1. Introduction
In much of the literature, the recognition of a (new) country can be seen as the ultimate sign of support from one country to another (Hechter 1992: 267). This recognition, as well as the interpretation of positive international law, can be approached in three different ways: politically, morally, and legally. Based on China’s historic attitude against the secession of Taiwan and its firm and explicit stance against the secession of Kosovo in 2009, it might be that China’s rejecting stance towards secession applies to all cases of secession, both domestic and foreign. China has always remained quite independent from the West in its evaluation of foreign problems and international security issues. It is well known that China holds a strong attachment to the concepts of inviolability of state sovereignty and territorial integrity in its foreign diplomacy, more than any other cultural norms or values (Strauss 2009). However, on July 6th, 2011, China was one of the first countries to recognize South Sudan after its secession from Sudan. This went against China’s former anti-secessionist attitude and its general approach towards it foreign relations. Meanwhile, not far from South Sudan in the Horn of Africa, another strong case for international recognition has remained unanswered for more than two decades: In 1991, Somaliland has withdrawn itself from its former union with Somalia, created in July 1960 after both countries gained independence from their former colonies, Britain and Italy respectively (Farley 2010). Despite Somaliland’s attainments in its democratic and economic development of the last two decades and the seemingly present basic elements of statehood, it still does not enjoy China’s recognition to this day. Even when a constitutional referendum in 2001 reaffirmed the support of ninety-seven percent of the population in favor of independence, China did not react (Eggers 2007). Therefore, the question of this thesis is: ‘what factors explain China’s shift in attitude towards secession in the most recent example of South Sudan, whilst not recognizing the previous secession of Somaliland?’
In this case study, the secessionist initiatives of Somaliland and South Sudan will be examined to determine which factors influence China’s change in its foreign policy with respect to recognition. A closer look will be given to China’s initial view on secessionism, to determine China’s motives against secession. Secondly, China’s increasingly complex and realistic approach to its foreign diplomacy will be used as a critical viewpoint on the two different processes of secession in the case study. Thirdly, an examination of China’s political and economic interests in both countries is utilized to see how this might have affected China’s involvement in both cases. And finally, a wider understanding of China’s growing power in the international arena is necessary to determine if China’s attitude is changing. Other authors have argued that China’s normative attitude in the international arena might be converging towards foreign cultural values (Kerr and Xu 2014; Shambaugh 2011).
This in-depth case study will provide more insight on the weight and relevance of China’s political attitude versus other factors that could have an influence on China’s recognition of a secessionist state. This insight might also contribute to a wider understanding of China’s possible changing position within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), now that its international power is growing alongside its economy.
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