The article “The Ankara Accord: What Does It Change?” discusses a recent agreement brokered by Turkey between Somalia and Ethiopia, aimed at reducing regional tensions in the Horn of Africa.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met in Ankara, facilitated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After seven hours of indirect talks, they agreed on a brief communiqué emphasizing Somalia’s sovereignty and exploring the possibility of granting Ethiopia sea access.
While the meeting was portrayed as a success in the media, reactions varied, with some praising Turkey’s role and others dismissing the agreement as insignificant. The deal remains vague, particularly regarding the proposed sea access and Somalia’s territorial integrity. It reflects more on symbolism than substantial change, amid ongoing tensions marked by military posturing from both sides, supported by regional allies like Egypt.
Erdogan’s mediation highlights Turkey’s growing influence in the region, though the roles of established organizations like the African Union were minimal. The agreement could diminish hardline nationalist sentiments in Somalia that oppose Ethiopian involvement in security efforts. However, skepticism remains, particularly from Somali officials who were cautious about the deal’s implications.
Ethiopia appears to have made few concessions, maintaining its stance on the previous memorandum with Somaliland. Future negotiations are planned for February 2025, though it is unclear if this accord will lead to a lasting resolution amid Somalia’s complex political landscape.
The complete piece is as follows:
The Ankara Accord: What Does It Change?
By The Somali Wire Team
Last week, Turkey brokered a sudden accord between Somalia and Ethiopia, which many hope will, at least, reduce heightened regional tensions in the Horn. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed Ali were invited to Ankara by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for the third round of bilateral negotiations in 2024 but the first with both premiers.
The Turkish strongman shuttled between the two and reportedly told his African allies they must not leave Erzurum, the meeting venue, without a deal. And after seven-hour-long indirect talks, the two leaders on 11 December agreed on a one-page communiqué that commits Addis to respect Somalia’s sovereignty and for two sides to form a commission to examine the feasibility of granting Ethiopia sea access.
In the official photo op, Erdogan attempted to convey renewed amity and camaraderie as he clasped the hands of both men, who have spent much of the past year at each other’s throats. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it seemed to fall somewhat flat, with the scene looking contrived and Abiy appearing to resist a longer handshake with HSM.
Nonetheless, the deal between the two domestically embattled leaders represented a breakthrough that several previous backchannels had failed to achieve and comes just days before the proposed African Union peacekeeping mission transitions to its next iteration.
Media in Somalia spun the deal in various ways, with pro-regime outlets hailing Ankara as a victory for HSM while pro-opposition commentators characterized it as another meaningless accord that would not be honored. The agreement has sowed more confusion than it resolves, having left the geography and nature of the proposed ‘sea access’ vague.
While the boilerplate language references Somalia’s sovereignty, it also lacks an acknowledgment of its “unity,” and the ambiguity surrounding the fate of the contentious Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland is deliberate. This was a deal more about symbolism than substance.
Symbolism has utility, particularly following months of plummeting relations between Mogadishu and Addis, driving heightened risks of new armed conflict, proxy or otherwise. Saber-rattling towards Addis by senior Somali officials, backed by the new Tripartite Alliance with Eritrea and Egypt, has become increasingly commonplace in recent months. Cairo, too, has dispatched a significant quantity of arms to Mogadishu and promised to deploy potentially thousands of Egyptian soldiers as part of the new African Union peacekeeping mission.
In this context, much of the Turkish diplomacy, supported behind the scenes by the European Union, was predicated on the assumption that keeping the parties talking, complimented by calibrated positive nudges and a bit of arm-twisting, may prevent the worst from happening.
More broadly, the images of Erdogan clasping the hands of Abiy and HSM have encapsulated the resurgent role of Ankara as a preeminent Eurasian and Afro-Asian power. This major geopolitical win for Erdogan has come shortly after a varied coalition of Syrian rebels, including Turkish-backed, unseated the long-serving dictator Bashir al-Assad from Damascus in just a handful of days.
Albeit for different reasons, Addis and Mogadishu are keen to remain close allies of Ankara. Turkey, on the other hand, wants to play a beneficial, tempering influence in the Horn even if it fails to broker a final deal. Despite their detente, Ankara is also keen to limit Egyptian military involvement in Somalia, aware this could trigger a wider conflict.
In contrast, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union were relegated to releasing statements in support of the Ankara Accord, having been unable or unwilling to play any mediating role between Mogadishu and Addis, as well as Asmara and Cairo in 2024. Last week’s events in Ankara once again underlined the current era of personalized and transactional foreign relations dominated by those like Erdogan.
One significant likely benefit of Ankara is that it might defang the hardline nationalists in Mogadishu who favor cutting out Ethiopia from any post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) security arrangement. For the nationalists, the accord is a dangerous capitulation to Addis, as they, as others have, understood the agreement as a face-saving attempt by Villa Somalia to allow it to begin de-escalating tensions and possibly allow Ethiopian troops to remain in the country.
Though not mentioned in the final communiqué, Ethiopian soldiers remaining in Somalia is the only acceptable security option for those under the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) security orbit. For the Leysan clan in South West State and others, this is critical for preventing a resurgent Al-Shabaab from bringing their communities under the extremists’ yoke.
Somalia’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Mohallim Fiqi, the most hawkish figure in HSM’s cabinet and notorious for his anti-Addis rhetoric, has since delivered statements that hint at his personal reservations about the new deal. He has informed Somali media that Mogadishu would still reserve the right to decide which external party would be allowed to participate in the post-ATMIS mission—the planning and funding for which remains in disarray in large part due to the Mogadishu-Addis tensions in 2024.
Ethiopia perhaps feels it has not compromised much, having not publicly backed down from the MoU. The ritualistic wording of the text on sovereignty suggests nothing new or profound—it is simply a restatement of basic and normative Westphalian principles.
Somaliland has also released a subsequent statement saying it was none of their concern and an agreement negotiated by two neighbors. However, with the arrival of Abidrahman ‘Irro’ to the presidency in Hargeisa last week and his well-publicized reticence to support the MoU without having read it, many speculate that the deal may be dead in the water.
More concrete negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia are scheduled to take place from February 2025, reinforced by a visit from Erdogan to both capitals in the first months of next year. Yet the accord will not halt the increasing pace of Somalia’s political settlement’s splintering. Ankara may also struggle to keep both Addis and Mogadishu happy in the coming months, with the lack of clarity in the communiqué allowing all parties to extrapolate their own interests for the time being.
This article originally appeared in Sahan Research’s thrice-weekly bulletin “The Somali Wire,” Issue No. 768, on December 16, 2024.
