Somaliland has been engineered by the Somali National Movement (SNM) (1981–1993) through the application of unique political contexts and trajectories that marked the collapse of the Somali State. SNM is one of the first and most important organized resistance groups opposed to the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre.
By Fatuma Ahmed Ali
The teeth and the tongue are close neighbors, and yet they sometimes bite each other.
Somaliland, an internationally unrecognized state located in the northwestern part of the Horn of Africa, is a product of transformation from political opposition to a rebel group to a government claiming sovereignty from Somalia, a state which it belongs to formally. The leaders and citizens of Somaliland strongly argue that they are reclaiming the sovereignty that they willingly gave up when they eagerly joined the Italian Somaliland on 1 July 1960 to form the Republic of Somalia. This union was conceived at the dawn of independence from the European colonial powers and it was inspired by the ideology of Somali nationalism (somalinimo).
This ideology promoted the belief that the Somali people should create their own nation-state since they have a common ethnic identity (Somalis), history, language (Somali), culture, religion (Islam), and territory. However, this new republic faced significant challenges from the onset which made it difficult to fulfill the ambition of this ideology because of dynamics such as colonial experience, exclusive power circle, the feeling of marginalization by the Isaaq clan of the northwest region, war with the neighbors and economic crisis. Moreover, clan interests and patronage quickly infiltrated the political sphere as the fluidity of parties and candidates underscored the relative importance and eventual dominance of clan identity in Somali politics.
As a self-declared state, Somaliland has been engineered by the Somali National Movement (SNM) (1981–1993) through the application of unique political contexts and trajectories that marked the collapse of the Somali State. SNM is one of the first and most important organized resistance groups opposed to the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre. It was formed in 1981 in London by different Somali diaspora groups from Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom which merged because of their common concerns with the activities of the regime back home in Somalia. As an opposition political organization, the SNM was established to overthrow the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre.
This chapter analyses the role the SNM played in engineering the self-determination of Somaliland. It contextualizes the historical background and the causes that led to the formation of the SNM and its transformation from political opposition to a rebel group and further to a government. Besides, while tracing the genesis of SNM, it is imperative for this chapter to examine how the SNM has engineered the self-determination of Somaliland by understanding the opportunities, efforts, and controversies it encountered in the process of reclaiming this state. This chapter eventually discusses the three stages of SNMʼs transformation and its characteristics.
Historical and political background
Apparently, the collapse of the post-colonial Somali State was a result of a combination of internal and external factors. Externally, there were the legacies of European colonialism that divided the Somali people into five states – Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French Somaliland that is now Djibouti, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, and the Ogaden Region in Ethiopia – and the impact of Cold War politics in shoring up a predatory state, together with the cumulative effect of wars with neighboring states, most damagingly the 1977–1978 Ogaden War with Ethiopia. Internally, there were contradictions between a centralized state authority, and a fractious kinship system, and the Somali pastoral culture in which power is diffused.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the history of governance in Somalia is a saga of contestability and a failure to attain national consensus and cohesion among the different clans/ regions due to political leadership. Conceptualized as a homogenous society, the different Somali clans existed as a collection of centralized and relatively independent city-states each with their own distinct formal government structures which emerged throughout Somalia centuries before the arrival of the first colonialists.
For instance, two dominant medieval power centers emerged in the 14th to 15th centuries: the Adal State and the Ajuuraan State, each wielding significant influence and strong political control over large swaths of East Africa. It has been documented that these city-states represented important instances where pastoral societies created and effectively operated large centralized government structures to primarily facilitate expansive trade networks and taxation bases.
Therefore, from 1884 until 1960 Somaliland became a small but important part of the British Empire. That is why to procure meat for its colony in the Gulf of Aden (present-day Yemen), Britain entered into a series of treaties with northern Somali clans. The British government also mandated a minimalist intervention strategy, choosing to do little more than ensure the region’s peace and stability.
Given the pastoral nomadic lifestyle of the northern Somalis, the British were unable to centralize power within the region. So, instead of enforcing radical socio-economic and political changes in the region, the British administration decided to endorse the local systems and institutions such as the traditional Somali law, Sharia law, and secular law. It can be argued further that it is this system of indirect rule that enabled the northern Somali pastoralists to continue using their indigenous institutions and methods to transform challenges and conflicts as they occur.
