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2. Literature Study

This literature study will consist of three sections. The first part will address China’s view on secession in general. China’s view on positive international law with respect to secessionism and its implications for political recognition will be explained with China’s stance towards domestic secessionist groups. Secondly, China’s growing involvement in Africa will be discussed in chronological order. This involvement will be discussed through a political and economic perspective. And lastly, China’s growing status as a world power is scrutinized for its possible implications for China’s stance towards secessionism.  

2.1 China’s view on secessionism

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A topic of political science literature is to discuss to which extent secessionism differs from the liberation of host states after colonialism. After the wave of decolonization in the 1950s en 1960s, new movements kept emerging, aspiring independence and sovereignty; increasingly based on ethnic recognition or the pursuit of self-determination (Silva 2014, p. 1). These demands for secessionism, defined by Hechter as ‘formal withdrawals from a central political authority by a member unit on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status’ (1992, p. 267), were problematic for the international political system since the separation from a central political authority politically and legally differed from ending the political control from a colonial host state (Kreuter 2010, p. 369). These new claims for independence lacked an international accepted legitimate motive and violated the sovereignty of a host state. Moreover, many constitutions had not yet made specific provisions for such eventual cases of secessionism, so secessionism neither complied nor violated international law (Jamar & Vigness 2010, p. 914; Christopher 2011, p. 126). The question remained when a state was justified to call itself a state for others to recognize.    In October 1970, all members of the UN General Assembly, including the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, adopted the Friendly Relations Declaration in the UN Charter, which implied that the principle of self-determination from then on was to be perceived as a human right under international law1 (General Assembly resolution 2625). Consequentially, the right for self-determination was no longer an entitlement exclusively for post-colonial states, but a human right for all people (Vidmar 2012: 544). At that time, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had no seat in the United Nations, after the US-supported Kuomintang (KMT) had fled China’s mainland for Taiwan in 1949 when the Communist Party of Mao Zedong had won the Chinese Civil war. Therefore, the PRC could only disagree and protest from a distance with the newly adopted resolution, including its so-called ‘fundamental principle’ of self-determination for all. The KMT had renamed Taiwan the Republic of China, which already had had a seat in the UN before the war. Backed by the US, it claimed to be the only legitimate government of China after the war, despite the fact that the PRC already ruled over China’s mainland by then. Not surprisingly, when the PRC eventually became a member of the UN in 1971, taking over the former seat of the ROC a year after the declaration was signed, it quietly agreed upon the Friendly Relations Declaration as only being legitimate in cases of self-determination after colonial subjugation, the argument being that the declaration was written in the historical context of decolonization (ICJ 2009). In addition, the final paragraph of the declaration underlined the importance of sovereignty, which would function as a political disclaimer for China from thereon.

Claiming the right for self-determination or independence are however not the end of a successful secession process. To be just ‘independent’ is not an entitlement under international law (Vidmar 2012, p. 544-545). It is the notion of a state according to the Westphalian state principles –which are still embedded in the international system- that remains the highest ultimate authority in the international system (Silva 2014, p. 13). How to define a state, has been agreed upon in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, during the Seventh International Conference of American States in 1933. Article 3 of the convention, known as the declarative theory of statehood, stated –much like the later UN Charter- that political existence of a state was independent of recognition by other states (Montevideo Convention, 1933, Article 116). However, according to the historically far longer institutionalized constitutive theory of statehood, a state becomes a legal person once other states recognize it as such (Kreuter 2010, p. 366). Diplomatic external recognition is thus fundamental to become a legal state in the modern state system (Rich 2009, p. 159).

