4. Case studies
Somaliland
&
South Sudan
4.1 Somaliland
Somaliland is internationally recognized as an autonomous northern state within Somalia. It is located in the northern top of the Horn of Africa. Somaliland shares its borders with Ethiopia in the south, Djibouti in the north, the Gulf of Aden and the autonomous Puntland region of Somalia in the East. Its capital is Hargeisa. The country has three and a half million inhabitants, and covers a geographic area of 137,600 square kilometers (Jhazbhay 2003, p. 79). The main religion since the 14th century is predominantly Islam. In the middle ages, the local clan system evolved when extended Islamic families from Arabia fled to Somali regions and economically beneficial relationships were established through inter-ethnic marriages with locals. The largest ethnic clan today are the Isaaq, but numerous smaller clans are present as well (website: Country Facts, UN permanent mission, n.d; website: UNPO, Somaliland, 2008).
4.1.1 History
Within a week after Somaliland’s -internationally-recognized- independence from Britain in June 1960, Somaliland decided to join its neighboring country Somalia, which declared its independence from Italy on July 1st. Despite a short political struggle caused by issues over the new representation, still motivated by a nationalistic pursuit of a “Greater Somalia”, the territories managed to form a new unified and rather peaceful Somali Republic at least its first decade (Kreuter 2010, p. 375). However, in October 1969 Somalia’s second president Abdirashid Ali
Shermarke was assassinated by one of his own bodyguards for reasons unknown. Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre took advantage of this sudden power vacuum and took power in a bloodless and unopposed military coup d’état. Siyad Barre was a member of the Marehan Darod Clan, from the south west of Somalia. As leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), he immediately began reforming the country. Firstly, the Somali Republic was renamed in the Somali Democratic Republic. The SRC arrested former government officials, banned all political parties, and dissolved the Parliament, Supreme Court, and the former constitution. Despite Barre’s promises to eradicate tribalism and decentralize power, all the important economical and political institutions were planned to be located in the Southern region of the Somali republic, where members of his clan could influence and support his rule (Forti 2011, p. 15). This generated great political and economical advantages for that region over other more distant regions, like Somaliland, which ultimately provoked northern resistance.
https://saxafimedia.com/legitimization-of-statehood-in-de-facto-states-a-case-study-of-somaliland/
In an effort to protect the northern clans’ interests, a guerrilla movement was established in 1982, named the Somali National Movement (SNM). This movement, or political organization mostly consisted out of members of the northern Isaaq peoples (UN permanent mission, n.d.). While promoting ‘Somali values of cooperation rather than coercion’, the struggle still escalated between May 1988 and March 1989, when the SNM tried to control northern towns through its newly established bases. Siyad Barre’s government brutally answered the SNM’s achievements by flattening out the northern capital Hargeisa and other major cities with artillery, South African mercenaries, and a bomber aircraft. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed and more than half a million citizens were forced to flee to neighboring Ethiopia. This escalation was the beginning of the Somali Civil war. Soon after the attack on Hargeisa, more opposition against the central government emerged from the south. A coalition of two southern-based clans of the Isaaq peoples and more armed actors joined the SNM in their efforts, until Mogadishu, the Somali capital, was taken over in 1991 and Barre fled the country (Bryden 2004, p. 24).
When Is A Nation Not A Nation – Somaliland’s Dream Of Independence
With the collapse of the government and the overthrow of dictator Said Barre in 1991, Somaliland declared itself independent for the second time, but now from its former union partner, Somalia (Bryden 2004, p. 23). This was nothing more than a formal revoking of the act of union, but it was interpreted differently by international organizations (Jhazbhay 2003, p. 78). Especially the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the League of Arab States (LAS) opposed Somaliland’s aspirations (Bryden 2004, p. 25). Having no choice, Somaliland started to rebuild itself without help from any other nation or organization. A modest economic and democratic development, with financial support from the Somaliland diaspora that fled the country during the civil war, eventually led to the establishment of a stable democratic society with fair elections and even a democratically approved constitution in 2011. At present, on the basis of its institutions and its respect to human rights, Somaliland should be able to call itself a righteous member of the nation of states (Jhazbay 2003, p. 80). However, to this day Somaliland is not recognized officially by any other nation. And so, fair or not, the Somaliland Republic is now often typified simultaneously as a ‘break away’ state, and as ‘the African state that could’ (Jhazbay 2003, p. 77l Poore, 2009). To better understand China’s position in relation to Somaliland’s secession, first the process of secession will be examined. Then, a closer look will be given to China’s view on the case.