Meanwhile, from the 1890s to the 1940s the Italians implemented more intense and stringent mechanisms in south-central Somalia in hope of developing a fully-fledged colony. Furthermore, the Italians developed large-scale agricultural projects, highlighted by banana, citrus fruits, and sugarcane plantations to develop a fully-fledged commercial economy with colonial appointments and taxation policies that simultaneously minimized clan elders’ power.
By introducing a direct colonial system of governance into southern Somalia, the Italians created a centralized power that only gave access to an elite minority of Western-educated Somalis, a new economic system and urbanization that weakened the traditional socio-political and economic system. This fundamental disconnection between the formalized government structure and Somali culture, values, and traditions has become the undercurrent that continues to propel Somalia’s crisis.
However, present-day Somalia is best described through its three distinct geographical, socio-economic, and political regions: south-central Somalia comprising Jubaland (southern), Hirshabelle (southcentral), and Galmudug (central), Puntland (northeastern), and Somaliland (northwestern). Despite being understood as a homogeneous nation-state, Somalia’s six major clan-families – Dir, Darood, Isaaq, Hawiye, Digil, and Rahanweyn – are relatively clustered in and separated by clannism along with political, structural, institutional, and economic factors. The Somalis also use the clan system to define kinship and identities.
In 1960, there was excitement for the unitary Republic of Somalia. However, political developments suddenly affected the union of northern (British Somaliland) and southern (Italian Somaliland) politicians. This was because there was no agreed arrangement for amalgamating their institutions since they had developed different administrative systems, police forces, taxes, currencies, education systems; conducted official affairs in different languages; and also inherited four distinct legal traditions: British common law, Italian law, Islamic Sharia and Somali customary law.
Even though many northerners held key positions in the government, perceived inequalities in the union emerged which meant that Northern support for the merger began to evaporate within months of unification. The northerners cited political and economic inequalities arguing that only 26% of the parliamentary seats were allocated to the north and with the senior ministries and senior army posts held by southerners, and since economical contacts between the two regions were constrained by the distance between the north and the capital in Mogadishu, they felt that their former capital Hargeysa was reduced to a regional headquarters, while Mogadishu became the seat of the government and national affairs.
Additionally, the newly independent government struggled to generate tax revenue from its young economy; therefore, it depended heavily on foreign aid to sustain the state.
Interestingly, as a newly formed State Somalia also practiced parliamentary democracy until 1969 when President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated. Then the military took control and the government rule evolved into a dictatorship under Major-General Mohammed Siyad Barre as the president.
In the beginning, Barre’s rule was marked by a totalitarian effort to stamp out clannism through an ideological mix of Leninism, Marxism, Islamic Sharia, Maoism, and Mussolini’s Fascism, known as Scientific Socialism. It is also crucial to note that as part of scientific socialism all political parties were banned except Barre’s Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), the premise being that parties were merely products and tools of clans. Similarly, traditional institutions were also dismantled and replaced by government-appointed officials.
However, when Barre was faced with critical opposition from the banned political and religious leaders, he quickly abandoned efforts to stamp out clannism and instead resurrected and heightened clan differences by promoting favoritism and nepotism while suppressing and weakening the traditional clan institutions. Siyad Barre’s goal was to divide, weaken and conquer his opponents while diverting attention away from his regime’s failures.
Simultaneously, he turned inwards to his own clan base Darood to the point that his government came to be known among Somalis as MOD. This acronym stood for Mareehaan (Barre’s sub-clan), Ogaden (sub-clan of Barre’s mother), and Dulbahante (sub-clan of Barre’s son-in-law, Colonel Ahmad Sulayman Abdullah, who head the National Security Service), respectively.
The formation of the Somali National Movement
Siyad Barre’s power circle tightened during and after the Ogaden War. Organized opposition groups began to emerge, and in dealing with them Siyad Barre intensified his political repression, using jailing, torture, and summary executions of dissidents and collective punishment of clans thought to have engaged in organized resistance. His political and economic hold on the predominantly Isaaq inhabited northwest of Somalia became increasingly suffocating.
First, the tightening of the power circle disenfranchised political, military, and business elites that had previously shared in the spoils of the Mogadishu government and, second, the total neglect of the social and economic needs of the local population in the northwest, combined with political and military suppression, mobilized local protests. On the ground, in northwestern Somalia, local urban intellectuals, activists, and professionals tried to address the population’s dire situation and their actions were met with arrests and death sentences. The protests that followed in Hargeysa were brutally suppressed.