However, there are different forms of secessionism to which the international rules apply on different levels. Kreuter (2010, p. 370-371) summarizes these different forms or methods of secession as follows:

  1. The first method is the use of domestic law to secure secession. This is also known as bilateral secessionism. It is a clear expression of democratic will by those wishing to secede, which is answered through peaceful negotiations between the secessionists and the parent country. This form of secessionism is often answered by international recognition. Unfortunately, in reality, in many cases the parent state is not willing to negotiate the wish for independence. And so, bilateral secessionism is often simply impossible due to conflicting opinions and sometimes even violent situations. Therefore, many secessionist movements have not been recognized by the international community and have encountered international condemnation and even diplomatic and military interventions opposing their aim (Christopher 2011, p. 126).
  2. The second method of secessionism is unilateral secession. This form is justified when those wishing to secede are “a people”, when they were subject to serious violations of human rights at the hands of the parent state, and when no other remedies were available to them. Here, the recognition of the secessionist case clearly relies on a more moral consideration (Rubin 2000). In a way, the state of Israel could be an example of this.
  3. One can also speak of simple declarations of independence. This can occur without negotiations or without the blessing of the parent state. Such de facto secession is the most difficult to justify in the international arena. The only possibility for justification in that situation occurs through recognition of the secessionist state by other nations. However, external recognition in this case is often more politically motivated than it is legally supported since no legal framework applies to the undermining of a sovereign country (Kreuter 2010, p. 372).

2.1.1 China’s domestic situation

When China became a member of the UN in 1971, it ensured its newly gained recognition and prohibited the recognition of Taiwan by confining all UN Members to acknowledge the ‘One China’ principle. This implies recognizing the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and recognizing Taiwan as a province of China (Zou 2005; Williams 1998). It is plausible that China’s sensitivity towards self-determination and the recognition of secession thus originally stems from its struggle for its own international recognition between 1949 and 1971. However, many argue that its domestic issues with separatist regions in Xinjiang and Tibet were and still are a great motivation for its rigid and negative stance towards secessionism as well (Alden 2007; Zhu and Blachford 2005).

Xinjiang, the most vast province in China’s North East has been concurred by the Chinese in 1945 for different geopolitical reasons (Bovingdon 2010, p. 11; Ong 2005). Currently, the region is principally in the news for the terrorist attacks that are conducted by separatist Turkish Uyghurs. Due to the increasing population of Han Chinese moving into the area, which was originally inhabited by Uyghur people, and the strict rule by the Chinese government and its harsh treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang, many Uyghur feel oppressed and discriminated for their ethnic background. This has led to a somewhat unorganized movement within the Uyghur population that aspires an Uyghur nation, independent from China. Most Uyghur aspire to a peaceful secession, whereas just a small younger group put their hopes in gaining independence through more violent acts. Both the Uyghurs themselves as the Chinese government thus condemn these attacks (Yee 2003; Bovingdon 2010).

            As for the Tibetans, who were independent from China until the end of Chinese civil war in 1950, similar cultural and religious differences lead to violent oppression, destruction of monasteries, including a ban of Buddhist religion and of Tibetan cultural values. Zhu and Blachford (2005, p. 247-249) underline that for both these cases, next to the secessionist aspirations, the attributes and distinctive elements of the ethnic groups such as their internally homogenous cultures, languages and traditions, enforce the perceptual threat to the central Chinese government. Since the Dalai Lama, leader of the Tibetan Buddhists, has always answered this oppression with peaceful non-violent protest since the 1960s, China has been heavily criticized in the international arena for its violations of human law. For this, China responded by stating that the issue of human rights is an internal affair of a country, which should be addressed only by the government of that country. In addition, it very much promotes common ground and promotes claims of inclusivity as a tactic to curb negative attitudes. Both Xinjiang and Tibet are now part of “the great family of the Chinese nation” (Bovingdon 2010, p. 45). China has been implementing special policies in both ethnic regions; enforcing both Tibet and Uyghurs to work together with Han Chinese in local autonomous government cadres.

            Meanwhile, since 2005, China has also faced considerably more difficulties with the political “secession” of Taiwan. As a reaction to the government in Taiwan, which is increasing its pressure and determination to secede officially from the mainland, the PRC enforced an unprecedented Anti-Secession law in 2005, directed against Taiwan. This would make Taiwan’s further efforts to secede from China, not possible under PRC’s law (Zou, 2005). China has namely stated that it will use military force to prevent Taiwanese independence, as this is included in the anti-Secession law (Posner and Yoo 2006, p. 3).

