The article “From Campaigning to Governance for the 6th Somaliland President” discusses the upcoming inauguration of Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Irro as Somaliland’s 6th President on December 12, 2024. Following a significant electoral victory where he received 64% of the votes, ‘Irro’s administration is anticipated by many after a peaceful transfer of power. However, only about half of eligible voters participated, raising questions about the depth of his mandate, as insights suggest that some support for ‘Irro may stem from discontent with outgoing President Musa Bihi Abdi.
‘Irro, a seasoned politician since 2002 and a former Speaker of the Lower House, is expected to adopt a more inclusive governance style than his predecessor. He aims to focus on bridging divides, particularly addressing issues in the neglected eastern regions of Somaliland. Nonetheless, challenges exist, particularly regarding his foreign policy and building effective relations with Somalia, which has a complicated history with Somaliland’s push for independence.
The article highlights the importance of ‘Irro’s approach to dialogues with the Somali federal government, especially given the previous administration’s demands for neutral mediation and substantive discussions on Somaliland’s status. While there may be pressure for ‘Irro to engage in talks without preconditions, this could risk backlash from supporters who wish to maintain the push for independence.
Despite the chaotic conditions in Somalia, the atmosphere in Somaliland appears favorable for ‘Irro as he takes office amidst a global trend of voters rejecting incumbents. His early actions regarding cabinet formation and policy direction will be closely watched, and there is hope for constructive change in Somaliland’s future governance.
The complete piece is as follows:
From Campaigning to Governance for the 6th Somaliland President
By The Somali Wire Team
On 12 December, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Irro’ will be sworn in as the 6th President of Somaliland, following his comfortable victory a month ago. Dignitaries and representatives from several nations are attending the buoyant festivities in Hargeisa as Somalilanders usher in another peaceful and successful transfer of power. It has been a triumphant few weeks for Somaliland, pulling off a consequential, direct vote in the face of external interference.
Looking ahead to the incoming administration, having enjoyed 64% of votes cast from across Somaliland’s 6 regions, ‘Irro and his followers may be tempted to believe they have a robust mandate for change. But considering that little more than half of eligible voters participated, and although reliable opinion polls don’t exist in Somaliland, Waddani’s victory was no less a protest against the incumbent, Musa Bihi Abdi, than it was a full-throated endorsement of the President-elect. Waddani may soon discover that its support is more shallow than anticipated.
Much of Somaliland’s population, not only supporters of the outgoing Kulmiye party, are watching with interest how Waddani shifts gears from campaigning to governing. ‘Irro’s domestic agenda suggests a more inclusive, accommodating governing style than his predecessor, promising some degree of institutional continuity, rather than a purge of Kulmiye appointees, as well as conciliatory engagement with Somaliland’s neglected eastern regions.
One of Bihi’s faults as president was the failure to manage tensions and the explosive violence that erupted in Las Anod before spreading through parts of the largely Dhulbahante-occupied Sool region. However, it is Waddani’s vaguely elucidated foreign policy agenda that entails the greatest risks, as well as the greatest possible rewards, for Somaliland’s incoming president.
‘Irro is one of Somaliland’s longest-serving politicians, having entered politics in 2002 as a co-founder of the opposition UCID party. In 2005, he successfully contested Somaliland’s first parliamentary elections and was named Speaker of the Lower House – a post he held for the next 12 years and in which he earned a reputation as a quiet bridge-builder and dealmaker. In 2017, after forming the Waddani party, ‘Irro made his first bid for the presidency but was bested by the now-outgoing Kulmiye candidate Muse Bihi.
In contrast with Bihi, who is a celebrated veteran of the rebel Somali National Movement (SNM) that liberated Somaliland from General Mohamed Siyad Barre’s dictatorship in 1991, ‘Irro served as a diplomat for Somalia in the late 1990s, staying on at his post in Moscow even after Barre’s ouster.
On these grounds, some detractors have unfairly tried to portray ‘Irro as somehow less loyal to the polity or less fit for office, omitting that two of Somaliland’s most accomplished former presidents – Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (1993-2002) and Dahir Rayale Kahin (2002-2010) – were not SNM veterans. Kahin even served as an officer in Barre’s dreaded security apparatus, the National Security Service (NSS). On Thursday, ‘Irro thus becomes the third civilian to serve as Somaliland’s president, all but ensuring that Musa Bihi will be the last SNM veteran to hold that office.
