Reports of Jubaland President Ahmed Islam ‘Madoobe’s’ poor health in recent weeks have brought about another debate surrounding succession in the southernmost Federal Member State (FMS). The incumbent president and reformed jihadist has led Jubaland for over a decade, serving as a bulwark against both Al-Shabaab and the centralizing impulses of successive federal governments.
Currently, though, Madoobe remains on the political sidelines amid growing cleavages between FMS leadership and the federal government concerning the proposed deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia and parallel demands that Ethiopian forces withdraw. Typically seen donning his traditional ‘kufi’ hat, he has been conspicuously absent from both Kismayo and Mogadishu.
The Jubaland leadership has been cautiously operating within the federal government’s orbit for over a year now, hedging its bets. Even while Villa Somalia has sought to rework the federal system by amending the Provisional Constitution, Kismayo has remained the fiefdom of Madoobe. Hailing from the Mohamed Zubeyr sub-clan of the Ogaden, the FMS president has ensured his hold on the profitable deep-sea port city through his loyal Daraawiish forces drawn from the former Ras Kamboni militia that he previously led. Madoobe’s tenure has overseen the significant development of Kismayo, but much of Jubaland remains under Al-Shabaab control, including the extremist group’s de facto capital of Jilib.
Having served Jubaland loyally for many years, the time may be approaching when the elder statesman chooses to step aside and allow new leadership to come forward. The process through which this might happen and the dynamics involved would depend on several factors, however, including whether Madoobe has identified a preferred candidate to replace him, the high likelihood of interference from Villa Somalia, and how regional presidential elections might come about. A peaceful political transition with so much vested interest in Kismayo is by no means guaranteed.
The first element to stress that would invariably shape any transition is Jubaland’s clan dynamics. Politically dominated by the Darood clan, the two major sub-clans of the Marehan and the Ogaden would both stake claims for the presidency. After Madoobe, the best-known political figure today from Mohamed Zubeyr is Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, a close ally of the FMS president who served on the electoral commission in Jubaland.
But Barre is a loyal member of the ruling Damul Jadiid Islamist faction in Mogadishu and is widely perceived as a surrogate for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). Many Jubalanders are profoundly wary of the federal government’s centralizing tendencies and overreach, and parachuting a federal proxy into Kismayo politics is highly complex and risky, as former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo found out in 2019.
The prospect of another Mohamed Zubeyr politician replacing Madoobe does not sit well with members of the Awliyahan subclan, whose elites contend that their time to lead Jubaland is overdue. Their clan stronghold, Bu’aale, is Jubaland’s official state capital but is currently under Al-Shabaab control. If the Ogaden are split between the Awliyahan and Mohamed Zubeyr candidates for the regional presidency, other factors will inevitably come into play, including the federal government’s preferences and the influence of Ogaden political elites in neighboring Kenya.
But an intra-Ogaden competition for the presidency would also be problematic. Many of the Marehan elite feel that after more than a decade of Ogaden dominance, it is now their turn at the wheel. The current Vice President of Jubaland, Mohamud Sayid Aden, hails from the Marehan and, according to the regional constitution, would assume the presidency if the incumbent were to vacate. Yet he would likely require the regional parliament, packed with Madoobe loyalists, to support the transition and Marehan elders to support his candidacy as well.
While the Marehan may feel aggrieved that Madoobe has lasted so long in power, the cold reality is also that they have failed to liberate themselves from Al-Shabaab to the same extent that the Mohamed Zubeyr-dominated Ras Kamboni forces have. And the installation of a Marehan candidate to the presidency without sufficient buy-in could have several disastrous consequences.
First, many of the Ras Kamboni forces that have secured Kismayo were once aligned with Al-Shabaab and could drift away from the regional government and back to the extremist group. This will be a particular risk if any incoming leader does not secure the financial and political interests of Mohamed Zubeyr, which could imperil the control of Kismayo—Jubaland’s undisputed commercial capital. Part of this would invariably be tied to the deep-sea port itself and the tariffs and taxes imposed on goods entering the city.
Any incoming leader will need to assert control over these resources, but a disturbance to the political-economic patronage networks that have sustained Madoobe’s administration could upset a delicate equilibrium.
Jubaland’s last highly contentious elections were held in August 2019 and resulted in three separate men declaring themselves president of the FMS. At the time, Farmaajo’s government sought to oversee elections to install their ally and, having failed to do so, created parallel polls to undermine Madoobe’s position despite protestations from the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
And following Madoobe’s inevitable re-election, Mogadishu subsequently sought to destabilize relations between the Marehan-occupied Gedo region and Kismayo while installing pro-Farmajo candidates and security forces in key areas. It precipitated a surge of Al-Shabaab in Gedo that has not been reversed to this day. The costs of a succession struggle after Madoobe could be very high indeed.
The situation becomes more complicated still when considering that Madoobe has already seemingly exceeded his term’s mandate. In July, Madoobe directed Jubaland’s parliament to amend the constitution to scrap the two-term limit for regional presidents and extend the presidential term from four to five years. The legality of this move is questionable, but even so, August 2019 is now over 5 years ago, and the regional presidential elections are overdue– as they are in both Galmudug and South West State.
Consequently, if Madoobe were to leave his position, the constitutional element of any immediate succession to the vice-president could be contested, as the incumbent vice-president’s term has also expired. According to the regional constitution, there would be a nominal period of two months under the Speaker of Parliament’s leadership until elections can be organized.
The nature of these elections is also likely to be challenged but will almost certainly have to be held using the clan-based parliamentary method, as in the past. The federal commission that is meant to oversee one-person, one-vote elections has not yet been formed, and there remain significant questions about the feasibility of any centrally-organized elections in Jubaland, not least the fact that most of the FMS is controlled by Al-Shabaab. While the federal government may consider succession as an opportunity to insert a loyalist and draw Jubaland firmly into its orbit, the stakes and the potential for disastrous miscalculation are high.
Whoever inherits the Jubaland presidency will certainly have a full in-tray. To name just a few issues, he (and it is all-but-certain that any successor will be a man) will have to contend with a hypernationalist Villa Somalia intent on pushing through a new electoral model that could supersede Jubaland’s. Al-Shabaab is resurgent and remains entrenched in Middle and Lower Juba, even while they currently focus their attention on Mogadishu and its environs.
Broader questions of the federal structure and Somalia’s frayed political settlement, the relationship with the Gulf, and Jubaland’s neighbors will all continue to play out. Ethiopia and Kenya both consider Jubaland to fall within their respective spheres of influence, and the FMS has often served as a barometer for the health of Addis-Nairobi relations. There have been periods in the past when acutely competitive and rivalrous dynamics between the neighbors have ratcheted up tensions in Jubaland.
Since Madoobe helped displace Al-Shabaab from Kismayo over a decade ago, he has been one of the few constants in Somalia’s turbulent politics. For years, Madoobe had been helping to maintain a delicate balance between Somalia’s pro-federal elements and Villa Somalia’s centralizing instincts, but as successive crises and ill health have weakened him, that balance has been shifting towards Puntland as the pillar of federalism. Among a host of other issues, whoever succeeds Madoobe, whenever that may be and however that comes about, will have to contend with this legacy of delicate balance and the future of federalism in Somalia.
This article originally appeared in Sahan Research’s thrice-weekly bulletin “The Somali Wire,” Issue No. 734, on September 20, 2024.