It was against this background that the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in 1981. The SNM evolved from a diaspora-based political opposition led by disenfranchised elites and politicians by the Barre regime to a clan-based armed grassroots movement dependent on the support of Isaaq clan elders.
Initially, the SNM was founded by a group of Somali émigrés based in Saudi Arabia in April 1981 as an oppositional political movement known as the Somali Islamic Democratic (SID) party. Later, the Saudi-based group merged with an Isaaq diaspora group in the United Kingdom to form the Somali National Movement (SNM) in London in May 1981. The London-based founders were more secular and nationalist in their outlook than the Saudi-based group who favored an Islamic separatist-oriented movement.
Following its formation in London, the SNM relocated to Ethiopia soon after its founding and began conducting cross-border attacks against Siyad Barre’s regime in an attempt to establish bases in the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burao. Its first major military operation inside Somalia took place in January 1983, when it attacked Mandera prison and Adaadle armory near Berbera released several hundred detainees, and escaped with arms and ammunition.
The SNM also launched a military campaign in 1988, capturing Burao on 27 May and part of Hargeysa on 31 May. At this time the SNM developed strong grassroots support, recruited more fighters, and formed a Guurti (council of elders) to guide decision-making and to advise its Central Committee, therefore linking traditional leaders with the movement’s political elite.
The SNM’s financial support primarily came from the Isaaq diaspora community, while most of its fighters were drawn from the rural Isaaq community within Somaliland. Furthermore, the SNM received some assistance from Ethiopia until 1988, when Siyad Barre signed an agreement with President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia; this support essentially consisted of permission to operate in Ethiopian border towns. Therefore, Ethiopia withdrew its support for SNM members who used their links to solicit support from the socialist regimes in South Yemen and Libya.
When the SNM began a rebellion against the regime in northern Somalia in 1982, most of the SNM members were from the Isaaq clan from the northern region who joined and supported the movement in response to years of systematic discrimination by the government. However, it was not set up as an Isaaq movement as such. Several successful attempts were undertaken to broaden the clan base of its top leadership beyond the Isaaq.
Nonetheless, it became an Isaaq movement as it grew increasingly hybrid, involving Isaaq clan elders in its operations and leadership. This hybridization was the result of two things: first, as Isaaq politicians vied for top posts within the organization, it became increasingly and competitively Isaaq with the support of the sub-clan constituencies which made the organization to be threatened by these internal tensions. It was then decided that the Isaaq clan elders will be involved to mediate the tensions.
Second, the SNM had neither contacts on the ground nor the popular legitimacy to lead an uprising. Therefore, the SNM needed the Isaaq elders for their military operation inside their territory. It is clear that without the Isaaq elders, the SNM could not win the war. As the Isaaq elders exponentially grew to play an increasingly important role in the war, the SNM rebel group became less hybrid.
Several factors explain why the SNM began a rebellion in 1982. The SNM’s primary grievances against the Barre government included underrepresentation within the political structure, unequal distribution of revenue from the livestock exports, and discriminate clan-based persecution, and violence. Other factors include the devastation brought about by the Ogaden conflict which sparked famine; an influx of refugees and growing public dissatisfaction with Barre’s regime, especially by the disgruntled officers from the Majeerteen (Darood) sub-clan who formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) as a rebel group drawing its support from the northeastern region.
The SNM was initially a non-violent organization involved in fundraising and creating awareness about the human rights violation by Barre’s government. It then focused on getting a share from the central government in Mogadishu by guerrilla operations. The brutal response by the government of Siyad Barre to the Isaaq people in the northwest region and to the formation and demand of SNM as an opposition political organization provoked the SNM to employ violence instead of a peaceful means.
In an attempt to suppress the rebellion, Siyad Barre’s forces devastated the town of Hargeysa in May 1988 and massacred unarmed civilians predominantly from the Isaaq clan. In fact, this retaliation of Siyad Barre was as a result of the SNM attacking and capturing the towns of Burao and Hargeysa in 1988. However, it is believed that these suppressive efforts by Barre’s regime did not stop the SNM from waging its armed resistance in northern Somalia, but it is also made it see the opportunity to support other clan-based rebel groups to take up arms against the regime. These included the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) supported respectively by the Hawiye and the Ogaden clans.
