditional structure’s capacity to absorb innovating influences and modernizing trends with a minimum of dislocation. For although the Somali region has attracted substantial development funds, radical socio-economic change on any appreciable scale has scarcely taken place at all.

[su_button url=”https://saxafimedia.com/politics-1969-somali-coup/8/” style=”soft” size=”12″ wide=”yes” center=”yes” text_shadow=”0px 0px 0px #FFFFFF” rel=”lightbox”]CONTINUE READING ON THE NEXT PAGE >[/su_button]