The article titled “Somaliland: The Nation the World Won’t Recognize but Can’t Ignore” by Daniel Haile and Will Childers explores the situation of Somaliland. Despite its stability, democratic governance, and peaceful power transitions, Somaliland lacks international recognition, which contrasts sharply with the turmoil and instability present in Somalia and other countries in the Horn of Africa.
Key points from the article include:
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Historical Context: Somaliland has a rich history as a trade hub and has a distinct cultural identity tied to the Isaaq clan. It was a British protectorate until 1960 when it united with southern Somalia, which has since experienced decades of conflict following the fall of its last autocratic ruler, Siad Barre.
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Somaliland’s Governance: After declaring independence, Somaliland established a stable government, maintaining law and order amidst chaos in Somalia. This stability is highlighted as a significant achievement compared to other regional states suffering from internal conflicts, dictatorial regimes, and civil wars.
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Challenges of International Recognition: The reluctance to recognize Somaliland stems from geopolitical concerns, particularly fears of encouraging other secessionist movements in Africa. The African Union and international community’s silence on Somaliland’s independence is tied to a broader hesitance to disrupt the political status quo across the continent, which has historically seen borders defined through colonial legacies.
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Geopolitical Dynamics: Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait interests regional powers like Ethiopia and Egypt, which complicates its quest for recognition. Ethiopia has established a military and commercial relationship with Somaliland, while Egypt is supporting Somalia’s central government, reflecting conflicting interests in the region.
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Somaliland vs. Somalia: The article questions why Somaliland should defer to a central government in Mogadishu that struggles to maintain control, emphasizing that Somaliland is a functioning entity with a successful governance model in a region marked by autocracy and failure.
Overall, the article suggests that Somaliland’s case challenges conventional views on statehood and recognition, arguing for a reconsideration of its status in light of its stability and governance success in a tumultuous region.
The full article is as follows:
Somaliland: The Nation the World Won’t Recognize but Can’t Ignore
Somaliland has been a beacon of stability, security, and democratic governance, marked by peaceful transitions of power.
Authors: Daniel Haile and Will Childers*
Somaliland has been a beacon of stability, security, and democratic governance, marked by peaceful transitions of power. This accomplishment sharply contrasts with Somalia’s ongoing civil war and three decades of failed statehood. Since the fall of Siad Barre, its last autocratic ruler, Somalia has descended into the “Mad Max” tier of failed states, rivaled only by Afghanistan. Given the precedents of Namibia, Eritrea, and South Sudan attaining independence, why has Somaliland been denied similar recognition?
Somaliland’s success is a striking anomaly within the Horn of Africa, a region dominated by fragile and failed states. South Sudan struggles with ongoing internal conflict and tenuous peace agreements. Sudan’s descent into anarchy mirrors the protracted civil wars in Libya, Somalia, and Syria. Ethiopia grapples with escalating ethnic tensions that jeopardize its unity, evoking parallels to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, Eritrea persists as a Marxist authoritarian relic, the “last of the Mohicans” among Africa’s Communist states, and Djibouti continues to bandwagon behind Eritrea’s one-man dictatorship style of authoritarian rule. Like the Balkans, the Horn of Africa is a center of gravity for instability, insecurity, and chaos. Amid this volatile landscape, Somaliland’s relative success in democratic governance makes its lack of international recognition all the more perplexing.
The hesitancy to recognize Somaliland stems from geopolitical complexities, regional power dynamics, and the broader fear of encouraging other secessionist movements. Indubitably, Somaliland meets the international requirements needed for recognition, including a permanent population, a defined territory, a stable governmental system, and the capacity to engage in international relations with other sovereign states.
This last criterion is perhaps the most important for its recognition, given the growing competing regional interests from its parent state, Somalia, and the international players who are geopolitically vested in its unification. Acknowledging Somaliland’s sovereignty would challenge the status quo, forcing the international community to reconsider long-standing policies on self-determination and state recognition in one of the world’s most volatile regions.
Somalia and Somaliland: A Tale of Two Diverging Paths
Two significant factors have contributed to how Somaliland functions today as a society. Given its proximity to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, Somaliland has long been a breadbasket for trade and commerce, connecting early civilizations of both the Middle East and East Asia to commodities like spices and other consumer products.
Secondly, early Somaliland society originated under the famed Islamic scholar Sheikh Ishaaq bin Ahmed around the 13th century, whose descendants formulated what we have today as a homogenous Isaaq clan hegemony and culture. These two geopolitical facets have long magnetized interest from international players and sparked regional upheaval.