4.1.2 China’s attitude towards the secession
During the war against Barre (1988-1991), the Isaaq Somali National Movement (SNM) had decided with the two southern fighting fronts that the Somali Democratic Republic would remain unified under a federal system after Siyad Barre was overthrown (Bryden 2004, p. 22). However, when Barre’s government collapse became a feasible prospect, Somaliland’s clan elders and SNM senior officials, who had respected positions within Somaliland’s traditional society, started to invoke all Somalilanders to end violence and mobilize support for an independent northern territory. Already in 1969, when the murder of Somalia’s first president was followed by a military coup, skepticism emerged amongst Somalilanders towards the viability of their union with Somalia. By 1990, this skepticism had further deteriorated because of Somaliland’s ethnic underrepresentation in the political structure of the country, an unequal distribution of the country’s revenue earned with livestock exports and national resources, and by the suffering of ethnic discrimination in the form of clan-based persecution and violence during the bombings on Somaliland’s northern cities (Forti 2011, p 17). Many of the fighting Isaaq from the SNM believed that their fight was for the eventual independence of Somaliland. For them, the rulers in Mogadishu could bring nothing more than discrimination, oppression and genocidal violence (Bryden 2004, p. 24). So, when General Barre eventually fell, and months of deliberations in major conferences between different parties and segments of society followed to establish peace and a ceasefire, the northern separatist lobby was also present.
During the second of two major conferences, respectively in Borama and Burao, in which a transitional administration for the northwestern regions of Somalia was to be discussed amongst traditional Somali leaders, mass demonstrations erupted throughout Isaaq regions. On May 18th 1991, one day after one of these demonstrations had even entered the building where the conference was held, the formal union between Somaliland and Somalia was entirely unexpectedly unilaterally revoked. The independence that Somaliland had previously enjoyed for five days in 1960 was now suddenly reinstated (Jhazbhay 2003, p. 79). Somalia’s central government however was caught up in a war and so did not respond to the secession; in anticipation of this response, this also put international responses to the secession on hold, including China’s. Moreover, Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence did not fall under secession after colonial subjection, a reason for secession that China undoubtedly would have supported. Breaking up a self-instigated union meant far more complex implications for the secession process. China had not signed the Friendly Relations Declaration in 1970 and did not support the International Court of Justice in many cases. In contrast with opinions of many other UN members, the right to self-determination did not fall under the umbrella of human rights in China’s perception and would thus not be answered with political recognition (Zhu and Blachford 2005, p. 250). This is also leaving aside the missing internal recognition from Somalia’s central government that would be necessary for external recognition in case China would have seen the right to self-determination as a human right for all peoples.
On a political level, Beijing, therefore, avoided direct comment on the status of Somaliland since its unilateral declaration of independence, stating that the issue was an internal affair of Somalia. And by this China showed its preferred approach to bilateral relations (Lanteigne 2012, p. 293; Zou 2005). In addition, China’s diplomatic ties with Somalia’s government in Mogadishu were already established decades before Somaliland’s secession, meaning these ties functioned as China’s bilateral starting point. Not recognizing Somaliland at the time was thus also an example of China’s boundaries for its perceived responsibility in its foreign policy. Following its ‘Five Principles of Coexistence’, China would have to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and would therefore not interfere with its domestic affairs, as it is expecting the same in return (Taylor 2006, p. 68).
In fact, China has nowadays become one of the important voices within the UN to seek attention for the increasingly chaotic situation in Somalia. With the international aid this has generated, China tries to help Somalia’s central government to regain power within its country (Farley 2010).