After more than two decades of dedicated public service, ‘Irro’s credentials to lead Somaliland are not in question. But some of Waddani’s senior cadres have less compelling resumés. The party’s top ranks include a number of leaders who have either served in Somalia’s federal government or held politically exposed positions with other entities in Mogadishu. Others are also closely associated with influential Islamist movements, known to vigorously oppose Somaliland’s independence.
Still, there are a number of seasoned political figures within the ‘Irro camp who could be of positive influence if fingered for senior cabinet positions. The Waddani leaders’ winning electoral strategy included bringing diverse political interests into the party’s big tent, but once he assumes office tomorrow, some of them could rapidly become liabilities.
Mogadishu and Djibouti have both welcomed ‘Irro’s victory, expressing hopes that his presidency might augur a retreat from Somaliland’s aspirations to international recognition as a sovereign state, and the resumption of talks with Somalia. But the issue of dialogue between Hargeisa and Mogadishu has a long, fraught history that ‘Irro and his team should not ignore at their peril.
Somaliland was first cajoled into dialogue with Somalia’s transitional federal authorities in 2012 by the British government, which assured then-President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud ‘Sillanyo’ that talks would be “without prejudice to [Somaliland’s] aspirations for independence, which we respect.” Just a few months later, however, London officially recognized Somalia’s new federal government – together with its claim to sovereignty over Somaliland – and washed its hands of any mediation role.
Ever since, Hargeisa has been trapped in more than 12 years of futile negotiations with Mogadishu, mediated mainly by Turkey and Djibouti, both of which vehemently oppose Somaliland’s independence. To date, Somalia has consistently refused to engage on the political question of Somaliland’s final status and categorically rejects any reference to self-determination. The two sides have instead signed a number of technical agreements in the name of ‘confidence building’ – all of which Mogadishu has subsequently reneged upon.
President Bihi therefore introduced a number of preconditions for resuming dialogue with Mogadishu, including genuinely neutral mediation and a substantive political agenda, up to and including Somaliland’s exercise of self-determination. The Waddani party leader has expressed a far greater willingness to resume talks with Mogadishu, but to do so without such preconditions would expose him to charges of backtracking on Somaliland’s independence – accusations that would surely cost him popular support.
Against this backdrop, ‘Irro’s reluctance to endorse his predecessor’s contentious Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Addis Ababa has fueled speculation that he intends to suspend or amend it, jeopardizing Ethiopia’s offer to recognize Somaliland as an independent state. ‘Irro has reasonably argued that he can’t approve an agreement he hasn’t laid eyes on, but he faces intense public pressure to clarify his position sooner rather than later. Any further delay could expose him to charges of equivocation and risk damaging relations with Ethiopia – Somaliland’s most important strategic and economic partner.
As unpalatable as this may be for other Somalis, the sad reality is that current circumstances in Somalia make unity less attractive than ever. Somalia’s nascent federal system is fast unraveling as one member state after another suspends relations with Mogadishu. Amidst a drawdown of African Union forces, the prospect of an Al-Shabaab takeover appears ever more likely in one form or another. And the diminished federal government in Mogadishu grows increasingly jingoistic in its approach to Somaliland, equating ‘separatists’ with ‘terrorists.’
Despite all this, the environment has rarely seemed so auspicious for Somaliland. The delivery of another set of free, fair, and peaceful direct elections has earned attention and praise from much of the African continent and beyond. And Ethiopia’s pending MoU offers a potential springboard to the incoming US administration’s Project 2025, which makes specific reference to Somaliland.
But ‘Irro will also arrive at Hargeisa’s Presidential Palace as the latest beneficiary of the global wave of voters rejecting incumbent administrations. This has both advantages and pitfalls, with Somalilanders’ hopes for change liable to shorten Irro’s honeymoon period.
The 6th President of Somaliland comes to power with the polity at a moment of opportunity and expectation; we will surely learn more about its direction in the coming days as ‘Irro begins forming his cabinet and laying out his domestic and foreign policy agenda more explicitly.
This article originally appeared in Sahan Research’s thrice-weekly bulletin “The Somali Wire,” Issue No. 766, on December 11, 2024.
