A legal and historical analysis of Somaliland’s state identity, examining the 1960 union, misnaming of states, and how legal ambiguity shaped decades of diplomatic paralysis.
This article, by M. Amin, argues that the international community’s misunderstanding of Somaliland’s claim to statehood stems from a historical misrepresentation of the 1960 union between the State of Somaliland (SOL) and the State of Somalia (SOS).
Here’s a breakdown:
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The Core Issue: The confusion surrounding the names “State of Somaliland (SOL),” “State of Somalia (SOS),” “Somali Republic (SR),” and “Republic of Somalia (RS)” and how they were used and changed in 1960.
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The Original Agreement: The State of Somaliland (SOL) and the State of Somalia (SOS) agreed to form a new state called the Somali Republic (SR) through a voluntary union. Somaliland entered this union as a recognized independent state on June 26, 1960.
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The Undermining of the Agreement: On July 1, 1960, the southern administration (former Italian Trusteeship Territory) unilaterally changed the terms of the agreement. They declared themselves the “Somali Republic (SR)” and applied for UN membership as the “Republic of Somalia (RS).” This effectively absorbed Somaliland into Somalia without Somaliland’s consent.
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The Consequences: This “chameleon” use of names led to Somaliland being misrepresented as merely a former colonial territory rather than a sovereign state that entered a union. It also led to political marginalization and ultimately, violence and destruction in Somaliland.
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Somaliland’s Position: Somaliland’s 1991 withdrawal from the union was not a new act of secession, but a reassertion of its original interrupted legal status as a sovereign state. They argue that the original union lacked legal, consent, equality, and clarity.
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The Importance of Clarity: The author emphasizes the need for precise language and a clear understanding of the historical facts to ensure Somaliland receives a fair hearing. They advocate for consistently articulating Somaliland’s position: its initial sovereignty, its desire for an equal union, the unilateral alteration of the agreement, and its current claim as a restoration of its original status.
In essence, the author calls for a re-evaluation of Somaliland’s case based on accurate historical and legal grounds, arguing that the current international understanding is based on a flawed narrative that has denied Somaliland its rights and agency.
The complete piece is as follows:
Somaliland, State Identity, and the Legal Legacy of a Misrepresented Union
By M. Amin
Debates over Somaliland are frequently reduced to questions of emotion, clan affiliation, or contemporary geopolitics. Yet such framings obscure the central issue at stake: the legal identity of states, the precision of political naming, and the consequences of historical misrepresentation. At the heart of the Somaliland question lies a persistent confusion—often deliberate—over four key designations: State of Somaliland (SOL), State of Somalia (SOS), Somali Republic (SR), and Republic of Somalia (RS). The way these names were reassigned, interchanged, and reinterpreted in 1960 has shaped more than six decades of policy, conflict, and diplomatic paralysis.
On 27 June 1960, the Parliament of the State of Somaliland (SOL) adopted an Act of Union that proposed a voluntary merger with the State of Somalia (SOS), the former Italian Trusteeship Territory. The outcome of this union was to be a new state, explicitly named the Somali Republic (SR). This formulation was unambiguous. It recognized two sovereign states, each with distinct legal personalities, agreeing to dissolve themselves into a newly constituted union. In this framework, SR was not the continuation of either predecessor; it was the legal product of their union.
Crucially, this Act of Union was the only union framework formally approved by Somaliland prior to independence. It reflected the prevailing international legal norm of the period: sovereign equality as the basis of union. Somaliland entered the process as a recognized state, having gained independence on 26 June 1960, with its own government, borders, and international recognition. The union proposal was therefore an exercise in state-to-state agreement, not an act of absorption or succession.
What occurred on 1 July 1960, however, departed fundamentally from this agreed framework. On that date, the southern administration undertook a series of unilateral acts that reshaped the legal narrative without Somaliland’s consent. In the Friendship Treaty between Italy and the Somali Republic, the former Trusteeship Territory identified itself as “the Somali Republic” (SR), effectively converting the intended union name into the proper name of the southern territory alone. Simultaneously, the application for United Nations membership was submitted under the name Republic of Somalia (RS), signed by southern leadership.
