Chapter 8: Northern Cyprus

On This Chapter


The road to rupture


Invasion and fragmentation

Enter the TRNC

International isolation

The EU dimension

International rewards

Renewed settlement efforts

Radical alternatives



The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) offers something of a model case study of contested statehood. And it is not primarily because the TRNC is a veteran contested state of 25 years’ standing. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the TRNC owed its existence to an act of secession on the part of Turkish-dominated Northern Cyprus and occupation perpetrated by Turkey. Conceived and born in political sin if not outside international law too, the self-proclaimed state was doomed to a life in international limbo. Despite having a powerful patron state in Turkey, the TRNC has been unable to graduate to confirmed statehood. Its original and veto state, the Republic of Cyprus (under Greek Cypriot rule), together with its patron state Greece, have been highly effective in keeping Northern Cyprus at the edge of mainstream international existence. By supporting opposing sides – their respective ethnic kin – Greece and Turkey turned Cyprus into a boxing ring in which they pursued their rivalry through their local proxies. Cyprus has also experienced another more beneficial form of internationalization in the shape of diplomatic settlement initiatives spearheaded by the UN and EU. These efforts together with the recent changes of government in both the TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus have improved the prospects for resolving the conflict on the island. In short, key variables in the actual making and prospective unmaking of a contemporary contested state were at work in Cyprus.

The road to rupture

Like numerous other territories with such a long recorded history, Cyprus had through the ages fallen under the heel of many different rulers. Until its capture by Richard I in 1191, the island had for centuries belonged to the Byzantine (or Eastern Roman) empire. Thereafter it saw a succession of rulers come and go until the Ottoman Empire gained control in 1571. During Ottoman rule the Turkish Cypriot community, followers of Islam, were treated as a privileged minority by for instance paying lower taxes than the island’s Greek majority with their Christian Orthodox faith. The Turks’ preferred status ended when Cyprus was transferred to Britain in 1878. In 1914 Britain annexed the island and for the next nine years assumed the role of a belligerent occupier of an enemy territory. Under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne peaceful relations between Turkey and the Allied powers were restored and Turkey recognized Britain’s annexation of Cyprus. In 1925 Cyprus became a British colony.1

His Majesty’s new subjects in Cyprus soon proved every bit as disloyal and restive as imperial Britain’s wards in Palestine. Not only were the Greek and Turkish communities deeply antagonistic towards each other, but they were also profoundly dissatisfied with the political status of Cyprus. On the Greek side the domestic leadership of the Orthodox Church had already during the Ottoman era become politically active. The greater freedom offered by British rule encouraged nationalist activists in the Greek community – with the church leadership or ethnarchy in the vanguard – to agitate for both representative government and eventual union (enosis) between Cyprus and an independent Greece. Enosis was to become a rallying cry for Greek Cypriots opposed to foreign rule. In this quest they could count on Greece’s enthusiastic support; mainland and Cypriot Greeks believed that the island was a Hellenic entity destined to be ‘redeemed by the motherland’. Fearing that enosis would reduce them to a highly vulnerable minority in a Greek state, Turkish Cypriots vehemently rejected union with Greece – and in this stance they could rely on Turkey’s backing. Constituting only 20 per cent of the island’s population, the Turkish community also opposed representative government for Cyprus on the grounds that they would suffer discrimination at the hands of the Greek majority.2 Notwithstanding four centuries of coexistence and physical intermingling, the two Cypriot communities remained separate and distinct, divided along language, cultural, religious and also political lines,3 reinforced by vast numerical inequality, and exacerbated by conflicting external orientations towards two rival ‘big brothers’ who extended their mutual antagonism to Cyprus. In this charged political atmosphere an enosis demonstration in 1931 got so out of hand that the British suspended the legislative council of Cyprus and exiled two bishops.4

The enosis movement was later led by Archbishop Makarios, who became the dominant political figure in independent Cyprus. It was with Makarios at the helm of the unity movement that Greek Cypriots turned to strikes and rioting in 1954 to vent their opposition to British rule and push their case for self-determination – which meant union with Greece.5 Fearing a new colonial order under mainland Greece, the Turkish minority in Cyprus sought refuge in a resurgence of Turkish nationalism. Turkey got drawn ever deeper into Cypriot politics, not only to defend the interests of the Turkish community there but to protect its strategic interests by preventing the establishment of Greek sovereignty over the island. The rival nationalisms in Cyprus were united in at least one respect, though: both challenged British rule over the island.6

Resigning them to the chasm between Greeks and Turks in their colonial possession, the British made no attempt to inculcate a unifying Cypriot national identity. Instead, Britain preferred to keep the antagonistic groups apart, even setting them up against each other in the tradition of divideand-rule.7 Britain could hardly have been surprised, then, when civil war erupted between the island’s two communities in 1955. The British themselves became targets of terrorism perpetrated by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), the armed wing of the enosis movement. Launched in 1954, EOKA was led by Colonel George Grivas, a retired Greek military officer of Cypriot origin. Greece was widely suspected of having a hand in creating and directing EOKA. In 1956 Makarios was temporarily exiled to the Seychelles for his alleged involvement in EOKA’s terrorist attacks.8

The Archbishop’s confrontation with the colonial authorities merely added to his political credentials. In 1959 he won a resounding victory in an election for the first president of an independent Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, proclaimed on 16 August 1960, was a rather unusual creation: it was an ‘international state’, as Tamkoc¸ called it, ‘surrounded by five layers of international documents’ (the so-called Zurich and London accords of 1959 concluded by Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two communities of Cyprus).9 These documents placed important restrictions on the autonomy of Cyprus in both domestic politics and foreign relations. The guarantor powers – Britain, Turkey and Greece – were given considerable formal authority over the affairs of an independent Cyprus.10

In terms of the Treaty of Guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus would be matters of direct concern to the guarantor powers. These three states would guarantee the preservation of the constitutional order of Cyprus. The new state was in turn obligated not to enter into a political or economic union with any country (read: Greece and Turkey). Should the Treaty of Guarantee be breached, the guarantor powers would consult together. If they failed to agree on common and concerted action, each reserved the right to act with the exclusive objective of restoring the status quo. The Treaty of Alliance gave Greece and Turkey the responsibility of defending Cyprus. For this purpose they were allowed to station 950 and 650 troops respectively on the island. Under the Treaty of Establishment Britain was to cooperate with Turkey and Greece in the joint defence of Cyprus. Britain was furthermore given sovereign authority in perpetuity over two military base areas. The two remaining documents were the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus and the constitution, the former providing the basis of the Constitution of Cyprus. The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee were also regarded as integral components of the basic structure of the new state and hence accorded constitutional status.

