While there are examples of “conflict entrepreneurs” who benefitted from the turmoil of the early 1990s, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the private sector as the unsung heroes of Somaliland’s struggle for survival.
In circumstances which would have discouraged experienced capitalists, businessmen in Somaliland helped establish a rudimentary police force, financed peace conferences, contributed substantially to the government coffers, provided jobs, facilitated remittances, and unleashed hope and pride in self-reliance. They imported supplies that made it possible for people to repair their homes and start their own businesses. In the absence of state structures, people turned to the private sector for water, power, transport, schools, and healthcare facilities.
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The lack of international recognition has inevitably undermined the capacity of the private sector to develop itself in Somaliland. Being invisible translates, in practical terms, to being cut off from international markets. Banks and insurance companies cannot risk engagement outside the rules that apply to other countries.
Furthermore, governments do not extend direct budgetary support to ministries and most of the assistance given is indirect. It is difficult for any government to demonstrate its legitimacy to its own people when essential services are provided by international organizations, local NGOs, and the private sector.
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It would be unrealistic to expect local businessmen to finance large-scale and expensive infrastructure projects, such as the port in Berbera, as well as the roads that connect Berbera to landlocked Ethiopia. But without this infrastructure, Somaliland’s economic potential remains untapped, trapping people in an endless cycle of dependence. Overreliance on the private sector risks excluding the poor, which constitutes a large percentage of the population in Somaliland.
“Fragile” states are inherently those with weak institutions. Somaliland and Somalia’s past shows what can happen when there are no institutions that can withstand the onslaught of war and conflict but that can also assist in providing solutions. Somaliland is now in a political twilight zone: it has gone beyond the point where its nascent institutions can, or should, rely on the resilience of traditional institutions of conflict management, which address problems at the community level.
It was apparent in Colombia that the decision to confront the problem of FARC and other rebel movements brought to the forefront questions about the state’s responsibility towards its citizens. One of the greatest challenges facing Somaliland is to open up a debate about the nature of the state and the political institutions which can ensure a stable future free of strife.
A great deal of time and energy has been spent in forming new political institutions to modernize the body politic without revising the old one. The result is a hybrid system of the old and the new – one which risks diluting the authority of the traditional structures while failing to fully embrace the new ones intended to lead to democratization.
At the heart of this debate is the future of the Guurti. Instead of remaining a body outside the political arena with the authority and moral standing to provide an alternative mechanism for dispute resolution, they have become more of an adjunct of the government rather than an asset to the community. Because they are no longer seen as entirely independent, they cannot be relied upon to challenge government policies. The material advantages and proximity to power have proved damaging.
Instead of experience and respect within the community as the criteria for nomination, families have come to regard the position as hereditary, leading to a huge inflation of individuals seeking and being bestowed with traditional titles.
The politicization of the role of elders has blurred the lines between the government and those who should be holding the executive in check, and very importantly, between the affairs of the state and the responsibilities of communities. In a context where the state (which lacks funds, human resources, and adequate infrastructure to maintain peace) must rely on elders to contain violence and address underlying problems, the confusion and dilution of roles is a cause of concern in Somaliland given the ever-present shadow of conflict.
Instead of limiting discussion of contentious clan issues to competent institutions, namely the Guurti, political elites are using clan politics to advance their own aims, irrespective of its relevance and whether they have been mandated to speak on their behalf.
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