In the article “All Roads Lead to Somaliland Guban: What to Expect from Ankara’s Declaration,” by Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud, the author discusses the implications of the Ankara Declaration, focusing on its potential impact on Somaliland’s sovereignty and strategic interests.
The primary purpose of the declaration is to facilitate the transition from the African Union’s ATMIS mission to the AUSSOM, creating a temporary diplomatic truce between Somalia and Ethiopia. A secondary goal is to engage with Somaliland’s new administration to explore whether they would accept an agreement under Somalia’s jurisdiction, dismissing the requirement for recognition as an independent state.
The author argues that, despite the potential benefits of this negotiation for Ethiopia’s access to the sea via Somaliland’s Guban coastal area, there are significant risks involved. The concern is that Somaliland’s interests may be compromised, similar to past experiences where strategic assets were conceded without proper safeguards, such as the loss of airspace control to Somalia in a 2014 agreement.
The piece highlights how previous leaders of Somaliland maintained a firm stance on sovereignty, which was weakened by more recent pro-talks politicians who engaged in negotiations without strong guarantees of recognition. The article criticizes these leaders for their failure to learn from past mistakes, suggesting a need for Somaliland to prioritize sovereignty and recognition over uncertain negotiations with Somalia.
In conclusion, the author emphasizes that to secure its sovereignty and utilize its strategic geographical position, Somaliland must focus on legally establishing its independence rather than engaging in potentially detrimental talks with Somalia.
The complete piece is as follows:
All Roads Lead to Somaliland Guban: What to Expect from Ankara’s Declaration
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud
Introduction
The Ankara Declaration has a primary goal and a secondary, more opportunistic aim. The primary objective is to address the deadline for transitioning from ATMIS to AUSSOM by the end of the year. By signing this declaration without canceling the MoU, it gives Somalia and Ethiopia a diplomatic ceasefire until the AU mission is resumed.
Our focus, and the secondary aim of the declaration, is to test the waters with the new Somaliland administration to see if they would sign the MoU under Somalia’s sovereignty and drop the recognition condition. This latter goal isn’t far-fetched, considering Waddani Party leader Hersi Ali’s initial reaction to the MoU, where he objected to signing it without first consulting Somalia.
The good news for Somaliland is that, after the aftershocks of the initial MoU and the dozens of counter-MoUs, all parties have arrived at one conclusion: the only feasible access to the sea for Ethiopia is via Somaliland’s Guban (a coastal plain running parallel to the Gulf of Aden). Somalia could theoretically grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden by traversing 2,078 kilometers of desert land—an utterly impractical proposition. Even the Indian Ocean, at 1,662 kilometers, is closer.
In stark contrast, the Berbera Corridor spans only 950 kilometers and passes through densely populated regions, making it the most practical and efficient route. Ignoring this reality defies fundamental principles of mathematics, geography, economics, social science, and history. I say history since the issue of access to the sea was called the Hawd-Zeila exchange and was negotiated between Britain and Ethiopia even before independence.
The bad news is that this declaration, mediated by Turkey, underscores a troubling trend: Somaliland’s strategic assets are repeatedly compromised in international negotiations. Much like the airspace sell-off of 2014, the Ankara process risks repeating history, leveraging Somaliland’s position without guaranteeing recognition or safeguarding sovereignty. The Ankara Declaration reportedly involves leasing Somaliland ports to Ethiopia, echoing past missteps. This article explores how pro-talks politicians surrendered Somaliland’s airspace and examines the implications of the Ankara Declaration for Somaliland’s sovereignty.
The Airspace Sell-Off: A Case Study in Miscalculation
Somaliland’s loss of airspace control didn’t happen through open consensus—Somalilanders would never have allowed it. Instead, it was a case of being outmaneuvered by Somalia.
Here’s how it unfolded:
- Egal and Riyale’s Leadership: Former presidents Egal and Rayale maintained a strict “no talks without mutual recognition” policy, ensuring all negotiations upheld Somaliland’s sovereignty.
- Policy Shift by Pro-Talks Politicians: Leaders like Hersi and Hashi deviated from this policy, engaging in unconditional talks with Somalia.
- The 2014 Agreement: Held in Ankara, Somaliland signed an agreement allowing Somalia to reclaim airspace control from international organizations (INGOs), with a promise that the operational office would be based in Hargeisa.
- Unilateral Action by Somalia: By 2019, Somalia unilaterally relocated airspace control to Mogadishu.
- ICAO’s Response: Somaliland’s protests were met with a definitive statement from the International Civil Aviation Organization: “We only recognize Somalia.”
The outcome: Pro-talks politicians inadvertently ceded control of Somaliland’s airspace to Somalia, proving that without international recognition, any agreements with Somalia inherently undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty. Alarmingly, some factions, like the Waddani Party, seem oblivious to this lesson, clinging to the belief that a Irro-Hassan Sheikh partnership could succeed where others failed.
Strategic Missteps: Arrogance of Pro-Talks Leaders
Sovereign states possess the ultimate authority over their territories and can withdraw from agreements, especially those made with entities they consider part of themselves. While such actions carry consequences, sovereignty provides the agency to act decisively. Somalia, viewing Somaliland as a “secessionist region,” faces negligible fallout from reneging on agreements.
Yet Somaliland’s pro-talks politicians continue to place faith in external guarantors or vague notions of “Somalinimo” (Somali solidarity). When questioned about these assumptions, Waddani leaders sidestep accountability, proposing national conferences instead of concrete strategies. This evasiveness weakens Somaliland’s position. The foundation of Somaliland’s claims lies in its 1960 independence and legal arguments rooted in state continuity—not in empty rhetoric or misplaced negotiation tactics.
Worse still, some pro-talks figures appear to actively collaborate with Somalian interests advocating unification. Symbolic gestures, such as opening offices in Hargeisa, subtly undermine Somaliland’s independence. The 2014 establishment of the airspace office in Hargeisa exemplifies this, setting the stage for portraying Hargeisa as the capital of a unified Somaliland and Somalia.
Muse Bihi’s Legacy
Former President Muse Bihi adopted a pragmatic stance on negotiations. While he participated in summits, he firmly insisted that recognition remain the sole agenda item. His unwavering “You shall not pass” approach avoided compromises that could jeopardize Somaliland’s sovereignty. Instead, Bihi emphasized alternative agreements and MoU that bolstered Somaliland’s position.
What is next?
Putting aside the high possibility of Trump recognizing Somaliland, how can Somalilanders trust pro-talks leaders like Hersi Haji Hassan to manage access to Guban when they handed over our airspace and failed to learn from past mistakes?
For Somaliland to secure its sovereignty and capitalize on its strategic assets, it must prioritize recognition, legal continuity, and strategic foresight over the infamous talks with Somalia.