Being the product of international agreements, the Constitution of Cyprus could only be amended in its key provisions if the three guarantor powers as well as the island’s Greek and Turkish communities concurred.11

The constitution took as its premise that Cyprus consisted of two distinct ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, each entitled to self-determination. This could not be achieved by way of enosis, or by returning Cyprus to its former owner Turkey, or by partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey (taksim); one or the other community, supported by either Greece or Turkey, would be resolutely opposed to such arrangements.12 The compromise formula was that of power-sharing on consociational lines enabling the two communities to exercise their respective rights of self-determination without being dominated by the other.13 Hence the constitutional stipulation that the Greek President of Cyprus and the Turkish Vice President had identical executive powers with respect to foreign affairs, defence and security. The two incumbents would furthermore exercise veto power, separately or jointly, over laws and decisions of the House of Representatives and over the actions of the Council of Ministers in the areas of foreign affairs, security and defence. Turkish representatives in the legislature also enjoyed a separate vote on amendments to the electoral law and the approval of any law regarding municipalities, taxes and duties. Other constitutional provisions with respect to the Turkish Cypriots’ so-called ‘immutable partnership status’ prescribed a 70–30 communal ratio in the cabinet, parliament, civil service and security forces, and allowed for separate (communal) municipalities in the five largest towns.14 Because the two Cypriot communities were territorially intermixed, cultural and political autonomy for each could only be granted on a non-territorial basis in the shape of their respective sub-legislatures known as Communal Chambers.15

The Constitution of Cyprus not merely entrenched the political separation of the Greek and Turkish communities, but also their connections with their respective mother countries. Under the constitution inhabitants of the island were not designated as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, but as Greek and Turkish citizens. Their languages were declared the two official languages of Cyprus and the communities were entitled to observe Greek and Turkish national holidays respectively. The constitution also permitted Greece and Turkey to subsidize educational, cultural, sports and charitable institutions in the respective communities. Through these arrangements the constitution in effect stated that there was no Cypriot nation and no need to build one either; instead, the two distinct communities of Cyprus were extensions of larger outside nations that had legitimate interests in maintaining their kin-relationships on the island.16

Since the constitutional arrangements represented a grand compromise that fell far short of both communities’ wishes, the achievement of statehood was hardly a joyous occasion. ‘Probably no people in history have ever viewed their independence with less enthusiasm than the Cypriots’, The Economist observed at the time.17 Far from creating inter-communal harmony, the very international character of the Republic of Cyprus had from the outset created tension on the home front. Opinion leaders in the Greek community claimed that the new Republic was stillborn because it did not meet a basic requirement of statehood, namely independence. They charged that the Zurich and London accords were imposed on the Greek majority under duress, placed the Turkish minority in a privileged position out of all proportion to their numbers, and created a political order in Cyprus that violated the democratic principle of majority rule.18 For good measure the leaders of the Greek community left no doubt about their unwillingness to implement constitutional provisions regulating the Turkish community’s partnership in public affairs.19 Even so the international community had no serious reservations about the independence of Cyprus; the UN General Assembly by unanimous vote admitted Cyprus to membership of the world body shortly after the new state was born.20

The Greek political leadership’s systematic subversion of the constitutional order culminated in what amounted to a coup staged by Makarios in December 1963. This triggered a new round of inter-communal warfare, with Greece and Turkey providing military assistance to their respective kinfolk.21 The Greek side managed to usurp political power and take administrative control, denying the Turkish community their constitutionally guaranteed partnership status in the affairs of state. Due to the collapse of bicommunal government, Turkish Cypriots could no longer take up their positions in the cabinet, parliament and civil service. Although the Greek community was left in exclusive control of the organs of state, their effective authority was confined to the Greek areas of Cyprus; the state’s writ did not extend to the Turkish enclaves. These vulnerable parts, surrounded by Greek Cypriot troops, comprised a meagre 3 per cent of the island’s territory. Cut off from government funding, the Turkish community was compelled to turn to Turkey for financial assistance.22

The international community extended de facto recognition to the new Makarios government, which insisted that it was the legitimate ruler of the Republic of Cyprus. And that Republic, the UN General Assembly resolved in December 1965 (resolution 2077), was ‘entitled to and should enjoy full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference’. The Turkish community and its defenders by contrast viewed it as an illegal government (an analogy was drawn with the Smith regime in Rhodesia) whose power grab had wrecked the internationally crafted constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus. The state was moreover deprived of its raison d’être, it was said, because one of the two Cypriot communities (the Turks) could no longer exercise their right of self-determination without being subjugated by the other.23

A renewed internationalization of the situation in Cyprus came in the wake of the turmoil at the end of 1963. One manifestation was the deployment of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) the following year to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to restore law and order.24 Another was the Security Council’s repeated requests that the UN Secretary-General use his good offices to resolve the Cyprus issue.25

In December 1967 leaders of the Turkish community established the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration, which they intended keeping in place until all the provisions of the constitution of 1960 were enforced. Given their suffering in the enclaves since 1963, the Turkish Cypriots saw this provisional structure as a vital protective measure, whereas Greek Cypriots suspected it was a calculated step towards fragmenting the island. Turkish Cypriots found little cause for comfort in developments on the Greek side of the ethnic divide, where rival factions clashed over the pace of enosis. Makarios and his ‘moderate revolutionaries’ were bent on leading Cyprus to eventual union with Greece through a gradual process of ‘Hellenization’ of the island. The militant revolutionaries among the Greek Cypriots were committed to early enosis at any price. Their leader was Grivas, the former EOKA militant, who was put in charge of the Greek Cypriot National Guard established after the 1963 coup. Either way, Cyprus seemed to have been reduced to a temporary ‘puppet state’ of Greece pending the achievement of enosis. Following the ascendance of a military dictatorship in Athens in 1967, Greece intensified its meddling in Cyprus.26

A vicious power struggle between the two factions in the Greek Cypriot community occurred in the early 1970s. In 1974 Makarios accused the Greek military junta of subversive activities by supporting the terrorist campaign that EOKA-B (formed by Grivas in 1971) directed against the island’s political leadership.27 Instead of ending their interference, as Makarios demanded, Greece’s military rulers plotted Makarios’ own downfall. He was duly deposed in mid-July 1974 by the National Guard led by mainland Greek officers, who installed former EOKA gunman Nicos Sampson as President. It was a breathtakingly brazen act of subversion aimed at accelerating enosis.28

Having fled Cyprus, Makarios made his way to New York where he appealed for help from the UN Security Council. He charged Greece’s military rulers of openly violating the independence of Cyprus and extending their dictatorship to the island by masterminding the coup. Makarios insisted that the junta in Athens withdraw Greek officers serving in the National Guard and put an end to the invasion of Cyprus.29 Just as there was no doubt about its complicity in overthrowing Makarios in 1974, the illegality of Greece’s latest involvement was beyond dispute. Under international law this was a clear-cut instance of illegal intervention in breach of the Zurich and London accords that formed the basis of independent Cyprus’s constitutional order.30

