The article “A Smile and a Hug in Addis” discusses the events surrounding a recent meeting between Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, which took place in Addis Ababa. The meeting is seen as a step towards reducing tensions between the two nations, tensions which have heightened in recent months. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had previously facilitated this tentative rapprochement.
During their meeting, Abiy extended a warm welcome to Mohamud, including public displays of support such as billboards and a ceremonial wreath-laying. There were contrasting domestic reactions, as Mohamud faced backlash from his supporters who felt he betrayed Somali interests by engaging with Ethiopia.
The article explains that while both leaders can claim some level of success from the meeting, significant unresolved issues remain, particularly regarding military presence and alliances in the Horn of Africa. While there seems to be a cautious acceptance of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, negotiations over troop numbers are expected to be complex and contentious.
Mohamud’s administration is in a precarious position, facing internal challenges and potential opposition from Islamist groups, while also trying to reflect a more favorable international image. Meanwhile, Egypt and Eritrea appear to be strategizing against Ethiopia’s growing influence, indicating that regional tensions persist despite recent diplomatic moves.
In summary, the meeting symbolized efforts to improve relations, but the actual impact and long-term changes on the ground remain uncertain, with ongoing geopolitical complexities in the Horn of Africa.
The complete piece is as follows:
A Smile and a Hug in Addis
By The Somali Wire Team
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali met over the weekend in Addis Ababa to cement a tentative détente brokered in December by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The new momentum towards normalization is welcome and certainly has the potential to de-escalate the dangerous tensions that have built up in the Horn in the last year. But beyond symbolism, will it change anything on the ground?
Abiy pulled out all the stops to give the Somali president an exceptionally warm welcome. Streets were festooned with the white-star-in-blue-ocean Somali flag. Billboards with the portrait of HSM were erected at major road intersections, emblazoned with ‘Welcome to Ethiopia, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’. A major hotel lit up the night sky in Addis decked in the Somali flag, and earlier in the day, the Somali president laid a wreath at the mausoleum dedicated to the Battle of Adwa and inspected a guard of honor of Ethiopian soldiers. Images of Abiy and Hassan Sheikh clasping hands and laughing were widely shared, a stark contrast to Erdoğan’s firm maneuvering of both men just a month ago.
The domestically embattled Abiy seemed to relish every moment, while Ethiopian media lapped up the pomp and circumstance associated with the trip. The official narrative is that a wise Ethiopian leadership had shown strategic patience, overcome a seminal crisis point, repaired ties with Mogadishu, and foiled Egyptian and Eritrean designs in the Horn.
Unsurprisingly, the raging insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara were nowhere to be seen, nor the surges in instability and poverty across the country. In Mogadishu, meanwhile, the Somali president’s core constituency—Islamists and nationalists—exploded in anger at the visit. Hassan Sheikh has since been accused of betrayal and even treason for ‘capitulating’ to Ethiopia.
In football parlance, Ethiopia and Somalia can both declare a draw and spin the new détente as some sort of success. Ethiopia has not achieved its ambition to gain its still-vague aspirations for ‘access’ to the Red Sea via Somaliland but has not formally renounced the contentious Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Meanwhile, the Somali president has not capitulated to Addis or officially agreed to an Ethiopian military presence remaining in Somalia. Neither, however, has he ruled out an Egyptian troop presence, deeply opposed by Addis, or a ‘hostile’ alliance with Eritrea.
In fact, the same day HSM was in Addis, Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiqi was meeting his Eritrean and Egyptian counterparts in Cairo. During this parallel meeting, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty declared that Cairo would not accept any military presence in the Red Sea from non-littoral states, i.e., Ethiopia. Pledging to hold another tripartite alliance meeting, the attendant’s support for Somalia’s “stability, security, and territorial integrity” was reiterated once more.
After months of deteriorated ties and much still in flux, all are hedging their strategic bets and making no binding commitments. Despite a new administration in Hargeisa and its vocal unease about the MoU, Addis is attempting to keep the Somaliland option open while protecting its security and geopolitical interests in Somalia. Ethiopia calculates that participating in the latest iteration of the African Union peacekeeping mission is crucial in preventing the Egyptians from deploying troops to their border.
Mogadishu is now believed to have cautiously accepted an Ethiopian military presence but is reluctant to budge on the numbers, still favoring a smaller deployment despite the Burundians having pulled out. Addis is demanding to be allowed more troops beyond the 2,000 now offered by the Somali federal government and has threatened to play its trump card by withdrawing its forces entirely.
The precise number of bilaterally and multilaterally deployed Ethiopian soldiers in Somalia is difficult to precisely know due to its fluid nature, but it is estimated to number several thousand primarily deployed across Hiiraan, Bay, Bakool, and Gedo. Many of these communities, particularly in South West State, are supportive of the Ethiopian military presence in the context of a resurgent Al-Shabaab. The haggling over numbers will take weeks to resolve, even though the peacekeeping mission has officially begun, and could well become more politically complicated.
Hassan Sheikh has clear motives for mending fences with Abiy, even temporarily. Both leaders have come under pressure from Ankara to negotiate their differences, and Somalia’s federal government remains particularly economically and politically dependent on Türkiye. With Somalia having assumed its seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Mogadishu may also want to generate some positive headlines.
Most importantly, Hassan Sheikh’s government remains mired in crisis domestically, though still set on unseating Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe. In recent weeks, Villa Somalia has shifted its anti-Kismaayo machinations to Gedo after the Ras Kamboni debacle, where it hopes to foment an anti-Madoobe rebellion and possibly goad Ethiopia to endorse the idea of establishing a parallel administration in Gedo to challenge Kismaayo. This is an old script attempted by Ethiopia and former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, and it is highly likely Villa Somalia will try to revive that plan or a variation.
Addis, however, remains reluctant to part with Madoobe or withdraw significant troop numbers. Another reported location of contention pertains to Baidoa, the seat of the South West State administration.
Again, Mogadishu here favors the Ethiopian military withdrawal ahead of regional elections this year so as to better influence the politics of the southern Federal Member State, no matter the security cost. The risk for Hassan Sheikh is that he appears to have damaged his credibility with influential Islamist and nationalist forces by traveling to Addis, even though they also oppose Madoobe. It has likely harmed his chances of re-election in 2026—whatever form these polls take.
Egypt and Eritrea are almost certain to read the new developments in Addis as a tactical setback in their attempts to isolate Ethiopia. The meeting in Cairo was purposely designed to divert attention from the buzz around the Somali president’s trip to Ethiopia and insist that the so-called ‘tripartite alliance’ remains unchanged.
Asmara and Cairo are expected to make counter-moves in the coming weeks to attempt to scuttle or undermine the delicate process of Ethiopian and Somali re-engagement supported by Ankara. What form that will take is hard to divine, but one must not downplay the determination of Eritrea and Egypt to ‘humiliate’ Abiy. Reports of increased hostile military activity by Eritrean forces along its Ethiopian border suggest that the risk of regional conflict still remains despite the thaw in relations between Addis and Mogadishu.
This article originally appeared in Sahan Research’s thrice-weekly bulletin “The Somali Wire,” Issue No. 773, on January 13, 2025.
