The Gulf of Aden could face a renewed maritime dispute as competing Somalia-Djibouti claims near Eibat Island and Saylac (Zeila) gain strategic importance. The dispute intersects with Somaliland’s position, Ethiopia’s search for sea access, Djibouti’s territorial and port interests, and growing Red Sea competition—raising the prospect that an old cartographic disagreement could become a serious diplomatic confrontation
HARGEISA, Somaliland — Deep within the United Nations archives, a quiet cartographic war is brewing over the strategic waters of the Gulf of Aden.[1] While global attention remains fixed on the geopolitical fallout of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)[2], a far older, unresolved maritime border dispute between Djibouti and Somalia is rapidly heating up. At stake is a vital stretch of ocean encompassing Aibat Island and the historical waters of Saylac (Zeila)—a maritime tripoint where sovereignty, economic survival, and military strategy collide.[3]
For years, a heavy, calculated silence has emanated from the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu regarding Djibouti’s aggressive seafaring claims. However, as regional alliances fracture and the balance of power shifts in the Horn of Africa, analysts warn that this quiet legal dispute is transforming into an active diplomatic confrontation.
The Paper War: 1997 Precedents and the 2014 Overlap
The roots of the current friction trace back to Djibouti’s ambitious maritime decrees of 1985 and 1997.[4] Attempting to maximize its territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Djibouti established a system of expansive “straight baselines.” This legal maneuver effectively turned outer maritime areas into internal sovereign waters, largely ignoring the presence of offshore islands belonging to the Somaliland coast.[5]
The move did not go unnoticed. In 1997, the United States government formally issued a diplomatic protest against Djibouti’s baselines.[6] Washington argued that Djibouti’s coastline did not meet the international criteria for straight baselines under international law, warning that the claims artificially restricted freedom of navigation near the crucial Bab el-Mandeb Strait.[7]
The dispute remained dormant until 2014, when the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) submitted its official EEZ coordinates to the United Nations.[8] Mapping its boundaries according to the historical 1960 borders of the Somali Republic, Mogadishu drew an equidistance line from the land border at Loyada. This line sliced straight through the waters Djibouti had already claimed for itself.
In January 2017, Djibouti struck back. In a formal Note Verbale sent to the UN, Djibouti explicitly rejected Somalia’s coordinates, stating inter-alia (among other things) that Mogadishu’s lines illegally encroached upon its sovereign maritime territory.[9]
Mogadishu’s Multi-Layered Silence: AMISOM and the Hargeisa Leverage
While Mogadishu aggressively pursued a high-profile maritime border dispute with Kenya at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it chose total silence regarding Djibouti’s overreach.[10] This contrasting strategy was not an oversight; it was a calculated geopolitical maneuver.
First, Mogadishu’s fragile security architecture remains deeply dependent on the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, formerly AMISOM). Djibouti is a vital troop-contributing country, maintaining a heavy military footprint in Somalia’s central regions.[11] Challenging Djibouti’s maritime claims risks a sudden withdrawal of Djiboutian forces, which would leave a devastating security vacuum for Al-Shabaab to exploit.
Second, Mogadishu harbors deep anxieties that a diplomatic rift would push Djibouti directly into the arms of Hargeisa. If the FGS aggressively contested the waters near Zeila, Djibouti could retaliate by abandoning its nominal support for a unified Somalia and formally strengthening ties with Somaliland.
Finally, Mogadishu utilized its silence as a weapon to politically isolate Somaliland. Because the United Nations only recognizes communications from the federal government, Mogadishu’s refusal to engage in the dispute left de facto independent Somaliland completely locked out of the legal conversation,[12] even as Somaliland’s own coast guards shed blood defending those very waters from foreign encroachment and Djiboutian marine patrols.[13]
The Breaking Point: From Appeasement to Open Confrontation
For more than two decades, successive administrations in Hargeisa also maintained a policy of cautious appeasement toward Djibouti, fearing economic blockades and transit isolation. However, the signing of the 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU completely shattered this status quo.[14]
By offering landlocked Ethiopia a 20-kilometer lease of its coastline for a commercial port and naval base, Somaliland struck a direct blow to Djibouti’s economic monopoly, which currently handles over 95% of Ethiopian transit trade.[15]
With its multibillion-dollar port revenues facing an existential threat, Djibouti has reportedly shifted from a passive neighbor to an active regional disruptor. In response, Somaliland political figures, including Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” and leadership within the interior ministry, have broken their historical silence. They now publicly accuse Djibouti of fueling proxy tribal conflicts along their shared land borders to destabilize Hargeisa and sabotage the Ethiopian naval deal.[16]
Future Developments: A De Facto Concession?