Invasion and fragmentation

The Athens-instigated coup in Cyprus provoked a drastic response from Turkey and plunged the island into war. On 20 July 1974, only five days after Makarios was unseated, Turkish troops landed in Cyprus and soon occupied 37 per cent of the island’s territory. The legality of Turkey’s invasion under international law has long (and inconclusively) been debated by jurists, politicians and other commentators. On the one hand there were those who argued that Ankara’s resort to limited force complied with the spirit of article 2(4) of the UN Charter (states may not threaten or use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another) and article 51 (the right of individual and collective self-defence). On this view Turkey had acted within its right as a protector of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus as enshrined in the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.31 According to a further justification ‘it was imperative that Turkey should take action in order to save the Turkish Cypriot community which was in grave and imminent danger of being annihilated by the Greek and Greek Cypriot armed elements’.32 The counter-argument held that Turkey had not consulted with its co-guarantors before launching its military invasion, as the Treaty of Guarantee required. Its unilateral action was only permissible under that treaty if it were undertaken to restore the status quo in Cyprus – and that would have included the maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus as well as the basic political structure of the Republic. Far from bringing about such a situation, Turkey’s military action caused a radical change in the state of affairs created by the London and Zurich accords.33 The unity of the island was destroyed by a territorial division between Greeks and Turks unknown in the history of Cyprus, thereby creating ‘two completely independent, physically separated statelets’.34

The international community did not approve of Turkey’s actions in Cyprus, but pronouncements through the UN were guarded. General Assembly resolution 3212, adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, called on all states ‘to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it’. The resolution went on to urge the speedy withdrawal ‘of all foreign armed forces’ from the island. The Security Council endorsed the Assembly resolution in December 1974. Although Turkey was not specifically mentioned in the Assembly resolution – it could have been addressed to Athens and Ankara equally – the Turks could not read any condonation of their Cypriot operation into the world body’s statements. Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks, supported by international opinion, had no doubt that it was the Turkish invasion of 1974 that had destroyed the Republic of Cyprus of the early 1960s. What this popular view overlooked, though, was that the main cause of the collapse of the ‘original’ independent Cyprus was the violence that the Greek Cypriots had inflicted on their fellow citizens in the early 1950s.35 The chickens had merely taken time to come home to roost.

The invasion and war of 1974 had severe political and demographic consequences. About 160,000 Greek Cypriots (one-third of the community) fled their homes in areas occupied by Turkish forces in the north of the island and took shelter in the south. In a simultaneous reverse flow some 45,000 Turkish Cypriots (40 per cent of this community) sought refuge in the north. Soon virtually the entire Turkish Cypriot community had been settled in the north under the protection of thousands of Turkish soldiers. Turkish Cypriots had for the first time established a sizeable, consolidated territorial basis for a separate government. To reinforce their claims to the northern third of the island, the Turkish Cypriot political leadership decided to strengthen the size of their community by recruiting thousands of settlers from Turkey. The resettlement programme helped to increase the Turkish proportion of the island’s population from 19 per cent in 1974 to approximately 24 per cent in 1996.36

A Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed in the north of the island in February 1975, an area by then under the effective and exclusive control of the Turkish Cypriots backed by several thousand troops from Turkey. In announcing the move, the President of the Turkish Cypriot administration, Rauf Denktash, affirmed that the Turkish Cypriots remained resolutely opposed to ‘all attempts against the independence of Cyprus, and its partition or union with any other state’. The ‘final objective’ of his community ‘is to unite with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a bi-zonal federation’. The Turkish component of a future federation of Cyprus had now been created. At the same time Denktash made it clear that the recent ordeals of the Turkish Cypriots left ‘no possibility of their living together with the Greek Cypriot co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus’. There was only one way to ensure ‘tranquillity, security and permanent peace’ on the island, he insisted, and that was ‘for the two communities to live side by side in their respective regions, developing their own internal structure’.37 To create these structures on the Turkish side, a Constituent Assembly was formed and a new constitution introduced after its approval in a referendum in June 1975.38 As the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly explained in 1976, they were determined to prevent ‘further tyranny and oppression or suppression by the Greek Cypriots’, who had planned ‘the total annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots’. These ‘attempts of genocide’ had only been stopped by Turkey’s military presence on the island, it was said.39

Trading on its international status, the Greek Cypriot government of the island took its objections to the Turkish Federated State to the UN Security Council. In resolution 367 of March 1975, the Council expressed regret over the Turkish community’s ‘unilateral decision’ that tended to ‘compromise the continuation of negotiations’ between the two Cypriot communities on finding a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement. In the same resolution the Council entrusted a good offices mission to the Secretary-General in a bid to resolve the Cyprus conflict.

The leaders of the new Turkish Cypriot entity engaged in several rounds of talks with their Greek Cypriot counterparts over the creation of a national government. The Greek side was initially led by Makarios, who was reinstated as President of the Republic of Cyprus in December 1974 but died in 1977. By the time Makarios returned to power, democratic, civilian rule had been restored in Athens too. Although these changes did not bring about a settlement in Cyprus, the two sides made some progress in their talks. The Makarios-Denktash guidelines of February 1977 allocated substantial powers and responsibilities to the two constituent regions in a future constitutional structure.40 A Ten-Point Agreement concluded in May 1979 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General stipulated that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus ‘should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession’.41 The two Cypriot communities were merely (re)committing themselves to the constitutional arrangements under which Cyprus had become independent – but with one major difference: the non-territorial autonomy enshrined in the 1960 constitution had been replaced by territorially based solutions, hence the dual notion of a future bicommunal, bizonal federation.42

Enter the TRNC

Driven in part by a desire to overcome their entity’s inferior international status, Turkish Cypriot leaders on 15 November 1983 founded the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The expectation was that the TRNC could henceforth engage the Greek side as an equal negotiating partner or cosovereign. The purpose of final status talks, the Turkish Cypriot leadership proclaimed, should be the establishment of a new bicommunal, bizonal federal republic by mutual consent.43 The declaration of statehood reiterated that the Turkish community remained committed to the international accords on which the Republic of Cyprus had been founded and that the TRNC would not unite with any other country (meaning Turkey) except with the southern entity to constitute a federal state. The Turkish Cypriot leadership consequently insisted that the proclamation of the TRNC was not an act of secession or a unilateral declaration of independence in the strict sense of the word; instead, it represented an important step in a process of political and administrative evolution.44 Yet the emphasis was more on separation than evolution: a ‘hard’ border separated north from south and Nicosia remained a militarily divided capital with the Turkish Cypriots controlling the northern section of the city (called Lefkosia) while the Greek Cypriots were in control of the southern portion (called Nicosia). The buffer zone between the two entities was patrolled by UNFICYP troops. The territorial division corresponded with ethnic separation. Fully 99.5 per cent of the island’s Greek Cypriots lived in the Greek zone in the south, with the remainder in the Turkish north; 98.7 per cent of Turkish Cypriots resided in the north, with a bare 1.3 per cent south of the line of partition.45