            Prior cases of domestic secession may illustrate that China’s recognition of a seceded state is eminently a politically sensitive consideration, which China backs with its own interpretation of relevant legislation (Mancini 2008, in Christopher 2011, p. 127; Kreuter 2010). China’s most radical answer to its domestic secession regions is making secessionism illegal by constitution. However, as the UN Charter is a very relevant international legislation that also applies to China’s domestic situation, as well as for secessionist cases abroad, the following hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 1: China’s attitude towards secessionist cases abroad is influenced by its stance towards the Friendly Relations Declaration of the UN Charter.

2.1.2 Principles under discussion

Previous cases of China’s domestic secessionist movements are thus believed to influence China’s foreign policy in relation to secessionism. Despite the fact that China’s foreign policy formulations remain opaque, it holds on to guiding rules called the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. These principles were originally formulated to solve a trade dispute in the Tibet area in 1954, and consequentially became the guidelines for Beijing’s relations with India (Taylor 2006, p. 68). But by the 1970s these principles were applied to China’s relations with all states. They foremostly stress the importance of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.   

  Despite the fact that these principles are addressed as cornerstone policy, they are under constant discussion within China’s domestic discourse when applied to the question whether China should become engaged in international affairs and to what extent China has a responsibility in the international arena. Shambaugh (2011) distinguishes seven different lines of thought that have emerged in the discussion during recent decades, which are: the Nativists, Realists, Major Powers, Asia First, Global South, Selective Mulitlateralists, and Globalists. China’s Nativists for example distrust international institutions and think China should withdraw itself from many of them in order to preserve China’s identity. The Globalist school on the other hand of the spectrum, believes China should cooperate and contribute to global issues just like other major powers. This dynamic discourse mainly takes place on the Internet amongst Chinese netizens. Despite the fact that most foreign policy decisions are made without taking into account this public opinion, Chinese officials know that dissatisfaction amongst the public can instigate critic on the Party’s ability to rule (Jakobsen and Knox, (2012, p. vii). In fact, it has happened several times that leaders were constrained in their actions by the public when issues related to Taiwan and Tibet came under international attention.

            However, not only unofficial circles, but also semi-officials (who?) and official circles are actively debating China’s new opportunities, risks and responsibilities. China’s short- and long-term policies have never been a product of one specific model, but always have been formed by compromises amongst elites, bureaucrats, and interest groups (Kennedy 2010). However, on a government level, China’s official policy lines through which foreign policy were always conducted have become even more fractured. Initially, the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee was perceived as the highest decision-making organ of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in relation to foreign policy. However, its agenda and deliberations are not made public and neither do they have an official policy portfolio, which makes every new agenda point subject to different interested actors (Jakobsen and Knox 2012, p. 15). This has instigated an increasing, new voice of the re-emerging People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which propagates the need for a more aggressive stance to protect China’s interests (Jakobsen and Knox, 2012, p. vii).

            Shambaugh (2011) calls this the realist front or realist school of thought, which is the most popular and widespread voice or school of thought within China’s domestic discourse today. Realism is deeply rooted in China’s way of thinking. Like other realists, they regard the nation-state as the unit of analysis and they reject all arguments that challenge the transcendence of national borders. State sovereignty is considered sacred. Moreover, Western arguments that China should be more involved in global management are perceived as a pitfall in which China has to give up a share of its resources and potentially even slow down the pace of its growth. Although the Realists are pessimistic about China’s external engagements, they also do not want China to be isolated; just clearly defined national interests, as a domestic issue to be protected.  

In other words, as granting diplomatic recognition is more a political consideration in the case of unilateral secessionism, it thus depends to what extent a nation believes that countries can interfere in other countries’ businesses; and, to what extent state sovereignty is an unchallengeable concept. China’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ and the dynamic domestic discourse related to these principles are important indicators for China’s stance towards sovereignty, and indirectly for its stance towards secessionism. Also, China’s more Realistic way of approaching its foreign relations, with an increasing ‘hardline realist’ voice from the PLA, may change its prerequisites of granting official recognition or not.

Hypothesis 2: China’s attitude towards secessionism is indirectly influenced by its principles of sovereignty and non-interference.

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