The Heritage Of War And State Collapse In Somaliland And Somalia
4.1.3 China’s involvement
China’s involvement in the Somali Republic, prior to Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991 was very characteristic for its third-world foreign policies at the time. After Stalin’s death, and Nikita Khrushchev’s revisionist denunciation of Stalin’s crimes in 1956, Mao chose to take a different and more independent path from then on. China started to support more socialist regimes in Africa, one of which was the new Somali’ socialist regime. In the first few years after China had established relations with Somalia on December 14th 1960, its foreign policy towards Somalia –as for other African countries-was full of Maoist ideology. China needed support for the restoration of its seat within the United Nations and tried to spread its influence by distributing ideological ideas that had worked domestically. Somalia pursued a foreign policy of nonalignment at that time. Therefore, to avoid harming the relationship, China omitted Maoist reform ideas in subsequent bilateral dialogues (Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).
https://saxafimedia.com/the-case-for-the-independent-statehood-of-somaliland/
When Said Barre took power in 1969, China started to promote the idea of China as a leader of all developing nations. Having its own history of anti-colonial struggle and underdevelopment, and being an ‘old civilization’ China had a more legitimate reason to cooperate with African countries than the west (Strauss 2009, p. 779). The relation with Somalia was reinforced by the fact that Said Barre’s political philosophy was already inspired by ‘Scientific socialism’ during Soviet military trainings, which followed the ideas of Karl Marx. He mixed the implementation of this ideological thought with several typical Chinese reforms, such as the road-building and the re-education of his people. To improve bilateral relations, China started to provide economic assistance and aid in the form of non-military funding for various projects (Van Dijk 2009, p. 9; Shambaugh 2011). China’s aid started to bear fruit, and as a formal reimbursement for its acquired aid, Somalia submitted a motion to the General Assembly of the UN for the restoration of China’s seat in the UN and actively contributed to the needs of the PRC within the UN (Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). And as a result, China regained its seat in 1971.
The relations between China and Somalia in the 1970s can be partially described by how the Chinese media reported on an official state visit of Barre to China in Beijing on May 1972. During this visit, Premier Zhou Enlai spoke about the struggles against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, and he mentioned the social progress that was growing throughout the world. Siyad Barre spoke about the friendly relations between China and Somalia, and he thanked the Chinese government for the aid that was given to Somalia and China’s support for the liberation movements in Africa and the rest of the third world (Peking Review, 1972, p. 4,5). China’s involvement in Somalia during the decades of Siyad Barre’s rule seemed to be thriving, and primarily symbolic and politically motivated.
In 1974, Somalia became the first African country to establish relations with the Soviet Union. In 1976 the Supreme Revolutionary Council transformed itself into the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, which was a one-party government. However, after having just three years of peaceful relations with the Soviets, Siyad Barre made a great strategic mistake in 1977. He had thrown Somalia in an unsustainable conflict that was started by his nationalistic aim to secure the Ogaden plain in Ethiopia, a cherished aim in the pursuit of a ‘Greater Somalia’ of the Somali nationalist movement. However, Ethiopia had recently turned towards Marxism, and garnered support from the Soviets. According to Brind (1983: 76) it has been argued that the Soviet Union favored Ethiopia for it was a better base to maintain power in the region. As a reaction of Barre’s attack on Ethiopia, the Soviets cut their aid to Somalia and Barre’s expansionist aspirations were answered by massive armed support to Ethiopia, by the Soviet Union and of Cuba (Mayall 1978, p. 336). Somalia then converted to the anti-Soviet camp, and ended the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviets a few months later. Now, Barre had hoped to gain US-support instead, but failed to comply with necessary prerequisites for aid. Due to the chaos of war, the lack of financial assistance and a following drought, a severe famine and subsequently more discontent towards Barre’s government spread in the country.
In 1976, after Mao’s death and the Gang of Four was arrested, Deng Xiaoping had started to lead China with a less ideological and more economic view. This clearly impacted its foreign policy, including its view on bilateral relations. Diplomatic relations would become less politically motivated and more focused on development. Deng Xiaoping even had a less radical view on Sino-Soviet relations than Mao had had before. However, the Soviets were no longer leading China’s taste of ‘picking friends’ and the multipolar world order was still considered a real scenario for the future. Especially after the Soviets’ rejection of Somalia’s regime, it seemed to become clear that China was pursuing ideology-free diplomacy and that it found trade relations and mutual development to be more important; China took over the aid projects that the Russians had left behind (Washington Post, 1978), and more official visits from China to Somalia followed. Moreover, two ‘Economic and Trade Agreements’ were signed by the two countries in 1978 and in 1980 on ‘Economic and Technological Cooperation’ and ‘Trade and Payment’, respectively. China’s exports to Somalia consisted mainly of light industrial products; textile; medicine; hardware and small-sized machinery, and China’s main imports from Somali were myrrh; frankincense; and leather. Several cultural exchanges and small-scale health care projects were arranged as well. And up until the civil war in 1990, China and Somalia even retained friendly military relations, which resulted in several military exchanges. Due to the separatist situation in the north, and the various striding and coexisting warlords in central Somalia ruling the country after 1991, the Chinese embassy, its medical team and relevant experts left Somalia, for safety reasons. Despite the physical absence of Chinese officials, China still maintains diplomatic contact with Somalia (FOCAC, Chinese Foreign Ministry 2006).