The TRNC was immediately recognized by Turkey, but not a single other state has since followed suit.46 By adopting resolution 541 within days of the proclamation of the TRNC, the UN Security Council condemned the entity to contested statehood. With only Pakistan opposing and Jordan abstaining, the Council deplored the Turkish Cypriot authorities’ ‘purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus’. Their declaration of 15 November ‘which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus’ was incompatible with the international accords that gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus and therefore legally invalid and should be withdrawn, the Council resolved. All states were called upon ‘not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus’. The world body has on several occasions reaffirmed its unambiguous rejection of a Turkish Cypriot state and the accompanying bisection of the island.

Under international law a number of objections to separate Turkish Cypriot statehood have been recorded. First and foremost, the creation of the TRNC was the product of Turkey’s military invasion and occupation of part of Cyprus. By so doing Turkey had violated the jus cogens norm prohibiting aggression. The birth of the TRNC was consequently met with collective non-recognition. The failure of the TRNC to qualify as a (confirmed) state is, according to Dugard, better explained by reference to this nonrecognition than in terms of the traditional criteria of statehood.47 Fowler and Bunck have, however, noted that some states questioned the Turkish Cypriots’ independence from Turkey. More importantly, in their judgement, was the inability of the Turkish Cypriots to persuade the world community that they were legally separate (and hence enjoyed de jure political independence) from the government of the Republic of Cyprus.48 A further complicating factor may have been the founding fathers’ portrayal of the TRNC’s purported statehood as a mere interim phase pending the reunification of Cyprus. Why should others recognize a ‘state’ that saw no long-term future for itself?

Despite Denktash’s pledge that ‘we shall keep the door wide open to reestablishing unity under a federal system’,49 the emergence of the TRNC complicated the search for an inter-communal political settlement in Cyprus. With Turkey as its patron state, the TRNC had the confidence to stand up to pressures from the Greek Cypriot side and from foreign powers to seek an early compromise solution. Turkey, for its part, was not in a particularly accommodating mood during much of the 1980s and early 1990s either because of its strained relations with Greece. It is against this backdrop that the Legislative Assembly of the TRNC in 1994 renounced resolutions of 1984 and 1985 which had declared that ‘setting up a federal state on the island was the only solution to the Cyprus problem’.50 The shift away from a federal formula was confirmed by Denktash in 1998 when he proposed a ‘confederal structure of two peoples and two sovereign states’, along with entrenching the two Cypriot communities’ special relationships with their respective mother countries.51 The Greek Cypriot leadership responded in predictable fashion, branding a confederation as ‘worse than partition’.52 In due course the Turkish Cypriot side would return to their original federal preferences.

International isolation

The TRNC has had to contend with the worst form of diplomatic isolation, namely collective non-recognition of its claims to statehood. It was international punishment for its sinful origins. The TRNC maintained diplomatic ties with Ankara only and failed to gain formal membership of any inter-governmental organization. With Turkey’s support the TRNC managed to obtain observer status and hence a platform of sorts in the Economic Cooperation Organization (which included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and several Soviet successor states) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The latter in 1994 called on its 51 member states ‘to increase and expand their relations in all fields and in particular in the fields of trade, tourism, culture, information, investment and sports’ with the TRNC, but stopped short of extending formal recognition to the breakaway state.53 Like other contested states the TRNC maintained semi-official representation abroad, with offices in Washington, New York, London, Brussels, Baku, Islamabad and Abu Dhabi.54

Economic isolation accompanied the TRNC’s diplomatic ostracism. One of the most harmful measures it experienced was an economic embargo imposed by the Greek Cypriot government. Greece and other European states joined the boycott of goods from Northern Cyprus. Also damaging to the TRNC’s economy was the Greek Cypriots’ success in getting foreign states (except for Turkey) to ban flights to the territory of the TRNC. This prohibition affected both trade and tourism. Northern Cyprus was furthermore denied access to the kinds of bilateral and multilateral aid freely available to the Greek Cypriot government. This economic isolation of course deterred foreign investors.55

True, per capita GDP in Northern Cyprus had increased threefold between 1977 and 2002 and annual GDP growth rates from 2001 to 2005 ranged between 5.4 and 15.4 per cent.56 This gave Turkish Cypriots a standard of living higher than that in mainland Turkey. These achievements had only been possible thanks to generous support from Turkey in the shape of direct aid, loans, subsidies and other grants. Turkey also carried the considerable costs of re-exporting Turkish Cypriot textiles and fruit.57 No less than 80 per cent of goods exported from Northern Cyprus flowed through Turkey – increasing costs for Turkish Cypriot businesses and reducing their international competitiveness.58 Economically the TRNC was utterly dependent on Turkey; it even used the Turkish lira as its currency. One disadvantage of this asymmetrical relationship was the TRNC’s vulnerability to its patron’s macro-economic turbulence and high inflation.59

Northern Cyprus’s economy made a poor showing against that of its southern neighbour. Take per capita GDP: although the available statistics vary considerably, one authoritative source recorded US$23,672 for the Greek south in 2006, against $11,802 for the Turkish north.60 The economic boom that the Greek Cypriot economy had enjoyed after 1974 was in no small measure due to its confirmed statehood and unfettered access to foreign markets.61 The international factor gained enormously in salience in the 1990s when the Republic of Cyprus began the process of joining the EU. This development deepened Turkish Cypriots’ sense of international isolation and relative deprivation – and eventually encouraged them to reconsider the costs of going it alone.

Still, the TRNC comfortably met three of the Montevideo criteria for statehood. Its population of 264,172 (according to a 2006 census)62 was much smaller than the south’s almost 600,000 people and also modest by global standards. Yet the TRNC’s population was larger than that of 21 UN member states, with Barbados the closest comparison. Northern Cyprus’s territory of 3,355 km2 (over one-third of the island’s total surface area of 9,251 km2) was in size between that of Cape Verde and Samoa. The government of the TRNC was firmly in control of this territory, thanks largely to the presence of between 35,000 and 40,000 Turkish troops (about twice the number of local and mainland Greek soldiers in the south). As a bonus, Northern Cyprus obeyed the rules of democracy. We must acknowledge, though, that heavy economic and security dependence on Turkey cast some doubt on the TRNC’s domestic sovereignty. Finally, the entity’s lack of participation in normal foreign relations was attributable to that familiar curse of contested states, namely the absence of collective recognition.