After half a millennium of rule, the Arab Sultanate was broken up in the 17th century, bringing the coastal society under Egyptian control until 1884. At that point, it became a British protectorate. During World War II and until 1960, Somaliland fell under Italian control, and in 1960, both regions united to form Somalia. The period from the 1960s to the early 1990s was characterized by the rule of Siad Barre, who ostracized any movement that challenged the ruling Darod clan.
The current governance structure of Somalia was established under the provisional Constitution following the end of the previous Transitional Federal Government that reigned from 2004 to 2012. The constitution laid out how these Federal Member States should be instituted and how the dichotomous relationship should exist with the Federal Government.
The House of the People of the Federal Parliament approves new states and demarcates borders. There are six Federal Member States and one Regional Administration: Puntland, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Southwest State, Galmudug, Somaliland, and the Banadir Regional Administration.
These Federal Member States generally align with the following significant clans: Dir, Darod, Rahanweyn, Hawiye, and Isaaq. On the one hand, each state should be self-governing and sustaining; on the other, they are expected to strive for a cooperative relationship with other states and the Federal Government. Above all, the Federal Government facilitates national unity, strength, and security. On the international stage, the Federal Government serves as the central authority for trade, negotiations, treaties, and foreign aid matters.
Africa’s Pandora’s Box: The Untold Costs of Secession and Fragile Borders
Recognizing the independence of secessionist regions remains a monumental challenge for African countries, even when those regions have a legitimate and moral cause for sovereignty. Since the 1990s, only three African states have achieved independence. Namibia gained its independence from apartheid South Africa in 1990 after 24 years of armed struggle.
Eritrea secured independence from Ethiopia following a 30-year war, the most protracted continuous struggle for independence in Africa, culminating in de facto independence in 1991 and de jure recognition in 1993. South Sudan, the continent’s youngest nation, became independent from Sudan in 2011 after more than two decades of civil war.
African nations have cemented the notion that recognizing secessionist movements threatens the fragile political fabric of the continent. They fear that granting autonomy to breakaway regions could lead to the unraveling of African states, whose borders were arbitrarily drawn by European colonizers. This fear serves as a Pandora’s box for the continent, discouraging the recognition of regions fighting for self-determination.
If the people of Somaliland have overwhelmingly chosen independence through a referendum, why should their aspirations be denied? The case of Somaliland raises pressing questions about the balance between preserving outdated borders and acknowledging the democratic will of a people striving for sovereignty.
The Case for Peaceful Secession: Redrawing Borders Without Bloodshed
The international community cannot ignore that Somaliland has functioned as a de facto independent and self-governing state for over 30 years. Astonishingly, the African Union and the broader international community have remained silent on recognizing Somaliland’s independence.
After all, Somaliland stands as one of the only regions within the Horn of Africa that has maintained political stability, functioning institutions, and a democratic system of governance underpinned by the consent of its people. This silence is even more perplexing when contrasted with the human cost of independence struggles in Namibia, where 20,000 to 25,000 lives were lost; Eritrea, which saw over 65,000 deaths; and South Sudan, where over 2 million perished in their quest for sovereignty.
Not all secessionist movements in Africa have succeeded. The Nigerian Civil War, or Biafra War, remains a poignant example. During the conflict, the Igbo people, under the leadership of Odumegwu Ojukwu, a Nigerian military officer of Igbo origin, unilaterally declared the Republic of Biafra in 1967. Their attempt at independence failed after the war concluded in 1970, dashing hopes for an independent Igbo state, and 3 million Nigerians perished during the Biafra war. Yet, the aspiration for the Republic of Biafra endures, and only time will reveal whether Nigeria will follow Ethiopia on the “Yugoslavia train” of disintegration.
Against this backdrop, one might ask: could a political union, akin to the structure binding England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, offer Somalia a framework to prevent future bloodshed? By accommodating regional autonomy within a broader national framework, such a union might provide a pathway toward stability while averting the human cost of conflict.
Somaliland: The Unrecognized Success Story of the Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa remains one of the most unstable regions globally, with Somalia serving as a prime example of this turmoil. Since the departure of Military Officer-turned-dictator Siyad Barre in 1991, Somalia has remained a failed state, unable to establish a central government with a monopoly on violence. This three-decade power vacuum has fueled regional instability, allowing Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization, to wreak havoc in Somalia since 2006. Somali pirates have further exacerbated the chaos, disrupting global shipping routes in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait since the 1990s and creating international maritime insecurity.
Who Is to Blame? Unpacking Accountability in Somalia’s Crises
The question persists: who is responsible for Somalia’s lawlessness? Neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya? Global actors? Or the enduring legacy of British and Italian colonialism?