On 19 January 1991, the rebel coalition made up of the SNM, USC and SPM successfully overthrew Mohamed Siyad Barre from power and forced him into exile. Even though the SNM was created to only ouster the repressive regime, it ended up proclaiming the right of self-determination of the northwestern region because of the events that unfolded after the collapse of the government in 1991.
For instance, despite the collaborative rebellion between SNM, USC, and SPM, their unification agreement failed to last after Barre fled Mogadishu. This is because the USC formed an interim government which the SNM refused to recognize because they were not consulted about its composition by the Southern USC and SPM. This was reminiscent of the kind of marginalizing rule from Mogadishu that they had endured under Siyad Barre.
However, for the SNM the most important factor that led to the proclamation of self-determination was the public sentiment in favor of full independence that had been growing in the northwestern region. Finally, the coalition was disbanded, and armed conflict ensued between and within the USC and SPM in the south. The bitter armed struggle and tactical warfare displayed by the SNM rebel group in the northwest region of Somalia finally heralded a profound secession that is current Somaliland.
SNM in engineering self-determination of Somaliland
As already mentioned, initially there was no talk of secession. The SNM still supported the union with Somalia, but there was a clear desire for greater autonomy if the Somali State were to be reconstituted. However, the immense suffering the Isaaq clan were subjected to by the Siyad Barre regime during the war and the domination of the southerners during the transition process finally convinced the Isaaqs to opt for secession, with the idea of independence coming later.
Among the most critical arguments advocated by the elders was the opportunity to finally separate the governance of Somaliland from that of south-central Somalia, as Barre’s predatory state targeted northern citizens and isolated Somalilanders from a significant share of national resources.
It has been observed that throughout its existence, the SNM remained self-governing and democratic. During the decade-long insurgency, the SNM had five chairmen who were selected at six congresses – it is this peaceful rotation of leadership that demonstrates its adherence to democratic principles and the consensus decision-making that are rooted in the traditions of governance in this pastoral society. The combination of the traditional and modern systems of leadership created a hybrid governance system for SNM as a rebel group.
Therefore, on 18 May 1991, during the Burao conference, elders representing the major clans in Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from the rest of Somalia, revoking the Act of Union with Somalia from 1960. This unilateral declaration of independence has never been recognized by any state, though Somaliland has achieved a ‘quasi-judicial’ sovereignty where it has low-key bilateral relations with a range of states, and informal links with regional political organizations.
The SNM declared independence because of the fall of Barre’s regime, after the realization that the southern armed groups had betrayed it and growing public sentiment for self-rule. However, the USC interim government opposed this declaration, arguing instead for a unified Somalia. The SNM further justified it actions by pointing to the existence of Somaliland as a political entity before 1960 and stating their belief that the union with Somalia was a failure.
However, Somaliland is not yet recognized internationally as a state, but it exists as a de facto state. As an organization, the SNM has made several efforts to achieve its goals but it has also had some opportunities that led to its success and controversies on its path to self-determination. One of the opportunities for mobilization for the SNM, was the relative concentration of the Isaaq clan within Somaliland, unlike in south-central Somalia where the Hawiye are spread across a massive area of land, renders the theory of a united country less important to those in northern Somalia who want their own homeland where they are the majority.
SNM leaders aimed to transform from a rebel group to a peaceful and democratic government. They had to make a tremendous effort to achieve their goals by constructing the northern grievances into a distinct identity which went beyond the elite diaspora and Isaaq majority concerns. This way they were able to bring on board the primary minority clans such as the Gadabuursi and Ise (Dir clan-family) in the west and the Warsangeli and Dulbahante (Darood clan-family, Harti sub-clan) in the east. The SNM also created internal mechanisms that included a Central Committee, which was tasked with most decision-making and responsible for holding regular congresses to elect the leadership.
The SNM and the challenge of peace
From 1991 to 1994, Somaliland experienced several episodes of civil war, mainly triggered by contestation over economic facilities such as ports and airports and also series of conflicts were averted in a ‘bottom-up’ manner through the clan conferences, which were brokered by the clan elders and backed by businessmen, religious leaders, civil society and scholars – in Somaliland and abroad. But despite this violent history, the SNM leaders opted for reconciliation and a cessation of hostilities within its territory instead of retribution and revenge.
The process of state-building and peacebuilding was conducted through a series of clan conferences such as the Burao (1991), Sheikh (1992), Borama (1993), and Hargeysa (1996–1997) where the clan families from the northwest agreed on cessation of hostilities and peaceful co-existence which led to the formation of the central-state institutions.