The EU dimension

In the 1990s the EU factor injected a new dynamic into efforts to resolve the Cyprus conflict. Encouraged by Greece’s admission to the European Community in 1981, the Greek Cypriot government in 1990 applied for membership too. At first the EU Commission wanted to see a political settlement in the divided island before commencing accession talks. Brussels subsequently relented, agreeing to reconsider Cypriot membership by January 1995 if no settlement could be reached. The EU made it plain that the accession process would not be derailed by Turkish Cypriot objections to the Greek Cypriot government acting on behalf of all of Cyprus in engaging with Brussels.63 In 1998 the EU duly agreed to start accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus.

The very next year the EU also recognized Turkey as a candidate for membership. This prompted Turkey to embark on a far-reaching process of internal political reform designed to meet the EU’s political criteria before talks on membership could commence. Ankara was also under pressure from the EU to adopt a new strategy that could resolve the conflict in Cyprus. Under Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, who came into office in 2002, domestic reform initiatives gained momentum and Turkey made a ‘historical shift’ in favour of the reunification of Cyprus. In December 2004 the European Council rewarded Turkey by deciding to start accession negotiations in 2005. Another encouraging development was the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece since 1999, further improving the political climate for a settlement in Cyprus.64

The EU had compelling reasons for promoting a settlement. As long as the conflict between its Greek and Turkish communities remained unresolved, Cyprus represented ‘a potentially disruptive element inside the European Union’.65 An isolated and aggrieved TRNC could moreover play the role of ‘spoiler’ by allowing a ‘cynical lawlessness’ to take hold in the territory. This could encourage trade in international contraband, including narcotics and human trafficking.66 Although the EU (supported by the UN) preferred that a reunited Cyprus should join the Union, Brussels gave notice that if reunification could not be achieved before the deadline for the island’s accession, the Republic of Cyprus would formally join as the sole legitimate representative of Cyprus as a whole. The Turkish-controlled northern part would then be effectively excluded from EU membership. Neither the EU nor the UN would leave matters to chance, though; the final years before Cyprus’s admission to the EU in 2004 saw ‘the most concerted and comprehensive’ international effort to achieve a settlement since the independence negotiations of 1959–60.67

The upshot of the renewed settlement drive was the so-called Annan Plan (named after the UN Secretary-General), of which the first version appeared in November 2002. It was an impressively detailed blueprint for a return to a complex, territorially based power-sharing formula found in some consociational democracies. The plan called for the creation of a United Cyprus Republic, a federal state consisting of two constituent units, the Greek Cypriot community in the south and the Turkish Cypriots in the north. The latter’s zone would be reduced from the existing 37 per cent of Cypriot territory to about 28.5 per cent. Under the constitution most powers would vest in the constituent entities, leaving the federal government responsible mainly for foreign relations, federal finance and monetary policy, and citizenship and immigration. The essence the Annan Plan was ‘the assurance of bizonality and political equality, the respect of ethnic diversity and human rights and the existence of an independent sovereign state with a single international personality’. To protect the constitutional status of the envisaged republic as well as that of its constituent parts, the plan stipulated that the existing Treaty of Guarantee remain intact. The UN peacekeeping force would also be retained to monitor implementation of the new design. In another provision reminiscent of the qualified independence of the original Republic of Cyprus, the Annan Plan stated that a United Cyprus Republic would not allow its territory to be used for international military operations without the consent of the two constituent units and of Greece and Turkey. Finally, the redesigned Cyprus Republic would be a full-fledged EU member.68

The Annan Plan went through no fewer than five revisions in a bid to get it approved by all sides, but each time the Turkish Cypriot leadership balked. On 24 April 2004 the two Cypriot communities held referendums on Annan V under the terms of an earlier agreement providing for such a mechanism. The popular verdicts caused a sensation by overturning the historical pattern in the search for a settlement: 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, whereas no less than 76 per cent of the Greek Cypriot voters rejected it.69 This time the deal wreckers were on the Greek Cypriot side, exercising their veto power in a most unexpected way. Even so the Greek Cypriots were allowed to join the EU: in May 2004 the still divided island entered the EU under the designation Republic of Cyprus. The TRNC became legally but not practically part of the EU; the benefits of membership would be confined to the Greek Cypriot side.70 And so the Republic of Cyprus, the exclusive political preserve of Greek Cypriots, reaped another benefit of its confirmed statehood while the TRNC remained condemned to contested statehood.

By supporting the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriot electorate rebuffed their long serving leader Rauf Denktash who, as founding father of the TRNC and President since its inception, had resisted several diplomatic efforts at reunification with the Greek south. One reason for the rift was the deteriorating economic situation in the TRNC coupled with the envisaged material advantages of EU membership. These considerations made the Turkish Cypriot community increasingly amenable to bearing the costs of reunification for the sake of EU membership. A related factor was Turkey’s own interest in joining the EU and its support for the Annan Plan. This reassured Turkish Cypriots that they would eventually be united with Turkey proper (as with the Greek Cypriots and Greece itself) in an expanded European family. Finally, the Annan Plan appealed to the Turkish Cypriot side because it promised to meet the community’s status needs and so allayed many identity-related fears.71 The new climate of opinion in Northern Cyprus was reflected in the election of Mehmet Ali Talat as President in April 2005 to succeed Denktash. Talat, a leftwinger, was an outspoken supporter of reunification and staunchly pro-European.72

Why did the Greek Cypriots so overwhelmingly reject the Annan blueprint for reunification? They judged that the settlement proposals held very few gains for them but considerable costs and risks. By giving the Turkish Cypriots minority vetoes on a range of matters, it was argued, the envisaged power-sharing mechanisms would entrench a ‘tyranny of the minority’. Another complaint was that the more affluent Greek community would bear the greatest costs for the island’s socio-economic reconstruction. At the heart of Greek Cypriots’ rejection of Annan V may well have been ‘an unwillingness to share power with the other community on the island’.73 Indeed, the Greek Cypriot leadership reasoned that Cyprus’s membership of the EU and Turkey’s aspirations to follow suit would enhance their community’s bargaining position and hence secure a more favourable deal for the Greek majority than that offered by Annan V. The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, put it bluntly: why should the Greek Cypriots ‘do away with our internationally recognized state exactly at the very moment it strengthens its political weight, with its accession to the EU’?74 We should bear in mind that the Greek Cypriots had gained EU membership without having to make any compromise: they had no real incentive to vote ‘yes’ in the referendum on the Annan proposals, nor any strong disincentive not to vote ‘no’. Not even Greece’s backing for the final Annan Plan could sway the Greek Cypriots.75