The critical question now hangs over the Horn of Africa: How long can Mogadishu maintain its silence as the waters of the Gulf of Aden continue to warm?
By refusing to defend its 2014 UN coordinates against Djibouti’s protests, the Federal Government of Somalia faces a grim reality. It may ultimately be forced to quietly grant Djibouti that contested slice of the EEZ between Aibat Island and Zeila simply to maintain its domestic political alliances and prevent a total realignment of Djibouti’s foreign policy.
As the land borders experience rising friction and the economic high stakes of the Gulf of Aden come to light, the quiet paper dispute at the United Nations is rapidly morphing into a public crisis. Whether these waters will be settled through quiet diplomatic concessions or open maritime conflict remains a question for future developments.
Footnotes & Sources
[1] United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), Maritime Space: Maritime Zone Notifications. Registers all state submissions, communications, and formal legal claims regarding the law of the sea in the Horn of Africa region.
[2] Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation (January 2024), Official Statement on the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Details the 20-kilometer maritime lease agreement at Berbera.
[3] Somaliland Law Database (Somalilandlaw.com), The Maritime Law of the Somaliland Republic: Historical Treaties and Coastal Boundaries (1888–Present). Cross-references the British Somaliland Protectorate maritime coordinates, including the specific jurisdictions of Eibat, Saadadin, and the Saylac coastline.
[4] Republic of Djibouti (Decree No. 85-048/PR), Decree Establishing the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Republic of Djibouti. Archived under UNCLOS legislation listings, specifying the system of straight baselines drawn across the Gulf of Tadjoura and the Gulf of Aden.
[5] International Maritime Boundaries (American Society of International Law), Djibouti-Somalia Country Profiles and Legal Boundary Analyses. Critical evaluation of how Djibouti’s straight baseline method bypasses standard low-water lines and envelopes regional island formations.
[6] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (1997), Limits in the Seas No. 118: Straight Baseline Claims: Djibouti. A formal United States geographical analysis and diplomatic protest against the legal validity of Djibouti’s maritime coordinates.
[7] United States Navy, Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAAG), Maritime Claims Reference Manual (MCRM): Djibouti Navigation Restrictions. Details Washington’s freedom of navigation assessments regarding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Western Gulf of Aden.
[8] Federal Government of Somalia (Executive Proclamation, June 30, 2014), The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Submitted officially to the UN Secretary-General under UNCLOS article 75(2), listing the precise latitude and longitude points extending from Loyada.
[9] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations (January 31, 2017), Note Verbale No. 27/PM/NY Re: Somalia’s Unilateral EEZ Proclamation. Explicitly states inter-alia that Somalia’s 2014 coordinate charts illegally overlap with Djibouti’s sovereign maritime boundaries.
[10] International Court of Justice (ICJ Judgment, October 12, 2021), Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya). Demonstrates Mogadishu’s intense legal allocation of resources toward its southern maritime front while completely ignoring the northern dispute with Djibouti.
[11] African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS / AMISOM) Troop Deployment Records, Sector 4 Operations Command (Hiiraan and Galguduud regions). Verifies that the Djiboutian Armed Forces (FAD) maintain the “Hiil Walaal” battalion, providing vital defense security to the FGS.
[12] United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Confirms that because Somaliland is unrecognized internationally, its coastal authorities are locked out of depositing sovereign charts to UN DOALOS.
[13] Garowe Online News Reports (2016), Djibouti Apologizes Over Coastguard Clash near Zeila. Documented the kinetic marine border skirmish where Djiboutian forces intercepted a Somaliland-licensed vessel, resulting in the death of a Somaliland officer.
[14] Regional Security Review, Horn of Africa Desk (2024), The Post-MoU Realignment: How Ethiopia’s Naval Ambitions Broke the Decades-Long Status Quo Between Hargeisa and Djibouti.
[15] World Bank Group & Djibouti Port and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) Annual Financial Reports, Ethiopian Transit Logistics and Transit Revenue Breakdown. Details that port services to landlocked Ethiopia generate approximately 76% of Djibouti’s national GDP.
[16] Saxafi Media / Somaliland Interior Ministry Press Briefing (2024–2026), Public Statements of Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” regarding Border Security. Transcripts of official addresses accusing external actors of fueling sub-clan friction in the Awdal and border zones to disrupt regional commercial infrastructure.