These acts produced a profound legal inversion. The name SR, which Somaliland had approved as the designation of a joint union, was reassigned to one party. The name RS was elevated internationally as the successor state, while SOL disappeared entirely from the formal diplomatic record. From that moment onward, SR and RS were used interchangeably, sometimes to justify unity, sometimes to assert continuity—depending on political need. The original Act of Union adopted in Hargeisa was neither fully implemented nor formally repudiated; it was simply bypassed.
This ambiguity enabled the emergence of a powerful and enduring linguistic construct: “British and Italian Somalilands merged to form the Somali Republic.” While seemingly innocuous, this phrase performs important political work. It reframes Somaliland not as a sovereign state but as a colonial territory, and it recasts the union as an internal administrative merger rather than an international agreement between equals. In doing so, it strips Somaliland of its moment of statehood and redefines its later claims as anachronistic or artificial.
The implications of this framing have been far-reaching. By treating “Somaliland” as a colonial label while presenting SR/RS as a continuous national identity, international discourse has tended to associate Somaliland’s reassertion of sovereignty with neo-colonialism or separatism. This stigma is particularly potent within institutions shaped by strong anti-colonial norms, where references to colonial-era names are often viewed with suspicion. Meanwhile, the interchangeable use of SR and RS—despite their contradictory legal origins—has largely escaped scrutiny.
This “chameleon” use of political language, in which names change meaning according to context, has not been a neutral error. It has functioned as a mechanism of exclusion, marginalizing Somaliland from meaningful participation in the post-union state and insulating the dominant narrative from legal challenge. Over time, the consequences of this imbalance extended beyond semantics into governance, representation, and security.
A union that lacked legal symmetry and mutual consent inevitably produced structural inequities. Centralized authority developed without regard to the original premise of equality between partners, leading to sustained political marginalization. The large-scale violence and destruction that occurred in Somaliland during the late 1980s must be understood against this backdrop. These events were not isolated aberrations, but the culmination of a state-building project rooted in the denial of Somaliland’s prior sovereignty and agency. Recognizing this context does not require emotive recounting; it requires acknowledging causation.
In the aftermath of state collapse in 1991, Somaliland’s decision to withdraw from the union was therefore not an abrupt act of rebellion, but a reassertion of an interrupted legal status. Yet the same naming ambiguities that shaped the original union have continued to cloud international responses. Somaliland’s claim is frequently assessed as if it were a new secessionist movement, rather than a case of contested state continuity arising from an unfulfilled union agreement.
Importantly, Somaliland’s position is not a rejection of unity as a principle. Rather, it is a rejection of unity sustained through historical distortion and legal inconsistency. International law does not privilege unity at all costs; it privileges consent, equality, and clarity. Where these elements are absent, the right of peoples to determine their political status becomes relevant—not as a political threat, but as a legal remedy.
For this reason, clarity of language is not a peripheral concern; it is central to any fair assessment of Somaliland’s case. Somaliland’s leaders and advocates must consistently articulate a precise historical position: that Somaliland was a sovereign state on 26 June 1960; that it sought union as an equal partner; that the agreed framework was unilaterally altered; and that the present claim is for the restoration of a status that was never lawfully extinguished. Such clarity removes the debate from the realm of accusation and symbolism and places it firmly within the domain of law and responsibility.
Ultimately, the Somaliland question challenges the international community to confront an uncomfortable possibility: that long-standing diplomatic consensus may rest on unresolved legal contradictions. Addressing those contradictions does not predetermine an outcome—unity or separation—but it is a necessary precondition for justice, stability, and durable peace. Without such reckoning, the legacy of misnaming will continue to shape policy, obscure accountability, and deny Somaliland a fair hearing on its own terms.
