This article, “Somaliland: The Other Somali Republic in the Horn,” highlights the unique situation of Somaliland, an independent republic that has yet to gain official recognition from the international community.
The historical context informs the reader about its brief independence in 1960 and subsequent merger with Somalia, leading to decades of instability.
Despite its effective governance, stability, and democratic processes such as peaceful elections, Somaliland remains in a legal and diplomatic limbo.
The absence of recognition limits its ability to access international financial assistance and participate fully in the global economy.
The recent deal with Ethiopia exemplifies Somaliland’s efforts to forge international partnerships despite the lack of formal recognition.
The article also discusses the challenges posed by the African Union’s adherence to colonial borders and the reluctance of Western powers to endorse Somaliland’s sovereignty, despite its adherence to democratic principles.
Ultimately, the piece argues for Somaliland’s rightful place in the community of nations.
The complete article is as follows:
Mention of Somalis—as in Somali nationals—conjures up images of the unstable Horn of Africa nation that has known little peace since the flight into exile in Nigeria of erstwhile President Mohamed Siyad Barre in January 1991 in the midst of a civil war. But, by referring to Somalis, one could just as easily be thinking of the citizens of the adjoining and lesser-known Somaliland.
Somaliland has a fascinating history. After being a British protectorate since the late 1800s, it became independent in 1960, but this lasted only five days before voluntarily merging with present-day Somalia, which had been under Italian rule and from which it is culturally and ethnically distinct.
Unlike Somalia, it is stable and has witnessed very little terrorist activity in an otherwise troubled region, thanks in part to its robust security apparatus, which involves the active contribution of citizens.
The 1960 merger faced early challenges, with many in Somaliland rejecting the centralisation of power in the country’s south, that is, in Somalia’s capital of Mogadishu, which was the seat of the government of the merged nation. It was unsurprising, then, that a rebel group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), emerged in the 1980s to oppose Barre’s military junta, which had seized power in 1969. The SNM was part of the insurgency that ultimately toppled Barre. After refusing to recognise an interim government that replaced him, the SNM declared Somaliland’s independence in May 1991.
Trouble is, no UN member state or global organisation officially recognises its independence, despite maintaining liaison offices in 20 countries on five continents and hosting several nations’ representative offices in its capital, Hargeisa. One would think that these diplomatic relations, along with having its own currency and security forces and the fact that it issues its own passports, would persuade the international community—that hackneyed phrase again!—to regard it as a sovereign state and treat it as such. But no dice.
Those with more than a fleeting interest in African affairs would recall the diplomatic ruckus caused in January this year when the leaders of Somaliland and Ethiopia announced a deal granting Ethiopia—which has been landlocked since the secession of Eritrea in 1991—access to 20 km of Somaliland’s shoreline in exchange for a stake in Ethiopian Airlines or the nation’s telecoms parastatal, EthioTelecom. Additionally, Ethiopia would seriously consider Somaliland’s aim of international recognition. Needless to say, the authorities in Mogadishu, who insist Somaliland is part of their territory, were not amused, and a war of words erupted.
Rendered ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by its lack of international recognition, Somaliland has had to negotiate its own foreign investment agreements. One of the landmark deals was struck with DP World, of the United Arab Emirates, in 2016 and entails developing and managing the Port of Berbera, a joint venture expected to generate millions of dollars of income a year for Somaliland. Ethiopia joined the port development project two years later with a view to expanding its access to the sea.
I understand why the African Union (AU) baulks at recognising Somaliland. The continental body’s stance is to stick with colonial borders, having relented only twice: when Eritrea seceded in 1991 and when South Sudan followed suit in 2011. But the colonial-borders argument shouldn’t really apply in this case, considering that both Somalia and Somaliland were distinct nations when they emerged from colonial rule, although this endured for less than a week. Their colonial legacies are completely different. Perhaps the folks at AU HQ in Addis Ababa fear that recognising Somaliland would encourage those with secessionist tendencies in places like south-eastern Nigeria and western Cameroon.
But I don’t understand the reluctance of Western powers. Somaliland passes democratic muster, as it holds peaceful elections that are observed by the likes of the EU, France, the UK and the US. Having postponed the 2022 elections because of financial constraints, the country heads to the polls next week—on November 13.
Somaliland deserves to be a full member of the community of nations, with access to vital financial assistance from the likes of the IMF and the World Bank.