Another important characteristic in this stage of SNM transformation is the fact that within two years of taking power, the Movement’s leaders stepped down and handed over power to a new civil administration; most of the rank and field fighters demobilized themselves spontaneously and returned to civil life and the SNM opted for the natural xeer (customary law).
Moreover, when Somaliland’s elders gathered at Borama in early 1993, they decided it was time for a change: the interim SNM government was replaced by a civil administration under the leadership of a veteran politician with no ties to the SNM, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal.
Unlike other rebel groups in the region such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which did not essentially ‘transform’ but emphasized its political wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has been in existence since the beginning. The SPLM is not autonomous from the military leadership and under its control largely because essential individuals in its leadership are from the military wing and exercise coercive power.
However, SNM as a rebel group has transformed itself into a government which transited to state-building and peacebuilding through reconciliation, democratization, inclusive leadership, and post-war reconstruction. Hence, currently, Somaliland’s political institutions are an intriguing mix of modern state structures and local forms of administration.
The Somali National Movement (SNM) is a unique example of how a movement can transform itself from political opposition to a rebel group and then to a government. The SNM was extremely instrumental in engineering the self-determination of Somaliland as a self-declared sovereign state. Besides, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was vital in the formation of the government and constitution and many former SNM members also played leading roles in the establishment and politics of Somaliland.
Even though the SNM proclamation of the right to self-determination of Somaliland was unsuccessful because it failed to get international recognition. Interestingly, as a movement, it has been able to transform itself in a dynamic and exclusive way. For instance, in its transformation from political opposition to a rebel group, the SNM successfully mobilized and relied on the support of the Isaaq clan families in the diaspora and in the northwestern region of Somalia.
An important characteristic of the Somali National Movement (SNM) transformation was the fact that as a rebel group it was led by civilian politicians rather than military officers. It was democratic and very inclusive as it involved traditional elders and institutions. This is exceptional considering that most rebel groups in Africa are normally led by military officers and do not tap into the local existing institutions and structures. As a government, the SNM was able to create a hybrid post-war governance system that reflected the societal values, traditional and modern structures in the process of state-making.
In a nutshell, the trajectory of the Somali National Movement (SNM) has engineered a democratic and peaceful Somaliland that has utilized local dispute resolution mechanisms (Xeer) and traditional institutions (Guurti or Council of Elders) for peacebuilding. Moreover, the SNM that was founded as political opposition to Siyad Barre’s regime is also accredited with engineering Somaliland as a peaceful, stable, and democratic state after the collapse of the Somali State. Even though it only wanted to topple the regime of Siyad Barre, the philosophically deliberated social cohesion that evolved afterwards created an atmosphere of peace and prosperity, which to this day makes it a force to reckon with.
About the Author
Fatuma Ahmed Ali (Ph.D.) is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the United States International University-Africa and an External Researcher of the Interuniversity Institute for Social Development & Peace (IUDESP) of the Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain. Her research interests are in gender and preventing/countering violent extremism, women and war, indigenous conflict transformation and peacebuilding models, women’s agency, conflict and migration/displacement in the Horn of Africa, gender/child protection of refugees, sexual and gender-based violence and African-Islamic feminism.
 For a brief historical perspective on Somali nationalism, see Abdulrahman Abdullahi’s chapter in this volume.
 Forti, Daniel A. 2011. “A Pocket of Stability: Understanding Somaliland.” Occasional Paper Series: Issue 2. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). South Africa, 10–13.
 Bradbury, Mark, and Healy, Sally. 2010. “Endless War a Brief History of the Somali Conflict.” In Whose Peace Is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking, edited by Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, 1–125, Accord ISSUE 1, London: Conciliation Resources, 10.
 Ibid., 10.
 Forti, Daniel A. 2011. “A Pocket of Stability: Understanding Somaliland.” Occasional Paper Series: Issue 2. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), South Africa, 10–11.
 Samatar, Said S. 1993. “Historical Setting.” In Somalia: A Country Study, edited by Helen Chapin Metz, 4th ed. Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 6–9.
 Cassanelli, Lee V. 1982. The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
 Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey, 25.
 Metz, Helen Chapin. 1993. “Introduction.” In Somalia: A Country Study, edited by Helen Chapin Metz, xxi–xxxvii, (4th ed). Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, xxii.
 Forti, Daniel A. 2011. “A Pocket of Stability: Understanding Somaliland.” Occasional Paper Series: Issue 2. South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), 12.
 Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey. 32.
 Bryden, Matt. 2003. “The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?” Annales dʾEthiopie 19: 341–364, doi: https://doi.org/10.3406/ethio.2003.1052. 343.
 Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford, James Currey. 33.
 Hesse, Brian J. 2010. “Introduction: The myth of ‘Somalia.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28, no. 3: 247–259, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2010.499232.
 Ibid., 251.
 Samatar, Said S. 1993. “Historical Setting.” In Somalia: A Country Study, edited by Metz, Helen Chapin, 1–55, (4th ed). Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 42.
 Ibid., 45.
 Renders, Marleen. 2012. “Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions.” African Social Studies Series, Volume: 26, E-Book ISBN: 9789004222540: 60.
 Ibid., 60.
 Bryden, Matt. 2003. “The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?” In Annales dʾEthiopie, Volume 19: 341–364, doi: https://doi.org/10.3406/ethio.2003.1052. 344.
 Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey, 64.
 Ridout, Timothy A. 2012. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3, no. 2: 136–156, DOI:10.1080/21520844.2012.741040. 140.
 Ibid, 61.
 Samatar, Said S. 1993. “Historical Setting.” In Somalia: A Country Study, edited by Metz, Helen Chapin, 1–55, (4th ed). Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 50.
 Ridout, Timothy A. 2012. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3, no. 2: 136–156, DOI:10.1080/21520844.2012.741040. 141.
 Ibid., 140.
 Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey. 64.
 Renders, Marleen. 2012. “Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions.” African Social Studies Series, Volume: 26 E-Book ISBN: 9789004222540. 60.
 Ibid., 60.
 Metz, Helen Chapin. 1993. “Introduction.” In Somalia: A Country Study, edited by Metz, Helen Chapin, xxi–xxxvii (4th ed). Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
 Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey.
 Ridout, Timothy A. 2012. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3, no. 2: 136–156. DOI:10.1080/21520844.2012.741040. 143.
 Ibid., 142.
 Bereketeab, Redie. 2012. “Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan: Challenges to Postcolonial State-Building.” Discussion Paper 75. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 1–37. ISBN 978–91–7106–725–8, 7.
 Forti, Daniel A. 2011. “A Pocket of Stability: Understanding Somaliland.” Occasional Paper Series: Issue 2. South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD): 17–18.
 Ibid., 67.
 See the chapter of Markus Hoehne in the volume.
 Musa, Ahmed, and Horst, Cindy. 2019. “State Formation and Economic Development in Postwar Somaliland: The Impact of the Private Sector in an Unrecognized State.” Conflict, Security & Development 19, no. 1: 35–53. DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2019.1561621. 38.
 Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey. 22.
 See also the contributions of Nasir M. Ali and Aleksi Ylönen in this volume.
 Ridout, Timothy A. 2012. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3, no. 2: 136–156. DOI:10.1080/21520844.2012.741040. 141.
 Ibid., 141.
 Musa, Ahmed, and Horst, Cindy. 2019. “State Formation and Economic Development in Postwar Somaliland: The Impact of the Private Sector in an Unrecognized State.” Conflict, Security & Development 19, no. 1, 35–53. DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2019.1561621. 38–39.
 Ibid., 38.
 Bryden, Matt. 2003. “The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?” Annales dʾEthiopie 19: 341–364. Doi: https://doi.org/10.3406/ethio.2003.1052. 346.
 Ibid., 346.
 Ylönen, Aleksi. 2018. “Inheriting Power: Somaliland’s Political Institutions and the 2017 Presidential Election.” Review of African Political Economy 45, no. 156: 354–362 DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2018.1451319. 355.
 For more about the SNM since 1991, see the chapters of Nasir and Ylönen, and Hoehne, in the volume.
Hansen, Stig Jarle, and Bradbury, Mark. 2007. “Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa.” Review of African Political Economy 34, no. 113: 461–476.
Jhazbhay, Iqbal D. 2009. Somaliland: An African Struggle for Nationhood and International Recognition, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue and South African Institute of International Affairs. ISBN 978-1-920216-20-7.
Lewis, Ioan. M. 2008. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, and Society. London: Hurst & Company.
Phillips, Sarah G. 2020. When There Was No Aid: War and Peace in Somaliland, New York: Cornell University Press.
Walls, Michael. 2009. “The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland.” African Affairs 108, no. 432: 371–389.
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