Online Aiddata, which tracks Chinese aid to Somalia through official media reports, showed that, in 2002, a commercial Chinese exploration ship arrived in Berbera, a northern city in Somaliland, to search the region for oil. The implementation and the present status of this project is however vague, with costs and profits unknown (Coastal Oil Exploration, 2002). Aiddata also showed that China has paid an unknown amount of Foreign Direct Investment to Somalia in 2002 as a means to voice interest in exploring oil fields in Mudug, the central province of Somalia, which lies south of Somaliland. The finding is backed by a report from a local news agency in Somalia, which states that Britain (BP) is now taking the lead in the bid (Mudugmedia 2012).
It is unclear whether China knew there was a possible presence of oil fields in Somalia, and whether that might have influenced its perceptions on its bilateral relations with Somalia. In addition, it is hard to say whether a Chinese oil corporation is commercial or government driven. Many indicators that have been discussed in the methods section have unfortunately been hard to find, due to the opaqueness of China-Somalia relations, and the lack of the registration of their trade exchanges. The Chinese Foreign Ministry website even states that most of the trade between China and Somalia was paid with cash transactions (FOCAC, Chinese Foreign Ministry 2006). However, what can be said about China-Somalia relations is that it has been mostly political and symbolic, especially around the time of Somaliland’s secession.
4.1.4 China’s growing power
Jhazbay (2003, p. 79) and Posner and Yoo (2006, p. 11) argue that Somaliland’s problem lies mostly in its geographical size. It is simply too small to garner the right amount of attention to gain recognition from foreign countries and organizations. They argue that it is even not important enough for a foreign intervention. This might play a part in China’s attitude towards the case. Kreuter (2010, p. 372) argues that secessionist movements in less influential nations must also gain the approval of a powerful nation in order to gain legitimacy. It thus depends on the will and the motives of one powerful nation to receive more attention and support. However, on May 18th 1991, when Somaliland declared its independency from Somalia, China was not seen as a big influential international power yet (Yan 2006, p. 6). In fact, when Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence, China’s international status could have played a part in China’s decision of not recognizing Somaliland and remain loyal to Somalia. Just two years earlier, China had been under great criticism for its violent military reaction to the student protests on Tiananmen Square. China clearly needed support from its existing diplomatic relations within multilateral organizations like the UNSC, the WTO and the IMF (Tull 2006, p. 467). As Somalia had previously helped to regain China’s seat in the UN at the cost of Taiwan, China could not betray this relation for a new state that did not have a seat within the UN or any other international organization, setting aside that this would entirely be against China’s foreign policy principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Currently, China still supports what is left of Somalia’s central government, and has become a big advocate to Somalia’s problems within the UNSC.
https://saxafimedia.com/in-depth-study-obstacles-non-recognition-somaliland-political-legal/
Moreover, in case of a security emergency, China also pays attention to the views of regional bodies before it takes a stance towards the case (Kerr and Xu 2014, p. 2). The relevant regional body in this case, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), predecessor of the African Union (AU), did not agree on Somaliland’s new terms (Jhazbay 2003, p.75). The OAU was established in 1963 as the first supranational organization in Africa to promote the unity of African states by creating one African voice. Next to the coordination and intensification of cooperation between African states in order to raise living standards of Africans, the OAU was there to protect the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of its member states by settling arguments between member states with diplomacy and peaceful negotiations. Unfortunately, the OAU did not have the means or assets to protect its members’ territories in an active manner when disagreement between member states would escalate. Because of this, the former colonial borders, despite their often ill-fated placements, became nonnegotiable for their risk of flaring more unrest (Murithi 2009, p. 91; Williams 2007). Not unexpectedly, the disagreement between the OAU and Somaliland arose over the question whether the official colonial boundaries were set after the act of union between Somaliland and Somalia, or before. According to Somaliland, the country did not part from a pre-independence bond with the south, and therefore did not violate colonial boundaries, all the more since it was even recognized as an independent state in 1960 (Jhazbhay 2003, p. 79). However, as the organization was established three years after both Somaliland and Somalia gained their independence and had merged together, the OAU had no official record of it. The leadership of Somaliland had not explicitly expressed its desire to secede from Somalia yet when Somalia became a member of the OAU.