Based on their 2004 referendum result, a clear majority of Greek Cypriots’ preferred future for the island may well have been a single, centralized state featuring majoritarian democracy (in which the Greek community would prevail) and giving Greek Cypriots the right to return to the north. The bicommunal and consociational characteristics of the original Cypriot constitution and of the Annan Plan would consequently be weakened if not altogether abolished. Advocates of this outcome believed that the Turkish Cypriots would ‘sacrifice’ self-rule for the advantages of an undivided Cyprus’s EU membership.76 Indications that absorption into the Greek south’s institutions (known as ‘osmosis’) may well have been Greek Cypriot strategy, were said to be the latter’s extension of such benefits as Republic of Cyprus citizenship and passports (by the end of 2006 about 65,000 Turkish Cypriots had already obtained such travel documents), employment, social insurance, education and health care to individual Turkish Cypriots. In February 2008 Turkish Cypriots living in the south could for the first time vote in the presidential election there.77 Pragmatic or opportunistic ‘absorption’ was one thing, but it is doubtful whether the majority of Turkish Cypriots or their government would countenance wholesale incorporation into the Greekcontrolled Republic of Cyprus.

International rewards

At the international level Northern Cyprus was meanwhile experiencing a welcome form of absorption or what the International Crisis Group called ‘a creeping de facto recognition of the TRNC by the rest of the world’.78 By approving Annan’s proposal for reunification in 2004, the Turkish Cypriot community turned their backs on secession and hence removed the rationale behind their enforced isolation.79 Indeed, the UN Secretary-General, EU leaders and several other governments called for an end to the TRNC’s isolation in the wake of the referendums. Another reason for lifting Turkish Cypriots’ quarantine, EU foreign ministers declared, was ‘to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the latter community’.80 To this end the EU approved a 259 million euro aid package for Northern Cyprus.81 The European Parliament established a High Level Contact Group for relations with Northern Cyprus, and two Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians enjoyed limited rights of participation in the activities of political groups in the European Parliament. The Council of Europe in turn permitted two Turkish Cypriot observers to its Parliamentary Assembly.82 The Organization of the Islamic Conference, determined to end the ‘unjust isolation’ of the Turkish Cypriots, in July 2004 upgraded the Turkish Cypriots’ designation from ‘community’ to ‘constituent state’ (although the TRNC remained an observer within the organization).83

At the bilateral level there were no legal or practical obstacles to states opening branches of their embassies on the northern side of the Green Line dividing the two parts of Cyprus, or expanding links with the political leadership and civil society in the TRNC.84 President Talat has held formal meetings with members of several foreign governments, including Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Northern Cyprus also managed to extend its representative offices (without diplomatic status) to Italy, Germany and Israel, among other countries.85 Britain, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, France and the US were among the states that allowed entry to holders of TRNC passports.86 The United Kingdom also gave Northern Cyprus aid worth over £500,000 per annum to help the entity reach EU standards, especially through judicial and civil service reform.87

Instances of de facto international recognition of Northern Cyprus have been dubbed the ‘Taiwan solution’.88 While there are some parallels (see Chapter 10), the TRNC faced formidable obstacles in engaging in international relations even at the functional (non-diplomatic) level. Procedural, legal and political impediments created by the Greek Cypriots in the EU kept hampering the TRNC’s access to international aid, trade, transport and tourism.89 A different stumbling block has been Turkey’s refusal to open its harbours and airports to traffic from the Greek-controlled Republic of Cyprus (as it should have under its obligations to the EU to fully implement the customs union protocol for Cyprus). Ankara insisted that the Europeans first honour their promise to lift the trade embargo against the TRNC and allow commercial air traffic into the territory.90 The Greek Cypriots rejected any such concession to the Turkish side as long as Ankara remained unwilling to recognize their government as the only legitimate one on the island.91 There has been a similar lack of progress in encouraging commerce between the two Cypriot entities; neither side appeared keen to allow free trade.92 This was in sharp contrast to the extensive economic ties between Taiwan and China.

Few if any of the foreign parties extending some form of de facto recognition to Northern Cyprus did so with the intention of paving the way for the de jure recognition of the entity. Referring to moves to lift the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, the UN Secretary-General declared in 2007 that ‘the objective of such efforts should be to engender greater economic and social parity between the sides by further promoting the development of the Turkish Cypriot community, so that the reunification of the island may occur in as seamless a manner as possible’. He emphasized that foreign economic, social, cultural and other links with Northern Cyprus did not amount to recognition or assistance to secession, which would in any case be contrary to Security Council resolutions.93

Renewed settlement efforts

A new settlement initiative was launched only in July 2006 when the presidents of the two Cypriot republics, Papadopoulos and Talat, agreed to a five-point framework for resuming negotiations aimed at resolving the Cyprus conflict. Brokered by UN Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari, the accord provided for negotiations at two levels: technical committees would tackle day-to-day issues and expert working groups would deal with substantive long-term political matters. The two leaders pledged themselves to the reunification of Cyprus on the lines of a bizonal, bicommunal federation and political equality. They also acknowledged that the status quo was untenable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences. Despite the apparent sense of urgency and the subsequent efforts of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative to Cyprus, the next 18 months saw precious little progress in implementing the July 2006 agreement. Not even a meeting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders in September 2007 – their first in 14 months – could break the impasse.94

Local and international hopes for a settlement in Cyprus were boosted when Demetris Christofias defeated Papadopoulos in the south’s presidential election in February 2008. Leader of the communist AKAL (Progressive Party of the Working People), Christofias pledged to resume talks with Northern Cyprus on reunification. With the previous hard-line nationalist leaders replaced, the two sides in Cyprus for the first time had (leftist) presidents who appeared equally committed to finding a lasting settlement to the decades-old conflict between the island’s two communities. Talat and Christofias promptly agreed on a set of confidence-building measures between the two sides and there was also progress in establishing the working groups and technical committees envisaged under the July 2006 agreement. In March 2008 the two leaders met for the first time and agreed to begin preparations for formal reunification talks due to commence in June.95