Somalia presents a paradox: Somalia has more in common with Japan and South Korea than with any other African country. Unlike most African nations, it boasts ethnic homogeneity: one tribe divided into clans, one language (Somali), and one religion (Sunni Islam). This unity should theoretically foster social cohesion, democratic governance, economic prosperity, and human development. Yet Somalia’s trajectory since the 1990s suggests otherwise. It continues to spiral into dysfunction and chaos.
Somaliland’s Gamble: Who Will Recognize Its Sovereignty, and Who Will Stand in the Way?
To fully understand how Somaliland fits into the larger picture of Horn of Africa relations, it’s essential to discuss the roles of two key players: Ethiopia and Egypt. Ethiopia, the most populous landlocked country on Earth, is in perpetual pursuit of Red Sea port access to bolster exports. 95% of its exports flow through neighboring Djibouti. On January 1st, 2024, Ethiopia struck a bilateral deal with Somaliland, granting it military and commercial access to the port of Berbera on a 50-year lease.
In contrast, Egypt signed a defense pact with Mogadishu on August 14th, 2024, promising 5,000 soldiers to the new African Union-led Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM), a multilateral peacekeeping force focused on thwarting Al-Shabaab’s presence in the region. Mogadishu has expressed that it would likely reject any future contribution of Ethiopian troops to the African Union mission, primarily due to the sensitive perception of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) defending the porous border along the Ogaden region.
Cairo’s recent interest in supporting Somalia through military troops and weaponry contrasts with Addis Ababa’s approach. This divergence in foreign policy makes sense when put into the context of Ethiopia-Egypt relations. Since the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) construction in 2011 on the Blue Nile, relations between the two countries have deteriorated. Egypt, another populous and growing power player in the region views the GERD as a threat to its water and food security based on the premise that Ethiopia can unilaterally control the water supply crucial to Egypt’s major population centers.
Additionally, Egypt is vested in securing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait from Houthi attacks and Somali pirates, whose disruptions have significantly reduced revenues in the Suez Canal by 50% in 2023. To Egypt, securing these interests is only possible by supporting Somalia through capacity-building and military aid.
Cairo’s intervention in Somalia and Addis Ababa’s recent Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland are significant regional foreign policy decisions that further challenge the debate over sovereignty and international engagement. Economic considerations continue to play a central role in the positions of major regional players in the Horn of Africa, directly influencing the official recognition status of Somaliland.
Rethinking Sovereignty in the Horn of Africa
Why should Somaliland defer to Mogadishu, a government incapable of exercising control even over its capital city, reliant on Western aid and regional military interventions? Somaliland’s progress highlights its status as an anomaly in the Horn of Africa, particularly when compared to its neighbors, most of which are ruled by autocratic regimes:
Eritrea: Under Isaias Afewerki’s iron-fisted rule since 1991, Eritrea holds the dubious distinction of being Africa’s most enduring dictatorship.
Ethiopia: Following the highly centralized control of Meles Zenawi from 1991 to 2012, Ethiopia transitioned into a new autocratic era under Abiy Ahmed in 2018.
Djibouti: Ismail Omar Guelleh has maintained his grip on power since 1999.
Uganda: Yoweri Museveni’s rule, beginning in 1986, surpasses even Eritrea’s in longevity.
Sudan: Before its political upheaval, Sudan was dominated by Omar al-Bashir from 1989 to 2019. Currently, Sudan is a failed state, mirroring the chaos and fragmentation seen in Libya and Somalia.
Somaliland’s stability and achievements starkly contrast with the instability of its neighbors. Its governance, security, and development successes raise a fundamental question: why does the international community hesitate to recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty? In a region dominated by autocracy and state failure, Somaliland remains a compelling anomaly.
About the Authors
Daniel Haile
Daniel Haile is a United States Army Officer with a distinguished academic background, holding two Master’s degrees in International Affairs from Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service and Texas State University. Born in the Horn of Africa, he offers a unique perspective on the region, enriched by personal experiences and extensive research. Daniel’s op-eds have been featured in notable publications, including The National Interest and InDepthNews, where he delivers insightful analyses on African politics.
Will Childers
* Will Childers is an active-duty U.S. Army Special Operations Officer specializing in Civil Affairs with a focus on East Africa. He holds a Master of Business Administration from Southern New Hampshire University and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Texas A&M University. As a former Civil-Military Liaison at the U.S. Embassy in Somalia, he facilitated critical engagements with Somali clan leaders and government officials, advancing regional stability and governance.
