The role of intergovernmental organizations in the recognition of states
Before any further steps are taken, it would be apt to understand what IGOs are. Peters contends that finding an all-embracing, clear and unambiguous definition for IGO remains to be formulated. He alludes to the Union of International Associations’ definition of an IGO as being based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation-states; including three or more nation-states as parties to the agreement and possessing a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks.[22]
According to the Public Inquiries Unit located in the Department of Public Information of the UN, “the recognition of a new State or Government is an act that only States and Governments may grant or withhold. The United Nations is neither and, therefore, does not possess any authority to recognize a State or a Government.”[23] Rothwell et al argue on their part that if a UN Member State votes in favor of the admission of a new member, that vote will necessarily imply recognition of the applicant as a state.[24] That having been said, they caution that not all states in the IS may be a member of the UN. Switzerland, a European State with a long-standing interest in international affairs and which hosts a number of UN bodies in Geneva, refrained from becoming a member of the UN until 2002.
Verma postulates that an international institution can provide a medium through which collective recognition by states can be granted to a territory seeking state recognition.[25] The Berlin Conference of 1878 granted recognition to Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro. In the UN membership case, the International Court of Justice clearly stated that admission of a new entity to the UN is merely an acknowledgment by the organization that the new member is a state. In essence, it clearly rejected the inference that admission to the UN amounts to recognition. The recognition, therefore, Verma adds, is evidence of statehood of the new entity as a State in the sense that the UN purposes to treat the new entity as a State for its purposes.[26]
Milton-Edwards affirms that economic assistance for less developed economies in the latter half of the twentieth century, from international lenders and financial institutions as the World Bank and the IMF, has often been tied to statehood, and statelessness has made it all the more difficult to obtain the important benefits associated with such international legitimacy and recognition[27]
Warbrick promulgates that NATO has been used as a podium from which the recognition of statehood has been influenced.[28] This can be seen in the statement by the NATO Heads of State and Government on 7th – 8th November 1991 when they said that they would not recognize any changes of borders, external or internal, brought about by the use of force. Weitz points out NATO’s influence in state recognition going by its condemnation of Moscow’s recognition of the formal independence of the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[29] Indeed after the war, NATO leaders visited Georgia to reaffirm their support for the government’s pro-Western policies.
Kamanu provides some insight about the African context. He notes that the struggle for African independence was waged under the banner of the right of self-determination. African states, as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), gave financial and diplomatic support to the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique.[30] The paradox he notes is that the same African states and the OAU denounced Biafra’s attempted withdrawal from Nigeria and similar struggles in South Sudan, Chad, and Eritrea, without reference to the possible merits their peoples’ claims to the right to self-determination.
Pavković identifies the fact that the contending norms of self-determination and non-interference brought the OAU to a standstill in the 1980s when the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco became the most contentious issue ever to confront the organization.[31] Indeed, he affirms that Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993 (and until recently South Sudan) is the only such case in Africa that has succeeded. The OAU treated the case of Eritrea as an exception and did not alter its stance on territorial boundaries in general. It should be noted that it was only after Ethiopia recognized Eritrea’s independence that the OAU followed suit.[32] Mazrui speculated that recognition of Eritrea would pave way for Somaliland and other disputed territories to resolve their claims.[33]
Dehéz argues that given that Somaliland is also seeking independence and is far more advanced in its consolidation of statehood it will prove to be problematic to offer international recognition to South Sudan and not to Somaliland, especially keeping in mind that Somaliland had been a single British protectorate in the colonial period and its case is hence a quest for the restoration of colonial borders, something that cannot be said about Southern Sudan.[34]
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