The parameters of a final settlement have been firmly established in earlier agreements, especially the Annan Plan of 2004, and enjoyed broad international support. These outlines were reaffirmed in UN Security Council resolution 1789 of December 2007, namely ‘a comprehensive settlement based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation and political equality’. Another basic element has long been the withdrawal of most if not all troops from Turkey stationed in Northern Cyprus.96 Turkey too backed the Annan formula and served notice that it would brook no major deviation from the plan. In early 2008 President Abdullah Gül insisted that ‘[a] solution will be based on the equality of the two sides and the existence of two different peoples, two democratic systems and two states on the island’. To expect of either the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey to accept anything less would be ‘a futile dream’, Gül added. For good measure he warned that Turkey ‘as the motherland and the guarantor country’ would not ‘merely stand by and watch’ if Turkish Cypriots lost their right to rule themselves in an equal partnership with Greek Cypriots.97 Talat in turn pledged loyalty to ‘the essence of the Annan Plan’,98 which for him meant ‘establishing a new partnership state based on the political equality of the two peoples and the equal status of two constituent states’.99 Talat was moreover confident that ‘[w]e will solve the Cyprus problem, and make our country a united country that is integrated with the world and a member of the European Union’.100 He even ventured to say that ‘it won’t be a surprise if we solve the problem by the end of 2008’.101 While such a timeline may be overly optimistic, the prevailing public mood in both parts of Cyprus seemed receptive to a grand compromise over the future of the island. A UNFICYP opinion poll conducted in 2007 found that 66 per cent of the Greek Cypriots regarded a federal solution as tolerable, against 72 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots.102

Amid the upbeat expectations, we should be aware of the constraints faced by the negotiators. One is that the Greek Cypriots had in 2004 decisively rejected the Annan Plan – Christofias among them. This verdict still rankled with the Turkish Cypriots. Even assuming that Christofias has since then become more amenable to the Annan formula, he has to contend with the wishes of his partner in the coalition government that is none other than the Democratic Party (DIKO) of Papadopoulos who so fervently championed a ‘no’ vote in 2004. Greece and Turkey could present further complicating factors if one or both opposed a settlement.

Although the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Cyprus said in February 2008 that the world body ‘will support good faith efforts on the part of both sides to restart talks and work for a solution’ rather than launching a new settlement initiative,103 the UN may well be compelled to assume a more active role should bilateral talks fail to make progress. The EU in turn can hardly watch from the wings. ‘Since the Cyprus problem has turned into a major EU-Turkey and EU-NATO problem’, the ICG observed, ‘Brussels has both a responsibility and a need to ensure the maximum is done to reach a settlement’104. Turkey for its part knew full well that it would not be admitted to the EU as long as it was blamed for partitioning a member state (Cyprus) and occupying part of it. Greece stood to reap political, security and economic benefits from improved relations with Turkey if the Cyprus issue was resolved to their mutual satisfaction.105 For both Cypriot communities there were sound economic reasons to break the current deadlock and reunify the island. A settlement coupled with EU membership would moreover signal the Turkish Cypriots’ complete international rehabilitation. An added benefit for Northern Cyprus could be badly needed EU assistance in curbing  organized criminal activity thriving in the entity’s isolation.106

The EU’s influence on settlement talks might be felt in a very different, indirect way too. If the Union were to decide that the final goal of Turkey’s accession negotiations was less than full membership, Ankara would have little incentive left to seek an accommodation with EU member countries – least of all with the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, as mentioned, Turkey’s admission to the EU seemed inconceivable while the status quo obtained in Cyprus. For one thing, Turkey’s presence in Northern Cyprus may well breach the EU’s accession criteria with regard to human rights and security policy. Also bear in mind that both Greece and Cyprus had veto power over Turkey’s admission to the Union.107 If the EU were to shun Turkey, Ankara could retaliate by pushing the TRNC’s claims to sovereign statehood. In the process relations between Ankara and Athens were bound to deteriorate – and again cause their mutual antagonism to be played out in Cyprus.108

Radical alternatives

Should a settlement based on the Annan plan be rejected by one or both Cypriot communities, some radical final outcomes may present themselves. The Greek and Turkish communities could then be given the option of ‘separate self-determination’ by the international community.109 Theoretically the self-determination options could for each side include sovereign statehood, involving the mutually agreed and externally supervised (even guaranteed) partition of Cyprus and the emergence of an internationally recognized Turkish state in the north alongside a confirmed Greek state in the south. Incorporation with their mother countries or some form of association with Turkey or Greece were other possibilities. As regards formal integration with Turkey, this alternative enjoyed only limited appeal among Turkish Cypriots and was not regarded as a desirable option in Ankara either.110 However, the growing number of mainland Turkish settlers in Northern Cyprus, who had little in common with Greek Cypriots, could have a profound effect on TRNC policies – especially if the immigrants became a majority in the north.111


With the perfect vision of hindsight it is easy to see that the Republic of Cyprus (b. 1960) carried the seeds of self-destruction. Its two antagonistic communities regarded themselves as extensions of mainland Greece and Turkey, respectively, and they displayed greater affinity for their mother countries than for Cyprus. The two kin states had few qualms about taking a hand in shaping events in Cyprus to suit their respective national interests. Such external meddling contributed to the present territorial and political division of the island between a contested state in the north and a confirmed state in the south.

With the TRNC having existed for 25 years, the territorial, political, economic and ethnic fragmentation of Cyprus has become deeply entrenched. The situation has moreover proven remarkably peaceful and stable. Yet there was no international constituency for prolonging the prevailing division of Cyprus. An impatient UN Security Council has more than once declared that the status quo was unacceptable and that negotiations to reunify the island have been deadlocked for too long. The Greek Cypriots have consistently rejected the right of existence of a secessionist Turkish republic on the island. Since 2004 the minority Turkish community has been prepared to reunite with their former Greek compatriots in a loose federal arrangement. The TRNC has thus signalled its willingness to renounce its claims to sovereign statehood. Add the recent changes of political leadership in both north and south, and the prospects for an amicable reunification of Cyprus currently seem better than in many years. In addition, future inclusion in the EU was for Northern Cyprus a major ‘pull’ factor towards rejoining a united Cyprus. In return for surrendering its purported statehood, Northern Cyprus would also expect meaningful regional autonomy.