At the time, China’s political relation with the OAU was not yet officially established. In fact, the African Union was admitted as a full member in the FOCAC in October 2011, yet only as an Observer (African Union, n.d.). However, around Somaliland’s secession the organization being the highest African multilateral organization- had the potential to become a very important actor for Africa, and indirectly also for China’s political and economic relations with African member states. China would have put itself in a risky position if it had questioned the OAU’s adjudication of the matter. Moreover, interfering with their agenda would resemble previous Western ways of cooperation, which did not rhyme with China’s diplomacy of a separate and better non-conditional development model than the West had to offer (Strauss 2009, p. 780).
Bound by its own problems, it was not China that could have changed the international view on Somaliland at the time. The international powers that could have had this influence were constrained by the fact that Somaliland’s secession process did not comply with international law. Moreover, most of the international attention (around the time of Somaliland’s secession) that was directed towards the Horn of Africa was mainly focusing on the civil war; making Somaliland’s case of secondary importance. A World Bank project support graph (Appendix 2) and an IMF balance (Appendix 3) show that all of the running aid projects were canceled and put on hold when the civil war broke out; despite the relative peace in Somaliland, in which aid projects could have worked out as planned.
https://saxafimedia.com/report-au-fact-finding-mission-to-somaliland-says-recognition-overdue/
4.1.5 Conclusion
The fact that China still supports Somalia’s government -despite the fact that it is essentially a failed state- is in line with the fact that China tends not to support secession movements when the secession is not from a former colonial subjection. Furthermore, China supported the former Mogadishu-based government of Somalia since the 1970s, having stable bilateral relations. Somalia actively helped China to regain its seat within the UNSC, and in return China provided unconditional aid (Strauss 2009, p. 780). As the fall of Somalia’s central government was the signal for Somaliland to declare itself independent, which made the secession a simple declaration of independence and not a bilateral one, recognizing it would mean undermining relations with Somalia (Kreuter 2010). China’s ‘Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ made this loyalty towards Somalia practically an obligation.
In addition, recognizing Somaliland could also have consequences for China’s relations with other African counties or official government bodies. From an economic point of view, China had strong aspirations to intensify its political and economical relations with all African countries. An important way of doing this was by establishing a good relation with the OAU (Zhang 2014). As the OAU argued that Somaliland’s secession was illegal, this could have influenced China’s perception on the case. Maintaining a credible and steady foreign diplomacy was a part of that as Strauss (2009) explained.
At present, the chaos the country receded into since 1991 is eminent to the point that it prevents China amongst many others to take a stance on the future of Somalia and Somaliland (Lalos 2011). Therefore, the secessionist case of Somaliland has remained unresolved to this day. Although Somalia’s interim government, the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) expressed to have the same transitional democratic aspirations as Somaliland, but in August 2000 during a conference in Djibouti it became clear that it still fails to take on its duties or even influence the daily affairs of the country (Bryden 2004, p. 28). The TNG only has control in parts of Somalia’s capital Mogadishu. Due to the chaos in the country, larger parts of Somalia are now ruled by clans, pirates and are host for terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab, a fundamentalist Muslim terror group linked to Al-Qaeda (Kreuter 2010, p. 377). Even despite the fact that Somaliland meets all the requirements of international law to become an internationally recognized state and that it already has de facto control over its own territory for more than three decades independent of Somalia (Rich 2009, p. 162).
[su_button url=”https://saxafimedia.com/fine-line-chinese-recognition-case-study-somaliland-and-south-sudan/7/” style=”soft” size=”12″ wide=”yes” center=”yes” text_shadow=”0px 0px 0px #FFFFFF” rel=”lightbox”]CONTINUE READING ON CASE STUDY – SOUTH SUDAN >[/su_button]