  1. Florence Elliott, A Dictionary of Politics, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977, p.112; Metin Tamkoc¸, The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination, M Rustem & Brother, London, 1988, p.42; Tozun Bahcheli, ‘Under Turkey’s wings: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the struggle for international acceptance’, in Bahcheli et al (eds), De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, Routledge, London, 2004, p.165; Stavros Panteli, A New History of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, East-West Publications, London, 1984.
  2. Florence Elliott, p.112; Tozun Bahcheli, p.165.
  3. Joseph S Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern, Peter Lang, New York, 1985, p.241.
  4. Florence Elliott, p.112.
  5. Florence Elliott, p.112.
  6. Tozun Bahcheli, pp.165–6; Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.42–3.
  7. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.42.
  8. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.43; Florence Elliott, p.112.
  9. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.71.
  10. Zaim M Nejatigil, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in Perspective, published by the author, Nicosia, 1985, pp.1–3; Florence Elliott, p.113.
  11. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.65.
  12. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.64, 70; Zaim M Nejatigil, p.1.
  13. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.67; ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next? Europe Report, No. 171, 8 March 2006, p.8.
  14. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.65, 71; Tozun Bahcheli, p.166.
  15. Guy Dundas, ‘Cyprus from 1960 to EU accession: The case for non-territorial autonomy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 50(1), 2004, p.87.
  16. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.65, 70; Zaim M Nejatigil, p.3; Halil I Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1978.
  17. Quoted by Zaim M Nejatigil, p.1.
  18. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.65, 71.
  19. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.71; Tozun Bahcheli, p.166; Zaim M Nejatigil, p.3.
  20. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.70–1.
  21. Nancy Crawshaw, ‘Cyprus: The political background’, in John A Koumoulides (ed.), Cyprus in Transition 19601985, Trigraph, London, 1986, pp.3–4; Salahi R Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic and its Aftermath (19601974), CYREP, Lefkosa, 2003, pp.37–67.
  22. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.81–2; Tozun Bahcheli, p.167.
  23. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.81–2, 133.
  24. Nancy Crawshaw, p.3; George S Kaloudis, The Role of the U.N. in Cyprus from 1964 to 1979, Peter Lang, New York, 1991.
  25. Tozun Bahcheli, p.165; Nancy Crawshaw, p.6.
  26. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.81–2; Nancy Crawshaw, pp.5–6, 9; Salahi R Sonyel, pp.94–7.
  27. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.82.
  28. Nancy Crawshaw, p.9.
  29. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.83.
  30. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.100; Salahi R Sonyel, pp.341–6.
  31. Metin Tamkoc¸, pp.101, 107; Tozun Bahcheli, p.168; Salahi R Sonyel, pp.346–9.
  32. NM Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, K Rustem & Brother, Nicosia, 1981, p.32.
  33. Metin Tamkoc¸, p.101.
  34. Guy Dundas, p.88.
  35. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.8.
  36. Tozun Bahcheli, p.168.
  37. Quoted by NM Ertekün, p.252.
  38. NM Ertekün, p.34.
  39. Quoted by NM Ertekün, p.274.
  40. NM Ertekün, p.357.
  41. Quoted by NM Ertekün, p.360.
  42. Guy Dundas, pp.88–9.
  43. Zaim M Nejatigil, pp.102–3, 150.
  44. Zaim M Nejatigil, p.102.
  45. Encyclopedia of the Nations, ‘Cyprus’, undated, http://www.nationsencyclopedia. com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Cyprus.html.
  46. Tozun Bahcheli, pp.170–1.
  47. John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective, Juta, Kenwyn, 2000, pp.88–9.
  48. Michael R Fowler & Julie M Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1995, p.52.
  49. Quoted by Zaim M Nejatigil, p.107.
  50. Quoted by Tozun Bahcheli, p.172.
  51. Quoted by Tozun Bahcheli, p.173.
  52. Quoted by Tozun Bahcheli, p.173.
  53. Final Communique of the twenty-second Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco, 10–12 December 1994, http:// English/conf/fm/22/final%2022.htm.
  54. Tozun Bahcheli, p.170.
  55. Tozun Bahcheli, pp.170, 174; ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.13.
  56. Wikipedia, ‘Northern Cyprus’, 29 April 2008, Northern_Cyprus…
  57. Tozun Bahcheli, pp.173–4.
  58. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Visit to Turkey and Cyprus, Fifth Report of Session 2006–07, The Stationary Office, London, May 2007, p.21.
  59. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.27.
  60. US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, ‘Background Note: Cyprus’, March 2008,
  61. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.2.
  62. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Presidency, ‘About TRNC’, undated,
  63. Tozun Bahcheli, pp.176–7.
  64. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, pp.16–17; Tozun Bahcheli, pp.177–80.
  65. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.30.
  66. NewNations Bulletin, 19 April 2006, 06042010NN.asp.
  67. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.3.
  68. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, pp.3–4, 7–9.
  69. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.4; Tozun Bahcheli, p.181.
  70. Guy Dundas, p.90.
  71. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.5; Tozun Bahcheli, pp.182–3.
  72. BBCNEWS, ‘Turkish Cypriots vote for Talat’, 17 April 2005,…
  73. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.6.
  74. Quoted in ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.10.
  75. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, pp.8–10.
  76. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, pp.19–20.
  77. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.15; ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, Europe Report, No. 190, 10 January 2008, p.25; The Economist, 26 February 2005; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, p.17.
  78. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.20.
  79. ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, p.22.
  80. Quoted in ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.14; International Herald Tribune, 17 June 2008.
  81. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, Security Council document S/2007/699, 3 December 2007, p.3.
  82. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.29.
  83. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.12; Istanbul Declaration, adopted by the thirty-first session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Istanbul, 14–16 June 2004,
  84. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.29.
  85. ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, p.25; David Ravid, ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to open trade office in Israel’, Haaretz, 10 March 2008, 2666.
  86. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, p.12; International Herald Tribune, 1 July 2005.
  87. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, p.12.
  88. Tozun Bahcheli, p.184.
  89. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, pp.12–15.
  90. The Economist, 9 December 2006.
  91. The Economist, 21 October 2006.
  92. Time, 13 November 2006; ICG, ‘Settling Cyprus’, 15 February 2008, http://www.
  93. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, p.10.
  94. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, pp.2–3; ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, pp.5–6.
  95. BBCNEWS, ‘Country profile: Cyprus’, 28 February 2008,…; TRNC Presidency, ‘Talat: “We are bound to prepare a plan, which would be acceptable to both peoples”’, 26 April 2008,; TRNC Presidency, ‘President Talat wraps up his contacts in Ankara’, 25 April 2008, http://www.kktcb. eu/print_news.php?id=305&1n=en; ICG, CrisisWatch, No. 56, 1 April 2008.
  96. ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, p.12.
  97. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaskanligi, ‘Speech by H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey, in honour of H.E. Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 3 January 2008, p.1,
  98. TRNC Presidency, ‘Talat: “We are bound to prepare a plan”’.
  99. TRNC Presidency, ‘President Talat’s statement on 25 February 2008 on the results of the Greek Cypriot elections’, php?id=242&1n=en.
  100. TRNC Presidency, ‘Talat: “We are bound to prepare a plan”’.
  101. Quoted in BBCNEWS, ‘Cyprus leaders seek fresh talks’, 25 February 2008,…
  102. ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, p.7.
  103. Quoted in International Herald Tribune, 7 February 2008.
  104. ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, p.9.
  105. ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, pp.17–18.
  106. ICG, ‘Settling Cyprus’, 14 February 2008; ICG, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, pp.15–18.
  107. Guy Dundas, p.91.
  108. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, pp.20–1.
  109. ICG, The Cyprus Stalemate, p.22.
  110. Tozun Bahcheli, pp.182–3.
  111. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, p.13.

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